Transatlantic dispute settlement: Two-level games and the Helms-Burton Act. by Perl, Shoshana
1Transatlantic Dispute Settlement: 
Two-Level Games and the 
Helms-Burton Act
Shoshana Perl
London School of Economics and Political Science
PhD in International Relations
June 2005
UMI Number: U202327
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U202327
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
FI 0 (a 1 f
Abstract
2
This empirical study examines the question o f why the United States persisted in enacting 
unilateral sanctions during the 1990s, given the increasing constraints, particularly by the 
European Union, in trade and investment policy. It selects the Helms-Burton Act o f 1996 
as its case study, a bill that not only tightened the long-standing American embargo against 
Cuba, but also incorporated extraterritorial aspects that purported to regulate third 
countries' legitimate rights to trade with that island nation. The European Union was 
particularly disturbed by the bill's extraterritoriality, and took the decision to request a 
WTO Dispute Settlement Panel. Out o f concern that their dispute may irreparably damage 
the fledgling WTO, Washington and Brussels embarked on lengthy bilateral negotiations 
that resulted in an accord that suspended the WTO panel. As the United States did not 
implement the requisite changes to Helms-Burton, the agreement remains inchoate.
This thesis argues that Helms-Burton was a particularly ill-conceived piece o f legislation. 
It strives to understand why the United States acted in this irrational manner by opening up 
the 'black box' o f the state to examine internal constraints on the formation o f foreign 
policy. Putnam's two-level game provides the analytic framework within which the thesis 
evaluates the simultaneous responses o f domestic (Level II) and international (Level I) 
influences. The thesis investigates the domestic American politics that led to the passage 
o f Helms-Burton, and the intergovernmental tensions at play in the EU's decision to 
request a WTO panel, both Level II. It then examines the protagonists' strategies at the 
Level I international bargaining table, where statesmen are simultaneously constrained by 
what other nations will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify. It 
concludes with an analysis o f how the EU successfully overcame its Level II national 
preferences to ratify the agreement, whilst the US defaulted. This thesis argues that 
Brussels' mounting o f a WTO action was crucial in bringing the United States to the 
negotiating table and that the EU won the greater gains in these negotiations.
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5Introduction 
Research Problem
i L
The United States passed the Helms-Burton Act on 12 March 1996, hardening the 
long-standing embargo against Cuba. On 5th August 1996, Washington passed the Iran- 
Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), designed to deny Western technology in developing oil 
and gas resources to these countries. Both acts encompassed extraterritorial aspects, 
insofar as both sought to extend American sanctions to third countries' legitimate rights 
to engage in commerce and trade. This research project has chosen to focus on the 
Helms-Burton Act, as it was arguably a more problematic bill; ILSA targeted rogue 
countries that posed terrorist threats internationally, whereas Helms-Burton targeted 
Cuba, a poor, inconsequential country struggling under one o f the last communist 
dictatorships in the post-Cold War world.
American foreign policy during the Cold War was overwhelmingly constrained by 
security concerns that relegated other interests to the back seat. Containing 
communism demanded multilateral cooperation and the building o f strategic alliances 
to protect the West, sacrificing personal short-term gains for the collective good. In this 
respect, the US laboured single-mindedly, establishing the IMF to promote monetary 
cooperation, creating the NATO military alliance, financing the Marshall Plan to aid 
economic recovery in Europe, and promoting GATT to liberalise international trade.
The 1990s unipolar world that witnessed the rise o f American unilateralism, particularly 
in the field o f economic sanctions, represented a significant departure from US foreign 
policy o f the previous fifty years. Samuel Huntington argues that the removal o f the 
communist threat to the dearly-held American principles o f liberty and democracy 
forced the US to re-define the national interest. Mighty institutions created in the Cold 
War were "redirected to serve narrow subnational, transnational and even nonnational 
purposes." American foreign policy increasingly became one o f "particularism 
increasingly devoted to the promotion abroad o f highly specific commercial and ethnic 
interests." Huntington quotes James Schlesinger saying that the US did not have a
6coherent foreign policy, rather a "stapling together" o f various objectives sought by 
domestic interests. (Huntington 1997: 37-48)
While not quite the isolationists of the interregnum years, Americans turned their 
attention inwards, preferring to focus on more immediate domestic concerns o f  crime, 
education, healthcare, and the economy. A 1998 survey by the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations found that, when asked to cite current problems facing the US, foreign 
policy was never mentioned; the most common response (21 percent) to identifying 
foreign policy issues was "don't know." Harvard's Stephen Walt links America's 
overwhelming preponderance to a loss o f interest in foreign issues and the public 
perception of favourable times, as reflected in the 1994 Congress, whose "disdain for 
foreign affairs is almost gleeful." (Walt 2000: 65) Clinton won re-election in 1996 solely 
on domestic issues, providing a startling measure o f American indifference to the world 
in his second inaugural speech, where he spoke for twenty minutes, but hardly mentioned 
foreign affairs at all. (Briscoe 1997)
Walt argues that America's declining interest in foreign affairs necessarily increased the 
influence o f special interest groups. In the absence of any major threat, pandering to 
partisan politics and narrow interest groups ensures their support whilst not antagonising 
other voters. He concludes that, rather than blaming Clinton for failing to set clear 
foreign policy priorities, these perceived failings are attributable to Washington's 
"unusual international position and the political incentives this position reinforces." 
(Walt 2000: 66)
Finally, the 1990s witnessed an accelerated decentralisation and fragmentation along 
bureaucratic and institutional lines. The Founding Fathers' distrust o f government led 
them to fashion a government designed to encourage deliberation, with separation o f 
powers and checks and balances restricting capabilities, slowing down a government 
designed not to govern. The absence o f any clear national threats in the 1990s 
encouraged a recalcitrant and fractious Congress; the President found it increasingly 
difficult to act purposefully and to actualise his preferences in the face o f determined 
opposition.
7Thus the 1990s were difficult and uncharted waters for American foreign policy-makers 
who struggled to define a new focus in the absence o f a clear threat, while domestic 
interests took advantage o f the resulting void to pursue their own agendas. This thesis 
argues that American domestic interests, while always a leitmotif in foreign policy 
decision-making, rose to prominence in the unipolar world o f the 1990s. The Helms- 
Burton Act o f 1996 encapsulated Washington's rather cavalier attitude to and carefree 
disregard of foreign interests in that decade.
Historical Context
The United States and Cuba have long had an ambivalent relationship. Their physical 
proximity, with Cuba only ninety miles from the Florida coast, has bound the two 
countries together in an intimate, psychologically charged love-hate association. 
Although attempts to buy Cuba from Spain in the nineteenth century, propelled by 
American visions o f 'manifest destiny,' were not successful, the Republic o f Cuba was 
born in 1902 under the American eagle, as the US implemented the Platt Amendment, 
under which Washington reserved the right to intervene in Cuban affairs to maintain 
stability. Cuba increasingly fell under American commercial and cultural hegemony; 
Cuban prosperity depended on American technology, capital and markets, despite 
American policies that discouraged anything but a sugar monoculture. Cuban elites 
often held dual-citizenship and sent their children to American universities; their 
adoption o f American baseball in 1874 symbolised their affinity for 'enlightened' and 
modern North American culture.
By the 1950s, Cuba had the highest standard o f living in Latin America after Venezuela, 
but suffered under the double burden o f a politically corrupt regime that was culturally 
and economically dependent on Washington. Wealthy Americans tourists enjoyed the 
Cuban playground, where gambling was legal and tax laws notoriously lax. The 
American presence in Cuba was so blatantly associated with preserving the status quo o f 
the propertied classes that anti-Americanism spread amongst intellectuals, nationalists, 
and workers. Fidel Castro rode to victory in 1959 on the romantic nationalism o f the
8nineteenth century to which was added a strong twentieth century anti-American 
component as revolutionaries were increasingly convinced that national self- 
determination could only be fulfilled by severing all links with the United States. 
Indeed, children marched daily in the streets, clad in red berets and red neckerchiefs, 
chanting, “Uno, dos, tres, cuatro, Cuba si, Yanquis no, Cuba si, Yanquis n o ...” (Eire 
2003:269)
Castro's initial liberalism attracted a degree o f foreign admiration before the revolution 
gave way to rigid central control, censorship and large-scale nationalisation o f private 
property. The escalating American embargo against Cuba began in the summer o f 1960; 
American oil refineries in Cuba refused to refine Soviet oil, leading to their 
nationalisation and Washington reducing Cuba's sugar quota. When Washington 
cancelled Cuba's sugar quota, Castro expropriated all remaining American property, 
worth $1 billion. The US imposed a total embargo on exports to Cuba in October 1960, 
followed by a ban on imports in early 1962. The entrance o f a 'white knight' 
substantially offset the deleterious effects o f a total embargo by a powerful and once- 
important trading partner; Moscow effectively neutralised Washington's embargo by 
purchasing Cuban sugar at five times the world price, and supplying Havana with 
heavily subsidised Soviet oil. The deepening o f the Cold War and the discovery o f 
Soviet missiles in Cuba in late 1962 intensified American antipathy, transforming Cuba 
into a national security threat on America's doorstep. Washington imposed a freeze on 
all Cuban assets under the Trading with the Enemy Act in July 1963.
The collapse o f the Soviet Union in 1989 left Cuba bereft o f support, and forced Castro 
to liberalise his command economy sufficiently to attract foreign investment. Many 
American policy-makers were inclined to ease Washington's hard-line Cuba policy with 
the end o f the Cold War. Eager to open commercial links with Havana, corporate and 
agricultural interests lobbied for moderating the embargo. Although the Republican 
capture of Congress in 1994 made modification of Washington's Cuba policy difficult, 
there remained a palpable feeling that the Clinton administration was predisposed to 
slowly open the door to normalising relations with Cuba after the 1996 elections.
On the other hand, there were hard-liners, prominent among them the highly politicised 
Cuban-American exile community, who saw the Cuban economic distress engendered by
the loss o f Soviet support as an opportunity to hammer the final nail into Castro's coffin. 
Senator Jesse Helms and Congressman Dan Burton introduced their bill in early 1995, 
intended to hasten Cuba's economic collapse by toughening the embargo. Helms-Burton 
faced stiff opposition in the Senate, resulting in the Senate and House passing different 
versions o f the Act, and necessitating a conference, where all presumed the bill would 
languish. Castro's shooting down o f two American civilian aeroplanes in early 1996, 
killing all four Cuban-Americans on board, propelled Helms-Burton into law.
The Helms-Burton Act
Helms-Burton extended the American embargo and put into law all existing economic 
sanctions against Cuba. This 'codification' o f the embargo removed an important 
presidential prerogative, revoking his authority to lift the embargo and granting this right 
to Congress, which has traditionally been very sensitive to the most conservative 
elements in the Cuban exile community. Furthermore, the bill laid out a number o f 
extremely strict criteria that must be met by a post-Castro Cuban government for the 
embargo to be suspended, including the establishment o f an independent judiciary and 
free trade unions. Most provocatively, Helms-Burton targeted foreign companies that 
acquire or otherwise 'traffic' in Cuban properties that were expropriated from their 
American owners without compensation. Such firms could become subject to lawsuits 
brought by American claimants to the expropriated properties, and their executives could 
be denied entry visas to the United States under this extraterritorial legislation.
Having universally condemned Castro's brutality in killing civilian pilots, the 
international community diverted its anger from Cuba to the US. The European Union 
(along with Canada and Mexico) expressed dismay at the unilateral nature of the 
measure, particularly in view of the recent initiatives promoting consultation in matters 
o f mutual interest.1 Specifically, the EU argued that Helms-Burton was inconsistent with 
widely accepted principles o f international law, contradicted WTO rules and OECD 
codes, and would jeopardise the reputation o f the US as a safe market for foreign
1 The New Transatlantic Agenda was signed in December 1995. (Fuller discussion in chapter 7)
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investment. Furthermore, prosecuting American allies would do nothing to further the 
bill's stated objective o f promoting democracy in Cuba. (Santer 1996b)
The European Union acted on two levels to combat the extraterritorial reach o f the 
Helms-Burton Act. Internally, its Council o f  Ministers passed a 'blocking action' in 
October 1996 to challenge Helms-Burton: any European company cited by the United 
States was to ignore the charges, was prohibited from co-operating with the 
investigations, and could counter-claim any penalties in European courts. Externally, 
Brussels requested a World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Panel in late
i L
1996. Bilateral negotiations led to a suspension o f the WTO action on 18 April 1997, 
as Washington and Brussels agreed to hold further talks to settle their differences; the 
United States meanwhile pledged to take no further action against European companies 
under the Helms-Burton.
In May 1998, the US and the EU reached a comprehensive agreement, abandoning the 
WTO hearing. President Clinton agreed to amend Helms-Burton so that all 
extraterritorial provisions would be subject to presidential discretion, further pledging 
not to prosecute any European companies under this legislation. Brussels agreed to 
exercise more caution in future investments in Cuba, to ensure that they were not 
expropriated American assets and to compile protocols protecting investments 
worldwide. The 15 member states o f the EU ratified the agreement, but the US 
defaulted. As of 2005, Congress has not amended Helms-Burton and the EU has not 
implemented its investment disciplines. There is a de facto  truce as no European entity 
has been prosecuted under Helms-Burton (although two British citizens remain excluded 
from the US), but de jure , the Helms-Burton episode remains unresolved.
Research question and hypothesis
Helms-Burton was problematic in manifold ways. Firstly was the substantive 
consideration o f whether the law was likely to achieve its purpose o f internationalising 
the embargo and toppling Castro. Why would the international community suddenly 
adopt Washington's embargo policy in 1996 when it had never felt inclined to do so
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before? What indication did Washington have that increasing the suffering o f ordinary 
Cubans would overturn a communist dictatorship, especially when over forty years o f 
asphyxiation had not succeeded? Did the Washington establishment ever consider 
offering 'carrots' instead of'sticks'?
Secondly, why would the US deliberately enact legislation that jeopardised significant 
national interests in maintaining good relations with important allies and trading 
partners? Surely Washington anticipated the international outcry against Helms-Burton's 
extraterritorial provisions? Was domestic pressure in a presidential election year so 
strong as to override rational legitimate international considerations?
In a wider context, Helms-Burton represented an acceleration o f the 1990s trend to 
employ unilateral economic sanctions as a tool o f foreign policy. This was disturbing, 
not only on a commercial level, but because it showed Washington's preference for 
unilateral action over engagement in multilateral institutions. Furthermore, in ignoring 
the reproach o f the international community, the US was displaying an arrogant 
disregard for international law that was worryingly misplaced in an increasingly 
interdependent world. Why did the United States persist in enacting unilateral economic 
sanctions in the 1990s, given the increasing constraints, particularly by the European 
Union, in trade and investment policy?
Finally, how should the countries involved in commercial activities targeted by Helms- 
Burton have defended themselves when confronted with an onerous bill that infringed on 
their sovereign rights? Was the WTO the correct venue to adjudicate the dispute, and 
was the institution robust and mature enough to withstand the consequences o f the 
American threat to ignore the ruling? Given the American disdain for the Panel, did the 
EU unnecessarily jeopardise the authority o f the fledgling organisation by pursuing the 
case? Was the EU's WTO threat substantive or merely tactical?
These three broad areas address American domestic preferences vis-a-vis Cuba, 
American unilateralist tendencies, and the defensive options open to the European 
Union. The first two questions raise concerns over the rationality o f US decision-making. 
Realists assume that states are rational actors; Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) contests
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this axiom and attempts to explain seemingly irrational foreign policy decisions. Realists 
also assume that states are unitary actors, whilst FPA opens up the 'black box' to examine 
relations within the decision-making apparatus, and how they affect outcomes. FPA 
links the micro level o f domestic politics with the macro level o f the international system 
in seeking to understand foreign policy decisions. (Light 1994: 93-94) This thesis is 
firmly in the FPA camp, opening the 'black box' to understand how domestic 
circumstances affect transactions between states, and how those transactions affect the 
international system.
The two central questions this thesis addresses are:
1. Why did the United States pass Helms-Burton further toughening an embargo that had 
little chance o f success and including extraterritorial provisions that deliberately 
provoked disagreements with Washington's close allies?
2. How successful was the European Union's strategy o f mounting a World Trade 
Organisation challenge in achieving European aims?
Washington's perception o f Cuba policy as an extension o f domestic policy begins to 
answer the first question. Harvard's Cuba scholar, Jorge Dominguez, argues 
Washington's intense preoccupation with Cuba is the modern-day incarnation o f the 
Monroe Doctrine in the post-Cold War world. Domestic hardliners in both Cuba and the 
US have helped maintain the belligerent policies that characterise US-Cuban relations. 
(J. Dominguez 1997) Many American policy-makers could not understand why the 
Europeans didn't accept American leadership in its natural sphere of influence. (Noriega 
interview) The Economist understood that America's close relationship with Cuba
• • • 9 •meant that "Cuba is always domestic, not foreign policy." Although Washington 
normalised relations with many former Cold War antagonists, Cuba was unique in 
continuing to arouse high levels o f animosity from single-minded pressure groups that 
locked Washington into an unhealthy love-hate relationship that clouded objectivity. 
This thesis argues that Helms-Burton was a particularly ill-conceived and ineffective 
piece o f legislation whose extraterritorial aspects showed alarming disregard for the
2“Survey: The Secret Life o f  the American Embargo -  Dances with Wolves,” Economist 338, 6th April 
1996.
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legitimate commercial concerns o f third parties. Washington ignored significant 
international considerations because Helms-Burton was driven by domestic politics in a 
presidential election year.
With regard to the second question, the European Union sought to demonstrate resolve 
after repeated objections to Helms-Burton fell on deaf ears. This thesis argues that the 
European Union's strategic initiation o f a World Trade Organisation hearing was both 
tactical and instrumental in bringing Washington to the negotiating table, and that it 
resulted in a successful challenge to American unilateralist attempts to undermine 
European sovereignty. It further argues that Washington and Brussels earnestly sought a 
compromise, as both agreed that Cuba was not worth a potentially disastrous showdown. 
(Roy 1997: 91)
Methodology, research design and aim
This research project explores a case study using 'qualitative' methodology, whereby 
inductive logic prevails as information is gleaned from actors, rather than being 
identified a priori by the researcher. Qualitative research is a discursive, comprehensive 
account of an event using in-depth interviews and analysis o f historical materials. The 
research design encompasses four components: the research question, theory, data, and 
interpretation o f the data. (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 4-13)
The research questions and the hypotheses have already been established. As the core 
questions demand both domestic and international level explanations, this thesis will 
combine these two levels o f analysis by using Robert Putnam's two-level game 
metaphor. Putnam essentially argues that diplomats bargain at two levels concurrently, 
negotiating international agreements and seeking domestic ratification. Diplomatic 
strategies are constrained simultaneously by what foreign nations will accept and by 
what domestic constituencies will ratify. Putnam's analysis attempts to move beyond the 
simple acknowledgement o f the effect o f domestic politics on international bargaining to 
provide a dynamic framework within which one can analyse the simultaneous responses 
o f domestic and international influences.
The aim of this thesis is to focus on the international negotiations and explain why the 
EU strategy in challenging the US at the WTO was primarily responsible for defusing 
the Helms-Burton dispute peaceably. Furthermore, although the EU was criticised for 
allowing the WTO Panel to lapse instead o f forcefully pursuing its case, this thesis 
argues that the EU won the greater gains in this dispute with Washington. As such, this 
thesis justifies the EU's decision to negotiate bilaterally and conclude an agreement 
rather than doggedly pursue the dispute at the WTO.
This thesis will use the analytic framework of the two-level game to investigate:
American and European domestic preferences that underpinned the passage and the 
reaction to Helms-Burton (Level II)
The bilateral international bargaining that defused the dispute (Level I)
European domestic constraints that were overcome to ratify the agreement while 
the US defaulted (Level II)
Academic studies o f the Helms-Burton dispute have focused either on more narrow 
aspects of the dispute, such as legal treatises analysing extraterritoriality under 
international law, or economic interpretations o f the investment protocols, or on a wider 
analysis, evaluating world-wide responses to the legislation. This thesis focuses 
specifically on the transatlantic dispute provoked by Helms-Burton, and proposes to use 
the two-level game framework to analyse the international negotiations necessitated by 
the European Union's WTO challenge to Helms-Burton. This approach will fill a gap in 
the research that should prove valuable in providing a greater understanding o f the 
dispute by considering how domestic preferences and international pressures 
reverberated upon each another. This research has resonance for students o f Foreign 
Policy Analysis and economic sanctions policy, as well as for the wider field o f 
International Relations, and for anyone interested in gaining a better understanding of 
transatlantic trade relations in the 1990s.
Putnam's model demands data on the Level I international negotiations, and the Level II 
o f both the US domestic constituency and EU national preferences. Official documents, 
congressional proceedings, speeches, academic journals, books and newspaper articles
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were helpful but limited, as high-level negotiations take place in secret. The major 
research tool in accessing new data was elite interviews with policy-makers, diplomats, 
and interest groups on both sides o f the Atlantic, many o f whom disclosed confidential 
information, and consented to being interviewed strictly on the condition o f anonymity. 
These elite interviews were a particularly rich source o f information concerning
• the Level II interaction between the White House and Capitol Hill in enacting Helms- 
Burton
• the Level I talks, especially the EU's internal management o f the negotiations,
• the EU's Level II ratification o f the agreement.
Putnam emphasises the crucial role played by a creative chief negotiator at Level I. This 
research particularly benefited from interviews with the two extremely gifted Level I 
chief negotiators, Stuart Eizenstat for the US and Sir (now Lord) Leon Brittan for the 
EU, who provided valuable insights into their preferences and their respective 
negotiating strategies.
It is possible to glean knowledge about the world around us in social sciences, but that 
knowledge may be somewhat uncertain. (King et al 1994: 6) Furthermore, as a 
qualitative research project is necessarily interpretative, the analysis o f the data can be 
somewhat subjective. This thesis has attempted to honestly report uncertainty and to 
verify the accuracy o f an account through triangulation (Creswell 1994: 158) and 
through requesting feedback from interviewees.
Structurally, rather than consolidating all the data interpretation in one section, this thesis 
prefers to present the narrative and the data collection simultaneously with the data 
analysis. The thesis thus progresses seamlessly from the Level II American constituency 
supporting and opposing the Helms-Burton Act, to the Level II European constituency 
protesting Helms-Burton, to the Level I negotiations over resolving the impasse, and 
back to the domestic constituencies on both sides o f  the Atlantic that grappled with 
ratification, with interpretation and analysis following on the heels o f the narrative.
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The end o f the Clinton Administration in 2000 is the cut-off point for this study for two 
reasons. Firstly, the EU’s Unilateral Statement issued in conjunction with the May 1998 
agreement interpreted the agreement as mandating that the EU's commitments would not 
apply if the US had not fulfilled its obligations by the end o f Clinton's term. As the 
accords contained an in-built deadline for their implementation, it is reasonable to use 
the same time frame within which to analyse this dispute. Secondly, 9/11 re-focused the 
ambiguous American foreign policy o f the 1990s in one devastating moment. National 
security became a primary national concern, as Washington struggled to shape a 
comprehensive response to transnational terrorism. As Washington's foreign policy 
emphasis has changed so completely, the decision to complete this analysis with the end 
o f the Clinton Administration has been reinforced.
Structure of Thesis
This thesis is composed o f ten chapters o f more or less similar length. Chapter 1 
chronicles the events leading to the passage o f Helms-Burton, and examines the 
legislation and its implementation. Chapter 2 presents a literature review of economic 
sanctions, exploring how costs and multilateral cooperation affect outcomes, analysing 
positive and secondary sanctions, and relating all to the American sanctions against 
Cuba. Chapter 3 introduces Putnam's two-level game, the analytical framework upon 
which this thesis is built. It discusses the different levels, the centrality o f win-sets and 
their size, and the importance o f  the chief negotiator before presenting some critiques on 
Putnam's theory.
Chapters 4-6 present the Level II American domestic constituencies interested in Helms- 
Burton, both those supporting and those opposing the legislation. Chapter 4 examines 
the drafting o f Helms-Burton, the fierce debates on Capitol Hill, and the strong White 
House representations against the bill, followed by Clinton's hasty capitulation after the 
shootdown that ensured Helms-Burton's passage. It concludes with a discussion of the 
legal implications o f extraterritoriality and rights granted to Cuban-Americans. Chapter 
5 analyses the main domestic interest group that drove Helms-Burton, the Cuban- 
American hard-liners, exploring their influence in perpetuating Washington's harsh Cuba 
policy. Chapter 6 investigates the formation o f business and agricultural lobby groups as
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a countervailing weight to the Cuban-Americans and examines the sanctions reform 
legislation o f the late 1990s. This chapter concludes with an analysis o f Clinton's 
implementation o f Helms-Burton in the context o f the two-level game metaphor.
Chapter 7 analyses the EU's competence to conduct foreign policy, and presents the 
European domestic Level II constituency that demanded a defence o f European rights in 
the face o f American extraterritorial legislation. Chapter 8 investigates the Level I 
negotiations between Washington and Brussels, exploring the shared win-sets, and how 
the negotiating strategies affected the outcomes before examining the text o f the 
agreements. Chapter 9 analyses the outcomes o f the negotiations as a two-level game, 
focusing on the importance o f an innovative negotiator in facilitating an acceptable 
compromise. It discusses the distribution o f gains from the negotiations, and analyses 
whether Washington's defection could have been prevented. Chapter 10 summarises 
both the main and the secondary arguments o f this research project before making some 
concluding observations.
Chapter 1
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The Helms-Burton Act
"'One reads about the world's desire fo r  American leadership only in the United States, ’ 
one British diplomat observed. 'Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance 
and unilateralism.'" (Huntington 1999: 42)
1.1 The Shootdown
Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) was founded in 1991 by Jose Basulto, a member o f the 
Cuban exile community living in Miami. Its objective was to patrol the often- 
treacherous Straits o f Florida to rescue Cubans trying to reach the American coast. It 
was particularly active in the summer o f  1994, when more than 30,000 desperate Cubans 
fled the island on rafts and small boats in search o f political freedom. The signing o f 
bilateral accords in May 1995 stabilised immigration, so BTTR changed its focus from 
the humanitarian to the political, flying over Cuba and dropping propaganda leaflets 
urging Cubans to oppose the Castro regime.3 Despite formal complaints by the Cuban 
government to Washington, the flights continued unabated, with as many as seven in 
1994-1995.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) report o f the Cuban shootdown
(■ficlaimed that, following a low flight over Havana that released political leaflets on 14 
July 1995, the Cuban government declared its determination to prevent further 
provocative flights, and warned that aircraft violating Cuban airspace may be shot down. 
When BTTR had the temerity to release leaflets over Cuba twice in January 1996, Cuban 
patience was exhausted. Havana, realising that the US government was either unwilling 
or unable to control the pilots, authorised its air force to intercept and shoot down if 
required. (ICAO 1996)
Washington chose to take almost no measures at all against BTTR, despite the fact that 
the Chicago Convention demands all governments ensure that aircraft flying under their
3 “EU Frames Law to Defy US Bill on Cuban Trade,” International Herald Tribune. 3 1st June 1996.
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flag comply with commonly accepted rules o f aviation, such as preventing unauthorised 
entry into foreign airspace. Washington was conscious o f numerous violations o f 
American regulations on the part o f Brothers to the Rescue, including the filing of false 
flight plans, yet did not revoke pilot's licences or ground planes. (W. Smith 1996a: 1-2; 
ICAO 1996), leading the Independent to charge that they operated with the tacit approval 
o f the US government.4 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) claimed to have 
suspended the license o f a BTTR pilot in 1994 and sought to suspend Basulto's pilot's 
license for 120 days for violating Cuban airspace in August 1995. However, the case 
was appealed, and Basulto retained his license, piloting the only plane to return safely on 
that fateful morning.5 (Phillips 1996) The Washington Post reported that the issue o f 
American flights over Cuba had been the topic o f diplomatic concern for months, with 
US officials conceding that Cuba's "legitimate rights" were being violated. (Graham 
1996)
As Cuba knew o f Basulto's earlier ties to the CIA, Washington's failure to curb sorties by 
BTTR provoked great suspicion in Havana. The fact that BTTR were able to operate 
almost with impunity suggested that an official operation might soon be mounted against 
Cuba. Misgiving was further aroused when Basulto was interviewed in January on 
Radio Marti,6 where he readily acknowledged that he had flown over Cuba and 
cavalierly suggested that he may well do so again. The following day, the radio 
commentator taunted the Cuban air force, implying that the economic crisis had led to 
such a deterioration o f the military's capability that they could not respond to the 
incursions o f BTTR. Cuba interpreted these irresponsible comments made on an official 
American radio programme as a dare. (W. Smith 1996a: 2)
On the morning o f February 24, 1996 three Cessnas operated by Brothers to the Rescue 
set off from Miami towards Cuba. Provoked again, Castro fired at the offending aircraft, 
shooting down two o f the planes, and killing all four Cuban-Americans on board. 
Although Washington claimed the planes were over international waters when hit, it did 
acknowledge that at least one o f the planes, and possibly all three, had penetrated Cuban
4 “Keeping Calm over Cuba,” Independent Editorial, 28th February 1996.
5 The FAA belatedly announced strict emergency measures against pilots violating Cuban airspace, 
including immediate forfeiture o f both o f license and aircraft, on 8th March.
6 Radio Marti and TV Marti are financed and operated by the United States Information Agency.
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airspace earlier. Cuba disputed this account, claiming they had the wreckage to prove 
the planes were violating Cuban airspace when shot down. Moreover, Havana air 
control had warned the planes that they were entering Cuban airspace, but Basulto boldly 
replied that they knew where they were, and would continue regardless. (Ibid: 1)
The ICAO report could not "reconcile" the different accounts o f the US and Cuba over 
the planes' position, but it did note that international law demands that states refrain from 
using weapons against civilian aircraft, irrespective o f whether airspace has been 
violated. (ICAO 1996)
What were Castro's motives? Castro's hard-liners argued that the US would never 
respond to goodwill gestures from Cuba and indeed, would not relax the embargo while 
Castro remained in office. Many in Castro's ruling elite were frightened that significant 
improvements in civil rights o f ordinary citizens would compromise their political 
control. Although the Cuban military was principally responsible for the economic 
reforms o f 1993-4, this institution was wary o f concomitant political reform. Finally, 
there were elements in the Cuban power structure that valued the American embargo as a 
scapegoat for all manner o f economic ills, and feared that its removal, with a resulting 
influx o f Americans to the island, would pose a greater threat than the continuing 
embargo. (Gunn 1997: 87) These considerations led Castro to conclude that he had 
nothing to lose, and even stood to gain, by provoking Washington into tightening the 
embargo.
1.1.1 Mobilising Incident
American officials condemned the shootdown as a blatant violation of the Chicago 
Convention on International Airways, which prohibits attacks against civilian aircraft 
under any circumstances. The Convention demands radio or visual communication, such 
as the tipping o f wings, to warn civilian aircraft and escort them back into international 
airspace, none of which Castro did. (White House 1996a) The American authorities 
said nothing about previous penetrations by Brothers to the Rescue o f Cuban airspace; 
the impression given was that the aeroplanes had been on a humanitarian mission, and 
that the Cuban action had come entirely without warning.
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The international community universally condemned the Cuban shooting down o f two 
planes. The United Nations Security Council "strongly deplored" Cuba's actions, 
disappointing US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, who had sought stronger language 
censuring Cuba.7 The European Union had been considering an economic agreement 
with Cuba that would have led to closer trade and investment ties, conditioned on 
political liberalisation. These negotiations were put on hold as a direct consequence o f 
Castro's action.
Initially, President Clinton acted cautiously, announcing restrictions on travel for Cuban
• o t
diplomats and cancelling all charter flights between Miami and Havana. (Clinton 
1996a) The international media praised Clinton for "talking tough but wielding a very 
small stick" in rejecting calls for a military strike, not recalling American diplomats from 
Havana,9 not blocking dollar remittances sent by Cuban-Americans to family members 
on the island, and not cutting phone services. (Dunne and Fletcher 1996)
But the fallout from the shootdown created a "mobilising incident...an event that lifts 
some political constraints blocking action" as Helms-Burton was propelled from the back 
burner to enacted legislation in weeks. (J. Dominguez 1997: 61-63) In the outrage that 
swept the US over Castro's brutality, Congress swiftly passed the Helms-Burton Act, 
leaving President Clinton little choice but to sign the legislation intended to deny Castro 
the foreign investment that had become his regime's economic lifeline. Clinton could 
hardly ignore the Florida primary, with its strong Cuban-American community calling 
for a military response, which was only two weeks away.
1.2 The United States Embargo before Libertad
When Fidel Castro's revolution gained power on 1st January 1959, the US had substantial 
private investment in Cuba, totalling about $2 billion. Castro's initial liberalism soon
7 “US Makes the Best o f  U N ’s Softer Denunciation o f Cuban Downing,” International Herald Tribune. 28th 
February 1996, p. 3.
8 This inconvenienced Americans more than it punished Cuba, for one could still fly to Havana, but only 
via a third country.
9 Independent Editorial, Op. cit. footnote 4.
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dissipated as he began consolidating a Marxist police state, nationalising private property 
and supporting revolutions abroad. The US sought to isolate Cuba through a series of 
escalating trade embargos, culminating in the 1963 comprehensive embargo imposed by 
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, under Washington's Trading with the Enemy Act. 
All Cuban assets in the US were frozen, and American citizens were prohibited from 
engaging in any commercial or financial transactions with Cuba. Travel was forbidden, 
as was sending money to relatives in Cuba, though clandestine remittances were sent 
before legalisation in the 1990s. Criminal penalties for violations were severe; up to ten 
years prison sentence and SI million in corporate fines. (Treasury 1963) This embargo 
had limited extraterritorial effect, principally because its application was restricted to 
American businesses and individuals and foreign businesses owned or controlled by 
American companies. Serious negotiations over compensating Americans for property 
expropriated by the revolution have never been held; Castro has offered limited 
compensation, but this is complicated by counterclaims for damage to the Cuban 
economy caused by the American embargo.10 (Roy 2000a: 63)
Since 1965 the United States has maintained a list of claims by American nationals 
against Castro's Cuba, arising out o f the expropriations that occurred after 1st January 
1959. These claims have been 'certified' by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement 
Commission, which means that there has been a pre-settlement adjudication o f the claims 
by the United States. These certified claims would be included in any compensation 
negotiations with the Cuban government. There were 5,911 claims with a value o f 
almost $2 billion certified through this process by 1970. The Cuban government argues 
that the cost o f the American sanctions, which it estimates at $67 billion, must be offset 
against any American property claims. (Askari et al 158)
Castro benefited from intensive Soviet subsidies worth about $6 billion a year, with 85 
per cent of Cuban trade with the Soviet Bloc in 1988; this largely offset the deleterious 
effects o f the American embargo. The collapse o f communism in 1990 led to a sharp 
contraction in the Cuban economy. GDP declined by almost 50 per cent by 1993;
10 Cuba has compensated other countries whose assets were seized, among them Mexico, Italy, France, 
Switzerland and Britain. See Anita Snow, “Cuba: Long-Ignored Property Claims at Center o f US-Cuba 
Debate” Associated Press 24th August 1996.
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particularly hard hit were the foreign exchange earning sugar and nickel industries, 
suffering largely due the inability to import the fertilizer and fuel crucial to sustaining 
them. (Lisio 1996: 696) This crisis ushered in the 'Special Period', in which Castro 
undertook drastic economic reforms, entailing austerity measures internally, and 
incentives to attract foreign investors, particularly in tourism, leading to 110 joint 
ventures by 1993. Continuing hardship brought further reforms - legalising dollars, 
allowing full ownership by foreigners, and extending opportunities for self-employment.
The economic deprivation suffered by their brethren propelled Cuban-Americans to send 
ever larger remittances to relatives at home; estimates range to over $1 billion by 1999. 
By 2003, Cuba had (quite successfully) made the transition from a highly centralised 
economy to a form o f state capitalism, with state-owned industries increasingly 
decentralised, and more than 300 investment projects planned jointly by foreign 
investors and the government. The cost, however, has been the erosion o f  social 
equality, as there exists a two-tier society: the privileged with access to dollars and 
'dollar stores', and those who are paid in pesos.11 Paradoxically, the educated elite, such 
as doctors and professors, struggle in pesos, while chambermaids and waiters work in the 
dollar economy. Cuba's faltering economy is mainly a result o f an inefficient centralised 
system, and a continuing reliance on a monocrop that places it at the mercy o f the 
vagaries o f weather and world commodity prices, rather than a direct outcome o f the 
American embargo. (Askari et al 111-151)
In order to attract foreign investors in the 1990s, Castro staged an international fire sale 
of the properties he had confiscated in the 1960s. For example, Cuban government 
brochures advertised properties like the "Hermanos Diaz" petroleum refinery in Santiago 
de Cuba. The brochure highlighted the American technology, but failed to disclose that 
the refinery had been confiscated from Texaco in July 1960 (Sanchez 1995: 127). In 
1991 and again in 1993, in reaction to the increasing foreign investment in Cuba, 
American embassies warned foreign companies against investing in Cuban properties 
subject to certified claims by American nationals.
11 Castro abruptly announced an end to the dollar economy in October 2004. See David Adams, "Castro 
Bans the Dollar in Response to American Sanctions," The Times, October 27, 2004, p. 16.
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In anticipation o f Castro's imminent demise with the worldwide collapse o f communism, 
the US strengthened and expanded the scope of the primary embargo through a series o f 
new regulations in the 1990s. These moves were largely supported by Cuban-American 
exiles, who dreamed o f returning to a post-Castro Cuba paradise, by certain American
19 •companies who had much to gain by Castro's fall, and by a conservative, anti-Castro 
Congress. For example, in October 1991 Washington reduced the dollar amount o f 
remittances that could be shipped to close relatives in Cuba. In April 1992 the US 
prohibited the entry into American ports o f vessels engaged in trade with Cuba. In 
October 1992, President Bush signed the Cuban Democracy Act o f 1992, which 
prohibited foreign subsidiaries o f American companies from doing business in Cuba and 
barred foreign vessels that transported goods or passengers to or from Cuba from 
American ports for six months.
Senator Jesse Helms (R/NC) and Congressman Dan Burton, (R/IN) introduced their bill 
to harden the Cuban embargo in February 1995. Heated opposition forced Senator 
Helms to delete the more controversial provisions o f the legislation, resulting in the 
Senate and House approving different versions of the bill in autumn 1995. The bill 
proceeded to a conference committee to reconcile the differences, but most lawmakers 
assumed the legislation would simply fade away.
Support for increasing pressure on Castro was far from universal in the US. Corporate 
America lobbied President Clinton and key congressional leaders for further 
modification o f the Cuban embargo as some restrictions on travel and 
telecommunications were eased. Many American firms undertook 'goodwill' missions to 
Cuba to explore possible future investments pending the removal o f the embargo. (Falk 
1996) The Republican sweep o f Capitol Hill in 1994 made it difficult for Clinton to 
launch any new Cuba initiatives, but there was a feeling that his Administration would 
begin to normalise relations after the 1996 presidential elections. (Brenner and Kornbluh 
1995: 39)
Then Castro shot down two civilian Cuban-American aircraft on 24th February 1996. 
Libertad's conference report was significantly harder on Castro than either o f the
12 For example, Bacardi Rum Corporation, which sought to recover nationalised sugar properties.
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previous House or Senate bills. Despite Clinton's well-documented reservations over the 
bill, the White House and Capitol Hill reached a speedy compromise in late February, as 
all sides wanted to avoid a pitched legislative battle and present a unified front to Castro. 
The only concession granted to the President was limited authority to suspend the right 
o f Americans to file suit in US courts against foreign businesses that 'trafficked' in 
expropriated American assets.
Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act by overwhelming 
majorities - 74 to 22 on 5th March in the Senate and 336 to 86 on 6th March in the House. 
President Bill Clinton enthusiastically signed Helms-Burton into law on 12th March 
1996, making it Public Law 104-114; while Clinton could have continued to express 
reservations, he had little room for manoeuvre, as he was "boxed in by Cuba's 
confrontational tactics and domestic political realities." (Doherty 1996a)
1.3 Text of the Helms-Burton Act
1.3.1 Purposes
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad) stated as its purpose:
•  to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the 
community o f  democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere;
•  to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government;
• to provide for the continued national security o f  the United States in the face o f  continuing 
threats from the Castro government o f  terrorism, theft o f  property from United States 
nationals by the Castro government, and the political manipulation by the Castro 
government o f the desire o f Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United 
States;
•  to encourage the holding o f free and fair democratic elections in Cuba, conducted under the 
supervision o f internationally recognized observers;
• to provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban people in response to 
the formation o f a transition government or a democratically elected government in Cuba; 
and
• to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in 
property confiscated by the Castro regime. (PL 104-114, §3)
Three o f these six purposes detailed American assistance and support for the return o f 
democracy in Cuba, giving the impression o f sincere motives behind the legislation. In 
fact, the bulk of the legislation was devoted to extending and strengthening the embargo 
against Cuba, and to protecting the property rights of American nationals.
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The third stated purpose of the Act implied that Cuba presented a continuing 'national 
security' threat to the United States. Cuba had posed a significant threat to the US during 
the Cold War, particularly when Russian missiles were stationed a mere ninety miles 
from the Florida coast during the Cuban Missile Crisis o f 1962. Cuba was also a force 
for destabilisation in the Western Hemisphere with its promotion o f revolution. 
However, Cuba o f the 1990s was a weak and impoverished nation; a 1995 Pentagon 
report confirmed that Cuba no longer posed a military threat to the US. When challenged 
that Helms-Burton violated fair trade regulations of NAFTA and the WTO, Washington 
responded that Helms-Burton was not a trade issue, but rather an issue o f national 
security; perhaps Washington was preparing to defend Helms-Burton from its inception 
on the national security escape clause o f those multilateral institutions.
The actual body o f the Helms-Burton Act consisted of four 'titles'. Title I contained the 
greatest detail, dealing with the extension o f sanctions against Cuba. Title II focused on 
the transition to democracy in Cuba. Titles III and IV dealt extraterritorially with 
property rights.
1.3.2 Title I: Strengthening International Sanctions against the Castro 
Government
Congress found that the "acts o f the Castro government, including its massive, 
systematic, and extraordinary violations of human rights, were a threat to international 
peace" (§101/1). Therefore, the US intended to seek an international embargo against 
Cuba in the UN's Security Council. (§101/2).
Perhaps the most significant section o f Title I was the 'codification' o f the embargo on 
Cuba:
"Codification o f Economic Embargo: The economic embargo o f  Cuba, as in effect on March 
1, 1996, including all restrictions under part 515 o f title 31, Code o f Federal Regulations, shall 
be in effect on March 12, 1996, and shall remain in effect, subject to section 204 o f this Act." 
(§ l02h )
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Previously, the sanctions imposed on Cuba by Washington were 'executive orders,' 
which could be modified according to presidential discretion. Codifying the sanctions 
meant that they were no longer based on executive orders, but were embedded in law that 
could be modified only by Congress. This had implications far beyond Cuban-American 
relations, weakening not just President Clinton, but the institution o f the presidency 
itself, and setting dangerous new precedents in restricting the president's capacity to 
initiate and direct foreign policy. This may prove to be the most onerous and 
troublesome legacy o f Libertad.
Title I extended and strengthened the embargo against Cuba in a variety o f ways. 
Washington's continued opposition to Cuban membership or participation in the 
Organisation o f American States (§105) or any international financial institution, such as 
the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank (§104a) was noted. Washington 
threatened that if any financial institution approved a loan to Cuba over the opposition o f 
the US, Washington would withhold payment to that institution by an amount equal to 
the amount o f the loan (§ 104b). The US would proportionately reduce foreign aid to any 
country that supported the completion o f the Cuban nuclear facility near Cienfuegos 
(§111), and expressed its strong disapproval o f  Russian support o f the Cuban intelligence 
facility at Lourdes (§106). Title I mandated an annual report by the president to 
Congress on all commerce with and assistance to Cuba from foreign countries, including 
details o f Cuba's trading partners (§108). The importation into the US o f any 
merchandise that was either Cuban in origin or had been transported through Cuba, or 
was even partly derived from anything produced in Cuba was prohibited (§110). 
NAFTA rules o f origin may not diminish the Cuban sanctions programme in any way 
(§110b).
Title I authorised the president to "furnish assistance and provide other support for 
individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy- 
building efforts for Cuba" (§109a). This was meant to include humanitarian assistance to 
victims o f political oppression and their families, and support for democratic and human 
rights groups inside Cuba.
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Finally, Title I condemned the shooting down o f the two unarmed American aircraft, and 
claimed that the planes were shot down well outside the internationally recognised 12- 
mile limit to Cuban airspace. "It is incumbent upon the United States Government to 
protect the lives and livelihoods o f United States citizens as well as the rights of free 
passage and humanitarian missions" (§116a/13). Congress urged the president to seek 
the indictment o f Castro for this act o f terrorism in the International Court o f Justice 
(§116b/3).
1.3.3 Title II: Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba
Title II expressed Washington's support and encouragement for the self-determination o f 
the Cuban people, and promised American material assistance to ease the transition to 
democratic government and to welcome Cuba back into the world of nations. (§201) It 
set out plans for assistance to both the transition government that would lead Cuba from 
a totalitarian dictatorship to a representative democracy, and to a democratically elected 
government. (§202b)
Washington offered a Cuban transition government food, medicine, medical supplies and 
equipment, assistance to meet emergency energy needs (§202b/A) and help to the Cuban 
military to adjust to its new role in a democracy (§202b/C). The US promised to use its 
influence to obtain assistance for Cuba from international financial institutions and 
multilateral organisations (§202e). The economic embargo against Cuba would be lifted 
when the president had determined, and had so reported to Congress, that a transition 
government was indeed in place in Cuba. (§204)
Title II enumerated fairly strict criteria for a transition government in Cuba. It would 
have legalised all political activity (§205a/l), would have released all political prisoners 
(§205a/2), and would have made a commitment to free and fair elections, (§205a/4). 
Moreover, it would have ceased interfering with either Radio Marti or Television Marti 
broadcasts (§205a/5), would have made progress toward establishing an independent 
judiciary (§205a/6/A), would respect internationally recognised human rights
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(§205a/6/B), and would allow the formation o f independent trade unions (§205a/6/C). 
Finally, a transition government would not include either Fidel or Raul Castro (§205a/7).
Once Cuba had a democratically elected government, America would offer financing, 
agricultural assistance, and Peace Corps programmes (§202b/B) and establish a United 
States-Cuba Council to assist in the promotion o f market-based development in Cuba 
and to facilitate the opening o f  bilateral trade between the two countries (§203b). Title 
II's criteria for determining a democratically elected government in Cuba included a 
government elected in free and fair elections (§206/1), supervised by internationally 
recognised observers (§206/1 a), that respected civil liberties and human rights (§206/2), 
and was committed to forming a constitution to secure civil freedoms for future 
generations (§206/4).
Finally, a democratic government would either return or compensate American citizens 
for property confiscated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959 (§206/6). Title 
II concluded that, "the satisfactory resolution o f property claims... remains an essential 
condition for the full resumption of economic and diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Cuba." (§207/d), diluting Washington's altruism by conditioning aid to 
claims settlements.
The democratic requirements mandated by Title II were very rigorous. It is doubtful 
whether any of the newly independent states o f Eastern Europe struggling to move from 
dictatorship to democracy could have met such stringent requirements. Many Cubans felt 
humiliated by American audacity in dictating how they should govern themselves, seeing 
it as a throwback to the Platt Amendment, and consistent with Jorge Dominguez' analysis 
o f US relations with Cuba determined by the Monroe Doctrine. (Roy 2000a: 41) But 
Cuba scholar Mark Falcoff reasons that Title II was specific to counter assertions that 
Castro's tentative economic liberalisation showed that political transition had begun. 
When genuine reform happens, the Cubans would not have to fulfil all the criteria o f 
Helms-Burton, as the thawing o f relations with Washington would develop a momentum 
of its own. (Falcoff 1998c: 97-98)
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1.3.4 Title III: Protection of Property Rights of United States Nationals
Title III declared that the United States Constitution guarantees individuals the 
fundamental right to own and enjoy property (§301/1), and that confiscation o f such 
property is wrong and undermines economic development (§301/2). Castro has trampled 
on the rights of his own people, confiscating their property along with that o f thousands 
o f Americans (§301/3). Desperate for hard currency, oil, investment and industrial 
expertise, Castro was offering foreigners the opportunity to invest in Cuban assets, some 
o f which were confiscated from American nationals (§301/5-6). Washington has warned 
foreign governments against 'trafficking' in confiscated properties as this would 
complicate attempts to return those properties to their rightful owners (§301/7). The 
international judicial system lacked effective remedies for dealing with properties that 
were wrongfully confiscated (§301/8). Washington had an obligation to its citizens to 
protect them from such injustices (§301/10); American nationals should therefore have 
the right of redress through the American courts (§301/11).
Title III granted a 'right o f action,' whereby US nationals may bring lawsuits in federal 
courts against foreign governments, companies and individuals who 'traffic' in 
confiscated property (§302a). To be eligible to sue under Title III, the amount o f the 
claim must exceed $50,000 (§302b). The value o f the property was to be determined by 
either its current fair market value, or its value when confiscated, as determined by the 
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) plus interest, whichever was the greater 
(§302a/l/A). Helms-Burton therefore only applied to substantial claims.
thLibertad took effect immediately when President Clinton signed it, on 12 March 1996. 
However, Title III was expressly due to take effect on 1st August 1996 (§305a), with the 
clear proviso that lawsuits may not be filed until 1st November 1996 (§302a/l/A). 
Furthermore, individuals and companies may only be held liable for 'trafficking' that 
took place after 1st November (§302a/l/A) so that foreign companies that were cited in 
August have a three-month 'grace period' in which to divest from Cuba and avoid 
prosecution.
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Title III provided for two categories o f  claimants. The first category included the 5,911 
American entities whose $2 billion claims had already been certified by the FCSC. This 
group o f claimants could file suit in federal court on 1st November 1996, three months 
after the implementation o f Title III o f the Act (§302a/l/A). The second category of 
claimants consisted mainly o f Cuban-Americans who were naturalised American 
citizens, but who were not American citizens at the time their property was confiscated. 
This group had no claims certification, and was to wait two years, until 13 March 1998 
to file (§302a/5/C).
Finally, Title III granted the President important suspension authority if "the suspension 
is necessary to the national interests o f the United States and will expedite a transition to 
democracy in Cuba" (§305b/l). The President had suspension authority in two key 
areas: he could suspend "the effective date" for a period o f up to six months (§305b/l), 
and he could also suspend "the right to bring an action" for six months, even after the 
Title had taken effect (§305c/l). The President was also granted the right to repeated 
suspensions in both areas o f six months each (§305b/2 and §305c/2). This presidential 
prerogative was the only concession Congress granted to Clinton during the 
consultations between the White House and Capitol Hill over Libertad. Significantly, 
President Clinton applied this division in allowing Title III to take effect, but suspending 
the right to action.
1.3.5 Title IV: Exclusion of Certain Aliens
Title IV provided for the exclusion from the United States o f aliens who 'traffic' in 
expropriated American property after 12th March 1996 (§401 a/2). The broad remit 
affected any corporate officer or shareholder with a controlling interest in a corporation 
that was involved in 'trafficking' in confiscated property (§401 a/3) inclusive o f such 
persons' spouse and minor children (§401 a/4). The only exemption would be granted for 
medical reasons, or for purpose o f defending litigation under Helms-Burton (§40lc). 
Unlike the suspension authority the President gained under Title III, the executive had no 
discretion in the application of Title IV.
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1.3.6 “Trafficking”
The Conference Report that accompanied PL 104-114 specifically emphasised that the 
definition o f 'trafficking' was more proscribed in Title IV than in Title III. Title Ill's 
definition of'trafficking' was (§4/13/A):
A person "traffics" in confiscated property if  that person knowingly and intentionally
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes o f  
confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, 
uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated 
property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking by another person...
Title IV's definition of'trafficking' was (§401/2/a):
A person "traffics" in confiscated property if  that person knowingly and intentionally-
(i) (I) transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes o f  confiscated 
property
(II) purchases, receives, obtains control of, or otherwise acquires confiscated 
property, or
(III) improves, (other than for routine maintenance), invests in (by contribution o f  
funds or anything o f value, other than for routine maintenance), or begins after M arch 12,
1996, to manage, lease, possess, use, or hold an interest in confiscated property
(ii) enters into a commercial arrangement
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from trafficking by another person..."
The bold type (my emphasis) highlights the discrepancies on which the Conference 
Report specifically commented:
• Title III applied to all acts of 'trafficking', but Title IV applied only to new acts o f 
'trafficking' that occurred after enactment o f Libertad, and
• Title IV did not include the sale o f confiscated assets in order to encourage persons 
suspected o f 'trafficking' to divest o f their holdings, and thereby avoid prosecution. 
(Conference Report 1996)
The unusual term 'trafficking' was used deliberately by Congress to link to 'drug 
trafficking' and thus convey a clear moral connotation to what are otherwise routine 
business transactions. (Stern 1997: 21; Roy 2000a: 38)
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1.4 Implementation
The Justice Department published a summary o f  the provisions o f Title III on 17th May 
as mandated in Libertad §302a/8, further clarifying the intent of that title. The guidelines 
on Title III allowed 'traffickers' to divest in order to avoid liability, but only until 1st 
November 1996. This was mandated in Libertad §302a/l, which stated that anyone who 
'trafficked' in expropriated American property in Cuba "after the end o f the 3-month 
period beginning on the effective date o f this title" would be held liable. (Reno 1996)
The State Department issued guidelines for implementing Title IV o f Libertad, on 17th 
June, designating the Office of Cuban Affairs at the State Department as the contact 
point for Title IV determinations. Foreign nationals who were "reasonably" determined 
to have "engaged in... trafficking after March 12, 1996" were to be notified by post that 
their name had been entered on the United States visa and port o f entry lookout system. 
The notice would state that the individual would be denied a visa upon application, or 
have his visa revoked 45 days after the date o f the notification letter. This would allow 
the foreign national the opportunity to divest from 'trafficking' and avoid exclusion. 
(Davidow 1996a) 'Traffickers' retained the freedom to escape liability whenever they 
divested of suspect assets, even after receiving a State Department letter. The State 
Department was implementing the express wishes o f the Congressional Conference 
Report that accompanied Libertad which pointedly defined 'trafficking' more narrowly in 
Title IV than in Title III.
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The State Department sent 'advisory letters' to three firms on 29 May 1996, warning 
that their commercial activities in Cuba may be constituted as 'trafficking', and that their 
executives may be liable to exclusion from the US under Title IV o f Libertad. The letter 
quoted the final words of the Congressional Conference Committee Report (p63); "the 
sale or abandonment o f confiscated property in Cuba for purposes o f disengaging from 
Cuba is excluded from the definition o f trafficking." It concluded that the State 
Department was "developing implementing guidelines for Title IV" and expected to be 
making "determinations" soon thereafter, and that it hoped that the information contained 
in the letter would be "useful" in making decisions concerning Cuban property. The 
State Department said it would not publish a "black list" of the firms it was investigating
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out o f respect to their rights to privacy and out o f concern for "friendly governments" 
who would be affected by this statute. (Burns 1996)
The three companies in receipt of advisory letters were
• STET, the Italian state-owned communications firm
• Grupo Domos, a Mexican communications conglomerate
STET and Grupo Domos were joint venture partners in the Cuban telecommunications 
systems, and allegedly 'trafficked' on property belonging to ITT.
• Sherritt International, a Canadian mining and energy group, who allegedly used
facilities belonging to Freeport-MacMoRan Co o f New Orleans. (Gedda 1996a)
The executives o f these three firms were sent exclusion notices (letters o f 
'determination') in early July 1996. The cited officials faced exclusion from the United 
States with effect 45 days after the date on the letter, the time allowed by Libertad to 
divest themselves of the Cuban properties. Grupo Domos relinquished its stake in the 
Cuban venture due to financial difficulties related to the collapse o f the Mexican peso, 
although Libertad supporters proclaimed it showed the bill was a significant deterrent.13 
STET paid compensation o f some $26m in the summer o f 1997 to ITT for the use o f its 
cables for a period o f ten years. STET's action was characterised as an "immunisation" 
against Libertad, for ITT agreed not to sue STET under Title III and the State 
Department removed STET from its exclusion list, (de Jonquieres and Tucker 1997; 
Kavulich interview) The State Department concluded that the ITT-STET agreement 
"constitutes authorization o f [a] United States national who holds a claim to the property 
consistent with Title IV." It claimed that the settlement reinforced respect for property 
rights and was an incentive to foreigners to seek authorisation from American claimants 
before investing in Cuba. (Burns 1997)
The STET deal highlighted a glaring contradiction in American policy vis-a-vis Cuba, 
severely undercutting the lofty principles o f promoting democracy and respect for civil 
rights that Helms-Burton purportedly espoused. Payments transformed 'traffickers' to
13 “Domos Drops Cuban Phone Stake: Mexican Firm Hit by Sanctions and Financial Problems,” 
International Herald Tribune. 1st July 1997, p 16.
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legal partners o f Castro, embodying the worst American stereotypes and considerably 
weakening Washington's position. (Roy 2000a: 113)
O f the three cited companies, only Sherritt suffered the indignity o f exclusion. Nine 
Sherritt executives and their families were banned from the United States, including two 
prominent Britons, Sir Patrick Sheehy, former chairman o f BAT Industries o f Britain, 
and Rupert Pennant-Rea, former deputy governor o f the Bank o f England and former 
editor o f The Economist. (Martin and Simon 1996) At House implementation hearings, 
Congressman Robert Menendez stated, "Title IV offers companies a clear choice: 
observe U.S. law or have your rights to visit and conduct business in the United States 
revoked. Sherritt has made its choice." (Menendez 1996: 4.)
As o f this writing, the ban is still in force, prompting (Mrs.) Helen Pennant-Rea to write 
to The Times, "I and my children, who have done nothing to offend the US, have been 
banned since 1996. I regard this as most un-American." (Pennant-Rea, 2000). Pennant- 
Rea, when asked whether he had considered resigning from his position at Sherritt, 
answered that it was a matter o f principle to stay the course and not give up, particularly 
when the UK was pressing the US to stop applying Libertad. (Ryle 2001) Did financial 
renumeration more than offset the inconvenience of exclusion from the United States?
Executives o f Grupo BM, an Israeli agricultural company, received advisory letters in 
September 1996. In September 1997, Grupo BM announced a 10-year, $200m project to 
build an office complex in Havana, under a Panama-based subsidiary called Monte 
Barreto, (Fletcher 1997) a move guaranteed to annoy Washington. Grupo BM received 
'letters o f determination' notifying them o f their exclusion from the United States, dated 
13th November 1997, with effect in 45 days time,14 (McClenny 1997) thus joining 
Sherritt in an exclusive club.
The invitation to foreign companies to divest o f their Cuban holdings to avoid 
prosecution under Libertad had some interesting ramifications. Libertad's Title III 
§302a/7 mandated "an action...m ay be brought and may be settled, and a judgement
14 Grupo BM's Miramar trade centre was inaugurated in October 1999. See Pascal Fletcher, "Israeli 
Office Venture is Launched in Cuba," Financial Times. 13th October 1999, p 7.
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rendered in such an action may be enforced, without obtaining any license or other 
permission from any agency o f the United States..." A Cuban-American former 
landowner may sue under Title III, seeking damages from a suspected foreign 'trafficker'. 
The two sides could reach an out-of-court settlement, avoiding prolonged litigation, 
whereby the Cuban-American shares in the profits o f the Cuban joint venture. (Desloge 
1996) John Kavulich o f the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council claimed there was 
a "new cottage industry" in the US. Companies with Cuban claims sought non-US 
companies that wanted to invest in Cuba, sold their claim for a pittance, and then became 
partners in the Cuban joint venture. In addition to STET, Kavulich claimed there have 
been several such quiet deals, away from the public eye, as Libertad permitted private 
settlements. (Kavulich interview) One could have the paradox o f Cuban-Americans 
and certified claimants profiting from Cuban business ventures entirely legally, whilst 
the rest o f corporate America waited impatiently for the embargo to be lifted.
1.4.1 Congressional Constraints
State Department official Michael Ranneberger outlined the procedures his department 
followed in investigating possible breaches of Title III to Congress. He explained that 
his department initially researched certified claimants who had fairly precise documents 
to back their claims, and had already sent "advisory" letters to Sherritt, Domos and 
STET. When they "reached critical mass" and could make a strong case for 'trafficking' 
after 12th March, they issued letters o f "determination." (Ranneberger 1996: 14-15) A 
former US official recalled that administering Helms-Burton was a nightmare because it 
was incredibly difficult to identify cases o f confiscation and build reasonable cases. He 
hinted that there were several companies who were quietly investigated, but were either 
found not to be in breach o f Libertad, or divested to escape prosecution, (research 
interview) Professor Joaquin Roy argues that the State Department lacked data as many 
potential claimants preferred to wait until Title III became effective. (Roy 1997: 94)
State Department official Jeffrey Davidow testified that the May advisory letters had a 
deterrent effect, with a "significant number" o f companies disengaging from Cuba as 
potential investors feared Libertad. He assured a sceptical Congress that more letters of
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determination would be forthcoming. (Davidow 1996b) State Department spokesman 
Nicholas Burns had already cited the Mexican cement company Cemex as having 
informed the State Department that they had terminated their involvement with an 
expropriated American company in Cuba in May. (Burns 1996) Stuart Eizenstat 
maintained that Helms-Burton had "a real chilling effect" on businessmen's attitudes 
towards confiscated property, with a dozen firms having "ceased activities" in Cuba, and 
a further two dozen firms under investigation. (Eizenstat 1997c) He later declared that at 
least a dozen companies had either pulled out o f confiscated property or, like Cemex, had 
suspended plans to avoid falling foul o f Title IV .15 (Eizenstat 1997d) In announcing the 
STET deal with ITT, the State Department claimed "We remain strongly committed to 
vigorous enforcement o f Title IV." (Burns 1997)
Notwithstanding these assurances, the Clinton Administration has implemented Title IV 
exceedingly sparingly, due to substantive political concerns that will be explored in this 
thesis. Grupo BM and Sherritt remain the only companies whose executives are still 
excluded from the United States, despite the evidence that there were some 200 
companies from 26 countries who had commercial dealings with Cuba, many o f whom 
were potentially in violation o f Title IV. (Dodd 1996)
1.5 Suspension
The effective date for Title III was set as 1st August 1996. The complicated waiver 
authority brokered between the White House and Capitol Hill during the conference on 
Libertad, granted the President the following suspension rights:
to suspend the effective date for six months, and to grant further suspensions o f 
six months, if the President determined it was necessary to America's national interests 
and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. (§306b/l-2)
after Title III had taken effect, the President could suspend the right to bring a 
suit for six months, and could make further six-month suspensions, if the necessary 
conditions for suspension were met, as stated above. (§306c/l-2)
13 It was unclear why Cemex reversed its decision, with some suggesting it was due to a sharp drop in its 
share value. See Gedda 1996a.
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Presidential suspension authority had to be exercised by 16th July 1996, fifteen days 
before the effective date o f Title Ill's implementation of 1st August. President Clinton 
formulated a brilliantly creative compromise, exercising his authority to split the 
effective date from the right to sue in court, thus implementing Title III, but gingerly. He 
declared that the right o f American nationals to sue for confiscated properties under Title 
III would become effective on 1st August, as mandated by Libertad. However, Clinton 
postponed the right to sue for six months, until 1st February 1997. Clinton's words were,
"The law...provides me with the authority to suspend the date on which Title III enters into 
force, or the date on which U.S. nationals can bring suit, if  I determine that suspension is 
necessary to the national interest and w ill expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. I have 
decided to use the authority provided by Congress to maximize Title Ill's effectiveness in 
encouraging our allies to work with us to promote democracy in Cuba. I will allow Title III to 
come into force...A t the same time, I am suspending the right to file suit for 6 months. 
During that time, my administration will work to build support from the international 
community on a series o f  steps to promote democracy in Cuba... At the end o f  that period, I 
will determine whether to end the suspension...based upon whether others have joined us in 
promoting democracy in Cuba." (Clinton 1996c)
This meant that fines would accumulate from 1st August until such time that the actual 
legal actions could be brought. "President Clinton has once again taken a firm stand on 
both sides o f an important issue," fumed Jesse Helms (Gedda 1996b). President Clinton 
suspended the 'right o f action' under Title III every six months, with consistent 
regularity, arguing that international efforts to restore democracy to Cuba were 
progressing and it was therefore not in the national interest o f the United States to pursue 
legal actions under Title III.
There was considerable anxiety at a Congressional hearing barely a week before the 
President had to determine whether to suspend Title III. Congressman Menendez 
claimed that the conference report clearly afforded the President "very little flexibility" 
in exercising the waiver. "In the judgement o f the Conference Committee, under the 
current circumstances, the President could not, in good faith, determine that the 
suspension o f the right o f action is either 'necessary to the national interest' or 'will 
expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba."' (Menendez 1996: 6-7) Menendez and 
Burton mounted a sustained grilling o f Michael Ranneberger as to what recommendation 
the State Department would be making to the President regarding suspension of Title III,
39
which Ranneberger parried admirably and diplomatically, without giving anything away, 
leading Burton to concede, "You are very adept." (Menendez 1996 and Burton 1996: 15- 
19)
1.6 Conclusion
The Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act o f 1996 was passed as a result o f Castro's 
'mobilising incident' in shooting down of two American aeroplanes and killing four 
unarmed Cuban-American civilians. Its dual aims o f promoting democracy and 
internationalising the embargo against Cuba on the island have not been realised. Many 
argue that toughening the embargo in order to promote democracy in Cuba was counter­
productive, for Castro has used the embargo to his advantage. Professor Joaquin Roy 
claims that high-ranking Cuban officials called Libertad a regalo del cielo, a gift from 
heaven for Castro. (Roy interview) Furthermore, the admirable aims o f promoting 
democracy and respect for civil rights in Cuba, for which there was arguably an 
international constituency, were muddied by being placed alongside issues o f sanctions 
and compensation. (Roy 2000a: 59) As o f this writing, Castro has conceded nothing to 
the liberalising forces o f democracy; indeed, Castro embarked on so repressive a
1 f%campaign in early 2003 that many o f his Western apologists have become disillusioned.
Turning to the second objective, that o f internationalising the embargo, bullying 
American allies by extraterritorially extending the Cuban embargo resulted only in 
alienating them, not in internationalising an embargo they had never supported. Many 
foreign governments shared American concerns over Cuba's future, but they encouraged 
democracy with "constructive engagement." Many scholars argue that change came 
about in Eastern Europe through encouragement and expanded informal contacts with 
the West -  not through coercion or threats. Indeed, Castro's loss o f Soviet subsidies 
represented a window of opportunity for the West to extend its influence in Cuba in a 
benign and non-threatening way.
16 “Cuba’s Crackdown,” The Times Editorial, 29th April 2003, p. 21.
40
International reaction to the Libertad Act was very negative. The United Nations General 
Assembly held annual votes calling on Washington to end its embargo against Cuba. In 
an extraordinary display o f anger at America's Cuba policy, Great Britain voted 'yes' for 
the first time in 1996, along with the overwhelming majority o f the world's nations. 
Indeed, the entire EU backed the resolution, whereas they had abstained in the previous 
five years.17 (Tran 1996)
Aside from the international repercussions, Libertad was problematic for domestic 
reasons. Firstly, Helms-Burton raised serious institutional concerns as the President 
abrogated a significant element o f power in his ability to conduct foreign policy by 
allowing the Cuban embargo to be codified. A weakened executive is o f particular 
concern as Congress is traditionally more responsive to narrow nationalist and domestic 
concerns than is the President.
Secondly, Libertad raised many issues under American law, both jurisdictional and 
constitutional. It appeared to contradict several US laws, such as the American statute 
that forbids American firms and their foreign affiliates from complying with foreign 
boycotts, like the Arab boycott o f Israel. Constitutionally, Libertad may violate the 'due 
process clause' because the term 'trafficking' is so broad. It may violate the 'equal 
protection clause' because the Act confers special retroactive rights on a group o f people 
who were not American citizens when their property was confiscated, opening the door 
to other groups, such as Chinese-Americans, to claim the same rights. (Fulbright and 
Jaworski 1996)
In conclusion, this thesis argues that the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act of 1996 has 
not achieved its purported aims. Libertad has had little effect on foreign investment in 
Cuba, notwithstanding Senator Helms' claims to the contrary, nor has it succeeded in 
promoting democracy or internationalising the embargo against Cuba. It has raised 
complex issues and precipitated extremely negative fallout, both domestically and 
internationally. The core question regarding the rationality o f Washington's decision to 
enact Helms-Burton will be analysed through a Foreign Policy Analysis lens, as Realist
17 The only nations to vote with the United States were Israel and Uzbekistan. (Tran 1996)
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theory that regards states as unitary rational actors is clearly inadequate to explain 
American motivation. Before opening the 'black box' o f the American domestic Level II 
constituency, this thesis will present a literature review o f economic sanctions, especially 
as it relates to the Cuban embargo, and the metaphor o f the two-level game, upon which 
framework the arguments will be presented.
Chapter 2
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Economic Sanctions: Literature Review
"The U.S. embargo should be held as a carrot to be lifted when Cuba changes its current 
system and develops a democratic society. The embargo is not an anachronism but a 
legitimate instrument o f  U.S. policy fo r  achieving the goal o f  a free  Cuba. " (Suchlicki 
2000)
2.1 Introduction
Economic sanctions were very popular foreign policy tools in the 1990s. Comprehensive 
sanctions, mandated by the United Nations Security Council, were in force against Iraq 
and the various states o f the former Yugoslavia, whilst Libya, Liberia, Angola and 
Somalia endured arms embargoes and Haiti was subjected to UN sanctions for over a 
year in the early 1990s. This marked increase in activity presents a stark contrast to the 
history o f the United Nations until 1990, when sanctions were imposed on only two 
occasions: Southern Rhodesia, from 1966 till just before its independence as Zimbabwe 
in 1979, and South Africa, who endured an arms embargo from 1977 to 1994 when a 
democratically elected government ending apartheid was installed. (Doxey 1996: 1)
What accounts for this increased activity? One fairly obvious explanation is that the veto 
power exercised by the five permanent members o f the Security Council led to its 
paralysis, almost precluding any decisions deemed objectionable to them or their allies. 
The thaw in relations between East and West led to far greater levels o f cooperation in 
international affairs. (Ibid) Significantly, this greater cohesion in international relations 
has not only led to multilateral agreements, but also to more cooperation in policing 
legislation that makes trade diversion and sanctions busting more difficult. 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War saw a decline in the legitimacy o f the use o f force; 
alternatives are preferred in an age where the awesome destructive capability o f modern 
weapons is too overwhelming to contemplate. Additionally, globalisation has meant an 
enormous increase in the volume of international trade, making nations more sensitive to 
the dislocation suffered by effective sanctions. An autarkic country is not vulnerable to
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economic sanctions. Finally, sanctions provide a graduated response to conflict, which is 
much in keeping with the role o f the United Nations as peacekeeper. (Cortright and 
Lopez 1995: 5-6; van Bergeijk 1995: 445-448)
The United States dramatically increased its use o f economic sanctions in the 1990s, 
adopting sanctions as a tool o f foreign policy with almost alarming frequency. A 1997 
study commissioned by the National Association o f Manufacturers (NAM) cited 35 
countries targeted with American economic sanctions from 1993 to 1996 alone. It 
seemed that sanctions became Washington's policy tool o f choice in its wide-ranging 
attempts to promote human rights, discourage the proliferation o f weapons o f  mass 
destruction, discourage support for terrorism, thwart drug trafficking, protect the
♦ I o #
environment, and oust governments. (Haass 1998: 1) The reasons for this phenomenon 
are complex. Sanctions may be favoured by liberals who see it as a powerful substitute 
for war. Cuba scholar Mark Falcoff believes that embargoes "are an invention o f liberal 
statesmanship -  an attempt to find a non-violent method o f influencing offending 
countries." (Falcoff email, 26/01/01) Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton's 
admission that Congressional sanctions are an unfortunate outcome o f the tug-of-war 
between the executive and the legislature to control foreign policy (Collins and Bowdoin 
1999: 10) has particular resonance for this case study.
State and local governments also adopted selective purchasing laws that prohibited 
public agencies from purchasing goods and services from companies doing business with 
such countries as Burma and Indonesia. It is widely acknowledged that the sanctions 
imposed by New York State against the Swiss banking and insurance sectors that were 
reluctant to settle their accounts with Jewish Holocaust survivors and their families 
finally achieved the agreement on compensation.19 The state o f Massachusetts was 
successfully challenged by the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) over its Burma
18 The United States also employs trade sanctions to ensure market access for its exports or to enforce 
compliance with trade agreements. Examples are recent trade wars with Japan and China under Super 
301, and the banana dispute with the European Union. This thesis will not include trade sanctions as they 
are introduced pursuant to an existing body o f  rules that govern trade; this thesis will focus on the use o f  
economic sanctions for political purposes, which work in the absence o f any agreed-on political or legal 
framework.
19 “The New  Driefuss: A Symbolic Swiss President at Home and Abroad,” The Times Editorial, 10th 
December 1998.
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sanctions; a US federal district court ruled that, while the Constitution grants states the 
power to control commerce, it does not grant them the right to formulate foreign policy. 
(Dunne 1998) This ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court on 19th June 2000, which 
affirmed that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional "under the Supremacy Clause." 
(Supreme Court o f the United States, No. 99-474)
The prevailing view in the literature has been that economic sanctions have not been a 
very useful instrument o f politics, regardless o f whether invoked unilaterally or 
multilaterally. Margaret Doxey, writing in the 1970s, doubted the utility o f sanctions, 
primarily due to the lack o f authority o f international and regional organisations to 
enforce them. She argued that international organisations are loath to impose sanctions, 
and that, even when invoked, non-participation and evasion easily diluted their 
effectiveness. Doxey concluded that sanctions did not produce the desired political 
result in any o f the cases she studied, (Doxey 1971: 138-139), maintaining her scepticism 
later, even when supported by an organisational framework. (Doxey 1987: 92)
There was near unanimous agreement with Doxey's pessimistic assessment regarding the 
efficacy o f sanctions (Kindelberger 1970, Knorr 1975); some scholars warned that, not 
only are sanctions ineffective, they may be counter-productive. (Bienen and Gilpin 1980)
Johan Galtung was one o f the first scholars to study the effects o f economic sanctions in 
his 1967 case study o f Rhodesia. The literature generally groups Galtung within the 
sceptic group for he opened his concluding remarks with "The conclusion about the 
probable effectiveness o f economic sanctions is, generally, negative." (Galtung 1967: 
409) However, he admitted that there may be conditions that are more conducive to 
successful sanctions, among them overcoming the problem of universality, i.e. the fact 
that sanctions often fail because they are not universally imposed and can be easily 
circumvented by the target country. (Ibid: 410-411)
David Baldwin, in his seminal 1985 work Economic Statecraft, first asserted that 
economic tools o f foreign policy serve a useful purpose if assessed through the social 
power literature. He argued that most analysts undervalued economic foreign policy 
devices, neglecting them in favour o f other policy tools. Several factors contributed to 
this underestimation, among them the embedded economic liberalism that promoted
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minimal government intervention in the economy, the 'high' politics o f the Cold War 
period with its emphasis on strategic goals, and the mistaken belief that economic means 
pursue strictly economic ends. (Baldwin 1985: 3-61)
Since Baldwin, some scholars have tentatively concluded that sanctions can successfully 
achieve selective foreign policy objectives. Enthusiasts are aware that sanctions have 
limits and that measuring their effectiveness is both difficult and controversial (Carter 
1988: 233) but they nevertheless see sanctions as a useful and efficient instrument for 
achieving significant political aims. They argue that, as sanctions rarely have a natural 
constituency, their successes are unreported while their failures are exaggerated. (Rogers 
1996: 72) Even Doxey conceded that sanctions can be an effective, if somewhat limited 
tool o f foreign policy, particularly since the end o f the Cold War. She supports selective 
use o f economic sanctions that convey clear political signals and avoid harmful 
consequences either to senders or innocent parties in the target country. (Doxey 1996: 
124-126)
Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott (HSE), researchers at the 
Institute for International Economics, conducted an influential study, exam iningll5 
cases o f economic sanctions from 1914 to 1990. They reported success in achieving the 
stated goals o f the sanctions in 40 o f the cases, a proportion o f 34 per cent. As the only 
major large case study o f  the efficacy o f economic sanctions, the HSE database has 
become the bedrock to which scholars and statesmen alike refer in debating this issue, 
and has helped immeasurably in re-shaping the accepted view o f the futility o f economic 
sanctions.20 (Hufbauer et al, 1990)
A major flaw in the literature is the assumption that sanctions fail if they don't turn the 
clock back to the status quo ante -  the situation prevailing before the action that brought 
about the sanctions. This is wrong; it is more realistic to assess projected outcomes in the 
absence o f sanctions. If  some compromise was effected, the sanctions should be judged 
to have had limited success. (Daoudi and Dajani 1983: 2; Drezner 1999: 18)
20 Robert Pape examined the HSE database, concluded that sanctions worked in only 5, not 34, o f  the 
cases studies and rejected the HSE study as seriously flawed. He determined that economic sanctions 
have little success in the pursuit o f non-economic goals. (Pape 1997)
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The academic debate over the efficacy o f economic sanctions continues. This chapter 
will summarise the current sanctions literature: survey the objectives o f senders, analyse 
how costs and domestic politics in both the sender and the target influence decisions and 
outcomes, and evaluate the role o f multilateral cooperation in the success o f a sanctions 
episode. The chapter concludes with a review of positive and secondary sanctions. 
Throughout, the discussion relates to the long-standing American economic sanctions 
against Cuba.
2.2 Definitions and Typologies
Policy-makers consider alternative methods for attaining specific foreign policy 
objectives, carefully weighing costs and benefits, before selecting an option. In 1808, 
President Thomas Jefferson wrote that there were three foreign policy alternatives: 
embargo, war, or submission and tribute. (Fisk 2000b: 111) Baldwin identified four 
foreign policy instruments that influence behaviour: propaganda, diplomacy, economic 
statecraft, and military statecraft, defining economic statecraft as relying on resources 
that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in money terms. While most 
influence attempts involve combinations o f these elements, it is nevertheless possible to 
identify the dominant thrust o f a policy decision. (Baldwin 1985: 12-14)
Margaret Doxey is critical o f Baldwin's definition, arguing that it describes any 
politically motivated act o f foreign policy that is coercive. Doxey prefers a more precise 
definition, "penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence o f the target's 
failure to observe international standards or international obligations," that distinguishes 
sanctions from other violent or non-violent attempts by one state to influence the 
behaviour of another. Coercive economic behaviour designed primarily to effect gains to 
the sender is not considered a sanction, as it has no punitive rationale; Doxey's definition 
clearly differentiates between sanctions as a response to unacceptable behaviour and 
other forms of influence attempts among states. (Doxey 1996: 8-9)
James Barber defines sanctions as "economic measures directed to political objectives." 
Sanctions may be mandatory or discretionary, employed against a wide range o f goods 
and services, or selectively (oil). (Barber 1979: 367-8)
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Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott define economic sanctions as "the deliberate, government- 
inspired withdrawal, or threat o f withdrawal, o f customary trade or financial relations." 
(Hufbauer et al, 1990: 2)
In an unusual episode between allies rather than adversaries, President Bush refused to 
agree to a $10 billion loan guarantee for Israel until Prime Minister Shamir agreed to 
freeze the construction o f new housing on the West Bank, in order to move the Middle 
East peace process along in 1991. This sanction episode was successful, in that it 
brought down the Shamir government, and the new Labour government under Rabin 
yielded to US demands. Drezner characterises this incident as one o f economic coercion 
as it corresponds to his definition, “The threat or act by a nation-state or coalition o f 
nation-states...to disrupt economic exchange with another nation-state...unless the 
targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political demand.” (Drezner 1999: 2)
It is useful to distinguish between the "target" or the actors to be influenced and the 
"scope" or the objectives o f economic sanctions. Any application o f economic sanctions 
often reflects a multiplicity o f targets and objectives. Barber makes a functional 
distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary objectives o f economic sanctions. 
The primary objectives relate to the actions o f the state against which the sanctions are 
directed. The secondary objectives relate to the status, behaviour and expectations o f the 
state imposing the sanctions. Tertiary objectives relate to the broader international 
considerations resulting from the application o f economic sanctions. (Barber 1979: 370)
Baldwin considers Barber's distinction helpful, but cautions against permanently 
assigning targets and goals to specific categories. For instance, a teacher who chooses to 
'make an example' o f a student who has been misbehaving is probably more concerned 
with effect on the rest o f the class rather than on the individual offender. The primary 
target is not the individual but the collective. Changing the behaviour o f the embargoed 
state often is the primary objective, but often it is more important to influence the 
thoughts and attitudes of third parties. Judgement o f primary, secondary, and tertiary 
goals should be assigned on a case by case basis, rather than embedded in a conceptual 
framework that ranks behaviour o f the immediate target as primary and assigns lesser 
importance to the perceptions o f third parties. (Baldwin 1985: 17-18) Similarly,
48
Miyagawa distinguishes between 'proclaimed' and 'hidden' goals o f sanctions. The real 
objective, such as demonstrating resolve to allies and foes alike or sending messages to a 
domestic constituency, is often concealed in the rhetoric. (Miyagawa 1992: 89) This 
analysis is particularly relevant to the Cuban embargo.
Economic sanctions include embargo (prohibition o f exports), boycott (prohibition o f 
imports), tariff discrimination, blacklisting, quotas, freezing assets, aid suspension, 
expropriation o f property, and the threat o f the implementation o f any o f the above if 
certain behaviour by the target country is not moderated. (Baldwin 1985: 40-42) Doxey 
includes the restriction or cancellation o f  fishing rights and trade agreements, and 
suspension or cancellation of technical assistance. She also argues that what appear to be 
cultural and communications measures can nevertheless have economic ramifications as 
well, citing examples such as the circumscription o f telephone, cable and postal links, 
and o f landing rights and docking privileges. (Doxey 1996: 14-15)
2.3 Contexts for Sanctions
Policy-makers must define goals, select measures that relate to the vulnerability o f the 
target, and correctly estimate the costs both to themselves and the target country. The 
sender must foresee the strategies the target state is likely to adopt in anticipation o f 
sanctions being directed against it. He must also forecast how public opinion is affected, 
the extent o f support from other countries, and the development o f new patterns o f 
commerce that result from the blocking o f previous conduits o f exchange. (Doxey 1971: 
3) Legitimate goals include:
• Deterrence: Warnings that sanctions may be applied if behaviour is not moderated. 
However, the nature o f deterrence is such that it is difficult to assess whether sanctions 
contributed a role in the successful outcome or whether there was another more 
important factor that caused the target to change its mind. For example, one cannot know 
with any degree o f certainty whether the Soviet Union was deterred from military 
intervention in Poland in 1982 because o f the American grain embargo imposed after its 
invasion o f Afghanistan in 1980. Nevertheless it would seem "that economic coercion,
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particularly when coupled with political pressure, may often perform a useful deterrent 
function.” (Nincic and Wallensteen 1983: 7)
• Compliance: The target is expected to change some aspect o f its domestic or foreign 
policy, for example South Africa's apartheid policy. (Doxey 1996: 55)
Illustrating both these objectives, the United States imposed an embargo against the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in the late 1940s. Washington used its considerable 
economic power to enforce its policy upon reluctant Western European allies by 
threatening to cut o ff all economic and military aid if they did not comply. No cutback 
was needed, as the threat was effective. (Knorr 1975: 142-143)
Closely related to compliance is the promise o f lifting sanctions as a bargaining counter. 
When the United States applied sanctions against Poland in 1982, Washington specified 
three conditions for the easing o f the sanctions: the end o f martial law, the release of 
political detainees, and the restoration o f dialogue between the Church and Solidarity. 
The understanding was clear that the economic sanctions would be eased as relaxation of 
controls occurred. (Miyagawa 1992: 99)
• Punishment: Sanctions exact a price for international misbehaviour, e.g. sanctions 
against the Soviet Union for its invasion o f Afghanistan in 1980. While some scholars 
argue sanctions may seek punishment and/or compliance, (Daoudi and Dajani 1983: 7) 
Galtung argues that the same action cannot simultaneously serve both purposes, and that 
the sender must determine whether it prefers punishment without compliance, or 
compliance without punishment. Believing that punishment is a sufficient condition for 
compliance is naive; believing that it is necessary for compliance shows that the sender 
seeks the gratification o f knowing that the delinquent has been punished. (Galtung 1967: 
380-381)
• Destabilisation: Although the basic principle o f state sovereignty is sacrosanct in 
international relations, there have been exceptional cases o f sanctions for this reason, for 
example the United Nations sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The
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United States has pursued this goal with its Cuba sanctions, hoping to instigate an 
internal uprising to topple Castro. (Doxey 1996: 55-56)
A more limited aspect o f destabilisation is the undermining o f the target nation’s strategic 
position, such as the previously cited example o f Washington's embargo against the sale 
o f strategic goods to the Soviet Union as the Cold War deepened. 'Strategic goods' 
includes not only military equipment but also civilian goods that could serve to increase 
Soviet military strength, with the intention not to coerce, but to weaken. (Knorr 1975: 
142) Another example o f this sort o f undermining is the enormous costs imposed on the 
Soviet Union to support Cuba. Cuban indebtedness to the Soviet Union in the years 
1961-1967 totalled some $1,100 million. (Miyagawa 1992: 103) Washington's Cuban 
embargo was a two-edged sword with regard to the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
• Limitation o f Conflict: In cases o f civil war, the Security Council has enacted neutral 
measures, such as arms embargoes against both sides, e.g. against the former states of 
Yugoslavia. Such embargoes are often employed in conjunction with peacekeeping 
efforts. (Doxey 1996: 56)
These five goals focus exclusively on the target nation, Barber's primary target. The 
following objectives relate to domestic and/or international audiences and allies, the 
secondary or tertiary targets.
• Symbolism and Signalling: Token measures may have no intent other than to signal 
disapproval, particularly where silence may be misconstrued as tacit approval. Scholars 
argue that the United Nations sanctions against South Africa were not important 
instrumentally for they did minimal harm to the ruling elite; their primary importance 
was the international message o f disapproval they conveyed. (Doxey 1996: 57) 
Sanctions may even be inwardly directed, providing statesmen with the ability to project 
an image o f 'doing something' that is not as provocative as military force, yet has far 
more substance than simple diplomacy. (Carter 1988: 4)
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Scholars broadly agree that symbolism is effective in conveying strong messages to 
either/both the international community and domestic constituents. A 1973 Royal 
Institute of International Affairs study described the American embargo against Cuba as 
a symbolic declaration o f US determination to fight the spread of communism in its 
'sphere o f influence'. (Schreiber 1973: 405) American Secretary o f State Dean Rusk 
stated in 1964 that the United States was pursuing four limited goals in sanctioning 
Cuba, among them "to demonstrate to the peoples o f the American Republics that 
communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere." (Baldwin 1985: 176) An 
important goal of Castro's foreign policy was to promote revolution through support for 
insurgent movements internationally, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba 
encouraged and assisted guerrilla groups in Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador among others. (Falk 1986) Most o f these 
countries enjoy democratically elected governments today, possibly a successful 
outcome o f US sanctions on Cuba in containing the spread o f communism.
• Satisfying international public opinion: Sanctions are often imposed in order to meet 
the demand o f friendly nations for participation. The Organisation o f American States 
endorsed American sanctions against Cuba in 1964; while no collective action was ever 
taken, it demonstrated support for Washington. In the case o f sanctions against Poland 
in 1982, NATO members agreed to join the US, albeit at a lower level o f sanctions. 
(Miyagawa 1992: 96-99) Knorr concedes that even relatively futile sanctions may be 
valuable if they signal international censure. (Knorr 1975: 162)
• Satisfying domestic public opinion: This comment by George Sokolsky, spokesman for 
the National Conservatives, speaks volumes about public opinion over the deteriorating 
relationship between the United States and Cuba in 1960. "Many were angered... Most 
did not understand Eisenhower’s 'policy o f patience' and wanted to hit back at the 'speck 
of a country' which was spitting in our face." (Miyagawa 1992: 95) Sanctions may 
serve important domestic needs. American sanctions against Libya's sponsorship o f 
international terrorism, which assuaged domestic sensibilities, constituted a strong moral 
statement, and sent a warning to future adventurers. (Hufbauer et al, 1990: 3) In Iraq
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and Bosnia, giving peace a chance first through applying sanctions discredited critics o f 
armed force later. (Pape 1997: 110)
Many scholars differentiate between instrumental behaviour, which is intended to 
influence other actors and is openly solution-oriented, and expressive behaviour, which 
seeks only the release o f internal tensions. Wallensteen suggests that governments may 
prefer economic sanctions because they diffuse the internal tensions between radicals 
who prefer a military solution and moderates who prefer little or no action at all. 
(Wallensteen 1983: 98-100) Hoffmann's analysis o f the Rhodesia crisis concludes that 
Britain chose sanctions in 1965 because the action eased domestic tensions. (Hoffmann 
1967: 145) Baldwin believes that symbolic sanctions can be both expressive and 
instrumental; when a powerful nation warns a state about its conduct, other states 
understand that the warning is neither frivolous nor hollow. The utility o f military force 
lies not only in its actual mobilisation, but also in the implicit threat made by its very 
existence and capability. (Baldwin 1985: 96-100)
Sanctions may be proposed entirely to serve the interests o f pressure groups within the 
sanctioning country. Proponents o f this view are called "public choice economists"; they 
explore state behaviour from the perspective o f rational decision making by individual 
participants. This branch o f economic analysis suggests that many government policies, 
including the levying of economic sanctions, are endogenous policies that are the direct 
outcome of domestic political decisions. Some o f these pressure groups may gain 
pecuniary benefits,21 for example, producers o f an import-competing commodity gain 
from a boycott, while others gain utility from taking a moral stand against an offending 
country's behaviour.
Public choice economists suggest that many o f the selective sanctions imposed by the US 
and the EC against South Africa quite conspicuously served protectionist interests in 
those countries. (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1995: 61-64) For instance, Washington 
sanctioned agricultural goods from South Africa whereas Brussels did not, as the US 
imports almost no South African produce, while the Europeans depend heavily on Cape
21 The National Foreign Trade Council, a business lobby comprised o f 580 member companies, brought 
the court case against Massachusetts previously alluded to.
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fruits during the winter. All OECD nations boycotted South African exports o f textiles, 
iron and steel; these industries, which have traditionally benefited from protectionist 
policies, reaped enormous gains from barring relatively cheap South African exports. 
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992: 44)
Public choice economists easily answer the question o f why economic sanctions are used 
with such frequency when their effectiveness is questionable, or why sanctions are often 
imposed on relatively unimportant trade flows: special interest pressures. Furthermore, 
the actual sanctions package that emerges reflects the bargaining o f interest group 
politics rather than a comprehensive programme of inflicting maximum damage on the 
target country. (Ibid: 118)
• Other reasons: The state may not be in a position to undertake anything else. Military 
power may be too costly with nuclear weapons making it highly unlikely that a nuclear 
state will employ military power against another nuclear state. Furthermore, powerful 
nations today find it much more difficult to subdue weaker countries militarily than a 
century ago. (Miyagawa 1992: 104) Knorr contends that the reason for this is the rapid 
spread o f nationalism among less-developed countries and their determination to resist 
domination by the more powerful states. The American experience in Vietnam, and the 
French experience in Algeria provide vivid historical verification. (Knorr 1975: 111- 
112)
2.4 Bearing Costs
The success o f a sanctions episode depends on the degree o f commitment and resolve 
shown by the sender. Costs play a paradoxical role, for the willingness to bear costs is 
widely seen as a barometer o f the degree o f one's resolve. (Baldwin 1985: 107) 
However, sanctions may fail due to high costs making them difficult to sustain 
domestically. Therefore, most scholars agree that senders attempt to avoid unusually 
high costs. The US purchased 40 percent of Libyan oil in 1980; this had fallen to 7 
percent by 1981, and continued falling further as the US bought more Mexican and 
North Sea oil. The 1982 Libyan sanctions were thus more of a nuisance than an effective 
foreign policy tool, and the more comprehensive sanctions of 1986 contained enough
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exemptions to ensure a minimal effect on US firms. (Rose 1998: 131-133; 146-147) 
Doxey proposes that minimisation o f costs may actually be a secondary objective for 
senders, but concedes that a sender's willingness to pay a higher price is proportional to 
its determination to inflict serious punitive deprivation on the target. (Doxey 1996: 66) 
Baldwin states, "Other things being equal, it is always desirable to minimize costs." 
Willingness to bear costs adds credibility. (Baldwin 1985: 372)
The domestic firms o f a sender country bear the costs of the sanction when normal trade 
flows are disrupted, but this is rarely calculated in advance as it is so difficult to quantify, 
and may only become clear with the passage o f time. A target may have its long-run 
development potential, such as building up a tourist industry, severely curtailed. 
Sanctions sometimes entail spill-over effects on innocent third parties; thus the United 
Nations sanctions against the former states o f Yugoslavia cost Bulgaria S3.5 billion, and 
Hungary, Romania and the Ukraine each lost $1.5 billion in foregone opportunities for 
trade annually. Indirect costs of economic sanctions are generally overlooked altogether. 
Substantial welfare loss is incurred as sanctions undermine the mutual benefits that 
derive from international exchange, inducing countries to specialise less and limit 
external trade, so as to decrease their vulnerability, (van Bergeijk 1995: 449-452)
Although the overall impact o f the sanctions on the sender's market may be negligible, 
the burden is rarely born evenly, and specific market sectors may suffer inordinately. 
The American grain embargo imposed against the Soviet Union in 1980 after its invasion 
of Afghanistan is a particularly apt illustration. The estimated immediate loss o f $600 
million in sales to farmers was negligible in terms o f the overall level o f GNP of the 
United States, but was quite devastating to the agricultural sector. Furthermore, it took 
nine months for the wheat, corn and soybean prices to recover, despite increased 
government purchases of grain. Inelastic demand for agricultural products meant that 
farm income in 1980-81 fell by an estimated $2-2.5 billion in a year that nevertheless 
saw agricultural exports grow by 2 percent. Higher cost sanctions may lead to higher 
failure rates either because these cases may entail intrinsically tougher objectives, or 
domestic pressures to abandon the sanction attempt may mount as costs escalate. 
(Hufbauer et al, 1990: 75-81)
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States conduct fairly precise cost analyses when they are not enthusiastic over supporting 
a sanctions attempt against a country with which it would be very costly to disrupt 
economic ties. Great Britain steadfastly refused to support the Commonwealth sanctions 
against South Africa; British exports to South Africa in 1982 totalled £1300 million, and 
provided jobs to 70,000 people. South Africa was also a major exporter o f minerals such 
as platinum, manganese and chrome, on which there was considerable western 
dependence in key sectors such as aerospace, chemicals and steel. (Doxey 1996: 69)
The rational policy-maker must compare the costs and benefits not only o f the
contemplated sanctions action, but those associated with the alternatives available to
♦ » •sanctions to reach a decision that will maximise his utility. Ignoring costs, failure to 
consider options, and misleading cost estimates can have devastating consequences; the 
Vietnam War was arguably the most counterproductive influence attempt ever 
undertaken by the United States. Knorr maintains that the US embargo against Cuba led 
to a considerable loss o f  respect and goodwill in Europe and Latin America. But how 
much goodwill would the US have lost regardless, and would Washington not have lost 
even more respect in the eyes o f the world by not responding to the anti-American 
posturing o f Castro? (Baldwin 1985: 118-129; Baldwin 1999-2000: 85-86)
Sanctions may produce unexpected and undesirable consequences. American sanctions 
against Haiti so intensified the economic plight o f the island, that they triggered a mass 
life-threatening exodus o f desperate Haitians to the Florida coast in 1992. In Bosnia, 
despite the fact that an arms embargo was imposed equally on all the warring sides, the 
Muslims were disproportionately weakened as the Serbs and Croats had stockpiled 
weapons previously. (Haass 1997: 78)
Broad international support for a multilateral action results in the target country being 
denied access to the supplies and markets o f its principle trading partners but may be 
difficult to sustain. The United States used diplomatic and legal pressures to gain 
capitalist-bloc support for its embargo against Cuba in the 1960s. Washington was 
successful in negotiating a virtual ban on the export o f strategic military goods to Cuba,
22 The TANSTAAFL principle: "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch."
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and a substantial decline in the export o f machines and spare parts. But cracks in the 
global blockade began to appear in the early 1970s, as the coalition participants, faced 
with disparate interests in Cuba, preferred different strategies. For example, Castro had 
expropriated all American assets in Cuba, but Canadian banking and insurance firms, 
who had not been expropriated, were successful in negotiating favourable 
compensations. The difficulty in sustaining a coalition with asymmetric problems led to 
its disintegration. (Morley 1984: 45-47)
Scholars who focus on systemic variables predict that sanctions outcomes will not 
necessarily be more successful in a multilateral context. Obtaining international 
cooperation is extremely difficult; sustaining that cooperation over time, and as the 
coalition is widened, becomes ever more complex, as there are increased incentives to 
break the agreement and greater risks o f free riding. (Drezner 1999: 11-15) 
Furthermore, multilateral sanctions often fail due to the difficulty inherent in agreeing on 
what constitutes sanctionable behaviour, and to the bureaucratic decision-making process 
that grants precious time to the target to take defensive measures. (Kaplowitz 1998: 78)
Lisa Martin argues that the leading sender's credibility is crucial to explaining the level 
o f cooperation achieved. Neoliberal theory focuses on the structural conditions that 
would facilitate cooperation by more or less symmetrical states. With regard to economic 
sanctions, however, states do not appear to have a symmetrical pattern o f interests that 
would allow them to achieve these mutual gains, as there is generally a leading sender 
seeking the cooperation o f lesser states. Thus the cooperation problem differs 
significantly from the neoliberal paradigm. Therefore, the leading sender o f sanctions 
will attempt to gain B's cooperation through 'issue-linkage,' thereby convincing B to 
prefer bilateral sanctions to free riding. Issue-linkage can take the form o f either positive 
inducements or side payments, or negative inducements in the form o f threats. In 
building a consensus to support the sanctions against Iraq in 1990, the United States 
achieved significant cooperation from reluctant states such as Jordan and Egypt by 
offering them goods such as debt relief. Threats, or counter-sanctions, differ from side 
payments insofar as they do not improve B's welfare, but they are cheaper and, if
2j The United States later successfully mobilised a multilateral force to fight in the 1991 Gulf War 
through manipulation o f issue linkages such as debt, trade and protection.
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successful, they may not have to be carried out by A. The United States was 
unsuccessful in gaining European cooperation by threats in the pipeline crisis. (Martin 
1993: 407-412)
Credibility can be enhanced through high cost sanctions and international institutions. 
Both mechanisms increase 'audience costs,' which refers to the "domestic political costs 
or loss o f reputation in international settings that [a state] would have to bear if it failed 
to make good on threats or promises." (Ibid: 413) On the international stage, many 
credibility problems are eased when bargaining takes place within the context o f formal 
international institutions, where the costs o f reneging on either threats or promises is 
significantly increased. On the domestic level, building a consensus for high cost 
sanctions is itself costly and one that cannot be reversed without damage to the state's 
reputation. (Ibid: 413-417)
A classic case of failure to co-operate due to American failure to appreciate the 
relationship between resolve and the readiness to bear costs was the pipeline sanctions 
episode in 1982. In response to the military crackdown in Poland,24 President Reagan 
announced an embargo on the export o f American technology for the construction o f the 
Siberian oil and gas pipeline, threatening to blacklist any firms that would not comply, 
and later extending the embargo to include foreign subsidiaries o f American companies. 
The pivotal factor was Washington's refusal to bear the costs o f a grain embargo, as it 
had done in 1980 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Reagan 
Administration choose a low cost option for itself, but one that imposed an unacceptably 
high burden on the Europeans, who needed the Siberian pipeline to meet their energy 
needs. This sent a double signal to the Europeans, telling them that American threats of 
counter-sanctions were not credible and raising questions over whether the real objective 
of US policy was to force Western compliance with its hard-line policy on relations with 
the Soviet Union. The Europeans correctly surmised that Reagan would be unable to 
invoke the threatened counter-sanctions. Thus, the pipeline sanctions were ultimately
24 NATO reportedly agreed to impose sanctions if  the USSR intervened militarily in Poland. The fact that 
the crackdown was conducted by Polish troops may be due to the deterrent effect o f  sanctions, and led 
George Kennan to highlight the significance o f  the fact that Soviet troops had not been deployed. See 
Baldwin 1985: 279.
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unsuccessful due to American failure to show resolve by incurring costs and make its 
threats credible. (Martin 1992: 224-240; Baldwin 1985: 279-283)
International institutions facilitate cooperation among senders o f sanctions; high self- 
imposed costs are important in establishing credibility and are strongly related to the 
degree o f multilateral cooperation. However, domestic factors will determine the extent 
to which a state will commit itself to high costs. For example, policy-makers may be 
reluctant to impose sanctions that adversely affect influential interest groups. 
Furthermore, as international institutions are not homogenous, the relative distribution o f 
power within international institutions is important. (Mansfield 1995: 576-589)
2.5 Successful outcomes
From the perspective o f the sender country, a successful sanctions episode has two 
dimensions: the extent to which the objectives sought by the action was realised, and an 
assessment of the contribution made by the sanctions to that successful completion. 
(Hufbauer et al, 1990: 41) Often a sanctions episode is judged a failure, although hidden 
goals such as demonstrating resolve to the domestic audience may have been realised. 
Empirical assessment is very difficult indeed, for one must conceptualise the effects of 
the sender country's alternatives, and how the target and/or the international community 
may have reacted to those alternative actions. (Doxey 1971: 3)
The following variables determine the degree o f success o f a sanctions episode:
• Dependence on trade is great: A country with minimal trade ties is virtually beyond 
the reach o f sanctions. Greater interdependence overall is a two-way sword, however, 
for it also means that the cooperation of many more nations will be needed in a 
successful multilateral action. Economic sanctions do not have to be universal to be 
effective against a politically isolated country. (Wallensteen 1983: 124)
The concept o f 'sufficiency' is important to the success o f a sanctions episode. A 
blockade that covers ninety percent o f the target's borders many not be sufficient to
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restrict imports. For example, American mining o f Haiphong harbour certainly disrupted 
the economy, but had no effect whatever on North Vietnam's ability to wage war, given 
its shared border with its ally, China. Sufficiency is the ability o f the sender to restrict 
the flow o f goods to the target, and is determined by geography and alliance solidarity. 
Geography is a given; alliance solidarity can be manipulated, as Martin has suggested, by 
side payments and inducements. Thus, the most important determinants o f the degree o f 
success o f a sanction may be largely outside the control o f policy-makers. (Lavin 1996: 
143-144)
• Size o f  economy: A target country with a small GNP relative to the sender makes it 
more vulnerable to sanctions. In successful cases, the average sender's economy was 187 
times larger than that o f the average target. (Miyagawa 1992: 24)
• Trade partners: Close trade ties between sender and target countries make sanctions 
bite fairly immediately. In 1959, the United States supplied 68 percent o f Cuba's imports 
and bought 69 percent o f its exports, mainly sugar. By 1962, US-Cuba trade was 
negligible. (Doxey 1980: 39; Galtung 1967: 385)
The nature o f the economic relations between sender and target is also important. A 
country's susceptibility to sanctions is determined by the ability o f the sender to restrict 
the flow o f three essential goods: oil, hard currency, and high-technology weaponry. 
Analysts therefore study the degree o f a target's autarky through indicators such as the 
dependence on importation o f raw material, and the stockpiling and consumption levels 
of fuels. (Lavin 1996: 144-145)
• Availability o f  substitutes: Multilateral support for sanctions is important, for the 
entrance o f a 'white knight' can seriously undermine the efficacy o f sanctions. 
(Miyagawa 1992: 25) As Cuba's main trading partner, American sanctions would have 
been highly effective, were they not largely mitigated by the Soviet Union.
60
• Economic system: A state-trading system is less vulnerable to sanctions than a free 
market system as it can more easily re-direct production and allocation o f resources. 
(Ibid: 25)
• Speed o f  imposition: Allowing the target no time to make adjustments increases the 
chances o f success o f the sanctions and enhances the credibility of the sender. Defensive 
actions include stockpiling and conserving scarce resources, developing alternative 
supply sources, stimulating domestic production, and forging new trade agreements. 
(Doxey 1980: 108) A case in point is Libya, which suffered gradually increasing 
American sanctions in the 1980s, culminating in UN sanctions in 1992. Having had its 
US investments previously frozen, Libya had ample time to transfer liquid assets out of 
Europe, particularly Britain and France, in anticipation of having them frozen by the EC 
in late 1991. (Rose 1998: 130-36, 146)
• Modest goals: This reduces the importance o f multilateral support and lessens the 
chances that a rival power will offer offsetting assistance. (Elliott 1995: 53) The target 
country will measure the demanded concessions against the costs of the damage inflicted 
by the sanctions, and will resist as long as the latter appear to be smaller than the former. 
Furthermore, specific demands such as trade concessions are more likely to be 
successfully concluded than are wider ultimatums, such as resignation o f a government. 
(Wallensteen 1983: 113)
• Duration o f  the sanctions episode: Scholars are divided on this issue. Longer sanctions 
are thought by some to increase the probability of success, as the costs to the target 
increase. In a twist on this theme, American sanctions forced an alliance between the 
Soviet Union and China, showing Peking just how unsatisfactory a relationship with 
Moscow could be. (Nincic and Wallensteen 1983: 9) Others, among them Hufbauer et 
al, argue that the longer sanctions are in place, the less effective they will be. Successful 
sanctions are imposed for a short period of time precisely because they have achieved 
their goals; senders find it increasingly difficult to maintain the requisite support for long 
periods o f time. (Dashti-Gibson et al, 1997: 609-610) Furthermore, long-term sanctions
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impact less on society and provide greater possibilities for circumventing them. 
(Wallensteen 1983: 109)
• Concentration: Successful sanctions are those that penalise groups benefiting most 
from the target government's policy or those that signal political support to opposition 
interest groups within the target country. (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988: 78) Galtung 
argues that the degree o f vulnerability o f the target country determines the outcome o f 
sanctions. Vulnerability rests on "concentration: the more a country's economy depends 
on one product, the more its exports consist o f one product, and the more its exports and 
imports are concentrated on one trade-partner, the more vulnerable is the country." 
(Galtung 1967: 385)
• Confluence: Asphyxiation can exacerbate economic problems, but is rarely successful 
on its own. South Africa and Nicaragua changed policies after being subjected to 
economic sanctions, but each government also faced pre-existing problems, lacking 
popular support and being engaged in costly counter-insurgency campaigns. The 
successful outcome o f a sanctions episode is enhanced when directed at countries already 
burdened by other problems. Thus, supporters o f a tightened American embargo against 
Cuba in the 1990s argued that the island's dire economic circumstances following the 
loss o f its Soviet subsidies improved the probability o f success.(Lavin 1996: 146)
• Cohesion/proportionality: Economic sanctions often function like a neutron bomb, 
insofar as they destroy the economy, but leave the politico/military establishment in tact. 
Did Saddam Hussein care that Iraqi children were starving and ill? Proportionality 
argues that because sanctions are a marginal tool, they cannot rightly be expected to 
topple governments, as the goal sought is vastly disproportionate to the means used. 
There is also the moral dimension to consider: even if South Africa and Nicaragua were 
examples of successful sanctions episodes, they also taught us that crippled economies 
do not recover easily and continued economic hardship may substantially undermine new 
governments. (Ibid: 147-148).
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Sociological theory argues that external pressures will further reinforce cohesion in a 
country where it is high already. This suggests that pressures on states with low 
cohesion will result in disintegration. Whilst it is difficult to measure the level o f 
cohesion in a society, some factors that could shed light are governmental control over 
police and the military, and the strength o f the popular opposition to the government. 
(Wallensteen 1983: 109) American sanctions against Cuba faced a highly cohesive 
society, with Castro a popular nationalist leader who had successfully overthrown a 
corrupt dictator and who assiduously cultivated anti-American feelings.
Finally, the most successful type o f economic sanction is one where the very threat is 
sufficient to persuade the target country to alter its policies. This rarely happens as most 
target countries make a determined effort to resist and overcome the negative effects o f 
sanctions. The target may have enormous defensive capabilities o f which the sender may 
not be aware, rendering the sender's expectations useless. Successful evasion o f 
sanctions may yield unexpected benefits in terms o f changing the structure o f the 
economy and establishing new patterns o f trade. (Doxey 1980: 106)
2.6 Unsuccessful outcomes
• Entry o f  a "white knight": Other countries may come to the aid o f the target, thus 
substantially diluting, if not totally offsetting, the intended effect of the sanctions. When 
Washington imposed the grain embargo against the Soviet Union over its invasion o f 
Afghanistan in 1980, Canada and Argentina refused to co-operate, with Argentina even 
expanding its exports o f grain to the USSR. (Miyagawa 1992: 61) The impact o f 
American embargo against Cuba was largely softened by Soviet support.
• Pressure groups within the sender country oppose the sanctions: The American farm 
lobby, understandably irate over the 1980 grain embargo in which they saw prices and 
incomes plummet, declared, "The President took aim at the Russians with a double- 
barrel shotgun but hit the American farmers instead." (Ibid: 73) Thus, another grain 
embargo following the imposition o f martial law in Poland two years later was not a 
politically tenable option for the Reagan Administration.
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• Fear that the target may be embraced by another bloc: Castro was a revolutionary 
nationalist, not a communist, when he toppled Batista in January 1959. Scholars have 
long debated whether American hostility was responsible for pushing Castro into the 
arms o f the Russian bear. Although Castro did not publicly proclaim himself to be a 
Marxist until December 1961, his purging of all moderate cabinet ministers by the end o f 
1959 clearly showed his authoritarian tendencies. Most scholars agree that Castro 
willingly went to the Soviets, but many blame Eisenhower's coercive economic policies 
in 1960 - reducing Cuba's annual sugar quota in July, and embargoing all exports to 
Cuba in October - for cementing that relationship by strengthening Castro's authority and 
making it easier for Moscow to accept Havana.23 (Luxenberg 1988: 44-51)
• Sanctions may hit the wrong group within the target country: Powerful social and 
political elites may be able to divert the worst of the economic sanctions away from 
themselves onto the disenfranchised, whose lives become even more miserable. Not 
only is this morally questionable, it renders the economic sanctions irrelevant by 
skimming over the ruling class. The impoverished masses o f Rhodesia, Haiti and Iraq 
bear testimony to this phenomenon. (Pape 1997: 107)
In an attempt to somewhat redress this anomaly and target Haitian political elites while 
sparing the general public further suffering, Washington imposed 'smart' or 'designer' 
sanctions, which denied visa access to the US to Haiti's military leaders and their 
families. Libertad employs similar designer sanctions, denying visa access to the US to 
suspected 'traffickers' in expropriated American assets in Cuba. (Haass 1997: 79)
• Defensive measures by the target: Adaptive measures may be taken to increase self- 
sufficiency and develop new ties with countries outside the sanction attempt. Rhodesia 
had non-participant neighbours (South Africa and Mozambique) whose support in 
allowing access to ports was invaluable. The target may take positive retaliatory action 
in the form of counter-sanctions. Because of the West's reliance on vital raw materials 
from South Africa, Pretoria's threats o f counter-sanctions were taken seriously by the
25 LSE Professor Margot Light commented that the Soviets deliberated for three months before agreeing 
to support Cuba. (IR504 Workshop, 11th March 2005)
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multinationals operating there. Expropriation of property is another weapon; Cuba 
nationalised many American holdings in retaliation for Washington's cut in the sugar 
quota in 1960. As relations grew frostier, Cuba expropriated all US property and 
Washington imposed an escalating embargo on trade with Cuba. (Doxey 1980: 111-119)
• Frequency o f  use: Hufbauer et al, among others, have suggested that frequent use o f 
sanctions by a single nation contributes to declining credibility over time. I f  the United 
States has imposed sanctions so frequently because, despite the rhetoric, there are hidden 
goals that are expressive, this point is irrelevant. (Dashti-Gibson et al 1997: 616)
• Hardening the position o f  the target: Imposition o f sanctions may promote social and 
political unity, stimulating intense nationalism rather than the intended social 
disintegration, and reinforcing the target's determination not to comply. A strong 
government may actually benefit from sanctions, which it can manipulate to rally 
support, and eliminate opposition. (Wallensteen 1983: 111-125) Paradoxically, states 
may prefer to be sanctioned, as this provides justification for toughening state control 
over the economy and the opportunity to reward key supporters o f the regime. Examples 
o f this paradox are the fall in the incomes o f Rhodesian blacks that was accompanied by 
a rise in white incomes under the Rhodesia sanctions, and Milosevic's use o f the UN 
embargo to punish rivals and reward cronies in Serbia. (Drezner 1999: 13)
Scholars agree that the success o f a sanctions episode is a reflection of the degree o f 
disutility experienced by the target, which is a function o f the sender's ability and 
commitment to impose costs, and the target's ability to avoid or bear those costs. 
(Dashti-Gibson et al 1997: 609) However, targets may have a high tolerance level, 
suffering tremendous economic disutility, but refusing to change their behaviour. Robert 
Pape observes that sanctions sometimes fail due to the fact that modern states are not 
fragile. Iraq had lost an astounding 48 percent of its GNP by 1997 due to the tough 
sanctions imposed upon Baghdad, but refused to surrender. Indeed, nationalism often 
makes states willing to endure extreme punishment rather than abandon their interests 
and may actually increase the legitimacy o f an unpopular government. Strategic 
bombing inflicted enormous damage on the economies o f North Korea, North Vietnam
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and Iraq but failed to provoke the population to rise up or surrender. Modern states that 
can endure such extreme levels o f punishment are unlikely to succumb to threats of 
sanctions. (Pape 1997: 106-107) Furthermore, the costs of compliance demanded by the 
sender country may outweigh the price o f suffering the economic sanctions; for example, 
if compliance demands the virtual dismantling o f the target country's political, economic 
and/or social structure, the target has no realistic choice but to stand firm and resist. 
(Green 1983: 64-65) No state would "choose national humiliation over economic 
hardship." (Lavin 1996: 147)
Failure o f a sanctions episode may be due to two interrelated explanations: the sanctions 
themselves promote adaptation and domestic cohesion in the target state and the nature 
o f the international community inherently allows for evasion as alternative trading 
partners can be found. Galtung argues it is naive to assume that "political disintegration 
is more or less proportionate to economic disintegration." He contends that economic 
deprivation may actually encourage political integration, as the population adapts 
sociologically and psychologically to the perceived external threat; the tremendous 
satisfaction derived from being able to face up to adversity encourages greater cohesion 
among the population. (Galtung 1967: 391-396) Others argue that external 
considerations carry more weight in explaining the failure o f economic sanctions. The 
notion o f universal sanctions has become so remote as to be purely a theoretical concept 
rather than an empirically attainable one, requiring an impossible degree o f global co­
ordination. (Green 1983: 64-65)
Finally, a misdirected sanctions episode can boomerang, and have the perverse effect o f 
lowering the costs o f the objectionable policy to the target country, reinforcing rather 
than reducing the offensive behaviour. (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992: 9) For 
example, sanctions that mandate cutting off capital flows may remove an important 
source of pressure for policy reforms. Forces opposed to disinvestment in South Africa 
argued that foreign firms were most likely to train black workers, provide decent 
accommodation for them and improve their standard o f living. Sanctioning foreign 
investment would simultaneously remove this positive influence along with incentives 
for local citizens to moderate their behaviour. Disinvestment is also exceedingly
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difficult to reverse, as once firms have left a country and re-located, they will not easily 
be persuaded to return. (Ibid: 100)
Much o f this analysis is relevant to the American sanctions against in Cuba. A 'rally 
round the flag' sentiment has promoted nationalism and social cohesion in a population 
determined not to capitulate to Washington. American sanctions have also provided 
Castro with a useful scapegoat on whom any and all economic difficulties and setbacks 
may be blamed, irrespective o f the fact that years o f economic mismanagement by the 
communist dictatorship account for Cuba's grim poverty today. Kaplowitz argues that 
"sanctions may be counterproductive and fail because they strengthen belligerent 
elements in the target country and increase the defensiveness of the target government." 
(Kaplowitz 1998: 178)
2.7 Positive Sanctions
"Positive sanctions ... are actual or promised improvements in B's value position relative 
to his baseline o f expectations. Negative sanctions are actual or threatened deprivations 
relative to the same baseline." The difference may be difficult to establish empirically as 
this definition is based on relative values and depends on one's point o f view. 
Furthermore, all threats imply promises, and vice versa, as a threat to punish B for non- 
compliance must imply a promise not to punish for compliance. To minimise costs to 
himself, A is more likely to use promises o f positive sanctions when he thinks prospects 
for success are poor and negative sanctions when the reverse holds true. (Baldwin 1971: 
23-29)
The sanctions literature focuses overwhelmingly on negative sanctions. However, 
positive measures offer much greater scope than do negative ones for flexible, incentive- 
oriented strategies in economic, political, military and cultural spheres. The very 
flexibility o f inducements is one o f its major strengths. For example, the West may 
facilitate the entry o f nations into international institutions, whilst at the same time 
promoting their own goals o f greater liberalisation and global integration. (Haass and 
O’Sullivan 2000: 3-6) While unilateral economic sanctions impose hardship and may 
provoke the target government to become more repressive, inducements promote
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political and economic engagement by Western democracies and are a powerful force for 
positive change in the target country. (Preeg 1999: 7-9) Economic progress inevitably 
leads to greater socio-economic mobility, offering individuals alternatives that break the 
government monopoly over their lives. (Lavin 1996: 141) An excellent example o f  this 
foreign policy approach emphasising incentives rather than threats was provided by the 
EU in late 2004, when Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy announced lower tariffs from 
January 2006 for developing countries that implement progressive labour and 
environmental policies. (Buck 2004) Nevertheless, scholars caution that incentives are 
unlikely to elicit the desired responses from closed totalitarian states, which may 
misinterpret such an approach as a sign o f weakness. (Collins and Bowdoin 1999: 24)
Positive sanctions, variously called inducements, incentives, carrots (rather than sticks), 
engagement, and side payments (the preferred phrase o f two-level game analysts), may 
be either conditional or unconditional. Unconditional engagement demands no explicit 
agreement for reciprocity. Examples o f this approach are the 1992 Cuban Democracy 
Act, where Track II offered carrots o f "people to people" contacts, along with the sticks 
o f sanctions tightening, and President Clinton's easing o f remittances and travel to Cuba 
in the wake of the Pope's visit to Cuba in early 1998. In both cases, the US offered 
unilateral concessions that were not tied specifically to any actions on the part o f the 
Cuban government. Such inducements are often presented to civil society and the 
private sector, to encourage further cooperation.
Conditional engagement implies a contractual reciprocity, ranging from very specific 
objectives to fairly vague policy changes. A watershed case was the US-North Korean 
Agreed Framework o f 1994, where Washington agreed to a wide array o f economic 
incentives (including provision o f fuel oil) in return for North Korea halting their 
development of nuclear weapons. It marked a significant departure from the long­
standing American strategy o f negotiating with an adversary in that it offered carrots 
rather than sticks. The EU's programme of constructive engagement with Cuba is an 
example o f quite a tightly focused system o f reciprocity, whereby the EU conditioned 
investment and loan guarantees on concrete democratisation and respect for human rights
26 See Curtis Martin (2000), “The US-North Korean Agreed Framework: Incentives-based Diplomacy 
after the Cold War,” in Sanctions and Economic Statecraft. Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury, ed. 
Macmillan Press: 86-109.
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in Cuba. Whether conditional or unconditional, failure on the part of the target to 
respond positively often leads to an abandonment o f the strategy. (Haass and 
O’Sullivan 2000: 4-5) As o f  early 2005, the EU's strategy has not achieved any 
significant political liberalisation in Cuba, and the North Korean understanding died as a 
result o f its admission in late 2002  that it had pursued a nuclear weapons programme for 
several years, in violation o f its 1994 agreement with Washington.
Policy-makers decide whether to employ positive or negative sanctions depending on 
their professed goals and a "tradeoff between often competing concerns about the 
effectiveness and externalities o f using carrots versus sticks." The effectiveness o f 
positive versus negative sanctions varies in accordance with the level o f dependence of 
the main actors, and with the baseline o f expectations each has in that relationship. 
Thus, incentives are more likely to work with a political adversary rather than an ally due 
to the lower levels o f both dependence and baseline of expectations inherent in this 
relationship. The sender must also consider, however, the political and economic 
ramifications, or externalities, o f a sanctions episode; the value o f incentives may be 
outweighed by negative externalities such as political fears over relative gains. Nations 
will prefer incentives to coercion when the former are likely to achieve their goals and 
when the externalities that ensue are positive. If, however, efficacy and externalities do 
not reinforce each other, the sender is faced with an efficacy/externalities trade-off 
predicament. States prefer positive sanctions when the predicted success rate is high and 
the sender values efficacy over the negative externalities inherent in the action, or when 
the probability of success is low, but the sender values the ensuing positive externalities 
more. (Davidson and Shambaugh 2000: 37-38)
Applying this analysis to Cuba leads to the conclusion that further tightening the 
American sanctions against Cuba would be unproductive, as Cuban dependence on 
American trade is nil. There are, however, enormous opportunities to be exploited by 
Washington in offering incentives to Cuba, precisely because trade dependence is so 
low. The US has not offered significant inducements to Cuba for two reasons. The 
symbolic goal o f negative sanctions against a communist enclave mattered more to 
Washington than the substantive objectives o f those sanctions. Alternatively, substantive 
goals were important, but were overshadowed by potentially enormous negative
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externalities such as fears o f relative gains, moral hazard associated with consorting with 
a communist regime and ally o f Soviet Russia, and strong domestic opposition from 
Cuban Americans. As negative externalities have diminished somewhat with the end of 
the Cold War, the US has been more prepared to offer timid incentives, such as Track II 
o f the Cuban Democracy Act o f 1992. This tentative approach has been derailed by 
domestic and international events (presidential elections and the shootdown) that have 
precluded the use o f carrots, and created short-term benefits for the use o f sticks. (Ibid: 
41-59)
2.8 Counter-sanctions
Secondary sanctions, or counter-sanctions, differ from other sanctions in that they do not 
focus on the primary target, but on third parties, attempting to force third party 
compliance with the sender's objectives towards the primary target. Secondary sanctions 
are fundamentally an exercise in power over trading partners, and are not generally 
successful in securing multilateral support. Indeed, they are often counter-productive, in 
that they are perceived as an admission o f diplomatic failure, and can severely damage 
relations with partners and allies. (Haass 1998: 207) The long-standing Arab boycott 
against Israel includes a secondary boycott o f any third party that contributes to Israel’s 
economic or military strength. Washington employed secondary sanctions during the 
Cold War; the export control o f strategic material to the USSR succeeded largely 
because o f American dominance in hi-tech goods, but Reagan's pipeline sanction was an 
example o f a spectacular foreign policy failure.
Secondary sanctions may be positive or negative, and may be directed against firms and 
private individuals (Libertad's Title III and IV) as well as states. Secondary negative 
sanctions may impose fines on negligent actors, restrict access to markets or products, or 
deny ability to travel to the US. Secondary incentives include privileged access to 
technology or markets. (Shambaugh 1999: 27-29)
It can be problematic to gain the cooperation o f otherwise friendly third party states and 
(particularly) private firms in supporting sanctions or incentives against a primary target. 
Third party collaboration depends on the trade dominance o f  the sender and the
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reciprocal levels o f trade dependence between the sender and the target. Thus, 
Washington’s degree o f success in moderating the behaviour o f some foreign firms under 
Libertad lay more in the interests and susceptibility o f those firms to American sanctions 
rather than in any defensive measures undertaken by the host (third party) countries. 
Discretionary use o f secondary sanctions can enable a government to extend its influence 
beyond its geographical boundaries. But the host is likely to be strongly opposed to 
secondary sanctions, interpreting them as an assault on their sovereignty, as in the case 
of Libertad. (Ibid: 2-24)
2.9 Conclusion
Sanctions, far from being solely about punishment and reward, are essentially concerned 
with wealth and power, and compliance from reluctant partners. (Ibid: 6) The scholarly 
debate continues over the efficacy and suitability o f economic sanctions in a world o f 
complex interdependence. While some argue that sanctions can be an effective tool o f 
foreign policy, especially when compared with adversely high-cost alternatives (Baldwin 
1985), others argue that sanctions are effective precisely because the costs entailed 
demonstrate resolve. (Martin 1992: 250) Most academics prefer multilateral sanctions 
and suggest providing offsetting assistance to increase compliance. (Haass 1998: 206; 
Martin 1993) Some argue that dramatic power play sanctions are generally ineffective, 
proposing that a discreet carrot or stick may lead to more satisfactory conclusions. 
(Knorr 1975: 165) Some academics view sanctions as counter-productive, although even 
sceptics admit that sanctions can be useful when employed in conjunction with military 
force. In Iraq, Bosnia and Haiti, the US invoked the "American way o f war," levying 
sanctions first, followed by military force. (Pape 1997: 110)
Operation Desert Storm showed the efficacy o f  sanctions as a foreign policy tool. No 
one naively thought that sanctions would accomplish all o f Washington's objectives, but 
they did provide valuable time for the military build-up to be completed whilst 
demonstrating American resolve. The liberation of Kuwait required a combination o f all 
o f Baldwin's typologies: diplomacy, propaganda, economic sanctions, and military force.
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Sanctions should not be discarded as each instrument, while insufficient on its own, 
played a vital role in contributing to the outcome. (Baldwin 1999-2000: 103-105)
Donna Kaplo witz's 1998 book title, Anatomy o f  a Failed Embargo, clearly conveys her 
evaluation o f Washington's Cuba sanctions. She identifies six foreign policy goals that 
the US sought, arguing that it has failed to accomplish any, and noting wryly that the 
continuing embargo bears witness to its ineffectiveness. They are: overthrowing Castro, 
retaliation for nationalisation o f American property, breaking Cuban-Soviet ties, 
demonstrating American opposition, containment (Kaplowitz argues that the USSR, not 
the US, successfully curbed Castro's zeal for exporting revolution) and changing the 
internal situation in Cuba (which is the raison d'etre o f Helms-Burton). She attributes the 
embargo's failure to three main factors: Soviet support, effective countermeasures 
developed by Castro, such as 'rallying around the flag,' and the fact that ousting Castro 
was too ambitious a goal for sanctions. (Kaplowitz 1998: 3-10)
This thesis disagrees strongly that the American embargo against Cuba during the Cold 
War has been an unmitigated failure. As Baldwin suggests, success is a matter of 
degree, not an absolute value, and alternatives, or the lack o f viable ones, are important 
considerations. (Baldwin 1985: 371-373) Although Castro clings to power, the sanctions 
have served important foreign policy objectives in demonstrating US resolve to contain 
communism, especially in the face o f Castro's promotion o f insurgencies throughout 
Latin America, and satisfying American public opinion to be pro-active against a 
taunting dictator. In a more substantive area, the embargo imposed enormous costs on 
both Cuba and the Soviet Union, considerably undermining their strategic positions. The 
US has thus attained three o f the four foreign policy objectives it sought in a State 
Department briefing in April 1964, (Baldwin 1985: 176) failing only to convince the 
Cuban people that "Castro's regime cannot serve their interests."
However, the case for continuing the embargo in the 1990s, with American national 
security no longer threatened by communist dictatorships, is problematic. The rationale 
for the embargo shifted from containment to regime change and the promotion o f 
democracy in Cuba. Bearing in mind that over forty years o f American sanctions failed
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to depose Castro, it is somewhat astounding that Washington still professed confidence 
in the ability o f economic sanctions to accomplish this ambitious aim. This thesis argues 
that focused interest groups wielding important votes in strategic states in the 
presidential election years o f  1992 and 1996 successfully reinforced and extended the 
American embargo against a beleaguered Cuba under the altruistic banner o f democracy- 
building. Indeed, both bills contained the word 'democracy' in their titles. That they 
were able to do this is a measure o f their political clout in a foreign policy area o f 
marginal concern to most Americans.
Chapter 3
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Two-Level Games
3.1 Introduction
International relations theorists have generally been categorised according to their 
preferred 'level of analysis,' which focuses attention on the causes o f state behaviour, and 
pinpoints the main determinants o f state interaction. Kenneth Waltz identified three 
levels o f analysis in the 1950s: the international-level, or the systemic, which maintains 
that the state's position in the international arena is paramount in understanding its 
interaction with other nations; domestic-level, which sees cultural, societal and political 
institutions and interest groups as defining a nation's relations internationally; and 
individual-level, which stresses the personalities and psychological makeup o f individual 
statesmen as the most important determinant of a nation's relations with other nations. 
Most traditional scholars o f international relations based arguments on a single level o f 
analysis; some felt that the different levels are mutually exclusive. The two-level game 
synthesises all three levels.
International, or systemic level theorists, treat the state as a unitary, rational actor who 
responds to external stimuli much as do billiard balls on a table. This celebrated 'Realist' 
approach, considers the pursuit o f  power as the most important preoccupation o f states in 
ensuring their continuing sovereignty. Realists see all states as essentially uniform in 
terms o f domestic structures and preferences, with their sole distinguishing feature being 
their relative place in the hierarchy o f the international community. As relations between 
states are motivated overwhelmingly by the pursuit o f power in an anarchic world, 
Realists see little hope or reason for states to co-operate with each other. More recently, 
'neo-Realists' concede the possibility o f cooperation among nations when balancing 
external threats, but only if the problem of cheating is addressed and relative gains are 
evenly distributed. (Grieco 1990)
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Domestic-level theorists look within the state for the determinants o f its foreign policy, 
tracing their roots to the Liberal tradition typified by John Stuart Mill and Woodrow 
Wilson. Contrary to the Realist dictum that the state simply responds to the international 
system, domestic-level theorists contend that the state can actively set the agenda in 
foreign relations and that different states will react entirely differently when faced with 
common challenges. These theorists open up the 'black box' o f the state to examine the 
various components involved in making decisions therein. Domestic theories can also be 
sub-divided into three categories: 'society-centred' theorists stress the importance o f 
domestic social groups who exert pressure through interest groups and elections; 'state- 
centred' analysts see the decision-making committees o f the executive branch o f 
government as the pre-eminent source o f foreign policy decisions; and 'state-society 
relations' focus on the institutions that bind the state and the society, such as the 
legislature and the educational system. (Moravcsik 1993a: 5-6)
While most traditional scholars preferred the systemic theory, employing domestic 
theories as a clearly secondary influence when necessary to explain irregularities, 
academics have increasingly acknowledged the importance of domestic actors in the 
formation and enactment o f foreign policy decisions. Tentative attempts to correlate 
domestic politics with international relations began in the 1960s, as James Rosenau 
constructed an elaborate taxonomy called 'linkage politics,' but little research ensued as a 
result. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane attributed some importance to domestic factors 
in international relations, emphasising interdependence and transnationalism in lieu o f 
the state as rational unitary actor concerned solely with power, but this was soon eclipsed 
by their work on regime theory. The 1970's scholars o f the 'bureaucratic politics' school, 
such as Graham Allison, Morton Halperin, Arnold Kanter and Roger Hilsman, focused 
attention on the importance o f bureaucratic interests in decision making; unfortunately, 
however, this concept did not evolve into a mature and vigorous theory. More recent 
scholars o f the 'second image reversed' school, such as Peter Gourevitch and Peter 
Katzenstein, reversed the causation by highlighting international effects on domestic 
politics. Gourevitch explored the extent to which the domestic institutions are 
themselves shaped by the interplay o f the international system. (Gourevitch 1978: 882)
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In all these scholarly analyses, however, there is no general equilibrium that accounts for 
the simultaneous interaction o f both domestic and international factors. Thus, the 
essential question is not whether to combine domestic and international theories, but how 
to do so. The two-level game attempts to move beyond the simple observation that 
domestic politics influences international relations and vice versa, and to fashion a 
parsimonious theory that integrates how domestic politics and diplomacy interact. As 
US Secretary o f  Labor John Dunlap declared, "Bilateral negotiations usually require 
three agreements - one across the table and one on each side of the table." (Putnam 
1993: 433-436; Milner 1997: 24-25)27
Robert Putnam's innovative 'two-level game' provides an ideal analytical framework for 
the study o f the Helms-Burton Act and the ensuing negotiations between the US and the 
EU to resolve their dispute, as it demonstrates that political actors play simultaneously to 
both a domestic and an international audience. Attempting to address the concerns of 
both arenas at the same time is no simple matter, as the two have distinct agendas that 
require different, sometimes contradictory, responses. Statesmen must successfully 
negotiate an international agreement, and then secure its domestic ratification; they are 
simultaneously constrained by what other nations will accept and by what domestic 
constituencies will ratify. As Putnam writes, "At the national level, domestic groups 
pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and 
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the 
international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments. Neither o f the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so 
long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign." (Putnam 436)
The two-level game assumes that statesmen have dual simultaneous objectives - to 
influence both international and domestic policies concurrently. "Diplomatic strategies 
and tactics are constrained both by what other states will accept and by what domestic
27 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f  Two-Level Games,” International 
Organisation 42 (Summer 1988): 427-460. Reprinted in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert D. 
Putnam, eds, (1993) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. 
Berkeley: University o f  California Press: 436-368. The references in this thesis refer to Putnam 1993.
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constituencies will ratify. Diplomacy is a process o f strategic interaction in which actors 
simultaneously try to take account of and, if possible, influence the expected reactions o f 
other actors, both at home and abroad.” (Moravcsik 1993a: 15) The role o f the statesman 
is crucial. A diplomat who is creative, bold and innovative can profoundly affect the 
outcome of negotiations by adopting a strategy that takes advantage of the area o f 
autonomy that exists even when there is no overlap between his international and 
domestic agendas. The creative statesman can employ international issues to change 
domestic constraints and successfully pursue policies that would have been entirely 
unthinkable previously (Putnam 448). Because the statesman is playing at two tables at 
the same time, domestic policies may be adopted to affect outcomes on the international 
stage, and international agreements may be entered into solely to achieve domestic goals. 
Furthermore, the clever strategist may trigger re-alignments on other boards via the 
moves that he plots on his own board. Unlike other theories o f international relations, 
two-level game metaphor adopts an "interactive approach" by studying the intercourse 
between international and domestic constraints concurrently and the ramifications and 
spillover effects o f developments in one on the other. (Moravcsik 1993a: 15-17)
3.2 The Analytical Framework
Putnam's two-level game commences as negotiators representing two organisations seek 
agreement on a matter o f mutual concern. The negotiators are not independent actors; 
they are agents subject to the constraint o f reaching an accord that is acceptable to their 
respective organisations. These negotiators may be heads o f government engaged in 
bilateral/multilateral talks, trade union leaders, finance ministers in IMF talks, or party 
leaders in a coalition. Putnam separates the two-level game into two phases:
Level I: International bargaining between the negotiators, which leads to a tentative 
agreement.
Level II: Separate talks within each domestic polity over the ratification o f the 
agreement.
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Although it is convenient to split the two-level game into two sequential phases - the 
negotiation phase and the ratification phase - this division is not entirely accurate, due to 
'expectational effects.' There will certainly have been domestic negotiations in Level II 
to establish a position prior to the Level I meetings, and Level I consultations will surely 
be guided by what can reasonably be expected to be successfully ratified at home. 
Indeed, expectation o f domestic rejection may lead to aborted talks at Level I without 
Level II ever having deliberated the issue. (Putnam 438)
Level II ratification may be formal, such as the requirement that the US Senate ratifies all 
treaties by a two-thirds majority, or informal, such as trade unions refusing to co-operate 
with an austerity programme hammered out by their government with the IMF. Because 
both parties at Level II must ratify an identical agreement, the tentative agreement 
stipulated at Level I cannot be changed without re-opening the bargaining at Level I. 
The ratification process is therefore a straightforward yes or no vote, with any attempt at 
modification tantamount to rejection. Level II actors may reluctantly support an 
agreement, despite serious reservations, if they prefer an imperfect agreement to no­
agreement at all. The metaphor underscores the importance both o f prior consultation 
with Level II constituents, and employing a negotiating team that understands the 
constraints o f the domestic polity. (Putnam 438-439)
3.2.1 The importance of win-sets
Putnam defines the term 'win set' as the set o f all possible Level I agreements that would 
'win' ratification in the Level II domestic constituency. The size o f the win-sets is crucial 
for two reasons. Firstly, larger win-sets enhance the possibility o f Level I agreement. 
Negotiators can achieve agreement at Level I only when their respective win-sets 
overlap, and the larger the win-sets, the more likely they are to overlap. For example, the 
Anglo-Argentine talks over the future sovereignty o f the Falkland Islands reached 
several tentative agreements, all o f which were rejected at Level II; clearly, the Level II 
win-sets of Britain and Argentina did not overlap, and war was the inevitable result. 
(Putnam 439-441)
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Secondly, the relative size o f  Level II win-sets affects the distribution o f the joint gains 
that accrue from a Level I agreement. A larger win-set may, paradoxically, handicap the 
negotiator as he may be pushed around more; indeed, a smaller perceived win-set may be 
an advantage at the negotiating table, as the negotiator may use his domestic constraints 
to extract additional concessions. Putnam credits Thomas Schelling as having first 
recognised this principle in his 1960 work The Strategy o f  Conflict, where he wrote, 'The 
power o f a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and meet 
demands." (Schelling 1960: 19) The US used this tactic in the Panama Canal Treaty 
negotiations, reminding the Panamanians that the agreement would have to be acceptable 
to at least sixty-seven senators. (Putnam 441-442) During the Uruguay Round, French 
agricultural protectionist policies substantially delayed agreement, but proved a useful 
bargaining tool for the Commission in its negotiations with Washington. (Van den 
Bossche 1997: 65-66)
Failed ratification may be due to either voluntary or involuntary defection. Voluntary 
defection constitutes deliberate reneging on an agreement in a situation where 
compliance cannot be enforced. An example would be that o f Iran exporting more than 
its OPEC-agreed quota o f oil. Cooperation in an anarchic world is extraordinarily 
difficult to achieve, as the incentives to cheat are great, but actors who expect to meet 
frequently will have stronger motives to adhere to an agreement. Involuntary defection 
refers to the failure o f  an agent to obtain ratification at Level II of an agreement he has 
initialled at Level I; this enhances the importance o f the credibility o f the Level I 
negotiator. Both forms o f defection are fatal to a contract, and uncertainty often makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the two. (Putnam 440-441) The agreement concluded in 
this case study is an example o f  such a contract, but whether due to voluntary or 
involuntary defection requires discussion.
Figure 1 below summarises a simple zero-sum game between parties X and Y, with X m 
and Ym representing the maximum returns to each, and Xi and Yi representing the 
minimum agreement that each would ratify. Clearly, the win-sets overlap and an 
agreement is possible anywhere in the area represented graphically by the distance 
between Yi and Xi. I f  Y's win-set were to contract to Y2, the range o f possible
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agreement would be trimmed in Y's favour to the area between Y2 and Xi. However, if 
Y were to attempt to reduce its win-set even further to Y3, the negotiations would be 
aborted, as overlap no longer exists between the two win-sets.
Figure 1: Effects o f reducing win-set size (Putnam 442)
Xr Yr
Y, y 2 X, Y3
3.2.2 Critique of the importance of the size of win-sets:
Putnam's two-level game has generated a fair amount o f scholarship, both broadening 
and challenging his assumptions. Not all scholars agree that large win-sets are crucial to 
successful conclusions. Frederick Mayer questions Putnam's focus on size, suggesting 
that a larger win-set may actually be detrimental to reaching an agreement if both sides 
attempt to gain the most from a large pool o f possibilities. Mayer prefers to concentrate 
on 'location', by which he means complete information, concluding that a smaller win-set 
whose agenda is well known may actually encourage an early agreement, as there is no 
point in prolonging negotiations. (Mayer 1992: 797-798)
Keisuke lida focuses on the issue o f uncertainty, particularly as it applies in realistically 
evaluating the domestic situation. Iida argues that Putnam's hypotheses are contradictory 
in their assumptions about the level o f information each side in a negotiation possesses 
about the other. Putnam's first hypothesis says the chances o f no-agreement are greater 
the smaller the win-set; this implicitly assumes a degree o f uncertainty about the 
opposition's win-set for why would the size matter if each side has complete 
information? Indeed, the size o f the win-sets is immaterial in a world o f perfect 
knowledge, as the two parties to the negotiations know exactly where each stands, and 
will only ever enter into negotiation when each knows there is some degree of overlap.
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But Putnam's second hypothesis, that a small win-set can be a bargaining advantage, 
implies that the negotiators have fairly complete information about each other. These 
two hypotheses "contain different informational assumptions (imperfect information in 
the former and almost perfect information in the latter)." (Iida 1993: 405)
Iida further reasons that, whereas Putnam's first hypothesis requires some uncertainty, 
that uncertainty may derive from various sources: the opposing win-sets may not 
intersect, negotiators may be misinformed about the preferences o f their own domestic 
constituency, or win-sets may vary with a change o f government during protracted 
negotiations. Additionally, Iida highlights the problem o f a potential conflict o f interest 
within a domestic constituency. For example, negotiations between two protectionist 
countries who seek to mutually lower tariffs may generate strong domestic debate 
between free traders, who would support almost any attempt to decrease levels o f 
protection, and protectionist elements (trade unions perhaps), who heartily oppose trade 
liberalisation. In such circumstances, Level I negotiations may be entered into by 
rational players, but successful ratification at Level II will depend on realistic 
informational assumptions o f domestic preferences on the part of the negotiators at Level
I. (Ibid: 405-407)
Uncertainty in the international arena and uncertainty in the domestic arena have entirely 
different systemic consequences. In Level I negotiations, asymmetric levels o f 
information about the domestic opposition may improve a negotiator's bargaining power, 
but will ultimately not endanger ratification at Level II. However, asymmetric levels o f 
information in one's own polity greatly endanger successful conclusions through 
involuntary defection. The size o f win-sets is significant only in models that 
acknowledge a degree o f uncertainty; failure to ratify international agreements is the 
result o f either involuntary defection or no intersection of win-sets, either of which may 
happen when information o f the domestic constituency is incomplete. Iida argues 
incomplete information renders the real world much more complicated than that implied 
in Putnam's work; perceptions are as important as genuine domestic constraints. (Ibid: 
416-419) Iida's analysis has particular significance for this case study.
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Putnam considers the issue o f uncertainty in bargaining, arguing that uncertainty can be 
either a positive or a negative asset in a bargaining situation. Contrary to Iida's analysis 
that perfect knowledge is implied in his second hypothesis, Putnam argues negotiators 
can use uncertainty advantageously by deliberately understating their win-set, confident 
that the opposition does not know the real truth. However, Putnam concedes that 
uncertainty increases the risk o f involuntary defection, and therefore lowers the expected 
value o f the agreement to the other party. Indeed, the opposing party may demand 
higher concessions and side-payments to offset the cost o f this uncertainty. The result is 
that each chief negotiator will try to convince his opposite number that his win-set is 
'kinky,' that is, that the proposal under consideration will certainly be ratified, but a 
proposal even slightly more favourable to the opponent is unlikely to be ratified at Level
II. (Putnam 453)
Jongryn Mo, focusing on the interaction between the international negotiation process 
and the formation o f  domestic coalitions, disputes Putnam's second hypothesis that a 
highly constrained win-set may be a bargaining advantage. He contemplates a strong 
domestic group that wields veto power over the ratification process at Level II and 
constrains the country's win-set to the range o f possibilities that are acceptable to it. The 
existence o f a virtual veto magnifies the uncertainty in the bargaining, may increase the 
cost to the foreign country o f obtaining an agreement and, by tightening the constraints 
on the negotiators, increases the likelihood o f involuntary defection. Possession o f veto 
power also suggests a highly undemocratic solution to international negotiations, as an 
agreement may be vetoed at Level II even though it is acceptable to a majority o f the 
domestic constituency. (Mo 1994:412-413)
Mo challenges the assumption, implicit in Putnam's analysis, that the chief negotiator 
and the domestic constituency share identical win-sets, asserting the very real possibility 
o f a divergence o f interests between the two. For example, in trade negotiations to lower 
non-tariff barriers between the US and Japan, Congress is interested in obtaining the 
maximum concessions from Japan. But the chief negotiator, as an official o f the 
executive branch o f government, is mindful o f other foreign policy concerns and may be 
reluctant to push too hard for concessions from the Japanese. (Ibid: 402-403)
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One may illustrate this graphically (Figure 2) using the same notations as Putnam, with 
Xm and Ym representing the ideal outcomes for each country, and Xi and Yi representing 
the maximum that each country would ratify. If  X's constraints increase so that Xi 
becomes smaller, Y must concede more in order to obtain an agreement. This argument 
presupposes an alignment o f  interests between the chief negotiator and the domestic 
constituency, so that the ideal outcome for the negotiator is also Xm, which lies to the left 
o f Xi. However, the negotiator may have different preferences to his domestic 
constituents, and his ideal outcome Xm may actually lie to the right of Xi, as in Figure 2b. 
If Xi is constrained further to the left, his ideal outcome becomes even more 
unattainable.
(a) Aligned Interests
Xm . X, Yr
(b) Opposed Interests
Xi Xm Ym
Figure 2: Aligned and Opposed Interests between the Negotiator and His Domestic 
Constituents (Ibid: 404)
Putnam assumes confluence o f win-sets to simplify his analysis. He further argues that 
even if the win-sets o f the chief negotiator and his constituency do not coincide, it is 
reasonable to assume that the chief negotiator will act as an honest broker and give
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primacy to the domestic agenda, not least because he wants to be re-elected. 
Nevertheless, Putnam concedes that a divergence o f preferences is possible. Indeed, the 
outstanding example o f a chief negotiator exercising veto power over a possible 
agreement remains Woodrow Wilson, who resolutely refused to modify the Versailles 
Treaty, despite the evidence that both Level I and Level II parties would have 
acquiesced. Conversely, American public opinion was strongly in favour o f a negotiated 
end to the Vietnam War in the early 1970s and this clearly affected the results o f the 
Paris talks although the chief negotiator was arguably more hard-line. (Putnam 456-458)
Mo constructs a model that allows divergence between the preferences o f the chief 
negotiator and his domestic constituency. The chief negotiator not only bargains 
internationally; he must also bargain with his own constituents in order to ascertain 
where the national interests lie. In effect, Mo adds another level to Putnam’s two-level 
game: a 'proposal-making process', in which the negotiator enlists supporters among the 
domestic constituency through bargaining and concession making, and both have the 
authority to veto a proposal. Mo assigns a more consequential role for the chief 
negotiator than does Putnam, making him more o f an actor than an agent. Mo's 
negotiator's constraints are endogenously rather than exogenously determined, whereas 
Putnam maintains that the domestic constraints under which the negotiator must labour 
are exogenously imposed for him by his constituents. (Mo 1994: 404-405; 414-415)
Mo's analysis has resonance for this case study. This thesis argues that the chief 
negotiators of both the US and the EU, representing divergent rather than homogeneous 
constituencies, were actors more than agents as both bargained with their constituents 
and determined the parameters o f  their constraints, but with entirely different outcomes. 
The continual consultations between the Commission and the Council during Level I 
talks, and the strong UK leadership in the Council ensured successful EU ratification at 
Level II. But despite the American negotiating team's numerous consultations with 
Capitol Hill, where Senator Helms held veto power over ratification at Level II, the US 
defaulted. This is a fundamental question that will be addressed in this thesis.
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3.3 Determination of Win-Sets:
Notwithstanding the debate over the (relative) size o f win-sets, all scholars agree that 
win-sets are central to the metaphor o f the two-level game, as they form the basis upon 
which negotiations can proceed. Putnam argues that the following three factors 
determine the size o f win-sets: (Putnam 443)
1. Level II preferences and coalitions
2. Level II institutions
3. Level I negotiators' strategies
3.3.1 The Distribution of Power, Preferences, and Possible Coalitions among 
Level II Constituents
The power and preferences o f the major political actors in the domestic constituency 
determine the win-set. Win-sets will be smaller the lower the cost o f no-agreement to 
the constituents. Support for international agreements is generally greater in smaller 
countries that have more dependent economies than in larger, more self-sufficient 
countries such as the US, where win-sets are smaller as the costs o f no-agreement are 
deemed low. The ratification process is not a multiple-choice menu of different 
alternatives; the choice is restricted to agreement or no-agreement. Failure to ratify often 
means a continuation o f the status quo, but it may represent a worsening option, such as 
the US failure to ratify the Treaty o f  Versailles. Ceteris paribus, one would expect 
countries like the United States to drive a hard bargain in the few international 
agreements they ratify. (Putnam 443-444) This thesis will argue that the high cost o f no­
agreement could explain American agreement to an accord over Helms-Burton whose 
ratification was uncertain.
Domestic constituencies may be homogeneous or heterogeneous, depending on the issue 
at hand. In a homogeneous polity, there are no deep divisions over what constitutes the 
national interest, and the debate evaluates the cost o f no-agreement. The SALT talks 
illustrated a homogeneous American polity. In a heterogeneous situation, however, 
constituents bear costs unevenly, and are therefore deeply divided as to what the
85
agreement should include. A heterogeneous constituency is more common when the 
agreement involves multiple issues, such as a labour agreement that involves tradeoffs 
between wages and pensions, with younger workers supporting higher take-home pay 
and older workers opting for increased pensions. American reservations over the 
Versailles Treaty reflected domestic debate over the principle and degree o f punishment 
meted out to the Axis powers. (Putnam 444-445)
Different constituencies present unique challenges to the Level I negotiator. The 
negotiator representing a homogeneous community will press for more concessions to 
assure ratification at Level II, particularly if there is a strong 'hawkish' division in the 
domestic constituency. The negotiator acting for a heterogeneous community, on the 
other hand, has a more complex task, for he cannot guarantee ratification through the 
simple 'the more, the better' principle. Pressing for harsher terms against Germany in 
1919 would have placated some at Level II, but would have alienated others. Potential 
exists for transnational alliances between domestic groups o f opposing countries who 
share preferences pressuring their respective governments to adopt the same policies 
such as Italian bankers welcoming IMF pressure to adopt a tighter monetary policy. 
(Ibid: 445)
We have implicitly assumed that all members o f Level II participate in the ratification 
process, and that negotiations are over single issues. Relaxing these two assumptions 
yields some interesting variations that will affect the size o f the win-set. Participation 
rates vary according to the topic under discussion, with some issues provoking intense 
debate, and some going almost unnoticed; this will depend on the level o f the perceived 
costs/benefits o f the agreement. Therefore, trade agreements carry higher participation 
rates than do monetary issues. Negotiating several issues at once involves trade-offs 
among various constituencies and the group with the greatest interest will generally hold 
the most hawkish views. If each group sets the conditions for its issue, the resulting win- 
set may be so hard-line as to be virtually non-negotiable at Level I. (Ibid: 446)
Domestic and international politics can become caught up together in ways that open 
new possibilities not previously available. For example, the majority o f voters in Level
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II oppose an issue like decontrol o f oil prices, but some could be persuaded to support 
this measure if it were linked to an agreement at Level I to increase employment 
opportunities through promoting exports. An innovative chief negotiator could strike an 
international deal that encourages exports, thus overcoming the initial opposition in 
Level II to oil price decontrol. Putnam calls this type o f linkage 'synergistic linkage', 
which works "not by changing the preferences o f any domestic constituents, but rather 
by creating a policy option (such as faster export growth) that was previously beyond 
domestic control." (Ibid: 448) Synergistic linkages that promote internal reform and 
expand the number o f feasible alternatives by linking them to international issues is only 
explicable in terms o f the two-level game.
3.3.2 The Level II Political Institutions
Formal ratification procedures affect the size o f the win-set. For example, the American 
Constitution mandates that the Senate ratify treaties by a two-thirds majority (rather than 
a simple majority as in all other legislation); win-sets will therefore be smaller in the US, 
to reflect this additional constraint. The Trade Expansion Act o f 1974, recognising that 
international agreements could not proceed as long as Congress voted piecemeal on 
every paragraph, provided for a straight up-or-down vote on trade issues. (Ibid: 448-449) 
This practice has been maintained by 'fast-track' legislation, in which the President seeks 
a mandate from Congress, prior to negotiations for further trade liberalisation, that any 
trade agreement initialled by the executive will be ratified or rejected by Congress as a 
package deal.
Institutions that are quite strong and relatively autonomous from their electorate will 
have fairly large win-sets. For example, an autonomous central bank with a large win- 
set will be freer to enter monetary negotiations than one that is more politically 
accountable. Paradoxically, however, the stronger the state is domestically, the weaker it 
will be at the international bargaining table. Negotiators dealing with a government 
represented by a fragile coalition know they cannot drive a hard bargain as their win-set 
is small; a strong state, on the other hand, that possesses a large win-set, may be subject 
to great pressure to grant concessions. (Ibid: 448-450)
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There can be multiple levels o f ratification. In an agricultural trade agreement between 
the US and the EU, ratification in the US would formally require a two-thirds majority in 
the Senate, but also informally require the support o f the major agricultural players. The 
Treaty o f Rome mandates unanimous ratification by the Council o f Ministers for any 
modification o f the Common Agricultural Policy, followed by ratification by each of the 
member states. Clearly, the potential for creative negotiation strategies, issue linkages, 
and coalitions are multiplied in such circumstances. (Ibid: 450)
3.3.3 The Strategies of the Level I Negotiators
Whereas it is in the interest o f the Level I negotiator to maximise his opponent's win-set, 
maximising his own win-set brings mixed blessings. On the one hand, he will find it 
easier to conclude an international agreement with a larger win-set; on the other hand, a 
smaller win-set enables him to press for greater concessions and drive a harder bargain 
for his country. Nevertheless, we shall assume that the chief negotiator wishes to expand 
his win-set so as to ensure ratification o f the international agreement, and there are 
several means by which he can accomplish this. (Ibid: 450)
The chief negotiator can employ 'side-payments' to facilitate ratification of an agreement. 
Such was the strategy o f the Carter Administration in facilitating the vote on the Panama 
Canal Treaty, where inducements such as public works projects were offered to 
undecided senators. Side payments may be offered domestically or internationally. 
Two-level games highlight the role o f side payments in securing ratification, rather than 
the purely economic benefits that accrue from them. These payments should be targeted 
strategically at the swing vote, where they are likely to bring desired results, rather than 
as an across-the-board concession.
Furthermore, being ever mindful o f both his and his opponent's domestic constituencies, 
Level I negotiators may collude, as each has a vested interest in helping his opponent to
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ratify the agreement back home . It is in the interests o f the negotiator to maintain the 
political standing o f  his opponent, as this expands the size o f the opponent's win-set, 
enhances his own bargaining power at Level I and increases the chances for successful 
ratification at Level II. High-level summit meetings seek to capitalise on media attention 
devoted to negotiators, who are often heads of government, granting them substantial 
advantage vis-a-vis their domestic opponents in ensuring ratification at Level II. Finally, 
a chief negotiator who is extremely well respected among his domestic constituents is far 
more likely to successfully negotiate and ratify an agreement. Voters may not fully 
comprehend the fine print o f a given contract, but will nevertheless ratify it if a leader in 
whom they have confidence and trust encourages acceptance. (Ibid: 451-452)
Ideally, the composition o f side payments should be known at the outset o f the 
negotiations. However, actors often seek to restructure the game to their advantage, even 
in mid-play, by wooing public opinion, offering aid to a friendly government, etc. 
Sometimes actions by one country will 'reverberate' within the domestic politics o f 
another country, dramatically altering the previously held consensus. An outstanding 
example o f a deliberate attempt at persuasion, which Putnam labels 'suasive 
reverberation,' was President Sadat's sensational visit to Israel. Moravcsik argues that 
public goods are more likely to be the subject o f strategies based on reverberation, 
whereas private goods will call for strategies o f side payments. (Putnam 454-456; 
Moravcsik 1993a: 29)
Frederick Mayer disagrees with Putnam's hypothesis that domestic constraints are an 
advantage in Level I negotiations, arguing that the outcome is debatable. He focuses on a 
fractured domestic constituency and the ability o f domestic interest groups to make 
strategic side-payments to one another in order to compose a mutually acceptable 
bargaining agenda. He identifies three structural attributes that set the tone for a 
negotiating round and ultimately determine whether the constraints are beneficial or not: 
"the characteristics o f the domestic factions, domestic political institutions governing the 
rules of the internal game, and the nature o f the external (international) bargain." He 
addresses questions about who is at the negotiating table and what their interests are,
28 Gorbachev benefited from Western leaders eager to enhance his domestic political standing.
(Moravcsik 1993a: 26)
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whether the entire society is engaged in the negotiations or whether only a few elites are 
involved, and whether the political institutions mandate an absolute consensus, or only a 
simple majority. (Mayer 1992: 793-96)
Winners in a divided constituency could partially compensate losers for what they have 
lost, thus gaining their support for the win-set through the use o f internal side-payments. 
Strategic use o f side-payments may encourage factions to consider options that were 
previously blocked, though the policy-makers must determine whether resolving the 
divisions at Level II are beneficial or detrimental in Level I negotiations. Some 
payments, though feasible in principle, may not be acceptable socially, legally, 
politically or morally (bribes, for example). Internal side-payments can rarely be made 
in hard currency, forcing actors to seek a non-monetary issue linked to the topic under 
discussion. For instance, in both SALT talks, Presidents Nixon and Carter bought 
support from the Joint Chiefs o f Staff by promising new weapons systems, to which 
Congress reluctantly agreed in order to facilitate the SALT agreements. (Ibid: 806)
Robert Schmidt studied the Pacific Salmon Commission, charged with allocating fishing 
rights between the US and Canada in order to ensure the continuing health and viability 
o f the valuable salmon fisheries. Negotiations between these two otherwise amicable 
neighbours broke down in the 1990s. Schmidt attributed the failure to reach agreement 
on the widely divergent interests and preferences in Level II, between the state o f Alaska 
and the Pacific Northwest states o f Washington and Oregon, rather than on any 
irreconcilable Level I differences. Exploring linking issues could have diffused the 
internal dispute. Alaska expressed a desire to develop oil in the Arctic region; 
Washington and Oregon could have supported Alaska in this endeavour, thereby 
obtaining concessions from Alaska on the salmon fisheries. Side-payments could have 
diffused the internal conflict and promoted a successful agreement with Canada. 
(Schmidt 1996: 95-111, 137-139)
The Cuban refugee crisis o f 1994 provided an example o f the efficacy o f side payments. 
When Castro announced he would not prevent Cubans from leaving, a torrent o f 
desperate men set out on rafts across the Florida Straits, provoking a crisis in Florida.
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Clinton detained Cuban rafters rescued at sea at Guantanamo Naval Base, winning 
Cuban-American support through offering side payments o f tougher sanctions: greater 
travel restrictions and a ban on dollar remittances to the island. This was followed by an 
agreement in September providing that the United States would admit up to 20,000 
Cubans immigrants annually, while Cuba agreed to return to its policy o f preventing 
illegal immigration. However, when warm weather brought the renewed threat o f 
another refugee wave in the spring o f  1995, Clinton resolved the refugee problem by 
negotiating with Castro in secret. The immigration accords of May 1995 stipulated that 
all the detainees at Guantanamo would be admitted to the US, but that all future rafters 
rescued at sea would be repatriated to Cuba, with the understanding that they would not 
be prosecuted. In return, Clinton vowed to oppose the Helms-Burton Act, a further 
example o f the use o f side-payments, this time internationally rather than domestically. 
Professor LeoGrande called the immigration accords nearly perfect from Clinton's point 
o f view, as he managed to put a halt to the unwanted wave o f new immigrants, thus 
maximising his Level I game, whilst at the same time controlling the Level II domestic 
costs in the short term through side payments to the Cuban-Americans. Clinton risked 
the ire o f the Cuban-Americans in negotiating the status o f the detainees, after having 
calculated that the political price o f  another refugee crisis was even greater. (Kiger 
1997: 42-44; LeoGrande 1998: 76-80)
3.4 Limitations of the Metaphor
Level I negotiator's strategies can successfully change and/or expand domestic win-sets, 
when suitably applied. Washington policy-makers' dramatic attempt to use the Uruguay 
Round GATT talks to dismantle domestic farm price supports almost failed completely 
because sufficient consideration was not given to the Level II politics o f the countries 
involved. GATT had succeeded in greatly liberalising the industrial sector, but in the 
agricultural sector shrinkage o f production and exports would occur without the critical 
aid o f internal price supports. Frustrated by agricultural crises in the 1980s, American 
officials sensed an opportunity to effect domestic reform at Level II through Level I 
negotiations, particularly as they understood that there was support from like-minded 
reformers in Europe and Japan. American policy-makers were hoping to expand their
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win-set by taking domestic farm policy reforms out o f the Congressional arena through 
playing a two-level game. (Paarlberg 1993: 39-44)
In 1987 excessively ambitious American officials proposed to eliminate all trade- 
distorting agricultural price supports within ten years; the proposal was far too radical for 
the establishment in either the EC or Japan. American farm lobbies sensed a great 
tactical opportunity, playing their own game by enthusiastically endorsing the plan, 
knowing full well that the Europeans and the Japanese would reject it. To the dismay o f 
the American reformers who had failed to give sufficient attention to domestic 
constituencies, this strategy blocked internationally negotiated reforms whilst
9Qmaintaining domestic agricultural subsidies. The agricultural agreement eventually 
signed in the Uruguay Round was due in part to a (domestic) budget crisis in the 
European Community that dictated the need for urgent reform. (Ibid: 46-53)
Jeffrey Knopf writes that the two-level game is limited in failing to give adequate 
attention to the differences among three logically separate forms o f domestic- 
international interaction, which he labels transgovernmental, transnational and cross­
level. Knopf argues that these distinctions are significant as they may have entirely 
different effects on the bargaining process.
Transgovernmental interaction occurs when one or both o f the negotiating teams are 
divided, and links are sought between one faction and a like-minded faction in the other 
government. These links generally involve discussion within a narrow range o f policy 
options, as the members o f the negotiating teams are part o f their own executive and are 
therefore more or less in agreement with their government's policy. Transnational 
interaction occurs when domestic actors outside the Level I negotiating team establish 
links with like-minded factions on the other side. Cross-level processes involve 
establishing communication between the leaders o f one side and the domestic 
constituency o f the other side, regardless o f who initiated the contacts. Because 
transnational and cross-level linkages involve domestic actors who are not part o f the 
official negotiating body, they are likely to support wider, more divergent policies than
29 Indeed, the farm lobby actually succeeded in boosting the level o f  price supports, arguing that higher 
levels would be useful as bargaining chips in future international negotiations. (Paarlberg 47)
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those supported in transgovernmental links. Domestic groups may strategically initiate 
transboundary links when they are experiencing difficulty in realising their policy goals 
within their own political system. (Knopf 1993: 606-608) The Helms-Burton case study 
provided several instances o f transgovernmental links as Washington and Brussels 
sought to narrow their differences.
The issue o f side payments has been substantially addressed in the literature on two-level 
games. Coercive bargaining, entailing threats and sanctions, has a good deal more 
relevance for the study o f the Helms-Burton Act, but is covered less in the literature and 
is more difficult to link into a two-level game. Moravcsik argues that threats widen the 
win-set o f the target state, by raising the cost o f no-agreement. He further claims that the 
more powerful the domestic group targeted by the sanctions, the more effective the threat 
of sanctions becomes. (Moravcsik 1993a: 29) John Odell explores the relationship 
between the strategic use o f overt economic threats in international bargaining and the 
outcomes of such talks. He argues that the target nation will not comply with threatened 
sanctions if the internal political cost o f compliance is greater than the cost o f no­
agreement. Policy-makers, primarily concerned being re-elected, will choose the 
alternative that most closely supports the domestic win-set. (Odell 1993: 233-234)
Whereas these hypotheses relate to the target state in a sanctions episode, there is little in 
the two-level games literature dealing with the coercive state as the relationship between 
threats and the ability to ensure the ratification o f  an agreement is not clear. Moravcsik 
suggests two possibilities. One hypothesis may be that the two vary inversely in that a 
narrowing o f the win-set may be correlated with threats o f increased credibility. A 
second hypothesis focuses on the credibility o f the sender, reasoning that the credibility 
o f a threat will be less the greater the power o f the groups disadvantaged at home by the 
threat. Odell concurs with Moravcsik's hypothesis that the credibility of the threat is 
primarily determined by the distribution of domestic interests in the sender state; the 
more concentrated and powerful the factions benefiting from the threat, the more 
credible the threat and vice-versa. This view presupposes a high degree of domestic 
consensus in the sender state, and a fairly accurate level o f awareness o f the internal 
politics o f the sender state on the part o f the target state (Moravcsik 1993a: 29-30; Odell 
1993: 233-34)
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These hypotheses explain why Washington won considerable concessions against a 
powerful EC, whereas it was less successful against a much weaker state, Brazil. The 
different bargaining outcomes can be explained on the basis of the credibility o f the 
sender nation, determined by foreign perception o f US domestic politics. Washington 
threatened the EC with severe sanctions when Spanish and Portuguese accession to the 
EC meant a substantial curtailment in a profitable grain export market for the United 
States in 1986. The Europeans perceived the American threat as highly credible, 
endorsed by powerful agricultural interests, and were eager to offer important 
concessions in order to head off a threatened trade war. American threats over 
computers against Brazil, a much weaker state, carried much lower credibility as 
domestic computer firms were themselves divided, and many were opposed to Reagan's 
coercive tactics. This encouraged Brazil to successfully resist American threats of 
sanctions. (Odell 1993: 237-243)
The Level II politics o f the target nations reinforce the variation in outcome of the two 
sanctions episodes, illustrating the hypothesis o f the greater net cost o f compliance vis-a- 
vis no-agreement. Washington created negative reverberation initially, both in Brazil 
and in the EC. But voices o f accommodation were soon heard in Europe, where 
Washington had carefully targeted a range of goods that hurt virtually every member 
state. European policy-makers concluded that they had more to gain by compliance than 
by standing firm; thus the reverberation became positive, leading to an early agreement 
favouring the US. In Brazil, strong Level II interests precluded capitulating to 
Washington, with the result that Reagan eventually backed down. (Ibid: 243-250)
In this case study, the EU's threat to mount a WTO challenge became patently credible 
with the appointment o f a Dispute Settlement Body in February 1997. American 
counter-threats to ignore the WTO procedure, as it questioned the legitimacy o f the WTO 
to adjudicate the matter, proved hollow; American respect for the WTO forced 
Washington to enter serious bilateral negotiations.
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3.5 Conclusion
Robert Strauss, the United States Special Trade Representative during the 1979 Tokyo 
Round o f GATT negotiations, famously declared that he spent as much time negotiating 
with domestic constituents and Congressmen as he did with foreign trading partners. 
(Putnam 436) Relaxing the Realist assumption o f unitary rational actor by investigating 
the domestic decision-making process helps understand that policy-makers have different 
agendas and leads to a significantly improved ability to predict the outcomes o f 
international bargaining. The two-level game suggests a plausible explanation for the 
oft-observed sub-optimal level o f international cooperation, as it highlights domestic 
political constraints and the interplay between domestic and international processes as 
erecting some of the greatest obstacles to international cooperation.
Academics increasingly recognise that it is imperative to consider the two-way flow o f 
interaction along the domestic-international divide to acquire a degree o f understanding 
about international bargaining. The analytical framework o f the two-level game offers 
an encouraging answer to this challenge. Unlike state-centric paradigms, the two-level 
game perceives that there may be strong internal conflicts about what constitutes the 
national interest. Unlike the second image and second image reversed schools, two-level 
game acknowledges that policy-makers struggle to reconcile domestic and international 
constraints simultaneously. The two-level game both demands and enables international 
statesmen to develop creative, multiple strategies in their pursuit o f the national interest. 
Peter Evans writes that Level I talks are not only about international relations, but also 
about domestic opinions and the relative distribution of costs/benefits in the 
constituency. "Bargaining is an inter-active process, simultaneously shaped by the 
pursuit o f international gains and the political dynamics o f domestic ratification." (P. 
Evans 1993:397)
This thesis will analyse the Helms-Burton negotiations using the two-level game 
metaphor to consider the following:
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• Win-sets: How large were the win-sets of the US and of the EU and how were they 
placed relative to each other? How transparent were the win-sets, both domestically and 
internationally?
• Preferences, coalitions, and veto power: Were Level II preferences homogeneous, or 
was the domestic constituency divided? In a divided constituency, were there powerful 
factions whose support could be gained with side payments?
• Institutions: The United States and the European Union have very different political 
institutions. What impact did the institutional framework have on the ability to conduct 
negotiations and deliver ratification?
• Level I  Negotiators: How competent were the chief negotiators in strategically seizing 
the moment to craft creative and ratifiable agreements? Were there possibilities for 
transgovernmental links?
The next three chapters present the domestic Level II constituency in the United States 
pertaining to Libertad. Chapter 4 examines the tensions within American political 
institutions as Helms-Burton was drafted. The following chapters analyse the 
heterogeneous domestic polity seeking to determine US policy on Cuba. Chapter 5 
presents the hard-line Cuban-American interest groups that lobbied to maintain pressure 
on Castro. Chapter 6 explores the growing consensus seeking moderation o f America's 
uncompromising Cuba sanctions, and general reform o f Washington's ability to use 
unilateral economic sanctions as a tool o f foreign policy.
Chapter 4
96
Level II Tensions in the Passage of the Helms-Burton Act
"The Clinton Administration was running a peripatetic foreign policy at prey to the 
whims o f  the latest balance offorces." (Brinkley 1997: 113)
4.1 Introduction
Washington sought various Cold War objectives through the use o f  sanctions against 
Cuba, among them instrumental goals such as destabilisation o f the Castro regime and 
expressive goals such as domestic and international signalling o f disapproval o f the 
human rights abuses in the country. With the fall o f the Iron Curtain in 1989, a 
reasonable argument could be made for lifting the sanctions and moving toward 
normalisation of relations, as the US has done with many former adversaries, China and 
Vietnam to name but two.
However, hard-liners argued that the impact o f the American embargo had been largely 
mitigated by Soviet support o f about $6 million annually; having now lost this crucial 
lifeline, the US embargo could finally bite and topple Castro. Cuban GDP was an 
estimated $334 per capita in 1986, plummeting to just $61 by 1996. The fall in living 
standards was accompanied by rising discontent among Cuba's military and ruling elite, 
and a growth o f civil society opposition. Hard-liners accused Clinton o f not taking 
advantage o f the economic straits and supplementing the embargo by, for example, 
providing independent news information to ordinary Cubans. A key factor in the fall o f 
the Iron Curtain was the dire economic circumstances; comparing Cuba and Eastern 
Europe, Radio Marti's transmissions were much weaker and less frequent than were 
those o f Radio Free Europe. Sensing Castro's vulnerability, the end o f the Cold War 
brought a strengthening rather than a moderation o f the trade embargo against Cuba, as 
"expectations... moved from the realm o f symbolism to the realm o f substance." (Krinsky 
and Go love 1993: 7)
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Promotion o f democracy and respect for human rights provided the new rationale for the 
intensification o f  the embargo in the nineties. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA, also 
known as the Torricelli Act) o f 1992 stated that the policy o f the US was "to seek a 
peaceful transition to democracy" in Cuba, hence its name (§ 3/1). Libertad stated as its 
purpose "to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity" (§ 3/1) 
and "to encourage the holding o f free and fair democratic elections in Cuba" (§ 3/4), 
hence the name Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. But the lofty democratic 
intent was no more than a smokescreen to legitimise the tightening o f the embargo as 
Washington shifted its goalposts vis-a-vis Cuba to actively seek regime change.
This chapter focuses on the Level II tensions evident during the congressional 
deliberations over Helms-Burton in 1995. The preferences o f the domestic constituency 
diverged; the Clinton Administration and the Democratic leadership on Capitol Hill 
questioned whether Libertad was the appropriate tool with which to promote democracy 
in Cuba and objected strenuously to many o f its provisions. Under the powerful 
leadership regimen o f the House o f Representatives, Libertad passed on a strongly 
partisan vote in September. But the Senate Democratic leadership mounted a sustained 
filibuster to halt the legislation, forcing Senator Helms to withdraw the more 
controversial paragraphs, before securing passage o f an emasculated bill in October. 
Castro's brutality temporarily united Washington's divided constituency; the shared win- 
set forced enactment o f Helms-Burton in early 1996.
4.2 Re-defining C uba Policy
The momentum for Libertad was generated by the confluence o f several factors in the 
mid-1990s. The loss o f Soviet support forced Cuba to sell o ff assets in a desperate 
search for foreign investors; Western Hemisphere governments like Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica were increasingly confiscating private property; and the Republican Party captured 
control o f both Houses o f Congress in 1994, which meant that Senator Jesse Helms, 
conservative cold-warrior Republican o f North Carolina, assumed the chairmanship o f 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Amid growing frustration at the 
Administration's 'listless' Cuba policy, Helms composed a menu o f ten foreign policy 
initiatives, giving Cuba priority listing. (Fisk 2000a: 66-67; Kiger 1997: 45) Francisco
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Hernandez, president o f the Cuban American National Foundation, testified that Libertad 
"sends a message to Castro that if the White House is not sure where it is going on Cuba, 
the representatives o f  the American people in the United States Congress know where 
they are going." (Hernandez 1995: 90)
Jesse Helms and Dan Burton, given the historical and theoretical evidence, probably 
knew their bill would impact little, if at all, on Castro and his regime. Their motivation 
was symbolic, to "demonstrate to interested parties that they still cared about ridding 
Cuba o f Castroism," those parties being Cuban-Americans who sought redress for their 
properties in Cuba, and who had contributed generously to their campaign coffers. 
(Kaplowitz 1998: 182) Dan Fisk, who worked as a Republican staffer responsible for 
Western Hemisphere issues at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from July 1994 
until August 1997, was assigned the task o f drafting new legislation on Cuba. Fisk 
acknowledged the interest o f the Cuban-Americans in this bill, but maintained that, as a 
single constituency, they could never have imposed Helms-Burton on their own. Joining 
the preferences o f the Cuban-Americans with Helms' staunch anti-communism and 
advocacy for property rights created a broader Level II consensus. (Fisk 2000a: 69-70)
Based on Clinton's political appointees, Fisk believed that the Clinton White House was 
slowly drifting toward moderating the Cuban embargo, a stance that put the White House 
at odds over Cuba policy with the State Department's career officers. (Fisk 1999: 28-29) 
Pamela Falk, Staff Director o f the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, wrote that 
her subcommittee felt that Clinton was "predisposed to opening the door slowly" if he 
won re-election. (Falk 1996: 17)30
Clinton's Cuba policy focused on ensuring orderly migration from the island to the US. 
Clinton had been governor o f Arkansas when forced to take some of the 125,000 Mariel 
boat people from Cuba who overwhelmed Florida in 1980; he blamed his gubernatorial 
defeat that year partly on the violence o f Marielitos at their Arkansas camp. 
Consequently, Clinton sought "stability", wanting nothing untoward to happen (again) 
with regard to Cuba during his stewardship. (Fisk interview) This view was shared by 
Michael Kosak o f the US Interest Section in Havana, who declared in 1998 that
j0 Falk’s analysis has been questioned by some observers, including Professor Joaquin Roy.
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Washington's principle concern was continued stability in Cuba, as unrest would propel 
thousands o f Cubans into the Florida straits. (Lopez 2000: 359-360)
Clinton also focused on encouraging a peaceful transition to democracy by supporting 
the Cuban people through Track II o f the CD A which saw food and medicine sent to 
Cuba by humanitarian NGOs and improved telecommunications between the US and 
Cuba. Whilst maintaining the leverage of the embargo over Castro, Clinton sought to 
reduce the sanctions "in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive change in
3 1 *  ♦Cuba." (Nuccio 1995) The Helms-Burton Act seriously compromised this last point, 
effectively tying the hands o f the executive and inhibiting his ability to respond to 
positive developments on the island.
4.2.1 Senator Jesse Helms
North Carolina's Senator Helms was a staunch defender o f traditional Southern values; 
an archconservative and nationalist, he supported the death penalty, the right to carry 
arms, and believed that the civil rights movement was unnecessary. Helms was a 
particularly firm supporter o f property rights; he held up $100 million in relief to 
Nicaragua in 1992 because the new government there had been slow to return American 
properties confiscated by the previous Sandinista government. (Kiger 1997: 46)
A long-standing member o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Helms was a 
unilateralist defender o f American sovereignty and a sharp isolationist critic o f free trade 
who voted against NAFTA and the WTO. Helms blocked so many nominations and 
bills, among them the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, that he has been called 
"Senator No," a name he cherished. (Waller 2000: 40-42) In defending America's 
'splendid isolationism,' Helms campaigned against the Kyoto Protocol and sought to 
reduce Washington's financial commitment to the United Nations, showing a tenacious 
unwillingness to compromise American sovereignty for the sake o f international 
cooperation. (Vita 2000; Hitchens 2001: 68) Helms never voted for a foreign aid bill,
31 This is precisely the language o f the Cuban Democracy Act.
32 Helms was one o f 34 senators to vote "nay" in December 1994, on H .R .5110 acceding to the WTO, 
which became PL 103-465. Helms retired from 30 years in the Senate at the end o f  the 107th Congress, in 
2002, aged 80.
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stating with typical directness, "Americans are tired o f pouring hard-earned money down 
those ratholes." (Walker 1997: 401)
The Washington Post sounded a warning bell early in Helms' tenure as Chairman o f the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It noted with alarm that Helms was "blithely" 
making sweeping changes geared to redistributing the foreign policy agenda-setting 
power from the Executive to the Congress. (Rosenfeld 1995) With eerie prescience, the 
editorial could have been referring to the power transfer effected by Libertad a year later. 
However, Helms enjoyed wide support as well. A scholar at the Council on Foreign 
Relations argued that Helms played a critical role in upholding the prerogatives o f the 
legislative branch to 'check and balance' the executive in the conduct o f foreign policy, in 
precisely the manner intended by the Founding Fathers. Senator Fulbright's criticism o f 
the Vietnam War was but one example o f the benefits o f congressional surveillance of 
foreign policy. (Mead 2001)
4.3 Drafting Libertad
Dan Fisk began work on Libertad in the summer of 1994, well before Helms assumed 
the chairmanship o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Helms planned to 
introduce Libertad in 1995, regardless o f the makeup o f the new Congress. The fact that 
there was a Republican majority substantially increased the bill's chances o f passage. 
(Fisk 1999: 30) Libertad promoted four broad policy objectives: to "halt the drift in US 
policy," to further isolate Castro, to prepare the US for the "inevitable transition," and to 
strangle Castro's economic lifeline o f  foreign investment whilst protecting and focusing 
"international attention" on the property rights of American citizens. (Fisk 2000a: 72)
Libertad incorporated many provisions that had previously failed to be enacted.
• Title I was similar to bills previously sponsored by Cuban-American
Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, R/FL, which extended the embargo and harassed 
Castro in myriad ways.
33 H.R.. 5295 to 5298, introduced 29th November 1994.
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• Title II was essentially legislation introduced by Cuban-American
Congressman Robert Menendez, D/NJ, entitled "Free and Independent Cuba Assistance 
Act o f 1993" (H.R.2758) which the Clinton Administration kept bottled up in committee. 
It described conditions necessary for a transition government in Cuba to merit 
suspension o f the American embargo. It was an important component for two reasons: 
with Menendez a Democrat, it showed bipartisan support for the bill, and it forced 
Washington to plan for a post-Castro Cuba. (Fisk 1999: 33; Kiger 1997: 46)
The new and contentious provisions o f Libertad were Titles III and IV. Title III granted 
all Americans, including Cuban-Americans who were not citizens at the time their 
properties were expropriated, a 'right o f action' to sue foreign companies 'trafficking' in 
their Cuban assets in US courts. Title IV denied visa access to the United States for 
executives o f companies suspected by the State Department to be 'trafficking' in 
expropriated American assets in Cuba.34 Helms was undaunted by the international 
furore provoked by the extraterritorial implications o f these two titles, for Libertad 
represented a synthesis o f two principles he held dear: the right to private property, and a 
unilateralist American foreign policy with carefree disregard for world opinion. The 
extraterritorial implications o f Libertad deftly combined Helms' philosophy o f 
"assumptions o f legislative arrogance and American predominance." (Walker 1997: 392)
Fisk intended Title III to have global reach, protecting American property anywhere in 
the world. Helms harboured a particular interest in property rights, believing that all US 
citizens should enjoy equal protection under the law, regardless o f when they obtained 
their citizenship. Furthermore, businessmen are rational actors, and Libertad's provisions 
served to sensitise them to the dangers o f  investing in Cuba. (Fisk 2000a: 71-73; Fisk 
interview)
Fisk took advice from many members o f the legal profession as he was drafting Libertad, 
prominent among them two Cuban-American attorneys, Ignacio Sanchez and Nicolas 
Gutierrez, whose firms represent Bacardi and the National Association o f Sugar Mill 
Owners o f Cuba, respectively. They were particularly active in drafting Title III; both
’4 As originally introduced in February 1995, both S .381 and H.R..927 combined these two titles into one.
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represented clients who stood to gain substantially from the retroactive rights o f 
citizenship conferred by Libertad. (Kiger 1997: 47) Aside from these two attorneys, the 
Cuban-American community had almost no role in drafting Libertad.33 Fisk argued that 
the Cuban-American's support was important, but that "they were not the driving force 
behind either the bill's content or its legislative strategy." It was Senator Helms' 
initiative, and his conviction that property rights should apply equally to all Americans, 
regardless o f when they received citizenship, that provided the impetus for this 
legislation. Indeed, Fisk recalled that the Cuban-American leader, Jorge Mas Canosa, 
was initially reluctant to support the bill, becoming an active supporter only when he 
realised the enthusiasm o f his community. (Fisk 2000a: 71-72)
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, or Libertad, was introduced 
by Senator Helms, as S.381 on 9 February 1995. Congressman Benjamin Gilman 
(R/NY), Chairman o f the House Committee on International Relations, introduced
j.L
Libertad as H.R.927 on 14 February 1995, sponsored by Congressman Dan Burton, 
(R/IN) the Chairman o f the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. Helms reminded the 
chamber that the Cuban embargo had always enjoyed bipartisan support, and that, with 
the end o f Soviet subsidies, the embargo was finally having its intended effect, so it was 
time to "tighten the screws" in order to bring Castro down. (Helms 1995a: S2411) It is 
noteworthy that, in both the House and the Senate websites, Libertad was described as 
strengthening international sanctions against Castro and planning for support o f the 
transition to democracy in Cuba "and for other purposes." It did not mention the 
contentious extraterritorial parts o f the legislation.
Supporters o f Libertad were confident that it would sound the death knell for Castro's 
Cuba within a very short time. In urging passage o f the bill, House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich encouraged Congressmen to make a "freedom contact with the people o f 
Cuba." (Doherty 1996b). Jesse Helms stated that there was no mistaking the bill's 
intention: "'Farewell, Fidel,' that's the message o f this bill," he crowed. (Doherty 1996a)
°  Professor Joaquin Roy notes that several other Miami attorneys were hired, and that Helms-Burton was 
widely known as “the Bacardi Law,” a notion that Dan Fisk brusquely dismissed in interview.
103
4.4 Libertad Debate: The Clinton Administration
The House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held two 'markup' sessions, 
intended to propel the committee to further action whilst providing the members with an 
opportunity to refine the bill before its consideration by the full House. Chairman 
Burton opened the markup on 22nd March, claiming that H.R.927 had wide bipartisan 
support, inclusive o f the Clinton White House, although there were some outstanding 
issues o f disagreement that he looked forward to resolving. (Burton 1995: 1)
Either Burton was unduly optimistic, or he was being economical with the truth, for the 
White House certainly did not share Burton's preferences. It had already voiced serious 
reservations at the previous week's hearing over, among other points, the apparent 
infringement upon the President's "constitutional responsibilities for the conduct o f 
foreign relations." (Watson 1995.) In a CNN interview on 13th April, Clinton argued that 
the CDA already strengthened Cuban sanctions, and provided for support for Cuba's 
transition to democracy, whilst not affecting American property claims against Cuba, 
making Libertad unnecessary. Clinton expressed similar sentiments in a letter later that 
month to Benjamin Gilman, adding concerns over infringement on the President's 
Constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy and whether Libertad's broad 
definition of'trafficking' was compatible with international law. (Galliano 1995: 199- 
201)
The State Department concluded an interagency study of Libertad by late April 1995. 
Broadly arguing that Libertad was counter-productive both to the promotion o f 
democracy in Cuba and to Washington's wider interests, among its specific objections 
were:
• Title I prohibited the importation o f sugar from any country that imports sugar
36 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings, but no markup, an anomaly noted by Senator 
Dorgan (D/ND). Senator Dodd added that, whilst a minority member o f committee might attempt this 
strategy, there was no precedent for the chair o f  the committee, who commanded a majority, not to have a 
markup to perfect a bill in his own committee. See Congressional Record 141: S 1 5 113. Furthermore, the 
Judiciary Committee held no hearing on Libertad, nor did it or the Foreign Relations Committee issue any 
reports. See Wallace remarks, Congressional Record 141: S 1 5 109.
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from Cuba, but this collided with America's long-standing opposition to secondary 
boycotts, and raised fears o f a Canadian/EU challenge under NAFTA/WTO rules.
• Title II unduly restricted the President in determining both Cuban transition to and
formation o f a democratic government. There should be a clearer programme o f benefits 
the US would provide to Cuba under those circumstances.
• Title Ill's definition of'trafficking' was too broad, and the right o f action conferred
jurisdiction "that goes well beyond accepted international practice, [and] would be 
difficult to defend under international law." The granting o f retroactive rights to Cuban- 
Americans was contrary to standard US practice and principles o f international law.
• Title IV's visa denial o f aliens suspected o f 'trafficking' in American assets could
unfairly affect persons who are not directly responsible for those business decisions. 
(Sullivan 1995: 7-11)
As congressional deliberations heated up in the autumn, the Clinton Administration 
repeatedly threatened to veto Libertad. Senior presidential advisors recommended 
deletions of, for example, the section in Title II mandating the withholding of US 
contributions to international financial institutions that aided Cuba, Title III for its 
dubious standing in international law and Titles III and IV for fear o f creation o f friction 
with US allies. (Administration Policy, 1995)
Secretary o f State Warren Christopher argued strongly against Libertad. Title II could 
damage a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by instituting an overly rigid list o f 
requirements. Title III would create tensions with US allies, was difficult to defend 
under international law, could jeopardise the certified claimants' cases, and was already 
being used by Castro to frighten ordinary Cubans with the spectre o f Cuban-Americans 
returning to re-claim their homes. Christopher concluded that the State Department 
could not support Libertad, and "if it were presented to the President, would urge a veto." 
(Christopher, 1995)
The Clinton Administration thus made its opposition to Libertad abundantly clear, based 
on constitutional, legal, and political considerations. In anticipating many o f the
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concerns o f the international community, Clinton correctly predicted that Libertad would 
create tensions with Washington's closest trading partners.
4.5 Libertad Debate: Capitol Hill
Lee Hamilton (D/IN) valiantly led the opposition in the House in the intense debates 
over Libertad. He urged lawmakers put aside their hatred o f Castro, and legislate based 
on the best interests o f the United States, which was to engage with the Cuban people 
rather than to worsen their conditions in the hope they would revolt against Castro. 
(Hamilton 1995) Nevertheless, the House o f Representatives passed Libertad on 21st 
September 1995, by a lop-sided vote o f 294 to 130, after a restricted two-day debate.37
Christopher Dodd (D/CT) led the opposition in the Senate, asking his colleagues to 
consider the two broad questions o f whether Libertad served American interests, and 
whether Libertad would achieve the desired results. (Dodd 1995a) His Democratic 
colleagues mounted a strong filibuster, obstructing the progress of the bill by capitalising 
on the Senate's hallowed tradition o f unlimited debate. Speaker after speaker expressed 
doubt over the bill's efficacy in promoting democracy in Cuba, and warned o f impending 
clashes with allies. They successfully forced the deletion o f the two contentious titles 
with the result that the Senate's bill was an emasculated version o f H.R.927.
The House and Senate operate under very different debating rules. The powerful House 
leadership acts like a dictatorship in enacting legislation it favours, ensuring fairly easy 
passage o f Titles III and IV. The House Rules allow only limited debate (Rademaker 
interview), as is evident from House proceedings in the Congressional Record, where 
references to time limits, and to lawmakers yielding each other part o f their allotted time 
are many. When Congressman Diaz-Balart, from the Committee on Rules, introduced 
the resolution to consider H.R.927, he determined a time limit of two and a half hours for 
the debate, "equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
member o f the Committee on International Relations." (Diaz-Balart 1995)
37 Congressional Record 141: H9398-9399.
38 Gilman and Hamilton respectively.
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The Senate conducts business more by consensus. As unlimited debate is permitted, a 
determined minority can block legislation through filibuster. Sixty votes (three-fifths 
majority) are necessary to obtain cloture on debate to move a bill forward. Helms and 
his supporters made several unsuccessful attempts to invoke cloture in mid- October.39 
Interestingly, not all who favoured cloture supported Libertad. Christopher Bond 
(R/MS) stated that he would be voting for cloture because he wanted to see the 
legislative process move on, not because he supported the bill; indeed, he warned that 
"the United States will find itself under immediate attack in the World Trade 
Organization." (Bond 1995) However, Clairbome Pell (D/RI), who usually voted for 
cloture as a matter of principle, felt that extended debate was warranted in the case o f 
Libertad, and voted reluctantly against cloture. (Pell 1995)
» thThe failed attempts at cloture forced Helms to capitulate. On 18 October, he sponsored 
an amendment without Titles III and IV, declaring that "if cloture is invoked, it is my 
intention to ... lay before the Senate amendment No. 2936, the Libertad Act, with titles I 
and II only." (Helms 1995b) Senate majority leader Bob Dole (R/KS), having earlier 
accused the Democrats o f turning Libertad into a partisan issue (Dole 1995a), lamented 
that the White House had encouraged a determined minority to force Helms into deleting 
Titles III and IV (Dole 1995b). Chris Dodd rejected Dole's charge, arguing that Senators 
objected to the bill as they foresaw the problems it would create. (Dodd 1995b) Richard 
Nuccio, Clinton's Cuba advisor, claimed that he contrived the filibuster strategy. 
(Nuccio phone interview)
An overwhelming majority o f  ninety-eight Senators voted for cloture, and Libertad 
passed on 19th October 1995 by 74 to 24, denuded o f its controversial components.40 
John Kerry (D/MA) said that he did not want his "yea" vote to be misunderstood; he was 
strongly opposed to Title III, terming it "the centrepiece o f the legislation," and would 
vigorously oppose re-instatement of Title III in conference. (Kerry 1995).41
The President's Press Secretary expressed satisfaction at the Senate's action, and looked 
forward to working with Congress "to address those aspects o f the legislation that still
39 See Congressional Record 141: SI4993-4; S15113; S15217; S15277.
40 Congressional Record 141: S15325
41 Kerry was one o f the 22 Senators voting against Libertad on 5th March 1996. See Congressional 
Record 142: S I5 11.
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concern us." (McCurry 1995) Most policy-makers thought Libertad would stagnate in 
conference for an extended period. The shootdown of the two Cuban-American planes 
over Cuba in early 1996 virtually insured the passage o f Libertad as the win-sets o f the 
executive and the legislature merged.
4.6 The Conference Report
Helen Milner argues that politicians' essential interest is securing re-election. (Milner 
1997: 34) Although the President had been publicly on record as strongly opposing 
Libertad, 1996 was a presidential election year and the Florida Republican primary was 
looming on the 20th March. In condemning Castro's attack on 26th February, Clinton 
announced that the US sought Security Council condemnation and sanctions against 
Cuba and suspended all charter flights to Cuba indefinitely. Remarkably, Clinton also 
stated his intention to "reach agreement" with Congress on the pending Helms-Burton 
legislation. (Clinton 1996a) Later that day, a senior administration official voiced 
"serious doubts" about whether Libertad would promote a peaceful transition to 
democracy in Cuba, but expressed the hope that a compromise would be reached with 
Congress to "improve" the legislation and "advance our interests." (White House 1996b) 
Congress was eager to enact legislation with strong bipartisan support and the signature 
o f the President. The remarkable about-face executed by the President in seeking 
agreement with Congress on Libertad can only be explained in the context o f the 
domestic politics of a presidential election year.
It is difficult to overstate the significance o f the White House press releases o f 26th 
February, as they were the first indication that Clinton was prepared to compromise with 
Congress and sign Helms-Burton. However, Clinton's confessional severely weakened 
his bargaining position with Congress (Nuccio phone interview). Although the White 
House and Capitol Hill shared an overlapping win-set of reacting swiftly to Castro's 
outrage, their preferences were far from identical. Clinton faced a tough bargaining 
round, particularly over Titles III and IV; he severely compromised his position by 
indicating his readiness to reach an agreement at the outset, thus revealing his win-set's 
location (Mayer) to Congress.
108
Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R/FL), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R/FL), and Robert Menendez (D/NJ) 
were the three Cuban-American Congressmen on Capitol Hill in 1996. All took part in 
the drafting o f Libertad, and participated, along with Torricelli and Burton among others, 
in a conference with the White House seeking a compromise on Libertad. Diaz-Balart 
was primarily responsible for Title I, modelled on his failed bill to needle Castro. His 
coup de grace was the codification o f the embargo, which was stealthily added to Title I 
at the eleventh hour,42 Diaz-Balart having secured the support o f the aforementioned 
Congressmen outside Menendez's office, on Tuesday, 27 February 1996. (Diaz-Balart 
interview)
At eight o'clock Wednesday morning, 28 February, Diaz-Balart joined Menendez at the 
latter's office for a preliminary meeting with three Administration officials, among them 
Richard Nuccio43, who held the post o f White House Special Advisor on Cuba from May 
1995 to April 1996. Clinton's officials declared that the price o f presidential agreement 
was waiver authority for Title III.44 Diaz-Balart answered that waiver authority, though 
difficult, was open to negotiation; however, he demanded codification o f the embargo as 
a non-negotiable counter claim. The White House officials were shocked, but Diaz- 
Balart persisted that, if they did not agree, it would be tantamount to proof that Clinton 
was planning to lift the embargo. As the Clinton officials denied this allegation, Diaz- 
Balart considered the issue o f codification resolved. Diaz-Balart triumphed easily. He 
remains convinced that Clinton would have lifted the embargo unilaterally if not for the 
codification, a suspicion shared by others on Capitol Hill. (Diaz-Balart interview)
Nuccio recalled a Cabinet meeting at the White House the weekend o f the shootdown, 
where the idea of codification was discussed, but summarily dismissed by Attorney 
General Janet Reno as being unconstitutional. Nuccio's mandate was solely to negotiate 
presidential waiver authority o f Title III. Codification was overlooked, with some White
42 H.R.927 as passed by the House o f  Representatives on 21st September 1995 had no mention o f the 
codification o f the embargo. It was inserted in the final version that became PL 104-114, Section 102(h).
4j As a former Torricelli aide, Nuccio was responsible for the Cuban Democracy A ct’s Track IL (Rieff 
1996:73)
44 Nuccio recalled that Menendez first mooted the compromise suggestion o f a presidential waiver 
authority for Title III in late 1995.
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House officials shockingly admitting later they had no idea it was so important a 
principle! (Nuccio phone interview; Nuccio 1999: 27 fn9)
thThe hill conference convened in the afternoon o f Wednesday, 28 February. Menendez 
was present, but, as the ranking Democrat on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, 
credited by Senator Dole as being "central in getting the Clinton administration to see the 
light on the legislation" (Dole 1996), left to phone Deputy National Security Advisor 
Sandy Berger. In the difficult talks over Titles III and IV, Congress' strategy called for 
Diaz-Balart to play the 'tough guy' in discussions over Title III, and for Torricelli to play 
the same role in negotiating Title IV. Diaz-Balart debated by phone through Menendez 
with Berger, who was next to Clinton. "Negotiating every comma," was how Diaz- 
Balart described the tortuous talks over Title III. At five o'clock, with Title III finally 
agreed, the White House officials brought up the subject o f a presidential waiver for Title 
IV, and Torricelli staged a great show of anger, as arranged, unbelievably leading the 
Administration to concede Title IV entirely! Diaz-Balart believed that Clinton could 
have won waiver authority over Title IV, but the White House team did not pursue the 
matter with sufficient conviction. (Diaz-Balart interview)
The wording o f the presidential waiver authority o f Title III was the subject o f intense 
discussion. The Conference Report indicated that the President sought broad suspension 
authority on the basis that it was "important to the national interests o f the United States, 
including expediting a transition to democracy in Cuba." The Conference Committee 
specifically rejected the broad language sought by the White House as it subordinated the 
question of expediting democracy in Cuba to the broader question o f the President's 
interpretation o f what was in the national interest. The legislators wanted the 
consideration of whether a suspension will expedite a transition to democracy to be the 
"central element" in the President's decision-making process. The Conference 
Committee tied the President's hands by requiring him to meet two distinct criteria before 
authorising suspension: firstly, that it was "necessary to national interests of the United 
States and [secondly] will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." (§305b/l) The 
Report expressed the belief that the President could not "in good faith" determine that 
suspension met these two vital standards, nor would such action expedite a transition to
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democracy as it would blunt an important weapon in ousting Castro. (Conference Report 
1996: 62) Nuccio agreed this language was much more restrictive than that sought by the 
White House, and was designed so as to make it virtually impossible to exercise. 
Nevertheless, the White House adopted the waiver as a face-saving gesture that allowed 
Clinton to sign Helms-Burton without appearing to completely backtrack. (Nuccio 
phone interview)
The easy White House surrender on a presidential waiver for Title IV was astonishing, 
particularly with the hindsight o f how integral this power was to become in the 
resolution o f the US-EU dispute over Libertad. Nuccio recalled that when a Title IV 
waiver was broached, the White House team was resolutely rebuffed in an abusive and 
contemptuous manner typical o f  Republicans, and particularly their staffers, when they 
knew they had the Democratic opposition trapped. (Nuccio phone interview)
This thesis argues that the Clinton White House were inept negotiators. Not only had 
Clinton conceded willingness to compromise before the start o f talks, his team did not 
secure broad waiver authority for Title III, and failed altogether to win any presidential 
leverage over Title IV. The resulting Libertad bill was substantially harsher than even 
the original H.R.927 passed by the House in 1995, which the White House had 
threatened to veto.
But potentially the most damaging aspect of Helms-Burton was the provision to codify 
the embargo, for it transferred substantial authority to determine the foreign policy 
agenda from the President to the Congress. The Conference Report that accompanied 
Libertad specifically noted Congress' frustration and dissatisfaction with the Executive's 
implementation of the Cuban embargo. "The explicit mandates in this legislation make 
clear congressional intent that U.S. law be enforced fully and, thereby, provide a basis 
for strict congressional oversight o f executive branch enforcement measures henceforth." 
(Conference Report 1996: 44). Libertad's Title I codified the embargo against Cuba, thus 
replacing executive 'listlessness' with a binding law, whose implementation would be 
supervised by a diligent Congress.
I l l
Putnam's two-level game predicts greater distributional gains accrue to the player with 
the smaller win-set. By reversing itself on its opposition to Libertad, the Clinton 
Administration enlarged its win-set vis-a-vis Capitol Hill, thus ensuring a successful 
compromise, but it forfeited the bargaining advantage that it would have had by 
maintaining its reservations. Clinton could have used uncertainty to his advantage, 
negotiating with Capitol Hill without revealing his intentions and obtaining a settlement 
closer to his ideal outcome. By disclosing early that he sought a compromise that would 
enable him to sign Libertad, he undermined his own negotiating position.45
Robert Muse expressed bitter disappointment that Clinton did not threaten a veto to 
obtain more favourable terms, but he conceded that Clinton never knew how to 'work' 
the Congress. (Muse interview) As governor o f a small Southern state, with no contacts 
in the capital, Clinton came to Washington as an outsider; though renowned for his 
communication skills, he never nurtured a relationship with Capitol Hill. Consequently, 
his presidency was plagued by strained relations with a recalcitrant legislature -  narrow 
approval o f NAFTA, failure to ratify the Kyoto agreement - even before the 1994 
elections resulted in divided government.
At a news conference on 28th February, Presidential Press Secretary Mike McCurry 
expressed the President's "delight" that the White House and Capitol Hill had reached 
agreement by which the president would sign the bill and encourage members o f 
Congress to support it. McCurry said Libertad would deal "both...with this incident 
[shootdown] and...promote our overall goal o f democratic change in Cuba." (McCurry 
1996)
4.7 Public Law 104-114
The Senate held a two and a half hour debate on 5th March (Lott 1996) and the House, a 
one hour debate on 6th March (Diaz-Balart 1996). Senator Dodd regretted that the Senate 
did not have sufficient opportunity to deliberate the bill, particularly as the conference 
had produced a new version replete with objectionable provisions, such as extraterritorial
43 Putnam's analysis refers to Level I; this thesis has applied the principle to Level II bargaining.
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aspects and the right o f action granted to Cuba-Americans. Dodd argued the codification 
o f the embargo (§ 102/h), was "very dangerous" in that it "tied the hands o f this and 
future Presidents...in their efforts to respond flexibly to changes ...in  Havana." (Dodd 
1996)
Senator Bob Dole happily declared that the "critical section" deleted by filibuster had 
been restored in conference, and that President Clinton had endorsed the new bill. Dole 
read Clinton's letter, "The Conference report is a strong, bipartisan response that tightens 
the economic embargo against the Cuban regime and permits us to continue to promote 
democratic change in Cuba. I urge Congress to pass the Libertad bill in order to send 
Cuba a powerful message that the United States will not tolerate further loss o f American 
life." (Dole 1996)
Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R/KS)46 declared that she would reluctantly support the bill, 
as it had the endorsement o f both the Republican leadership and the President. She 
likened her ambivalence to the story about a cowboy who worked hard all week, then 
rode into town each weekend and lost his entire wages in a poker game. When someone 
pointed out to him that the game was rigged against him, he replied that he knew, but 
would continue to play because it was the only game in town. "Despite its faults, this 
legislation is the only game in town. For that reason, I will support it." (Kassebaum 
1996) The Senate passed the Helms-Burton Act by a vote of 74 to 22 on 5th March 
1996.47
Diaz-Balart opened the House debate, characterising Castro as a "gangster regime." 
(Diaz-Balart 1996) John Moakley (D/MA), doubted Libertad would topple Castro, 
worried it would only make the lives o f ordinary Cubans more miserable, and cited 
strong opposition to Libertad from leading national newspapers. (Moakley 1996) 
Libertad was passed by 336 to 86 that afternoon.
46 Kassebaum had changed her vote from yea to nay on the cloture vote that Helms lost by one vote on 
17th October 1995, thus forcing Helms to delete Titles III and IV. See Congressional Record 141: S 15113 
and S 15217.
47 Congressional Record 142: S15 10-S1511
48 Congressional Record 142: H I749
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thPresident Clinton signed Libertad into law on 12 March 1996, welcoming the 
congressmen who had supported the bill to the White House and declaring that he had 
decided to work with Congress to "reach prompt agreement" on Libertad after the 
shootdown. Alluding to the waiver compromise on Title III, Clinton singled out 
Congressman Menendez as having exerted great effort to produce "a better bill...within 
two days." (Clinton 1996b) Robert Muse charged that Clinton asked aides what was in 
the bill as he was walking along the corridor to sign the bill! (Muse interview)
4.8 Legal Implications
Titles III and IV were controversial due to their extraterritorial implications, in addition 
to Title Ill's granting a right of action to Cuban-Americans. Although this is not a legal 
dissertation, it is appropriate to briefly discuss some of these legal implications of 
Libertad.
4.8.1 Extraterritoriality
The American position is primarily based on the Restatement (Third) o f  the Foreign 
Relations o f  the United States §§402-04 (1987), which is a collection o f model rules, 
compiled by the American Law Institute, and extensively used by lawmakers when 
drafting legislation. The Restatement carries significant weight, particularly in the 
absence o f any other guidance. It notes that international law acknowledges restrictions 
on the authority o f states to legislate extraterritorially, but the rigid concepts o f 
territoriality and nationality have been replaced by broader measures o f fairness that 
reconcile conflicting interests o f states. §402 states "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe 
law with respect to...conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory." §403 limits a state from exercising jurisdiction if 
doing so is "unreasonable," and, in the event o f conflict arising, mandates that "a state 
should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater." §404 gives the 
state jurisdiction to punish offences such as piracy and hijacking, even when not so 
indicated under the 'effects' o f §402. To conclude, the Restatement's position is "that a 
state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or intended
114
effect is substantial and the exercise o f jurisdiction is reasonable." {Restatement 1987: 
235-54)
Libertad referred obliquely to the Restatement when introducing Title III, proclaiming, 
"International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules o f law with 
respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect 
within its territory." (PL 104-114, §301/9) Proponents o f Libertad have extensively cited 
the Restatement to argue the legality o f Title III under international law. Monroe Leigh, 
prominent lawyer and former legal advisor to both the Departments of State and 
Defense, testified that Title III does not contradict international law because its 
implementation occurs only within US territorial boundaries, as lawsuits may only be 
brought against 'traffickers' who enter and operate within the United States. (Leigh 
1996: 22-23). Miami attorney Ignacio Sanchez concurred, further claiming that the US 
"is entitled to enact legislation with respect to conduct outside its territory if it has an 
effect within its territory." (Sanchez 1995: 136)
Washington lawyer Brice Clagett argued that the 'effects' jurisdiction has been expanding 
with increasing globalisation, citing the example o f the EU's objection to the Boeing- 
McDonnell Douglas merger because o f possible effects on the European aircraft 
industry. Supporters o f Libertad also considered American interests in Cuba greater than 
those of Europe, not least because o f the geographic proximity, concluding that Europe 
should acquiesce and defer to Washington, as §403 mandates. Finally, Clagett argued 
that a foreign nation's interest in protecting a 'trafficker' is neither greater nor more 
legitimate than American attempts to help its citizens recover their property, claiming 
that both were operating extraterritorially. Clagett concluded that, rather than violating 
international law, Libertad positively contributed to its further development "by 
reinforcing otherwise rudimentary enforcement mechanisms, which provide little 
deterrence to rogue states that ignore the law and violate with impunity the most 
elementary human rights." (Clagett 1996-7: 279-282, 296)
The State Department disagreed strongly with the legal underpinnings o f Title III; it 
concluded that Title III was inconsistent with international law, and, without specifically
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referring to the Restatement, argued that none o f the criteria advanced by the Restatement 
were fulfilled. It was "difficult to imagine" how 'trafficking' in expropriated American 
assets has a substantial effect within the United States. Finally, whilst many countries 
legislate domestically against ill-gotten gains, 'trafficking' per se is not prohibited by 
international law, whereas Title Ill's broad extraterritoriality may itself be an 
infringement of international law. (State 1995)
The State Department robustly opposed the civil remedy proposed by Title III. It 
labelled the right o f action "an unprecedented extra-territorial application o f U.S. law 
that flies in the face o f important U.S. interests" that would "create friction with our 
allies, fail to provide an effective remedy for U.S. claimants and seriously damage the 
interests of...certified claimants." It predicted that Title Ill's extraterritorial application 
would force many US allies to take legal action to protect their nationals. This was an 
oblique reference the UK's 1980 Protection of Trading Interests Act, passed in response 
to Whitehall's displeasure with the pipeline sanctions.49 (Ibid)
Many countries do not accept the American interpretation o f the 'effects' doctrine. 
Europeans accept the 'effects' doctrine only if the effect outside the territory is an integral 
part o f the wrong, without which there would be no wrong. (Stem 1997: 13) The 
European Union issued a sharp statement re-iterating its position expressed many times 
in diplomatic demarches, that the "extraterritorial extension o f US jurisdiction is 
unacceptable as a matter o f law and policy." The EU was concerned over several aspects 
o f the legislation, including the right o f action to adjudicate disputes over expropriated 
Cuban property. The statement cautioned that the EU was "examining the compatibility 
o f this legislation with WTO rules" and concluded with the explicit warning that Brussels 
intended to "defend its legitimate interests in the appropriate international fora." 
(Commission 1996b)
Libertad specifically referred to State Department notifications to foreign governments 
"that the transfer to third parties o f properties confiscated by the Cuban Government 
'would complicate any attempt to return them to their original owners.'" (PL 104-114,
49 This was the basis for the EU's blocking action, taken the following year.
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§301/7) As early as 1993, Secretary Warren Christopher had ordered American 
diplomatic missions to alert prospective buyers "to ensure that property the Cuban 
government attempts to sell or otherwise dispose o f is not the subject o f a claim by a 
U.S. national." (Christopher 1993) But the 1995 State Department review reversed itself 
by refusing to accept that transferring assets to a third party constituted a "substantial 
effect" as Cuba, the expropriating state, retained responsibility for compensation or 
restitution. The Europeans also argued that business dealings fifty years after 
nationalisation neither augment nor diminish American property claims. (Stern 1997: 
15)
4.8.2 Right of Action for Cuban-Americans
Brice Clagett argued that the right o f Cuban-Americans to sue under Title III was 
justified under several grounds, among them the Restatement and the widely accepted 
notion o f including property rights as an essential part o f international human rights. He 
cited international documents such as the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights of 
1948 and a lengthy 1992 report prepared by the UN Commission on Human Rights to 
support this claim. Furthermore, Clagett contended that the EU and most of the 
Americas had formally accepted the legal concept o f the right o f individuals to be 
compensated for loss o f property, even when expropriated by their own government. 
(Clagett 1996-7: 287-291)
Nicolas Gutierrez decried the rift that developed between the certified claimants and the 
Cuban-Americans, for, in seeking to gain compensation from Castro "we hang together 
or hang separately." (Gutierrez interview) Sanchez argued that the Cuban government 
did not have 'good title,' having confiscated American assets without compensation and 
Libertad recognised that Castro was selling 'bad title.' Sanchez cited cases that 
developed after the Bolshevik Revolution, in which Russian emigres' claim to bank 
accounts held abroad was disputed by the new communist government. American case 
law acknowledged that the US could not legislate for another country; however, it was 
against US public policy to recognise unlawful confiscation o f property, and the US 
therefore recognised the claims o f the emigres as legitimate. The Czech glass
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manufacturers, Karl Zeiss, whose family fled to the West with the communist take-over, 
won their right to maintain their highly respected trademark in Western Europe. 
Similarly, Cubans who lost assets must be recognised as legitimate owners to enable 
them to obtain redress. Castro's sale o f such assets unduly complicated the matter. 
(Sanchez interview)
Sanchez argued that Libertad was a continuation o f a long-standing American policy, 
denied that Title III was extraterritorial, and claimed that international law recognises 
that a country may legislate outside its own borders if it is affected by foreigners' 
conduct, a reference to the Restatement §402. Sanchez argued that the certified 
claimants received a tax write-off o f $1.8 billion in 1960 dollars for their losses in Cuba, 
and Cuban-Americans received a tax write-off, spread over twenty years, for their losses; 
both groups must repay these monies to the US Treasury when those assets are 
recovered. The US government is therefore directly affected by the unresolved issue o f 
American assets in Cuba, and can legitimately legislate in this area. (Sanchez interview)
The retroactive right granted to Cuban-Americans was hotly contested. During the final 
debate before passage o f Libertad, Senator Dodd quoted from a legal brief prepared by 
Washington attorney Robert Muse that clearly stated the limits o f protection under 
international law o f Cuban-American losses in Cuba. "If international law is to apply to 
a governmental taking o f property, a party claiming the loss must occupy at the time o f 
loss the status of an alien with respect to the Government that took the property. The 
injured person must be a foreign national." (Dodd 1996)
Muse argued that the US should not use its courts to institute a mass restitution of 
properties to Cuban-Americans for several reasons; this entitlement represented a 
"profoundly undemocratic" solution in not allowing the Cubans to decide the matter, and 
such judgements could hinder normalisation o f relations between Washington and 
Havana. (Muse 1996-7: 229-31) Senator Dodd also worried that Title III was an 
alarming reversal o f along-standing American precedent in that Title III would transform 
the judicial system, "the principal duty o f which is to adjudicate legal disputes, into an 
instrument o f U.S. foreign policy, something we have always tried to avoid." (Dodd
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1996) But Ignacio Sanchez argued that the inclusion o f Cuban-Americans "is imperative 
to accomplish the foreign policy goals" o f Libertad, for the certified claimants 
represented a mere 5 percent of saleable Cuban properties; including Cuban-Americans 
broadened the range o f properties enormously. (Sanchez 1995: 135)
Robert Muse had ulterior motives in objecting to the right o f action granted to Cuban- 
Americans. Corporations whose claims had been certified were horrified by the idea o f 
thousands o f Cuban-Americans being granted the right to sue in US courts by Title III, 
and they lobbied vigorously against it. Muse30 represented Amstar Corporation, the 
corporate descendant o f American Sugar. Amstar owned extensive sugar plantations and 
two sugar refineries in Cuba, and, despite having divested itself o f its sugar interests 
(selling out to the British firm o f Tate and Lyle) and diversified into electrical tools, 
retained its $81 million certified claim against Cuba. In Muse's words, reflective o f the 
feelings o f the other 5,911 certified claimants, "We drown in a pool o f Cuban-American 
claims." (Kiger 1997: 51) David Wallace, the chairman of the Joint Corporate 
Committee on Cuban Claims representing most o f the $1.6 billion in certified claims, 
lobbied strongly against Title III. He predicted that Title III would overwhelm the courts 
with 300,000 to 430,000 lawsuits,31 and threaten the property rights o f the certified 
claimants. "This unprecedented conferral o f retroactive rights upon naturalized citizens is 
not only contrary to international law, but raises serious implications with respect to the 
Cuban government's ability to satisfy the certified claims." (Wallace 1995a; 1995b)
To conclude, the judiciary is the final arbiter o f conflicting interpretations in domestic 
law, but international law enjoys no such final referee. It is significant that the 
Restatement upon whose authority supporters argue Helms-Burton's legality is purely an 
American interpretation o f international law. It was hardly surprising that foreign 
countries disputed the legal premises o f the Restatement, when the debate raged among 
American legal experts as well; adjudicating the legality o f Libertad rested as much on 
political as on legal considerations. Muse warns that blase American attitudes
30 Muse was one o f the key lobbyists responsible for the emasculation o f  Libertad in the Senate in 1995. 
(Kavuiich interview)
51 Some observers feel Wallace’s prediction may be exaggerated, due to the enormous cost involved in 
documenting the claims and mounting the court action.
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questioning whether there is such a thing as international law could rebound with severe 
consequences, as American national interests lie in promoting compliance. (Muse 1996- 
7: 267-268)
4.9 Conclusion
The decision-making process can be quite different from the ideal paradigm o f rational 
choice deliberation. Policy-makers who are burdened with enormous workloads and tight 
schedules rarely have time to consider comprehensive policy options. Henry Kissinger 
protested that leaders have no time to reflect. "They are locked in an endless battle in 
which the urgent constantly gains on the important. The public life o f every political 
figure is a continual struggle to rescue an element of choice from the pressure of 
circumstance." (Kegley and Wittkopf 1995: 50)
In response to Dominguez's 'mobilising incident' o f Castro's brutal shootdown of 
American planes, the Helms-Burton Act was summarily resurrected, hastily enacted by 
overwhelming majorities on Capitol Hill and signed into law by President Clinton on 12th 
March 1996. Although Clinton lauded bipartisan lawmakers for producing a "better bill" 
(Clinton 1996b), Public Law 104-114 retained all the objectionable passages that had 
worried the executive, mitigated only by the face-saving presidential waiver of Title III. 
This thesis contends that Clinton fully intended to use the waiver, ignoring the legislative 
intent designed to make it unworkable. The president knew he faced Hobson's choice in 
reconciling the constraints o f his Level II domestic constituency with his obligations to 
allies in the Level I international arena. Title III waiver authority was the equivalent of 
an 'escape clause' that Clinton would use with consistent regularity.
This thesis argues that Clinton's representatives showed appalling negotiating skills in 
their bargaining with Congress. While it is true that Clinton had little room for 
manoeuvre - domestic constraints demanded he sign Helms-Burton - he conceded a great 
deal to Congress in his haste to present a unified response to Castro's brutality. This 
thesis argues that Clinton erred in two specific areas that had entirely different political 
consequences. He agreed to the codification o f the embargo, which set an important 
institutional precedent and significantly enhanced congressional authority in determining
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foreign policy at the expense o f the White House. And he did not obtain waiver 
authority for Title IV, which virtually guaranteed friction between Level II domestic 
considerations and Level I international obligations.
The United States Constitution is deliberately obtuse in delegating power to conduct 
foreign policy to two branches o f government. The President is commander-in-chief o f 
the armed forces and charged with the power to negotiate treaties, but the Congress 
controls the purse strings and the Senate must approve treaties and presidential 
appointments by a two-thirds majority. The result has been an institutional power 
struggle over prerogatives in the conduct foreign policy. Jesse Helms famously told 
visiting United Nations dignitaries that "it has been suggested ...that the president alone 
speaks for the United States in foreign affairs. And in most o f the nations...that is 
indeed the case. Not so in the United States." (Vita 2000)
The Cuban embargo had, until Helms-Burton, been an executive order, to be renewed 
annually by the president. Clinton's concession embedded the Cuban embargo into a 
formal statute under congressional control. In view of the intergovernmental tensions 
over foreign policy decision-making, codification o f the embargo rescinded an important 
presidential right to provide flexible responses to changing events.
The separation o f powers that characterises American political institutions charges the 
executive with implementing legislation passed by Congress. Clinton had the option to 
implement Libertad energetically or sparingly. Clinton chose the latter, implementing 
Title IV so fastidiously that only four companies o f the potentially dozens doing business 
in suspect property were cited under Title IV. What irony that the same Administration 
that was so hesitantly applying the bill at home had to defend this rash and irksome bill 
on the international stage.
To conclude, this chapter has documented the Level II domestic divisions over Libertad; 
Clinton and Democratic leaders on Capitol Hill predicted Libertad would not achieve its 
dual aims o f internationalising the embargo or promoting democracy in Cuba, and 
worried that Libertad was not conducive to Washington's broader interests. Castro's 
brutality altered the domestic context, temporarily uniting the disparate groups with a
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shared win-set to enact Helms-Burton, and thereafter condemning Clinton to endure 
irreconcilable domestic constraints and international obligations.
Chapter 5
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Level II: US Domestic Politics and the Cuban-Americans
“Fidel drove me out o f  Eden... and he stands there still, clutching a fiery  sword, to keep 
me from  reclaiming the knowledge that should be mine. ” (Eire 2003: 248)
“As the United States is a representative democracy, its foreign policy must, to some 
extent, reflect domestic values and institutions. ” (Purcell 1998: 37)
“It is unseemly in a democracy as strong as Am erica’s fo r  a single pressure group to 
dictate policy, especially one that is so wrong-headed. ” (Zimbalist 1993: 167)
5.1 Introduction
This thesis argues that non-state actors were primarily responsible for the hardening o f 
the Cuban embargo in the 1990s. In a policy area o f marginal interest to most 
Americans, domestic pressure groups, essentially Cuban-American hard-liners, hijacked 
Washington's Cuba policy. This thesis does not argue that the Cuban-Americans were 
solely responsible for Helms-Burton; a confluence o f interests between state and non­
state actors resulted in Libertad. But it does argue that the Cuban-American comunidad 
manipulated the agenda vis-a-vis Cuba to reflect its rabidly anti-Castro interests. Their 
formidable influence waned in the late 1990s as pressure on Washington to soften its 
Cuba stance was fuelled both by the international controversy created by Helms-Burton 
and by a coalition o f US domestic non-state actors who sought modification o f the 
Cuban embargo.
The next two chapters examine the American Level II non-state actors that jostled for 
primacy in shaping Cuba policy. This chapter investigates the Cuban-American interest 
groups, analysing their legitimacy as policy brokers and their ability to set national 
policy agendas and negotiate outcomes. Chapter 6 explores pressure groups from the 
business world that advocated general sanctions reform, including moderation of the 
Cuban embargo, and analyses their effectiveness.
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5.1.1 Non-state Actors
The argument that non-state actors have become increasingly significant in the world, 
both politically and economically, has its roots in the 1970s interdependence literature of 
Keohane and Nye, which argued that the state-centric view o f the Realists was becoming 
increasingly anachronistic in a world o f more permeable borders. Globalisation perforce 
led to increased interdependence among states, with transnational actors, particularly 
multinational corporations, gaining dominance in the international political economy at 
the expense o f the state. Moreover, even civil society NGOs, such as environmental 
groups, have also grown increasingly influential through transnational alliances 
facilitated by widespread use o f modern communications technology. The disruption o f 
the 1999 WTO talks in Seattle by the environmental/labour coalition was a remarkable 
illustration o f this.
Interest groups representing civil and business interests in Washington have grown 
exponentially. In 1955, there were approximately five thousand national associations; by 
1999, the number had climbed to over twenty-three thousand. There has been growth 
not only in business and trade associations, but also in pressure groups with a foreign 
policy agenda. (Hula 1999: 3) Some analysts worry that this phenomenon indicates a 
fragmentation o f America's political system. But interest groups do not seek to 
restructure the government or challenge egalitarian values; they work within the political 
institutions to increase the "representation o f the unrepresented." (Berry 1999: 28)
The uniqueness o f the American democratic structure promotes growth o f interest groups 
in the US more than in the European democracies. The US has a strong two-party 
system, based on plurality and single-member districts, rather than proportional 
representation. Thus it is extremely difficult for a new party to emerge on the national 
scene; indeed, the last new party to elect a president was the Republican Party in 1860. 
Whereas environmental concerns have spawned numerous green parties in Europe in 
recent decades, American environmentalists have organised lobby groups to advance 
their platform in Washington. (Ibid: 16)
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Institutional changes in American government have encouraged the proliferation o f 
interest groups. As the federal government has grown and new programmes have been 
created, the opportunities for influence by lobby groups have grown concomitantly, 
creating a 'supply side' to interest group formation. Furthermore, Congress itself has 
become more decentralised, resulting in a proliferation o f subcommittees offering greater 
access to interest groups. Lobbyists perform an important function for government 
officials, in the way that they gather and disseminate information, conduct research, 
mobilise public opinion, and educate lawmakers through expert testimony in 
congressional committees. (Ibid 19-33)
Helen Milner focuses on the much-neglected role o f information in the domestic polity. 
The uncertainty that results from incomplete or asymmetric information leads to less 
than optimal levels o f cooperation and political advantage for the owner o f more 
information, who is generally the executive (particularly in foreign affairs). By 
providing policy-makers with information in the course o f attempting to influence 
policy, interest groups unintentionally eliminate both the inefficiencies and the political 
advantages caused by incomplete information, thus facilitating cooperation and 
agreement. (Milner 1997: 20-23) The presence o f an 'endorser', an interest group that 
provides reliable information to the legislature about a particular issue, greatly enhances 
the chances of ratifying an agreement. Multiple endorsements from opposing groups 
guarantee congressional acceptance o f a proposal. (Ibid: 239)
The traditional role o f interest groups, however, is to act as pressure groups; lawmakers 
decide policy based on the preferences o f their constituents, and neglecting the 
preferences o f interest groups may lead to loss o f financial or electoral support. Interest 
group pressure has consequences in both the domestic and the international domains, as 
their preferences may determine the essence o f domestic policy and the extent of 
cooperation internationally.
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5.2 The Cuban-Americans: Demography
The Cuban-American exile community has an obvious and enduring interest in 
Washington's relations with their island home, and has been credited with perpetuating 
and indeed strengthening America's continued sanctions against Cuba. Their leitmotif 
has been a resolutely uncompromising hostility towards Castro and a refusal to engage in 
negotiation with his regime. The militancy and intolerance that characterise the exile 
community have been underscored by a Manichaean vision o f  stark black and white: the 
wonderful days o f pre-revolutionary Cuba contrasted with the absolute evil o f the Castro 
regime. This mindset perforce prevents hard-liners from conceding that the revolution 
has accomplished anything o f value, and perpetuates the comunidad’s resistance to 
dialogue or compromise with Castro on pain o f charges o f treason. (Castro 1997: 93)
The first Cuban exiles to flee Castro and arrive in the US in the early 1960s were mostly 
white, middle-class, urban professionals,32 who settled mainly in the Miami metropolitan 
area (Dade County) where their cultural enclave is called 'Little Havana.' They built up a 
hugely successful Spanish-speaking economy in banking, construction and trading, 
living in a sort o f limbo o f being physically in the US, but culturally and psychologically 
in Cuba. Subsequent waves o f  immigration brought a broader representation o f Cubans, 
with regard to ethnicity, race, and socio-economic status, to American shores. Today's 
exile community is somewhat divided along class and generational lines with the earliest 
wave o f exiles, who are the oldest and the most economically successful, tending to be 
the most conservative and the most virulently anti-Castro. The majority o f this Cuban- 
born community remains concentrated in Miami, close to their place o f birth, all o f 
which gives the Cuban exile community "an unusually high degree o f  cohesion, and a 
concentration of political weight, greater than that o f other diasporic communities." 
(Molyneux 1999: 292)
32 Substantial emigration from Spain made Cuba the most Spanish o f  Latin countries by 1959. Castro’s 
revolution simplified Cuba’s complex socio-econom ic structure, as the descendants o f  these emigres fled. 
Present-day Cuban society closely resembles Caribbean ethnicity, with the majority o f  Cubans black, 
although the party leadership remains overwhelmingly white. (Falcoff 1998b: 568-569)
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In a beautifully evocative memoir o f his Cuban childhood, Carlos Eire writes,
It was early 1961. March, to be exact. About one half o f  my classmates had vanished without 
saying a word. One day they’d be there, and the next day they’d be gone. Teachers vanished 
too. O ff to the United States or som e other country. The rest o f  us knew why they were 
vanishing and why they couldn’t say good-bye, but it hurt all the same to see the empty desks.
By April the school had to close because there were too few students and teachers, and 
because so much had changed for the worse.
We children o f the Revolution had much to learn when I was in fifth grade. Everything 
changed ....as bombs fell from the sky, and bullets flew, and money evaporated, and Fidel laid 
claim to our souls, and everyone I knew and cared about vanished quietly....
(Eire 2003:266-267)
Second generation Cuban-Americans born in the US put down firmer roots, seeing 
themselves more as ethnic Americans rather than as exiles, and plunging purposefully 
into the political arena. Cuban-American leaders, quick to recognise the political 
leverage that citizenship would confer, began promoting naturalisation in the mid-1970s. 
The Republican Party supported this crusade, which culminated in an extraordinary 
event at Miami's Orange Bowl in which over 5,000 Cubans were naturalised. This was 
conveniently just before voter registration closed for the 1984 presidential election, and 
was attended by the incumbent, President Reagan. Naturalisation rates among Cubans 
have been among the highest among immigrant groups, and have helped them achieve 
political influence. (DeSipio 1996: 153-154)
By the 1990s, two Republican Cuban-Americans were serving in the House of 
Representatives from the Miami area: Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (elected 1988, 18th 
congressional district) and Lincoln Diaz-Balart (elected 1994, 21st congressional district), 
with many Cuban-Americans serving as elected officials in the townships o f Dade. The 
13 congressional district in New Jersey (Union City, Bayonne, Newark) boasts the next 
most important concentration o f Cuban-Americans, and they, too, elected one o f their 
own, Robert Menendez, a Democrat, to the House o f Representatives in 1992.53
In addition to their elected representatives, Cuban-Americans wield considerable 
political clout by exploiting the geopolitical fact that their voting power is highly
5’’ Mario Diaz-Balart, brother o f Lincoln, was elected to represent Florida’s 25th congressional district in 
2002. Florida elected the first Cuban-American Senator, Mel Martinez, in 2004.
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concentrated in the two politically important states o f Florida and New Jersey.54 Cuban- 
Americans account for only eight percent o f the population o f the state o f Florida but, as 
their voter participation rates are so high, they account for 14-16 percent o f the vote in 
the state. (Garcia interview)
Contrary to other Hispanic groups (and immigrant groups in general) that vote Democrat, 
Cuban-Americans are exceptional in supporting the Republicans.3:5 The Institute o f 
Public Opinion Research (IPOR) o f Florida International University (FIU) and the 
Miami Herald have conducted a 'Cuba Poll' biannually since 1991. One o f the most 
significant results to emerge was the fact that the domestic spillover effect o f the exile 
community's concern over Washington's Cuba policy is manifested in their loyalty to the 
Republican Party. The 1997 poll found that 70 percent o f Miami exiles registered as 
Republicans and only 16 percent as Democrats (with 14 percent Independents). Analysts 
attribute this atypical voting pattern to Cuban exile concern over foreign policy issues 
with 70 per cent admitting that the local candidate's position vis-a-vis Cuba determines 
their vote in local elections. (Grenier and Gladwin 1997: 2-4) These figures not 
withstanding, there is a significant degree o f asymmetrical bipartisanship and strategic 
voting among Cuban-Americans, which has figured importantly in presidential elections 
since 1992.
'Diaspora' is an apt description o f the Cuban-American community as they are an 
ethnically distinct minority group o f migrant origins, residing and acting in host- 
countries, but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their homeland. 
Although diaspora groups are citizens o f  their host country, they often feel they retain the 
right to influence political/economic events in their homeland either directly or 
indirectly, through lobbying the host country, in what has been labelled 'long distance 
citizenship' (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001: 218-20; Molyneux 1999: 292).
The Cuban-American diaspora in the 1990s numbered in the region o f nearly two million 
people; it was a highly cohesive unit, especially the three-quarters o f a million souls
34 87% o f all Cuban-Americans live in four states: 65% in Florida, 8% in New Jersey, and 7% each in 
New York and California. (M olyneux 1999: 307)
53 They blame President John Kennedy, a Democrat, for the Bay o f  Pigs fiasco.
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resident in the greater Miami area, who comprised an astonishing 29 percent o f Miami's 
population in 2000.36 The Cubans who fled Castro's regime over the last 40 years see 
themselves as 'exiles'57 or 'political refugees' rather than as 'immigrants', an appellation 
unique among the many immigrant groups that form the American melting pot. This has 
resonance in their resistance to assimilation and in their relationships with other 
immigrant groups, especially other Hispanics. (Castro 1997: 93) The first wave o f 
immigrants sincerely viewed themselves as temporary residents in the US, confident in 
the imminent overthrow o f Castro; the geographic proximity o f  Miami to Cuba only 
served to encourage the dream that they would soon return. Castro's fear o f a concerted 
American attack after the failure o f the Bay o f Pigs invasion is cited as one o f the reasons 
for the build-up of Soviet missiles in the summer o f 1962; President Kennedy pledged to 
respect Cuba's sovereignty in the resolution o f that crisis. (Allison 1971: 47) 
Nevertheless, subsequent administrations tacitly encouraged the dream o f many exiles of 
a military foray into Cuba, and most pretended not to notice attacks by para-military 
Cuban-American groups launched from South Florida.38 (Rieff 1995: 77-80)
5.3 Cuban American National Foundation: Hard-liners
The first successful attempt to influence American policy on Cuba through conventional 
means was the formation o f a pressure group called the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF). Founded by Jorge Mas Canosa and Raul Masvidal in 1981, CANF 
specifically sought to lobby Congress against a negotiated settlement with Castro and to 
increase support for policies that put pressure on Cuba. Mas Canosa almost single- 
handedly moulded CANF into a powerful and sophisticated pressure group, which 
virtually monopolised American policy towards Cuba through the nineties. The source 
o f CANF's clout was both its sizeable donations to favoured political candidates, and its
36 The Miami Cubans accounted for 56% o f the Cuban-American population in 1997. (Molyneux 1999:
307) According to the 2000 Census, the Cubans were the largest Hispanic nationality both in Florida and 
in Miami. Florida's population was 17% Hispanic, with 31% o f that group Cuban. Miami-Dade's 
population was 57% Hispanic, with half o f that Cuban. See
www.miami.com/herald/special/news/census2000/docs/hispanic pop.htni (downloaded 30/01/02)
37The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act treated Cuban immigrants as political refugees, affording them special 
status not accorded any other group and encouraging their self-image as exiles. This changed in May 
1995, with a new accord limiting Cuban immigration to just 20,000 annually. (R ieff 1995: 87)
58 For a fuller discussion o f terrorist attacks mounted by militant Cuban-Americans in the 1970s, see 
Robbins 1992: 171.
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ability to ensure the block votes o f Cuban-American exiles. CANF helped President 
Reagan solidify his political base in Florida in the 1980s, donating substantial sums to 
Republican coffers and delivering thousands o f Cuban exile votes. Furthermore, CANF's 
influence was magnified by the strategic geographic location o f the Cuban exile 
communities in New Jersey and Florida, "where every vote is critical."39
Jorge Mas Canosa was a genuine American success story, arriving penniless to the 
United States in 1960, and building up a multimillion-doliar telecommunications 
company in South Florida. Mas Canosa was catapulted to political prominence as he 
spoke fluent English, enjoyed a close personal relationship with President Reagan, and 
knew the "ins and outs Capitol Hill." By 1986, Mas Canosa was regularly testifying 
before congressional subcommittees in Washington, forcefully articulating his hard-line, 
anti-Castro view. Mas Canosa was also dictatorial and aggressive, allowing no dissent 
from his hard-line policies at CANF; he waged 'war' against The Miami Herald in the 
early 1990s when he disagreed with their editorials urging a more moderate approach to 
Cuba, sponsoring billboards and bumper stickers that proclaimed "I don't believe the 
Herald." (Davison 1997; Zengerle 1997)
President Reagan created Radio Marti to broadcast uncensored news to Cuba in 1982, 
and appointed Mas Canosa chairman o f its Advisory Board, a post he held until his death 
in November 1997. Its stepsister, TV Marti, created in 1992, was plagued by 
transmission problems and so easily jammed on the Cuban side that no one saw it. By 
1996, Radio and TV Marti had benefited from over $280 million in federal funds and, 
despite reports questioning their efficacy, financial and managerial practices by the 
General Accounting Office and various congressmen, Radio and TV Marti's broadcasts 
continued through the 1990s. Congress actually voted to end the $16 million annual 
funding o f TV Marti in 1994, but President Clinton intervened to save it. In 1996, Mas 
Canosa succeeded in quietly transferring the operation away from the probing eyes of 
Capitol Hill to Miami. A rumour claimed that Mas Canosa struck a deal with President 
Clinton. In return for permission to re-locate and for continued federal financing, CANF 
would not object to Clinton's second waiver o f Title III of Helms-Burton due in January
59 “Obituary o f  Jorge Mas Canosa, Cuban Exile Who Insisted on American Boycott o f Castro,” Daily 
Telegraph. 26th November 1997.
130
1997, nor would CANF protest if Title IV was not strictly enforced. (Manitzas 1996; W. 
Smith 1996a: 3) If  true - and indeed, CANF's objection to Clinton's ambivalent 
implementation o f Libertad was particularly muted - this was a remarkable quid-pro-quo, 
and a brilliant example o f the efficacy o f side payments.
5.3.1 Campaign Donations
CANF boasted a large treasure chest, which it used selectively to promote its agenda. 
The Foundation's sixty-five directors each contributed $10,000 annually, in addition to 
pledging a further $10,000 in political campaign contributions.60 In 1992, CANF's Free 
Cuba Political Action Committee (PAC) donated over $55,000 to twenty-six 
congressional candidates. Congressman Robert Torricelli o f New Jersey, who sponsored 
the Cuban Democracy Act, was the largest beneficiary, receiving the maximum legal 
contribution o f $10,000 from PAC, in addition to personal contributions o f  many more 
thousands by individual CANF members. (Robbins 1992: 165) The remarkable 
transformation o f Torricelli from a 1980s liberal to a 1990s conservative is an intriguing 
question whose answer would seem to be linked both to the congressman's close 
association with CANF, from whom it is claimed he received more that $120,00061 
(Kiger 1997: 3), and to his ambitions for higher office. Torricelli's Bergen County has 
few Cuban-American voters, but the state o f New Jersey boasts 85,000 Cuban- 
Americans, many in next-door Union City. (Kaplowitz 1998: 151; Robbins 1992: 166- 
173) New Jersey elected Robert Torricelli to the Senate in 1996; he abruptly withdrew 
from his re-election campaign in 2002 just one month before polling day amid 
allegations of improperly having accepted gifts.
The two sponsors o f Libertad benefited hugely from Cuban-American support in Miami. 
Facing a tough re-election campaign in 1996, Helms was guest o f honour at several fund­
60 The Center for Responsive Politics claims that CANF contributed over $250,000 to four congressmen 
between 1987 and 1994: Dan Burton $12,150; Robert Torricelli $53,150; Robert Menendez $69,873; and 
Ueana Ros-Lehtinen $127,565. (Kaplowitz 1998: 182)
61 The 1997 investigative report by the Centre for Public Integrity claims that Torricelli has received 
$26,750 from CANF's Free Cuba PAC and a further sum o f at least $93,900 in private contributions from 
CANF members since 1987. (Kiger 1997: 34)
131
raising events in Dade County. The Miami Herald reported that Helms gained more 
than $48,000 for his campaign coffers from these engagements. According to attorney 
Nick Gutierrez, speaking on behalf o f the exile community, "We all feel down here that 
Helms more than earned whatever money he made." (Kiger 1997: 65) A 1997 
investigative report claimed that Helms was one o f the greatest beneficiaries o f CANF's 
over $3 million in campaign contributions since 1980. (Ibid: 2) Senator Helms' 
spokesman, Marc Thiessen, famously growled, "Believe me, he [Helms] doesn't have to 
be paid to fight communists." (Gedda 1997)
The Cuban American National Foundation, through vigorously espousing three 
principles - opposition to negotiations with the Castro government, refusal to moderate 
or lift the embargo, and support for policies that continue and even increase pressure on 
Castro - was widely perceived as an effective power broker in Washington. Although 
CANF did not publicly support strategies aimed at destabilising the Castro government, 
many members were privately not averse. (Molyneux 1999: 295)
5.3.2 Presidential Election Politics
The influence CANF cultivated under Reagan continued in the 1990s Bush White House, 
primarily through the president's son Jeb, a Florida businessman (elected Governor in 
1998). Nevertheless, Robert Torricelli's 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA, also known 
as the Torricelli Act), designed to tighten the embargo and be the final nail in Castro's 
coffin, received a mixed reception from Bush officials. Bush was concerned about the 
extraterritorial provision reinstating the ban on trade with Cuba by foreign subsidiaries o f 
American companies, which had been lifted by President Ford. This provision was 
similar to the 'Mack Amendment,' introduced by Florida Senator Connie Mack in 1989 
and vetoed by Bush in 1991. Bush opposed the CDA for the same reasons that he had 
opposed the Mack Amendment, arguing that attempting to apply the US embargo to third 
countries would "lead to unproductive and bitter trade disputes with our allies." (1989 
State Department cable quoted in Kaplowitz 1998: 151; J. Dominguez 1997: 61).
62 Helms represented North Carolina, some 800 miles north o f Miami; Burton's Indiana is 1500 miles 
northwest o f Miami. Neither state has appreciable Cuban-American populations.
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But 1992 was a presidential election year. Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton, 
courting votes by attempting to outflank Bush on the right, endorsed the CDA after 
meeting with CANF officials, by declaring "I like it." at a Little Havana fundraising 
dinner that earned the Democrats $125,000.63 It was alleged that Mas Canosa 
propositioned Clinton, promising entree into the wealthy political club o f  Little Havana 
in exchange for support for the CDA. Although this alliance meant abandoning the 
Republican Party, Mas Canosa was foremost a pragmatist; his close association with 
Clinton was to endure until his death. (Brenner and Kornbluh 1995: 34) Faced with 
Clinton's endorsement, President Bush felt compelled to support the CDA (thus ensuring 
its passage) albeit with some modifications, but with the ban on foreign subsidiary trade 
that would come back to haunt future administrations intact. (Robbins 1992: 165-167; 
Rieff 1995: 83-86) Bush had no choice, for "neither he nor Clinton could afford to write 
off Florida's 25 electoral votes and New Jersey's 15." (Purcell 1998: 44) The smooth 
passage o f the CDA was nothing short o f a triumph for CANF. Remarkably, President 
Bush signed the CDA into law in Miami, (PL 102-484) acknowledging the key influence 
o f Mas Canosa and the CANF in its passage. (Krinsky and Go love 1993: 155)
The Cuban Democracy Act was remarkable in that it not only intensified the Cuban 
embargo, it also contained 'sweeteners,' known as Track II, which attempted to 
strengthen elements o f civil society in Cuba through increased contacts, cultural 
exchanges, and humanitarian aid programmes. Track II allowed links with Cuban NGOs 
in the provision o f American food, medicines, and support for individuals promoting 
non-violent democratic change in Cuba. Furthermore, it provided direct phone links and 
postal services between the US and Cuba for the first time in decades. Paradoxically, 
hard-line Cuban-Americans who sought tougher sanctions against Castro welcomed the 
opportunity to directly phone relatives in Cuba. They had also surreptitiously been 
sending large sums o f money to family in Cuba64 (Rieff 1995: 84), although this became 
legal following Clinton's relaxation o f the embargo in January 1999. This seemingly 
contradictory behaviour is due to the comunidad discriminating between publicly
63 Clinton's endorsement o f the CDA brought him $275,000 from Cuban- Americans. (Kiger 35)
64 A conservative estimate valued annual remittances sent by Cuban-Americans at $800 million in the 
mid-1990s, rising to $1 billion by 2000. To understand the impact o f these donations by way o f  
comparison, the largest single foreign investor in Cuba was Sherritt International, whose revenues were 
$250 million in 1995. (Rieff 1996: 65)
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maintaining support for the embargo as a symbol o f continuing resistance to Castro, and 
privately empathising with relatives struggling under his tyrannical regime. The exiles 
see ordinary Cuban families as hostages o f the Castro regime whose plight is somewhat 
eased through the dollar remittances. (Grenier interview; Garcia interview) Professor 
Suchlicki argues that the hard-liners do not send dollars, so there is no contradiction. 
(Suchlicki interview)
Track II was extremely threatening to Castro, perhaps more than the embargo, for it 
encouraged dissident movements within the Cuban totalitarian state. Castro's 
belligerence seems to support this argument. In February 1996, he abruptly cut short his 
'constructive engagement' talks with the EU, began a severe crackdown on Cuban 
dissidents who had been meeting the EU delegation, and shot down the two American 
planes. Castro thus forced Clinton's hand in signing the Helms-Burton Act, an embargo 
tightening law that he could handle. (McFayden 1996: 5; Nuccio 1999: 15-17) 
Furthermore, Castro had achieved a degree o f success in his economic liberalisation 
programme o f dollarisation and relaxation o f state control over enterprise, which put 
Cuba in a favourable position to attract foreign investment. This led alarmed hard-liners 
in Washington to support passage o f Helms-Burton. (Muse 1996-7: fh 45, 222)
The 1992 presidential election was significant for it witnessed the first concerted 
Democratic effort to woo votes from this group o f committed Republicans; Clinton 
supported the CDA and assured Cuban-Americans o f his commitment for a hard-line 
policy on Cuba during his many visits to the state. The Democrats believed they could 
win Florida if they reduced Cuban support for the Republicans to 66 percent, which 
would translate into two to three percentage points state-wide. The polls predicted that 
the Democrats would meet their expectations, with Mas Canosa proclaiming that "any 
fears that the Cuban-American community may have o f the Clinton administration with 
regard to Castro's Cuba have dissipated," although he admitted that he would vote 
Republican out o f loyalty. Confounding the predictions, Bush retained 70 percent of the 
Hispanic precincts in Miami in 1992, and carried the state, but by a much-reduced 
majority o f 86,000 compared to one million votes in 1988.63 While Clinton garnered
63 Bush should have overwhelmed the state, having spent $5-6 million campaigning, far more than 
Clinton. (Garcia interview)
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only 22 percent o f the Cuban-American vote, he succeeded in making significant inroads 
into that staunchly Republican community. (Moreno 1992; Moreno 1996)
During his first administration, it was Clinton's political staff, not his foreign policy staff 
that dictated Cuba policy with the specific aim o f winning the state o f Florida for the 
Democrats in 1996. State Department official Richard Nuccio confirmed this when he 
stated that Clinton lost 85 percent o f the Cuban-American vote in 1992, but that he 
would have won Florida if he had lost only 75 percent. "Our goal is to get that 10 
percent." (Brenner and Kombluh 1995: 35) According to another index, Clinton's share 
of the Cuban-American vote rose from 22 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 1996. 
(Kaplowitz 1998: 183; Grenier interview) By Nuccio's measure, he gained more than an 
extra ten percent o f the Cuban-American vote, and secured Florida in 1996. This was 
only the second time in the last eight presidential elections that Florida fell to the 
Democrats, effectively turning the state into an important swing state in the 2000 
elections.
It is difficult to assess the impact that the defection of large numbers o f Republican 
Cuban-Americans had on the outcome o f the 1996 presidential election; many scholars 
acknowledge the critical influence o f the comunidad, but several scholars contend that it 
was nil. Moreno argues that it was not the "decisive factor in Clinton's Florida victory" 
though it had important ramifications for the Republican coalition in the state. (Moreno 
1996: 4) Wayne Smith, head o f the US Interest Section in Havana during the Carter 
Administration, argued that Clinton's courtship o f Florida's Cubans in 1992 made no 
difference in that election's outcome, and that "the Cuban-American vote does not and 
probably never will determine the electoral outcome in Florida or even in Dade County" 
(W. Smith 1996b: 109). Professor Grenier o f FIU shares this sceptical view, arguing that 
Cuban issues never determine voting in Florida, and that CANF's power is highly 
overrated. Grenier contends that CANF and Washington happen to have a confluence of 
interests with regard to Cuba, which is mistakenly perceived as a sign o f CANF's 
strength, but that Washington would change its Cuba policy if it so desired despite 
CANF. (Grenier interview) Finally, some attribute Clinton's winning margin to the 
support o f Florida's ageing population who were concerned with social security and
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health benefits rather than to the Cuban-American Republican defectors. (LeoGrande 
interview). Indeed, exit polls showed the most important issue concerning voters was 
Medicare (19%) followed by taxes and the economy/jobs (17%).66 (The Vote '96)
While Clinton's significant inroads into the Republican Cuban-Americans are open to 
various interpretations, the shift away from single-issue focus became apparent. By 
1996, the comnnidad had broadened its agenda to include domestic issues such as 
immigration and welfare reform, with CANF announcing that, for the first time ever, it 
would lobby for maintaining social welfare programmes. Grenier claims that the Cuban- 
Americans were far more to the right on foreign policy issues than on domestic policy, 
with the result that their populist tendencies were vastly underrated. Therefore, many 
Cuban-Americans voted strategically rather than along partisan lines, supporting the 
Democratic platform in far greater numbers than in any previous presidential election. 
(Moreno 1996; Grenier interview).
5.4 Level II Analysis
It is never easy to methodologically quantify an individual lobbyist's input into 
legislative outcomes. Nevertheless, members o f Congress on both sides o f the political 
divide acknowledge CANF's sway over US-Cuban relations. For example, Mas Canosa's 
easy access to Congress and the White House meant that he flew to Washington on the 
day the planes were shot down. (Kiger 1997: 28-44) According to Gutierrez, "Nobody 
lobbied the bill as methodically and in as well-funded a fashion as CANF." (Ibid: 52) 
This thesis notes that CANF had no involvement in the drafting o f Libertad, becoming a 
staunch supporter only after the shootdown. Nevertheless, Congresswoman Ros- 
Lehtinen, referring to both the CDA and Libertad, credited Mas Canosa's Washington 
activities, saying, "Without Jorge Mas Canosa none o f that legislation would have been 
enacted into law." (E. Dominguez 1998).
The rise o f a powerful and sophisticated lobby like the Cuban American National 
Foundation provides a compelling example o f the domestic influences at Level II 
determining US-Cuba policy. There was no significant group opposing CANF's agenda,
66 Only 2% o f voters named foreign policy as their major concern.
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as no domestic group stood to benefit from a normalisation o f relations with Cuba. The 
moderate groups who advocated dialogue with Castro tended to be poorly financed, 
loosely organised, and subject to intimidation by the hard-liners in the Cuban exile 
community. (Kiger 1997: 3) To paraphrase Putnam, "When the political costs o f an 
international agreement fall disproportionately on a domestic group that is cohesive and 
politically mobilized, and the benefits from the agreement are diffusely distributed, the 
mobilized group often has the power to block ratification." This does not mean that the 
entire Cuban-American exile community supported CANF, nor does this mean that there 
was no opposition to the continued embargo amongst the general population. Indeed, 
polls in the late 1980s and early 1990s showed that a 'silent majority' o f Americans 
favoured normalisation of relations with Cuba. It simply means that, as there was little 
or no perceived gain from normalising relations with Cuba, there was no effective 
countervailing lobby to the CANF. (LeoGrande 1998: 74-75)
Molyneux agrees with this assessment (even though she cites broad support on the part 
o f the general population for a continuation o f the trade embargo against Cuba).67 She 
claims that the comunidad has maintained pressure to ensure continuing support for the 
embargo, and "in the absence o f any remotely comparable lobby on the other side, their 
interests have prevailed." (Molyneux 1999: 305) Kaplowitz observes that the fact that 
the Cuban embargo has been tightened twice in the 1990s, both times in a presidential 
election year is no accident. She does not doubt that Clinton's signing o f Libertad was 
domestically motivated, and that Clinton cited four companies under Title IV in the 
spring and summer o f 1996 after being censured by Robert Dole, the Republican 
presidential candidate, for lax implementation o f Helms-Burton.(Kaplowitz 1998: 184- 
186)
5.4.1 Monolith or Symphony?
Wayne Smith credited Mas Canosa with having almost single-handedly blocked 
normalisation of relations with Cuba and CANF with being the unchallenged spokesman 
of the Cuban-American community. However, as CANF faced an uncertain future upon
67 A 1993 poll found 66% o f the American public favoured continuation o f  a trade embargo on Cuba. 
(Molyneux 1999: 305)
137
the death o f Mas Canosa in late 1997, Smith sensed a change in Miami, as more 
moderate Cuban-Americans felt increasingly free to express their views. The symbolism 
of the fact that Castro outlived Mas Canosa has not been lost on the comunidad. The 
younger generation, many born in the US, began to challenge the 'establishment,' 
advocating a more liberal Cuba policy, modification o f the embargo, dialogue with 
Cuban leaders, and cultural exchanges in seeking to promote democracy in Cuba. (E. 
Dominguez 1997)68. Indeed, one prominent liberal Miami attorney described himself as 
an 'exile' for he left Cuba because his civil rights were curtailed, but describes newer 
arrivals as 'immigrants' for they have come for economic, rather than political reasons. 
(Duran phone interview) As the millennium approached, there was growing evidence 
that the hard-line Miami monolith, if it ever existed, was crumbling.
The 1997 Cuba Poll confirmed that the most contentious question dividing the Miami 
exiles was over the issue o f opening a dialogue with Castro in order to promote change 
in Cuba. Significantly, 51.6 percent o f respondents favoured opening a dialogue with the 
Cuban government in 1997; this rose from 36 percent in 1995 and 39 percent in 1993. 
This was striking evidence o f a major shift in Little Havana's thinking, with the fault line 
lying along the generational/cultural/racial divide. The poll compared the opinions of 
different waves o f immigrants, concluding that Cubans who arrived in the US after 1979 
were far more liberal on a range o f issues, and more likely to support a negotiated 
solution than were the earlier immigrants. For example, 78 percent o f Cuban-Americans 
overall supported continuation o f  the embargo; this reflected support o f 90 percent from 
exiles who had arrived before 1964, but only 65 percent support from second-generation 
Cuban-Americans. (Grenier and Gladwin 1997)
Although the 1997 Cuba Poll found that only 25 percent o f Cuban-Americans felt the 
embargo had worked well, a decisive 75 percent saw the Helms-Burton Act as a good 
vehicle to promote change on the island. Most astounding o f all was the level o f support, 
66 percent, for an American invasion o f Cuba! These seemingly contradictory results are 
difficult to interpret. One possible explanation is that, although a majority of the exile 
community supports dialogue, perhaps they perceive direct talks as both an agent of
68 See also “Miami Cubans -  Patriarch’s Death Opens Door for Dialogue with Castro,” The Independent. 
25th November 1997.
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positive change and a tool to bring Castro down. (Ibid) One analyst, observing similarly 
contradictory results o f an earlier (1995) Cuba Poll, proposed that perhaps Cuban- 
Americans are prepared to consider all manner o f different alternatives, in their 
frustration at the continuing impasse. (Elliston 1995: 41)
In contemplating who speaks for the Cuban-Americans, it seems that the era o f the 
monolithic, uniformly conservative exile community is something o f the past. A 
symphony o f voices advocating different means to the same end increasingly typified the 
Cuban-American community o f the late nineties. Geoff Thale o f the Washington Office 
on Latin America think tank rejected the monolithic characterisation o f the exile 
community, arguing that the hardliners were seen as an "intolerant and obsessed 
minority." (MacSwan 2000) Much o f the political influence that CANF enjoyed hinged 
on the singular style and political access that Mas Canosa was able to provide. Grenier 
credits Mas Canosa's outstanding organisational skills with making CANF seem like a 
monolith by sharply focusing on a single agenda. Not only has CANF not found a new 
leader o f  his calibre, it has been plagued by corruption and fraud charges69, while the 
Pope's 1998 visit focused the nation's attention on the moral dilemma o f withholding 
food and medicine from ordinary Cubans. The cumulative effect has altered the political 
climate in Miami and has encouraged open espousal o f a more moderate line. (Hamman 
1998; Grenier interview)
Molyneux, however, argues that CANF was representative o f the exile community in the 
late 1990s (a qualified "yes), especially as CANF began moderating its hard-line stance, 
with Mas Canosa opening a dialogue with Cuban leaders before his death. With the 
authoritarian and dictatorial Mas Canosa gone, she predicted CANF would continue to 
relax its attitude and pursue a more conciliatory line, concentrating on supporting 
dissidents in Cuba and advocating respect for human rights. (Molyneux 1999: 295-298) 
CANF has mellowed with Mas Canosa's son, Jorge Mas Santos at the helm; it has also 
changed focus, primarily supporting cultural exchanges, education, endowment for 
Cuban studies and humanitarian programmes on the island, with political lobbying a very 
small part o f the organisation's activities. Joe Garcia was appointed executive director in
69 The US Coast Guard stopped a cruiser near Puerto Rico in October 1997, and found it contained an 
enormous cache o f weapons; both the cruiser and the weapons were registered to members o f the CANF 
executive board. Four men were charged with conspiring to kill Castro. (Hamman 1998)
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2000, determined to continue CANF's liberalisation programme and change the public 
perception o f CANF as an extremist group, despite considerable opposition from older, 
more conservative exiles. (Garcia interview)
5.5 Cuban-American Moderates
Perhaps the most important moderate voice to emerge was the Cuban Committee for 
Democracy, Inc. (CCD) founded in 1993, to represent progressive members o f the 
Cuban-American community who advocated diversity, dialogue, tolerance and 
reconciliation with Cuba, rather than confrontation and hard-line opposition. It promoted 
mutual respect for sovereignty and civil rights through a variety o f projects including a 
daily Miami radio programme, publication o f a newsletter with updates and discussions, 
and hosting conferences featuring prominent guest speakers on Cuba related issues. 
CCD's twofold goal was "to support a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba and to 
promote the democratization o f politics on the island as well as within the Cuban- 
American communities in the United States," (a veiled censure o f CANF's
* 70  • •intolerance?) Its members included many prominent professionals and academics from 
the exile community that sought to redress public perception o f the Cuban-Americans as 
being a monolithic, uniformly conservative group. The CCD was active in both Miami 
and Washington, attempting to air more moderate Cuban-American views by "opening a 
political space". (Elliston 1995: 41)
The CCD was anti-embargo, arguing that ending the isolation o f Cuba would deprive 
Castro of a scapegoat for his failures and hasten his demise. Its president in 1995 was 
Alfredo Duran, a Miami lawyer active in local Democratic politics; as a former hard­
liner, Duran was evicted from the Bay o f Pigs Veterans Association for being a 
dialogado. Duran compared the Cuban embargo to the Berlin wall insofar as it has kept 
Cuba from being "contaminated" by the political and economic freedoms o f the West. 
He argued that honest hard-liners acknowledge that the embargo has not worked, but 
endeavour to maintain it as a bargaining chip to reclaim their properties. (Duran phone 
interview)
70“Statement o f Goals and Principles,” CCD, h ttp://wwvv.us.net/cuban/ixoa 1 s 1.h tm (accessed 14/10/99)
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The CCD was actively opposed to Libertad in 1995. Duran's testimony urged the US to 
take advantage o f the economic concessions Castro had made and respond positively in 
order to accelerate the peaceful transition to democracy. US moderation could disarm 
Castro and "reveal the barrenness of his policies." (Duran 1995: 103)
Another important moderate voice was that o f Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, a former 
revolutionary commander who fought alongside Castro, became disillusioned with the 
communist regime and emigrated to Florida where he helped found Alpha 66, a 
paramilitary exile group. Gutierrez Menoyo was arrested on a mission inside Cuba, 
jailed for twenty-two years, and released into exile in 1987. Like Duran, his experiences 
moved him from being a hard-liner to seeking a more conciliatory approach. In 1993, 
Menoyo founded "Cambio Cubano" (Cuban Change), a moderate group that supported 
an end to isolationism and confrontation, favoured lifting the embargo and saw dialogue 
as the best way forward to securing a democratic government in Cuba. Cambio Cubano's 
charter advocated achieving Cuban freedom peacefully, without revenge or hatred. In 
June 1995, Menoyo spent a week in Cuba, talking to Castro, other government leaders 
and dissidents, presenting a strategy for transition to democracy. Although little progress 
resulted, Menoyo remained optimistic because he perceived Castro had treated him with 
tolerance and respect. Cambio Cubano's focus has been primarily on the political future 
o f Cuba itself, rather than on the politics o f the diaspora, and for this reason, few in 
Miami considered Menoyo's project realistic. (Elliston 1995: 40-41; Molyneux 1999: 
304-305)
Finally, the Cuban-American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF) was a small non-profit 
organisation dedicated to education on issues o f hardship related to the American 
embargo on Cuba. It was particularly interested in the humanitarian implications o f the 
embargo on food and medicines to Cuba. CAAEF formed coalitions with business and 
civic organisations, supported cultural exchanges between the US and Cuba, held 
organisational workshops, and published a newsletter on Cuban-American issues.71
71 Many o f  its members are active in other Cuban-American organisations. For example, Dr. Delvis 
Fernandez Levy, president o f  CAAEF was also a board member o f Americans for Humanitarian Trade
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5.6 Conclusion
The influence o f the Cuban American National Foundation was based on substantial 
campaign contributions to select candidates, its perceived ability to sway important votes 
in Florida and New Jersey, and Mas Canosa's easy access to Congress and to the White 
House. CANF can claim credit for the creation and continued federal funding o f Radio 
and TV Marti and the drafting and passage o f the Cuban Democracy Act. The 
inspiration for the Helms-Burton Act came from Senator Helms himself, with CANF 
supporting the measure only after the shootdown in February 1996. Indeed, the question 
o f why Mas Canosa did not support Libertad earlier continues to vex this researcher.
The Bush administration whispered rather than shouted when opposing CANF, as 
illustrated by the fact that Bernard Aronson, the highly respected Assistant Secretary o f 
State for Inter-American Affairs, chose not to testify against the Cuban Democracy Act, 
sending a deputy instead. The general feeling o f timidity on the subject o f changing US 
policy toward Cuba, and the well-entrenched practice o f having to administer Cuba 
policy from the right continued under the Clinton presidency. Clinton officials referred 
constantly to the Torricelli Act, reinforcing the impression o f continuity in Washington's 
Cuba policy. Clinton showed a marked reluctance to discuss Cuba policy openly; he 
rarely announced decisions on Cuba himself, delegating such pronouncement to 
spokespersons. (Robbins 1992: 166-167; Nuccio 1999: 12) CANF's objection to 
Clinton's appointment o f Mario Baeza, a Cuban-American investment lawyer perceived 
as 'soft on Castro', to the post o f Assistant Secretary o f State for Inter-American Affairs 
led to the nomination being withdrawn. Even Clinton's early opposition to Helms- 
Burton in April 1995 was muted; he bifurcated by saying that, although there were 
sections o f the legislation that he could not support, these concerns could be resolved 
through negotiations. (Brenner and Kornbluh 1995: 39) Washington's win-set was 
constrained by the clout o f the hard-line Cuban-American community, especially as 
represented by the Cuban American National Foundation.
and the US-Cuba Business Association. See La Aiborada: 1/10 (Sept 1999), 
http://www.cubamer.orix/al_engl .htm (accessed 11/11
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Many scholars disagree with this contention. Professor Grenier argues that CANF's 
influence has been grossly exaggerated. As board members contribute huge sums to its 
coffers, CANF stands accuses o f  being an exclusive businessman's club, rather than one 
that enjoys broad popular support in the Cuban-American community. Furthermore, 
CANF's reputation as an effective lobby and power broker showed how unimportant 
Cuba was to the post-Cold War national debate. The fact that Washington policy­
makers' interests converged with those o f CANF was serendipity, not indicative o f 
CANF's clout. (Grenier interview) Professor Suchlicki broadly agrees that the Cuban- 
Americans influence, rather than determine policy, drawing parallels with Washington's 
general affinity towards Israel, regardless o f Jewish clout. (Suchlicki interview) Mark 
Falcoff reasons that the hard-line Cuban-American attitude towards Castro enjoys broad 
support in the wider American community, downplaying their exploitation o f power in 
determining Washington's agenda. (Falcoff 1998c: 96) Krinsky and Golove agree that 
the Cuban-American hard-liners have benefited from a confluence of interests with 
powerful right-wing elements in the Washington security establishment, including the 
CIA and the Pentagon. The hard-liners have also been supported by businessmen who 
dream of restoring Cuba to its pre-Castro heyday as a tourist playground and investors' 
paradise, devoid o f government regulations and taxes. (Krinsky and Golove 1993: 8)
By the end of the nineties, CANF's hard-line message had moderated in response to 
shifting demographic trends within the Cuban American community, for second 
generation exiles born in the United States saw themselves as American as they are 
Cuban. It became acceptable to advocate dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation without 
being branded a gusano (worm).72 Furthermore, CANF endured negative political 
fallout over Elian Gonzalez, the six-year-old Cuban refugee who survived the 
treacherous crossing o f the Florida Straits in late 1999, but whose mother tragically died. 
Castro demanded return o f the boy to his father in Cuba, but CANF campaigned loudly 
for him to remain in Miami with his extended family. The case was headline news for 
months as various courts adjudicated, sparking a national debate over the rights o f the
72 This term was coined to describe the ‘counter-revolutionaries’ o f  the Bay o f  Pigs invasion. “Worms. 
Crawling vermin, returning to reclaim their property and privilege, returning to enslave all other Cubans 
once again. Fidel wanted everyone to think that all o f the invaders were the sons o f  the rich and 
powerful.” (Eire 2003: 293)
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father as opposed to the morality o f returning the child and denying him the freedoms 
that his mother had paid for with her life. Elian was forcibly taken from his Miami 
family in April 2000, reunited with his father, and returned to Cuba. CANF was 
described in the media as irrational and intransigent, emerging from the episode with 
much-diminished prestige, but with a commitment to modernise its image. CANF's 
transformation has not been easy, as rival factions of hard-liners compete for influence, 
and many activists defected from the organisation rather than temper their philosophy.73
Cuba analyst Gillian Gunn writes that Washington's national interest remains to promote 
a peaceful transition to democracy, to stabilise immigration from the island, to improve 
regard for human rights in Cuba, and to realise a rapprochement between the Cuban- 
American exile community and the islanders. But many Cuban-Americans, ambivalent 
about a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba as this could cut them out o f any future 
definitive role on the island, promote a hard-line policy that flies in the face o f America's 
national interests. Adopting their hostile and confrontational position gives Cuba no 
incentive to liberalise. Indeed, the US has never responded reciprocally to any small 
steps Cuba has taken in the past - for example, the legalisation of dollars in 1993 - 
despite having undertaken to do so under the CDA. Cuba perceived that nothing would 
satisfy Washington short o f the fall o f  Castro from power. (Gunn 1997: 73-89)
The next chapter charts the growing influence of the Level II domestic constituency 
seeking moderation o f Washington's hard-line policy towards Cuba. It concludes with 
the application of two-level game analysis to Clinton's Cuba policy.
73 Some twenty hard-line board members resigned from CANF in protest at the evolving moderation o f  
the Foundation. See Elaine de Valle, The Miami Herald 22nd September 2001; Jacob Bernstein, Miami 
N ew  Times. 1st November 2001.
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Level II: US Domestic Politics of Sanctions
“[State Department spokesman Nicholas] Burns said the United States hopes to 
implement the law in a way that maximizes pressure on the Cuban government and 
minimizes its effect on friendly governments. " (Gedda 1996a)
6.1 The Cuba Lobby
The 'Cuba Lobby' was the name given to the loosely knit and greatly disparate groups 
opposed to the American embargo against Cuba. It combined vastly dissimilar 
organisations whose interests in Cuba were commercial, humanitarian, or religious, and 
whose agenda incorporated anything from slight modification o f the embargo to its 
complete repeal, and from support o f the Castro government to vehement anti-Castroists. 
The Cuba Lobby included many elite and highly focused groups that often had 
substantial funds with which to promote their agendas, despite appealing to limited 
audiences. In contrast to the concentrated voting blocs o f the Cuban-American exile 
community, the Cuba Lobby was hampered by the almost impossible task o f organising 
an effective opposition from diverse groups who had never developed a trusting working 
relationship before.74 It was distinctive in that it had minimal Cuban-American support, 
aside from the Cuban Committee for Democracy and Cambio Cubano. (Horowitz 1998: 
553-557; Kiger 1997: 53)
The Cuba Lobby consisted o f four discrete wings, each of whom had a different strategic 
agenda vis-a-vis Cuba, but sharing a common goal o f seeking, to end the American 
embargo. It often disregarded the human rights abuses, the lack o f civil liberties and the 
harassment o f dissidents that are characteristic o f Castro's repressive regime, focusing 
primarily on a coherent American foreign policy as a goal in itself. Its arguments 
included:
74The Center for Foreign Policy, a liberal think tank, failed in an attempt to organise an effective coalition 
opposed to Helms-Burton in 1995. Among those contacted were corporate executives, certified 
claimants, religious organisations, and foreign diplomats. (Kiger 1997: 53)
145
• The Cold War is over and Cuba no longer poses a security threat to the US nor does it 
export revolution abroad as it did in the 1970s;
• The US embargo hurts the Cuban people and leaves the elites still in power; 
moderating the embargo may stimulate positive changes in Cuba; and
• The US should pursue a consistent foreign policy that treats all the old adversaries, 
such as China, Vietnam and Cuba, in a similar manner. (Horowitz 1998: 558-5S9)75
The four broad components of the Cuba Lobby were:
• Intellectual-academic circles, which supported a limited but quite specific agenda 
including relaxing travel restrictions to Cuba, expanding academic exchanges and 
increasing collaboration on scientific projects. Among their members was the American 
Association for World Health, the American branch o f the World Health Organisation, 
who was concerned about the effect o f the embargo on the health and nutrition o f the 
Cuban people. (Ibid: 554)
• Policy-oriented think tanks, the most amorphous and least effective group in the Cuba 
Lobby who shared no consensus on Cuba or Cuba policy. This spacious umbrella 
offered room to anti-Castroists, who saw the end o f the embargo as the first step towards 
democracy on the island, as well as Castro supporters, who interpreted ending the 
embargo as an endorsement o f the Castro regime. The staunchly conservative Cato 
Foundation shared this platform with the World Council o f Churches, although they have 
little else in common. It included humanitarian groups that promote peace through 
reconciliation, such as the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, as well as groups that 
support the Castro regime, such as the Center for Cuban Studies and (more mildly) the 
Center for International Policy.76
• Foundations and grant-making agencies, which funded research projects that 
advocated specific agendas, and was the most inchoate group in the Cuba Lobby. It 
included the Area Foundation, a partisan pro-Castro group, who spent nearly $2 million
73 This argument is a bit facile, for it assumes that the US has identical national interests in different areas 
o f  the world, which is patently untrue.
76 CIP is headed by Wayne Smith, former staffer o f  US Embassy in Havana before the Castro revolution, 
and head o f US Interests Section in Cuba 1979-82. (www.ciponline.ora:)
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7 7in the three years leading up to 1996, promoting their agenda, and the Ford Foundation, 
which spent $1.8 million in the same period but with no specific focus other than 
increasing understanding between Washington and Havana. (Ibid: 556-557) Both 
foundations funded the Center for Public Integrity's investigative report on Cuba, 
Squeeze Play, published in early 1997. (Kiger 1997: ii)
• Business-commercial circles which sought to expand trade (and aid) to Cuba, in areas 
as wide-ranging as agriculture, livestock, transportation and communication. These 
executives studiously ignore the human rights abuses o f  the Castro regime, arguing that 
Cuba's human rights record is no more dismal than China's, yet Washington trades with 
China. Members include large umbrella organisations such as the United States 
Chamber o f Commerce, the National Association o f Manufacturers, and the National 
Foreign Trade Council, in addition to entities such as Alamar Associates, who provided 
consulting services to American companies interested in conducting business with Cuba. 
(Horowitz 1998: 554-555)
One of the most high profile organisations in this last group was the U.S.-Cuba Trade 
and Economic Council (USCTEC), established in 1994 to facilitate the flow of economic 
and commercial information to American businessmen about Cuba. A private 
organisation supported by some 200 companies, many o f them certified claimants, 
USCTEC received no government funding and never took a political position with 
regard to US-Cuba relations. Its president, John Kavulich, was regarded as somewhat of 
an expert on potential business ventures in Cuba, often quoted in the media and testifying 
on Capitol Hill.
Kavulich predicted that up to 2,500 American executives would visit Cuba in 1998 to 
assess business opportunities there, in the belief they would soon have access to the 
Cuban market. He argued that Libertad had precipitated fundamental changes in the way 
large American corporations viewed Cuba, creating a justification for companies to seek 
to open markets in Cuba whilst initiating a national dialogue over the use of unilateral 
sanctions. (Kavulich 1998; Kavulich interview) Kaplowitz broadly concurred with
77 See Kiger 1997: 38.
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Kavulich. Until Helms-Burton, the business community's interest in trade with Cuba had 
waxed and waned in response to the easing/tightening o f the comprehensive embargo. 
Libertad provoked the first open challenge by the business community to Washington's 
authority in the thirty-five year long Cuban embargo, as it began to lobby Capitol Hill to 
moderate the embargo. (Kaplowitz 1998: 187)
The Cuba Lobby was politically insignificant until 1998, when the visit o f the Pope to 
Cuba focused attention on the island, and the death o f Jorge Mas Canosa left a void in 
the leadership o f the Cuban American National Foundation. (Nuccio 1999: 9) The 
Clinton administration supported the businessmen's agenda as the only effective antidote 
to the unrelenting pressure from the conservative Cuban-American exile community. 
The business-commercial group became the most effective wing of the Cuba Lobby by 
the late 1990s, warranting more in-depth analysis.
6.2 Business Lobbies
Business groups are a powerful source o f influence in Congress, using to full advantage 
their corporate expertise, their access to large membership, and their abundant wealth. 
Their strategy is based on gathering information, activating their membership, targeting 
individual Congressmen, and using widespread advertising to convey their message to 
the public. (Hrebenar and Scott 1982:26)
Prominent business groups such as the National Association o f Manufacturers (NAM) 
and the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) fretted over the proliferation o f 
unilateral American sanctions that limited or prohibited American companies from 
engaging in commerce in major markets. The US Chamber of Commerce argued that 
unilateral embargoes "further isolate U.S. foreign policy, reinforce rather than weaken 
hostile regimes, and diminish economic opportunity for U.S. firms and workers." 
(Helms-Burton Conference 1997: 1-2)
Corporate America cited independent surveys to support the core argument that sanctions 
were both costly and ineffective as foreign policy tools. The International Institute for
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Economics in 1997 conducted a widely quoted study in 1997, computing the direct and 
hidden costs of sanctions on the 1995 American economy in terms o f jobs and wages. 
Re-iterating its previous findings that sanctions fail 80 percent o f the time in attaining 
their foreign policy objectives, it concluded that sanctions cost the United States $15 to 
$19 billion annually in lost exports.79 Furthermore, between 200,000 and 260,000 jobs 
in export related industries were lost due to sanctions. And, because the export sector 
paid premiums o f 12 to 15 percent higher than average wages in the manufacturing 
sector, this translated into a loss o f $800 million to $1 billion to US workers. (Hufbauer 
et al, 1997)
In addition to supporting general sanctions reform legislation, corporate America lobbied 
specifically for more targeted reforms exempting food and medicine from such policies. 
Predictably, they were supported by farmers and the pharmaceutical industry. A unique 
coalition o f businessmen and former government officials was founded in 1998, 
Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba, advocating the sale o f food and medicines 
to Cuba. Although the rhetoric was cloaked in humanitarian concern, the objective was 
clearly the pragmatic goals o f gaining valuable export markets and protecting jobs. 
(Kaplowitz 1998: 187)
There was a widely held feeling during Clinton's first term that the White House was 
predisposed to slowly open the door to normalising relations with Cuba, but only after 
the elections in November 1996. (Brenner and Kornbluh 1995: 39-40) On the strength 
o f this sentiment, corporate America took two concrete actions. Dozens o f Fortune 500 
companies booked fact-finding trips to Cuba, with over 1,300 American executives 
meeting with Cuban officials in 1995 alone; and executives intensified their efforts to 
ease the Cuban embargo by increasingly lobbying the president and key members o f 
Congress. (Falk 1996: 14-16)
78See testimonies by Kittredge 1998 and Schott 1998.
79A Congressional Budget Office report disputed these figures. It found sanctions had an inconsequential 
effect overall on the US economy, registering a loss o f perhaps $ I bn in 1997. (Rennack and Shuey 1999)
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6.2.1 USA*Engage
The National Foreign Trade Council launched USA*Engage on 16th April 1997, 
specifically to lobby policy-makers about the economic cost of sanctions and "to build 
support for alternative policies." USA*Engage was a broad-based coalition o f  670 
businesses, agriculture groups and trade associations seeking to slow the proliferation o f 
unilateral American sanctions and promote engagement instead. USA*Engage rapidly 
achieved a high profile through extensive advertising, testifying before congressional 
subcommittees, and liaising with think tanks and religious organisations to increase its 
appeal. (Kittredge 1998)
Clinton apparently encouraged the creation o f USA*Engage to provide a countervailing 
weight to the hard-line Cuban-Americans (although USA*Engage promoted wider 
sanctions reform). This potent lobby was first organised by Anne Wexler, a "powerful 
Democratic insider," Washington lobbyist and former aid to President Carter. 
USA*Engage carefully nurtured a patriotic image by stressing the negative impact 
sanctions have on the economy in terms of lost export markets and American jobs, 
portraying sanctions as "undesirable, unworkable, and, above all, un-American." 
(Heilbrunn 1998: 22)
A compelling example o f USA*Engage's style was an open letter on the eve o f Pope's 
historic trip to Cuba in January 1998, printed as full page advertisement in the Wall 
Street Journal. It proclaimed "...the United States has an opportunity to demonstrate 
leadership through engagement...We believe the time is right to explore new initiatives 
to promote freedom in Cuba...Leadership is something all Americans respect." 
(USA*Engage 1998) Laced with emotive words like 'freedom' and 'leadership,' the letter 
urged an end to the ban on exports o f food and the sale o f medicines to Cuba, its 
commercial agenda camouflaged beneath lofty ideals.
Many heralded the historic visit o f the Pope to Cuba in January 1998 as a catalyst for a 
review o f Washington's Cuba policy. Washington Post columnist Thomas Lippman 
argued that changing circumstances within the Cuban-American community warranted a
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fundamental change in US-Cuba policy, citing the death o f Mas Canosa in November 
1997, and poll data showing growing willingness among younger Cuban-Americans to 
engage with Cuba. Lippman also cited corporate America's strategy to promote sanction 
reform, concluding that the challenge was to build momentum in support o f greater 
flexibility so that Clinton had the political support to institute change. (Lippman 1998a)
Powerful lobbying and the papal visit resulted in Cuba becoming the test case for those 
seeking to modify US sanctions policy. However, the Clinton administration was 
markedly hesitant. The greatest obstacle for the reformers remained convincing an 
irresolute, timid White House that there was substantial political support to reform.
In conclusion, the Cuba Lobby gained significant support from moderate sectors in the 
Cuban-American exile community and from corporate America in the late 1990s. The 
demographic changes within the comunidad led to growing support for dialogue, travel, 
cultural exchanges and engagement with Cuba. Business executives were frustrated by 
continuing sanctions, particularly as they witnessed rival European, Canadian and 
Japanese firms winning coveted contracts. Encouraged by the Clinton White House, 
corporate America lobbied for reforms under an ostensibly patriotic and humanitarian 
banner to promote democracy to oppressed people through engagement.
6.3 Sanctions Reform Legislation
The late nineties saw intense debate over the proliferation o f unilateral sanctions by 
Washington. Richard Haass, of the Brookings Institute, argued eloquently against 
unilateral sanctions, citing a National Association o f Manufacturers study that that 
revealed that Washington had imposed an astounding 61 episodes o f unilateral sanctions 
against 35 different countries between 1993-1996. Senator Jesse Helms refuted Haass, 
based on a study he had commissioned by the Congressional Research Service, claiming 
that the total number o f new sanctions during those years was only nine. (Haass 1997: 
74; Helms 1999)
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Fuelled by intense corporate lobbying, the sanctions debate spawned numerous attempts 
to reform America's sanctions policy, with little substantive results. The most 
comprehensive legislation was Senator Richard Lugar's Sanctions Reform Act; Lugar 
proclaimed that his bill was the "legislative component" o f the attempt to slow sanctions 
by USA*Engage. (Lugar 1998)
6.3.1 The Lugar Bill
The Hamilton-Crane-Lugar Sanctions Reform Bill, The Enhancement o f Trade, 
Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act,' was introduced as S. 1413 
by Senator Richard Lugar (R/IN) and H.R.2708 by Representative Lee Hamilton (D/IN) 
in the autumn o f 1997. It sought to clarify the use o f unilateral economic sanctions as a 
foreign policy tool by both the executive and the legislature, mandating that:
• sanctions be targeted as narrowly as possible,
• a cost-benefit analysis be conducted whereby the economic costs (both short and long­
term) on American industry would be calculated,
• a two-year sunset provision automatically terminated the sanctions after two years 
unless renewed by Congress,
• presidential authority to waive a sanction if he determined that it was in the national 
interest,
• the President consult with Congress, publish advance notice o f sanctions in the Federal 
Register, and make periodic reports to Congress,
• farmers are compensated for loss o f markets due to a sanctions episode.
Despite powerful lobbying from USA*Engage, business and agricultural groups, and 
strong bipartisan support, the bill was sidelined as a result o f an anticipated Senate 
Sanctions Task Force report in 1998. It was subsequently re-introduced with relatively 
minor changes under the same name in the 106th Congress in March 1999 by Senator 
Lugar (S.757) and Congressmen Crane, Dooley and Manzullo (H.R.1244). 
USA*Engage again lobbied fiercely, urging Congressmen not to be side-tracked yet 
again, declaring, "This year, we are looking for tangible results." (Swift 1999) No 
sanctions reform legislation had been passed by the millennium. Fieldwork in
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Washington discovered that this was primarily due to the fact that the bills did not enjoy 
the ’right' support in Washington: neither o f the White House, nor o f the Republican 
leadership on Capitol Hill.
Stuart Eizenstat testified that the Lugar bill had much to commend it, but argued that it 
hampered the President's ability to conduct foreign policy by imposing more "inflexible 
restrictions" on the President than on the Congress, even though the proliferation o f 
sanctions legislation had come from Capitol Hill. He argued that the President needed 
flexibility in order to respond judiciously to changes in the international order, citing the 
waiver authority granted to the President by Helms-Burton (and ILSA) as being the key 
in defusing the dispute with the EU. Eizenstat sought broader presidential powers to 
waive sanctions in the national interest, applicable to existing and future sanctions laws 
(Eizenstat 1998), leading Washington Post columnist Thomas Lippman to write that 
Clinton was seeking "blanket authority...to waive any sanctions, existing or future, in the
♦ RO'national interest."' (Lippman 1998c) Eizenstat later re-iterated many o f his 
administration's earlier objections to "excessive procedural constraints...hamstringing 
the Executive Branch," proposing that, instead of a rigid two-year sunset clause, the 
president review sanctions annually and determine whether they should be continued. 
(Eizenstat 1999c)
Congressional Research Service analyst Dianne Rennack concurred that the lack o f 
White House support was critical. The bill was indeed inflexible by, for example, 
mandating the 45 day notice before enacting sanctions (even though this could be 
suspended in an emergency), and the fairly stiff reporting rules to congressional 
committees. The reporting requirements, including analyses and on-going assessments, 
were enormous. Rennack mused that perhaps Congress mandated such stringent 
reporting requirements because Clinton was so slippery and adept at "fudging" issues. 
(Rennack interview)
Andrew Semmel, Legislative Assistant for Foreign Policy for Senator Lugar, had the 
primary responsibility o f drafting the reform bills and shepherding them through the
80 Eizenstat sought presidential waiver authority to waive Title IV to fulfil his obligation under the US-EU  
Understanding negotiated the previous May.
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legislative process. Semmel denied the personalisation o f the reporting requirements o f 
the bill, maintaining it had nothing to do with Clinton per se. He argued that S.757 
responded to some o f the objections against S. 1413, by softening some o f the 
presidential requirements, for example, by allowing the President to impose sanctions 
and report to Congress later. But he acknowledged that the Lugar bill never enjoyed the 
support o f the White House, so Democrats, who might have been open-minded about 
supporting the bill, had no reason to do so. Semmel was convinced the bill enjoyed 
backing from some members o f  the Clinton administration, but not at the top, where 
"they are more political." Despite a Republican Congress, it would have been 
exceedingly difficult to enact a controversial piece of legislation without the support o f 
the Democrats. (Semmel interview) Brian Mohler, Director o f the Office o f Economic 
Sanctions Policy at the State Department, had the clear impression the White House did 
not want a comprehensive statement o f policy with regard to sanctions reform. Mohler 
felt that a political decision had been made by Clinton's National Security Advisor Sandy 
Berger, but would not speculate as to the reason. (Mohler interview)
Furthermore, Lugar (a Republican) never had the backing o f the powerful Republican 
kingmakers in Congress, Jesse Helms in the Senate and Benjamin Gilman in the House, 
who, as chairmen o f the relevant committees, were in a position to impede the 
legislation. Sensing the 'groundswell' o f  support for the bill in the summer o f 1998, the 
Republican leadership deftly thwarted the momentum by announcing the formation o f a 
Bi-Partisan Task Force, effectively shelving the bill pending their report. This group
thheld hearings and issued a summary report, but by then the 105 Congress had ended 
and the bill died. (Rennack interview)
Semmel concurred with Rennack's analysis o f the strong bipartisan opposition, 
particularly by Helms, although Helms did try to work out a 'disingenuous compromise' 
in the Ashcroft Amendment permitting the sale o f food and medicine, which was later 
emasculated. Semmel also cited strong opposition from a variety o f ideological as well 
as political objectors, including protectionist groups, like organised labour and anti-free 
traders, and NGOs such as human rights activists, whose 'bread and butter' is imposing 
sanctions. Finally, commenting on Capitol Hill politics with the savvy o f an insider,
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Semmel mused that legislators prefer to cite a 'neutral' reason for supporting or opposing 
a bill, as this is politically safer. It was convenient to oppose sanctions reform on 
substantive matters o f policy, but those protestations may have masked more 
controversial political grounds. (Semmel interview)
6.3.2 Cuban Sanctions Reform Initiatives: Capitol Hill
Numerous Cuba-specific initiatives o f  the late nineties suffered the same fate as the
t hLugar bills. In the 105 Congress, Representative Esteban Torres (D/CA) sponsored 
H.R.1951, called the Cuban Humanitarian Act of 1997, mandating exempting food and 
all manner o f medicines from the Cuban embargo. Senator Chris Dodd introduced 
similar legislation, the Cuban Women and Children Humanitarian Relief Act, S. 1391, 
which had strong bipartisan support led by Senator John Warner (R/VA). And
♦ t hRepresentative Charles Rangel (D/NY) sponsored an ambitious bill in the 106 
Congress, H.R. 229, calling for the repeal o f  the Cuban embargo completely. None o f 
these became law.
Senator Jesse Helms introduced S.2080 on 5th May 1998, called the "Cuban Solidarity 
(Solidaridad) Act of 1998", which authorised support under Libertad for "increased 
humanitarian assistance directly to the oppressed people o f Cuba to help them regain 
their freedom..." Helms' new bill was the brainchild of CANF, who proposed to send up 
to $100 million in food and medicine to Cuba to be distributed by NGOs like the 
Catholic Church. It lacked the support o f Miami's two Cuban-American congressmen, 
Ros-Lehtinen and Diaz-Balart, who were concerned that it would lend credence to 
arguments to lift the embargo against Cuba entirely, whereas they argued that there was 
no embargo on humanitarian aid to Cuba in the first place. (E. Dominguez 1998) The 
Times wrote that Helms hoped his legislation would strengthen independent non­
governmental institutions in Cuba. Helms' spokesman, Marc Thiessen remarked the 
Helms bill "puts Castro in a Catch-22," for accepting the aid would strengthen Cuban 
civil society, but refusing the aid would be difficult to justify to 11 million suffering 
Cubans. "He's damned if he does and damned if he doesn't." (Rhodes 1998) The bill 
was not enacted.
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Senator John Ashcroft (R/MO) introduced legislation to exempt food and medicine from 
all unilateral American embargoes, in an amendment added to the domestic farm bill, 
FY2000 Agricultural Appropriations. This would have allowed American farmers, food 
processors and pharmaceutical companies to sell directly to Cuba. The amendment 
would have modified the Clinton executive order o f April 1999, which allowed such 
sales to take place, but mandated that they must be under special licenses to ensure that 
independent NGOs benefited rather than the government. In a communist country still 
tightly controlled by central government, the restriction over dealing exclusively with 
NGOs rendered the bill almost useless. It was precisely this drawback that the Ashcroft 
Amendment sought to redress. Confounding predictions that the Ashcroft Amendment 
would face tough opposition from the Cuban-American congressmen and their allies, it 
passed the Senate by 70-28 in August 1999. (Fletcher 1999b)
CANF immediately expressed satisfaction that the amendment had passed the Senate. 
This was puzzling. Apparently, after negotiations with Florida Senators Bob Graham and 
Connie Mack, and New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli, along with staff from the 
Helms' Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a compromise was reached with Ashcroft, 
to require the following:
• A license must be obtained before transactions o f food and medicine are carried out 
with countries that have supported international terrorism, and
• Federal financing, direct export subsidies, and any other form of federal assistance 
programmes will not be available to such transactions.
These two compromises allowed CANF to claim victory for the continuation of 
America's hard-line sanctions policy against Cuba. Jorge Mas Santos declared that the 
Senate had "stood firm on the side of democracy and respect for the human rights o f the 
Cuban people." (Mas Santos 1999)
In September 1999, Senator Ashcroft reported that the conference committee had killed 
his amendment, even though it had been approved unanimously in the Senate (S. 1233, 
05/08/99) and in a stronger version in the House (H.R.1906). Apparently, the 
Republican leadership in Congress decided to 'strip' the Ashcroft Amendment out o f the 
agricultural appropriations bill, disregarding the clear intentions their colleagues
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(Ashcroft 1999). Although several lawmakers regretted the conference's summary 
execution o f the Ashcroft Amendment, such action is not uncommon in the face o f 
determined opposition o f  the majority leadership.
Clinton signed an $80bn agriculture bill in the twilight o f his administration, PL 106-3 87, 
in what could have been the most significant change to the comprehensive embargo in 
forty years had it not suffered from similar machinations to the Ashcroft Amendment. 
Its Title IX was the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act o f 2000, 
which relaxed the embargo on food and medicine to Cuba, but with impossible 
restrictions rendering the bill virtually useless. (Nakashima and Fletcher 2000; Rennack 
2000: 6)
A bill to exempt food and medicine from sanctions regimes was introduced as H.R.4461 
in May 2000, but was adamantly opposed by both the Republican leadership and the 
Miami Cuban-American legislators. The House passed the amendment in late June, after 
a coalition o f farm state lawmakers, headed by George Nethercutt (R/WA) succeeded in 
drafting an acceptable compromise insuring Castro would not qualify for any credit in 
the purchase o f food and medicines. (Panin 2000a; 2000b) Nevertheless, the GOP 
leadership summarily stripped the Nethercutt Compromise from the spending bill in July, 
to howls o f bipartisan protest both from conservative lawmakers representing farm states 
and liberal representatives seeking moderation o f the Cuban embargo. (Anderson 2000) 
Diaz-Balart worked solidly to replace the Nethercutt Amendment in Conference but, 
because it prohibited any US government or commercial credit or any barter 
arrangements such as Cuba enjoys with many countries, Cuba's purchasing ability was 
almost nil. (Rennack interview)
6.4 Clinton’s Cuba Policy
President Clinton presided over a divided domestic constituency with regard to Cuba, 
which became increasingly fractured as his presidency progressed and the Cuba Lobby 
gained ascendancy. He endured criticism from the left for failing to moderate the 
embargo, and criticism from the right for not complementing the embargo with further
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measures to destabilise Castro. Clinton attempted to please all factions by supporting the 
tough anti-Cuba line espoused by the Cuban-American exile community in the difficult 
presidential election years of 1992 and 1996, but hinting at moderating the embargo, 
lobbying strongly against Libertad in 1995, and supporting the nascent USA*Engage to 
counterbalance the hard-liners. The passage of Libertad added to Clinton's woes, 
burdening him with international constraints that united with the Cuba Lobby in arguing 
for restraint and moderation in Cuba policy. This thesis argues that Clinton's personal 
sentiments leaned towards moderation; his ambiguous Cuba policy reflected his 
impossible struggle to accommodate divergent domestic preferences and international 
constraints simultaneously.
The Clinton Administration's Cuba policy was succinctly stated on the State 
Department's website. The policy statement contains clear references to strengthening 
both the embargo and the elements of civil society in Cuba, indicative o f the Janus-faced 
policy Clinton employed.
"The fundamental goal o f United States policy toward Cuba is to promote a peaceful 
transition to a stable, democratic form o f government and respect for human rights. Our 
policy has two fundamental components: maintaining pressure on the Cuban Government 
for change through the embargo and the Libertad Act while providing humanitarian 
assistance to the Cuban people, and working to aid the development o f civil society in the 
country." (State 1999)
Clinton stands accused o f mortgaging a sensible Cuba policy for short-run political 
gains. Legitimate US interests regarding Cuba should include managing immigration 
flows, regulating drug trafficking and seeking peace and stability with its neighbours in 
the Caribbean basin. But these goals were secondary to the domestic political concerns 
o f money and votes. Clinton reasoned that maintaining hard-line policies on Cuba, while 
annoying moderates and liberals, would not drive them away from the Democratic Party. 
"Therefore, greater flexibility marginally hurts Clinton's electoral prospects, while 
maintaining a tough stance has a neutral to slightly positive impact." (Gunn 1993: 26)
Support for maintaining the stubbornly hard-line policies espoused by the Cuban 
American National Foundation against Castro was steadily eroded as the nineties 
progressed, with the remarkable confluence of interests shared by CANF and
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Washington's foreign policy and national security establishment a distant Cold War 
memory. American businessmen travelled to Cuba on 'goodwill' missions as restrictions 
on travel and telecommunications were eased. American firms explored possible future 
investments pending the removal o f the Cuban embargo, worried that foreign 
competitors had already become well entrenched in Cuba before them. (Falk 1996) Even 
the right-wing Washington Times suggested that it was time to bomb Havana -  with Big 
Macs, and American ideas and products. It suggested 'killing' Castro while still alive, by 
showing his irrelevance and lifting the embargo unilaterally without negotiating with 
him. This strategy would reveal Castro's personal accountability both for the sorry state 
o f Cuba's economy and for a tyrannical regime with no respect for human rights, and 
encourage a more peaceful transition for Cuba after Castro. (Ratliff and Fontaine 1993)
A behind-the-scenes debate took place early in Clinton's first term over a moderate 
relaxation o f sanctions against Cuba. No clear shift on Cuba was discerned, and Clinton 
continued to waffle, still held hostage to the money and votes o f the Cuban-American 
exile community. Then the Republican sweep o f both Houses o f Congress in the 
elections of 1994, resulting in a 'divided government', made any modification o f 
Washington's Cuba policy more difficult. Nevertheless, there was a feeling that Clinton 
would tentatively begin to 'normalise' relations with Cuba after the 1996 elections. 
Clinton's fairly active involvement in emasculating Libertad in the Senate debate in 
October 1995 corroborated this impression.
The passage of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996 caught the Clinton administration between 
two 'policies o f appeasement': appeasing international governments irate over Libertad's 
extraterritorial implications, whilst trying to appease the domestic constituencies that 
demanded continuing harsh sanctions against Castro. Many anticipated that Clinton, as 
chief executive, "would implement provisions of the law with constraint instead of 
expansively." (Kavulich 1998)
In choosing engagement over embargo, Clinton 'fudged' the issue, seemingly enforcing 
Libertad, yet regularly announcing waivers for Title III every six months, declaring "a 
suspension is necessary to the national interest and will expedite a transition to 
democracy in Cuba." (Clinton 1996c) Clinton endured stinging attacks from Libertad
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supporters with each suspension. Congressman Diaz-Balart charged that Clinton was 
blackmailed by "unscrupulous interests" who profited from stolen property, and accused
O 1
Clinton o f being a "systematically weak Chief Executive."
Clinton showed similar restraint in implementing Title IV. Despite many dozens o f 
companies entering into joint ventures with the Cuban government and potentially in 
violation o f Title IV, the State Department conducted scrupulous, deliberate 
investigations before authorising letters o f warning. Only four companies received State 
Department letters, and only two have suffered exclusion o f their executives, Sherritt 
International, a Canadian mining company and Grupo BM, an Israeli agricultural group.
Clinton's second term saw several timid 'executive order' initiatives, as the president 
announced new regulations designed to marginally ease the Cuban embargo and support 
individuals without strengthening the government. But these were cautiously tempered 
to emphasise that Washington remained fully committed to the embargo, and that any 
modifications o f the Cuban embargo were wholly consistent with both the CDA and 
Libertad.
In response to the Pope's highly publicised visit to Cuba in January 1998, Clinton eased 
the conditions for issuing licences for the sale o f medicines, and allowed Cuban- 
Americans to send money to their families in Cuba (which they had surreptitiously been 
doing anyway). Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright pointedly declared that the 
measures "do not reflect a change in policy towards the Cuban Government. That policy 
has been, and remains, to seek a peaceful transition to democracy." 82 (Albright 1998a) 
A senior White House official declared that the new measures needed only a change in 
the licensing procedures for implementation, and that the intent was to focus on post- 
Castro Cuba, "not to abandon the embargo." (Dobbins 1998)
Clinton announced further relaxations a year later, allowing remittances o f up to S I200 
annually to individual Cubans or Cuban NGOs by any American resident (not only those
81 “Mixed Reaction among Cuban Exiles on Helms Decision.” Reuters. 16th July 1996.
82Secretary Albright also stated that the administration was working with Jesse Helms and others to 
develop a bipartisan bill to ease the humanitarian needs o f the Cuban people.
160
with family in Cuba), authorising charter flights from cities other than Miami to cities 
other than Havana, establishing a direct postal service (as authorised under Track II of 
CDA), and expanding the sale of food to individuals and NGOs. Clinton emphasised 
that the new modifications were humanitarian measures that supported ordinary Cubans, 
but were absolutely consistent with the CDA and Libertad policy o f maintaining pressure 
for democratic change. (Clinton 1999)
Richard Nuccio, White House Special Advisor on Cuba, met with the President less than 
five times, although he held this post for nearly a year, from mid-1995 to mid-1996. 
Nuccio confided that he never knew conclusively what Clinton's final position on 
Libertad was, so reluctant was he to take a position on Cuba, due to the domestic 
constraints which made it "troubling." (Nuccio phone interview) He charged Clinton 
with having abdicated his responsibility as chief executive, speaking about Cuba policy 
as if someone else were accountable for its implementation. Nuccio concluded that 
Clinton was "unwilling to do the hard work necessary to lead the country toward a more 
responsible Cuba policy." (Nuccio 1999: 22)
In conclusion, caught between two irreconcilable camps, Clinton prevaricated rather than 
articulating a clear policy. Clinton promoted measures to ease the embargo, particularly 
in the humanitarian areas o f the sale o f food and medicine, and paid lip service to foreign 
policy goals o f promoting the growth o f democracy and the protection o f human rights. 
But his administration also "deferred to the entrenched Cuban-American lobby which 
opposed any policy change... [and] confined itself to a timid extension o f 'people-to- 
people' contacts with Cuba." Remarkably, in the twilight o f his administration, Clinton 
expressed regret over having signed Libertad, saying that Congress had gravely erred in 
removing presidential leverage, for it "tied the hands o f the executive so much that it's 
hard for us to use the frill panoply of pressures we had." Clinton felt that promoting a 
transition to democracy would have been better served by offering carrots, and
OA
empowering ordinary Cubans struggling for political freedoms.
8j “Cuba: Food for Talk,” Economist. 353, 21st August 1999.
84 “Clinton Says 1996 Incident Undercut Plans to Weaken Castro,” Miami Herald. 9th November 2000.
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6.5 Two-Level Game Analysis: Managing Win-sets in a Divided Constituency
The domestic constituency with interests in Cuba policy was vastly heterogeneous. 
Castro's 'mobilising incident' fused the disparate domestic preferences into a shared hard­
line win-set that resulted in Libertad's enactment into law. But the shared win-set was 
ephemeral. Domestic groups supporting engagement increasingly shared a win-set with 
Washington's allies, as both opposed energetic implementation o f Libertad. There was 
thus both a divided domestic constituency and a divergence between the executive's win- 
set and that o f the domestic constituency.
Jongryn Mo is disturbed by the implicit assumption that the chief negotiator and the 
domestic constituency have identical win-sets. Putnam concedes that there may be a 
divergence o f opinion between the two, but argues but that there are compelling forces 
for the executive to submit to the will o f his constituency, not least because he wants to 
be re-elected. Mo, however, argues that there may be reasons for the divisions to persist. 
He cites the example o f trade liberalisation talks, where the US Trade Representative 
may promote his agenda o f lowering trade barriers, whilst Congress traditionally reflects 
the more narrow, protectionist sentiments o f its constituents, particularly if they represent 
strong labour or agricultural districts. (Mo 1994: 403-404) This case study would 
support Mo's hypothesis that there may be deep divisions between the executive and the 
domestic constituency for precisely the same reasons. Nevertheless, Clinton's courting 
of the hard-line vote in 1992 and again in 1996 lends credence to Putnam's argument that 
those divisions may dissipate in the face o f elections.
6.5.1 Structure of Political Institutions
Putnam argues that the size o f win-sets is determined by the structure o f political 
institutions. Helen Milner focuses on the issue o f divided government, by which she 
means "a divergence between the policy preferences o f the executive and the median 
legislator." (Milner 1997: 37) Milner argues that divided government is a phenomenon 
found sporadically in presidential systems, where the executive and the legislators are 
elected entirely independently o f one another. In a two-party system, the president may
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be o f one party, but the majority in Congress may be in hands o f the rival party, with 
party affiliation a proxy for policy preferences. A divided government can have serious 
repercussions on the degree o f cooperation the executive can expect from his legislature; 
and the more divided the government is, the more constrained it will be by its domestic 
politics and the less likely it will be to enter into international agreements. (Ibid: 37-42)
The extent o f divided government will depend not only on how wide is the divergence 
between the preferences of the political parties, but also on the political institutions 
within which they operate. Regardless o f whether a country has a presidential or 
parliamentary system, the distribution o f legislative powers may favour either the 
executive or the legislature. Whereas Britain and Canada have strong executives, the 
United States has a more powerful legislature. Milner asserts that cooperation is least 
likely when the distribution of powers within the political institutions empowers the 
more hawkish domestic actor (whether that is the executive or the legislature). She 
maintains that, given a divided government, with a legislature that is more hawkish than 
the executive, the US would have great difficulty in successfully completing 
international agreements. Milner concludes that policy outcomes depend on both the 
structure o f domestic preferences and the institutional balance o f power between the 
executive and his legislature. (Ibid: 242-244)
Milner's 'divided government' was the political reality in 1990s Washington, forcing 
President Clinton to grapple with a Republican Congress with opposing domestic 
preferences after the elections o f November 1994. Clinton's unhappy situation was 
exacerbated by the institutional balance o f power weighing heavily against him. 
Furthermore, Milner predicts little chance o f cooperation if the empowered institution is 
also the more hawkish body. Jesse Helms became the Chairman o f the powerful Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in 1995, with embargo-tightening legislation against Cuba 
a top priority. Helms resolutely refused to moderate his hard-line position against Cuba, 
despite the conclusion o f the US-EU Understanding in May 1998, and the threat o f a 
resumption o f a WTO Panel if the undertakings in that agreement were not implemented.
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Faced with an intransigent legislature, Clinton actively encouraged the growth of 
business pressure groups like USA*Engage to help him widen domestic support for his 
win-set. But Clinton's attempts to seek a more conciliatory win-set were not successful 
enough to empower the executive. As Milner predicted, a hawkish Congress in a divided 
government prevented the US-EU agreement being ratified.
The American foreign policy establishment is somewhat schizophrenic, with the agenda 
setting commander-in-chief at the White House, but the purse strings controlled by the 
House and the Senate wielding final authority in the approval o f ambassadors and 
foreign treaties. The executive generally adheres to a more cosmopolitan view o f world 
affairs, for it is he who must engage with world leaders, while the legislature is often 
swayed by more parochial concerns that directly affect their constituents. "The national 
focus o f the executive and the more local concerns o f legislators help explain why, 
although they may have the same interests, legislators and executives may have distinct 
policy preferences." (Ibid: 36)
Bill Clinton and Jesse Helms were not only from opposing parties; Clinton was a centrist 
Democrat and Helms a staunchly right-wing Republican. They exemplify Mo's 
description of a divergence o f win-sets between the executive and the domestic 
constituency, as represented by the congressional leadership, on both ideological and
* * o c  .
political grounds, and perhaps also on personal grounds. Clinton's agenda, as his rocky 
eight-year presidency drew to a close, was to deflect attention from his shabby personal 
life and secure a favourable legacy for his presidency. Clinton sought a foreign policy 
coup, but Congress refused to co-operate, as the divergence between executive and 
legislative preferences widened. This could perhaps partly explain Congress' refusal to 
grant Clinton 'fast-track' authority in further trade liberalisation talks in 1997, the 
Senate's rejection o f the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation in 1999, and Congress' 
refusal to amend Libertad.
83 Clinton's 1999 impeachment trial left him with many personal enemies.
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6.6 Conclusion
The last two chapters established the influence o f domestic interest groups in the shaping 
of Washington's Cuba policy. The Cuban American National Foundation promoted its 
hard-line agenda through targeting politicians with substantial campaign contributions, 
and through their perceived ability to command bloc votes in the key swing states o f 
Florida and New Jersey. They "established the domestic game as the major factor 
shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba" (LeoGrande 1998: 75) due to the fact that there was 
no organised countervailing entity to effectively argue against them, and no perceived 
political benefits o f doing so.
The emergence o f an increasingly effective Cuba Lobby provided a counterpoint to 
CANF and encouraged an easing o f the Cuban embargo; it gained momentum after the 
passage o f Libertad, led by corporate America and abetted by President Clinton. Their 
argument, while supported by religious and humanitarian groups, was essentially a 
commercial one, cleverly couched in emotive patriotic terms o f extending the freedoms 
Americans take for granted to unfortunate people struggling under dictatorship.
Clinton showed a remarkable ability to 'sit on the fence', seemingly upholding Helms- 
Burton and catering to the Cuban-American hard-liners and their sponsors in the 
legislature, whilst at the same time seeking to dilute their political clout, particularly as 
the international furore over Libertad forced consideration o f Level I sensibilities. 
Although Clinton negotiated a Level I 'Understanding' with the EU, the executive was 
doubly hampered: the paralysis o f a divided government that reduced presidential 
authority, and a more institutionally powerful and more hawkish Congress that did not 
share the executive's win-set. The consequence of the diverse preferences at play 
coupled with a sclerotic, weak-willed administration unable to mobilise a comprehensive 
win-set encompassing a majority o f the domestic constituency, fulfilled game theory 
prediction o f American defection.
Chapter 7
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Level II Tensions in the European Union: Leading to the WTO
"It is difficult to overstate the virtual unanimous scorn and disrespect that the Helms- 
Burton economic sanctions elicit abroad. " (Preeg 1997)
Henry Kissinger famously asked, "When I  want to speak to Europe, whom do I  call? "
“ I f  Europeans obey the Helms-Burton law, [the] EU would fin d  a great deal more o f  its 
foreign and trade policies being written in Washington. ”86
7.1 Introduction
The United States and the European Union have enjoyed close relations since the early 
days o f the movement to foster European integration, which many American statesmen 
interpreted as a logical extension o f the Marshall Plan. The US encouraged Europe's 
early steps at integration in the late 1950s, although an increasingly effective customs 
union would impose costs on American farmers and manufacturers. This decision was a 
strategic Cold War manoeuvre by Washington, for the US considered a democratic, 
stable, and prosperous Europe essential in the fight against communism. Cynics might 
reason that the Americans preferred to fight communism in Europe rather that closer to 
its own shores, even if the trade-off was lost export markets. However, the menacing 
strength o f the communist parties in post-war Greece, Italy, and France underlined the 
importance o f rapidly improving living standards to undercut their growing support. 
Stuart Eizenstat believes that Brussels has encouraged the "democratic impulse" in 
Europe, contributing decisively to the transformation of countries such as Spain and 
Portugal from military dictatorships to vibrant democracies. Indeed, the US and the EU 
are close partners precisely because they espouse similar liberal, democratic values. 
(Eizenstat 1996a: 23-25)
86 Anthony M. Solis, “The Long Arm o f U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act.” Loyola o f  Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Journal 19:3, p. 729. Quoted in Roy 2000a: 82.
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Washington and Brussels have nurtured their close relations, co-operating in institution 
building, such as the enlargement o f NATO, and the creation o f the WTO to fmd 
mutually acceptable norms for protecting intellectual property rights and trade in
• 527services. At the Madrid Summit in December 1995, US and EU leaders reinforced 
their partnership by signing the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), supplementing the 
1990 Transatlantic Declaration. The NTA reaffirmed their joint "conviction that the ties 
which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the past half century," 
(Commission 1995d) and sought "to translate common political and economic objectives 
into practical measures centred around four priorities." (Commission 1995e) These four 
areas, to be monitored by twice-yearly presidential summits, were to promote peace, 
stability and democracy; to respond to global challenges such as crime, drug trafficking 
and protecting the environment; to strengthen the multilateral trading system and further 
reduce barriers to transatlantic trade; and to build bridges across the Atlantic through 
commercial, intellectual and cultural exchanges.
Transatlantic trade amounted to more than $200bn annually by the mid-1990s, with over 
forty percent of US investment abroad in the EU, and over fifty percent o f EU 
investment in the US. (Eizenstat 1996a: 24) Notwithstanding several US-EU clashes, 
such as the banana war and disagreements over genetically modified foods, officials on 
both sides o f the Atlantic agree that media hype obscured their close economic ties. The 
furore over Libertad was another example o f a dispute between two friends who 
remained committed to nurturing a deeper alliance. EU Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan 
(SLB) declared in the summer o f 1996, as the Helms-Burton controversy was 
intensifying, "Those relations are too deep, too long-standing and too important. We
o o
have not sought confrontation and don't do so. We are merely defending ourselves."
This chapter introduces the EU's Level II preferences with regard to Cuba. It analyses 
the EU's competence in articulating and pursuing foreign policy objectives, and 
examines the tensions inherent in EU foreign policy decision-making between the
87 US President Bill Clinton; Felipe Gonzalez, Spanish Prime Minister and President o f the European 
Council; Jacques Santer, President o f the Commission.
88 “EU Vows Retaliation if  US Doesn’t Waive Cuba Sanctions,” International Herald Tribune. 16th July 
1996.
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supranational Commission and the member states in the Council. Finally, it describes 
how Level II tensions were resolved as Brussels debated its response to Libertad.
7.2 EU-Cuba Relations: Constructive Engagement
The European Union never supported the American sanctions against Cuba, unlike Latin 
American countries in the Organisation o f  American States, who effectively made the 
embargo multilateral until 1975. Despite the best efforts of Washington officials, 
Europeans maintained normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba; the levels 
of trade were not great, as Cuba enjoyed preferential treatment with the Soviet bloc, but 
significant nonetheless for the policy statement they proclaimed. When the loss o f 
Soviet support compelled Cuba to actively seek foreign investment, Cuban government 
figures claimed that there were 212 joint ventures by the end o f 1995, the bulk 
undertaken by Europeans. Whereas only 7 percent of Cuba's trade was with Western 
Europe in the 1980s, by the late 1990s, Europe was responsible for roughly a third o f 
Cuba's international trade. Much o f this trade was from tourism, with Italy, Spain, and 
Germany (along with Canada) accounting for the greatest number of tourists. (Roy 
1999: 31-33) Foreign investment was fuelled by expectations of American loosening o f 
the embargo, perhaps after the 1996 presidential elections; Europeans would then be well 
placed to benefit. (Falk 1996: 16-17)
Europe's motivation in nurturing trade contacts with Cuba was not solely mercantile. 
The EU has long espoused 'constructive engagement' - by which they hoped to promote 
civil society and democratic reforms in Cuba through cultural and economic links with 
Havana. Perhaps the best articulation o f European objectives was the Commission's 
communique o f 28th June 1995, noting the economic reforms Castro had instituted, and 
concluding:
"In the Commission's view, a peaceful and successful transition to a market economy and 
political pluralism will depend on Cuba's ability to forge new international and regional 
bonds and that, by virtue o f its very size, the European Union is probably best placed to 
play a supportive role vis-a-vis reforms likely to draw in other major partners. The first 
step is to initiate a dialogue based on regular consultations and which will also provide a 
forum for an exchange o f  views on current reforms, the development o f a civil society and 
measures to extend private initiative and personal freedom in Cuba." (Commission 1995b)
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Commissioner SLB confirmed the 1995 EU decision to open a dialogue and co-operate 
with Cuba "to underpin the process o f democratic reform, encourage human rights, 
broaden private enterprise and develop a civil society." (Brittan 1996b)
Washington agreed that economic and diplomatic isolation was not conducive to 
fostering change in a country, and that "principled, purposive engagement is generally 
preferable to isolation...Nevertheless, engagement is useless with unreconstructed 
dictatorial regimes whose actions are completely outside the norms o f responsible 
international behavior." (Eizenstat 1999a) This view was validated by Human Rights 
Watch, which concluded in late 1996 that the EU's policy had had no effect on 
promoting civil liberties in Cuba. (Lopez 2000: 348, fn 14)
The debate over Cuba is part o f a wider debate between diverging Level II preferences 
concerning the appropriate use of foreign policy instruments. The US has followed 
containment and asphyxiation policies since the Cold War; the EU has preferred the use 
o f integration, dialogue and trade to influence others. With regard to Cuba, the US has 
employed isolation, whilst offering limited carrots, such as Track II of the CDA. More 
controversially, the US has imposed secondary sanctions on its allies to coerce them into 
supporting its position. The EU has valued carrots over sticks, offering conditional 
inducements to encourage reform. Many scholars believe in the efficacy of positive over 
negative sanctions in dealing with an adversary, due to the lower levels of dependence 
and the lower baseline o f expectations inherent in an adversarial relationship. This is 
tempered, however, by the moral hazard associated with supporting a dictatorial regime, 
and the limited ability o f totalitarian states to respond to positive overtures.
7.2.1 Spanish Initiative
With common historic, cultural and linguistic ties, Spain has maintained a close bilateral 
relationship with its former colony, Cuba, beyond those cultivated by Brussels. Madrid 
advised Cuba on economic reforms, and, through the promotion o f dialogue within Cuba, 
was responsible for the release o f many political prisoners in the early 1990s. (Lisio 
1996: 709) As Spain's socialist government under Felipe Gonzalez prepared to assume
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the presidency o f the EU in July 1995, Spain embarked, in early 1995, on a new 
programme to establish closer economic ties with Cuba with an eye to encouraging a 
democratic transition, using the French-Spanish-Italian troika. This Spanish initiative 
resulted in a flurry o f activity throughout 1995. Following the Commission's
O Q
recommendation (Commission 1995b), the Council opened a dialogue in October, to 
determine a framework for EU-Cuba relations that would serve to hasten process o f 
reform (Commission 1995c: 1.4.108), and the troika held exploratory talks in Havana in 
November. The Madrid European Council in December 1995 asked the Commission to 
"draft negotiating directives for a trade and economic cooperation agreement, which will 
be examined by the Council in the light of developments in the political and economic 
situation in Cuba" (Commission 1995d)
Manuel Marin, Vice President o f the European Commission, and the (Spanish) 
Commissioner primarily responsible for this initiative, personally presented the plan to 
Castro in early 1996. Castro flatly rejected any commitment to a programme of political 
and economic reform in return for aid in a contentious eleven-hour meeting with Marin, 
then cancelled Marin's planned meeting with Cuban dissidents by arresting them. The 
Cuban shootdown o f the Cuban-Americans followed days later, effectively shelving the 
cooperation. (Roy 1999: 35-37; Nuccio 1999: 14) The Times expressed Europe's 
disillusionment at Castro's brutality, understanding why Washington viewed Cuba as a 
"pariah."90
Marin's abortive trip was the culmination of a remarkable secret transgovernmental 
initiative in US-EU cooperation that took place between January 1995 and February 
1996. This plan put aside the embargo, on which there was no agreement between 
Washington and Brussels, and concentrated on advancing those values on which there 
was substantial agreement: encouraging the growth of civil society, protecting human 
rights and promoting a peaceful transition by nurturing democratic reforms in Cuba. 
Rather than seeking to marshal support against the aforementioned Spanish initiative, the 
State Department, astonishingly, chose to work quietly throughout 1995 with Spain and
89 The European Parliament supported this in January 1996. See Commission 1996a: 1.5.150
90 “Big Brother Fidel,” The Times Editorial, 28th February 1996.
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the EU, challenging Europe to put 'serious conditionality' for the promotion of reform in 
the agreement.
The year's diplomatic activity climaxed on 7th February 1996, as Commissioner Marin 
met in Brussels with Stuart Eizenstat, US ambassador to the EU and Richard Nuccio, 
Clinton's Cuba advisor, just before travelling to Cuba. The degree o f confluence 
between the American and European positions was startling; without time to consult 
Washington, the American delegation gave an undertaking to Commissioner Marin that 
if  his mission succeeded, they would prevail upon President Clinton to respond in a 
positive and significant manner. In response to this researcher's question of what the 
President would have done, Nuccio confessed that he did not know for certain. 
However, he surmised that the White House would bring into play the quid-pro-quo 
policy "to reduce the sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive 
developments in Cuba" as stated in the CDA. Nuccio probably referred to the ongoing 
secret initiative when he used the identical CDA expression o f the Administration 
responding "in carefully calibrated ways" to positive change in Cuba in a September 
1995 speech. (Nuccio 1995; Nuccio 1999: 13-16).
The Cuban shootdown o f the aeroplanes effectively aborted the European cooperation 
formula, and Clinton's nascent softening o f Cuba policy was overwhelmed by the 
enormous political constraints o f a re-election year. In attempting to explain Castro's 
appalling behaviour, perhaps the Track II people-to-people contacts o f the Torricelli Bill, 
coupled with Marin's EU initiative menaced Castro by promoting the growth o f a civil 
society that threatened to de-stabilise Cuba's strict totalitarian regime. Castro's response 
guaranteed continued American animosity. (Nuccio 1999: 16; Rieff 1996: 73; Haass and 
O'Sullivan 2000: 184) A Whitehall official's interpretation was that Castro could not 
accept Marin's proposal, and therefore, knowing he had nothing to lose, deliberately shot 
down the American aeroplanes, thus handing momentum to the Cuban-American hard­
liners in an election year, (research interview) Professor Joaquin Roy argues, based on 
evidence from Cuban officials, that Castro benefits politically from the embargo, and 
that the shootdown was a deliberate provocation. (Roy interview) It is a validation o f 
Jorge Dominguez's argument that "hardliners in each country have been each other's best
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allies, each remaining an obstacle to changing the quality o f US-Cuban relations." (J. 
Dominguez 1997: 70).
The May 1996 election o f Jose Maria Aznar, the first conservative government in Spain 
for fourteen years, heralded a radical about-turn: a hard-line Spanish policy toward Cuba 
through the direct linkage of bilateral cooperation agreements with political reform, 
much to Castro’s displeasure.91 The new Spanish policy was announced on 25th May at a 
joint press conference at the end o f an official visit by American Vice-President A1 Gore, 
and was predictably praised by Gore. Moreover, Aznar was responsible for initiating a 
similar hardening o f the EU's Cuba policy, as Madrid presented a draft resolution to the
• * t h  • •EU Foreign Ministers on 14 November 1996, making European cooperation with Cuba 
proportional to its democratic reforms. (Arenal 2004) El Pals reported that Aznar's 
proposal “se alinea estrechamente a la actualpolltica norteamericanana. ” (Vidal-Folch 
1996) Spain's conditional initiative was adopted as the Common Position after heated 
debate, discussed later in this chapter.
To summarise, the degree o f division between the United States and the European Union 
on Cuba policy was less than perceived. The overlapping win-sets led to covert 
cooperation between Washington and Brussels to promote a peaceful transition to 
democracy in Cuba immediately before the passage o f Libertad. There seems to have 
been a particularly close working relationship between Clinton and Madrid's Aznar, who 
may or may not have been a recipient of a side payment from the Americans - adopt a 
tough line and speak out against abuses in Cuba and win immunity from prosecution 
under Libertad. (Kiger 1997: 66)
7.3 EU Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Level II
The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) o f 1992 had extraterritorial implications for it 
extended the Cuban embargo to American subsidiaries operating in foreign countries.
91 Tensions mounted between Madrid and Havana as Aznar's repeated criticism o f Castro's totalitarian 
system culminated in Havana refusing to approve the new Spanish ambassador. See Roy 1997: 90-91; 
Patrick Chalmers, “Tougher EU Cuba Stance Adds to Madrid-Havana Row,” Reuters 28th November 
1996.
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The Europeans threatened to contest the CDA, but nothing materialised as they realised 
the potential benefits that could accrue to their own firms. The response to Helms- 
Burton was entirely different, with Eizenstat characterising the EU's reaction as 
"unadulterated, undiluted anger." (Kaplowitz 1998: 184) The different European 
reaction astonished Washington. But in 1992, Europeans believed that the Clinton 
Administration would either emphasise Track II or significantly moderate Washington's 
harsh Cuba policy soon. (Purcell 1998: 47-49) A Whitehall official conceded that, in 
view o f Libertad, the EU had erred gravely in not forcefully defending itself against the 
extraterritorial aspects o f the CDA. (research interview) The toothless European bark 
was not lost on supporters o f Libertad. In 1995 Congressional testimony, the president 
o f the Cuban American National Foundation recalled that the EU's vigorous protests 
against the CDA were not substantiated, implying that European threats were hollow. 
(Hernandez 1995: 93)
What accounted for the varied reactions? In protesting against Helms-Burton, perhaps 
Brussels was more concerned with the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) that was making 
its way through Congress in the summer o f 1996, which sought to impose sanctions on 
any country that aided Libya or Iran in developing their oil or natural gas fields. Middle 
East oil was a far more important issue than Cuba to Europe, for both consumers and 
producers (France's Total was involved in a consortium negotiating to develop oil fields 
in Iran). It was easier to object to an existing law, rather than to pending legislation, and 
the American defence o f  national security could be much more easily challenged in the 
case of Cuba than in a case involving 'rogue' states. (Purcell 1998: 47-49) Indeed, Sir 
Leon referred to the ILSA bill as the EU was considering options for defending itself 
against Libertad, arguing that it was "imperative to send a clear message" that the EU 
would not tolerate extraterritorial legislation. (Brittan 1996a)
What was perhaps most extraordinary about the EU's reaction to Helms-Burton was the 
remarkable degree o f unity that it fostered. The EU not only mounted an effective 
defence against what it perceived as an onerous law with serious extraterritorial 
implications, Brussels also successfully orchestrated a compromise with the US that 
averted a potentially damaging WTO hearing. (Roy 1999: 33) In announcing the May
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1998 Understanding, Commission President Jacques Santer crowed, "It's a deal that is 
good for the EU, which has shown that it can act together, united in important foreign 
policy issues." (Santer 1998) Fieldwork confirmed that there was remarkable unity on 
the over-arching substantive issue o f contesting Libertad's extraterritoriality; 
nevertheless, there were conflicting national preferences over tactics that required 
resolution.
How competent a foreign policy did the EU have in the 1990s? Christopher Hill and 
William Wallace argue that an effective foreign policy is based on a shared sense o f 
national identity, which the EU can never have. While the EU has achieved a 'collective 
presence' internationally and the ability to articulate objectives, it has not achieved 
'actomess,' which demands the practical ability to effect policy in relations with other 
actors in the international arena. National governments, therefore, downplay the extent 
o f compromise they have to make to national priorities in order to reach consensus with 
their fellow member states. EU foreign policy decisions are taken in almost total 
secrecy; member states take great pains to disguise the integration o f foreign policy, to 
avoid domestic scrutiny and democratic accountability in their common foreign policy. 
Hill and Wallace conclude that the sticky issue o f a comprehensive foreign policy 
remained unresolved by the EU in the 1990s. (Hill and Wallace 1996: 6-13)
But Andrew Moravcsik argues that EU institutions strengthen the power o f member 
states in two ways. Firstly, they increase efficiency in interstate bargaining by pooling 
sovereignty. Secondly, they create a two-level game, which enhances the autonomy o f 
national leaders with regard to domestic interest groups. The fact that intergovernmental 
discussions are held in secret affords national leaders the freedom to bargain with 
relatively little domestic constraint. Domestic polities cannot amend or revise 
agreements, only accept or reject. Indeed, in facilitating agreement on common interests, 
the 'democratic deficit' may be an important source o f the success o f the EU. (Moravcsik 
1993b: 507-517)
7.3.1 Instruments of Foreign Policy: Three Pillars
The intergovernmentalist approach won over the community approach at Maastricht, 
establishing the three pillar structure upon which the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is 
based. Commission President Jacques Delors warned at the time that the arrangement 
was "a recipe for confusion" (Cameron 1999: 24), while Helen Wallace has characterised 
the TEU as having "grand policy ambitions and muddled institutional results." (H. 
Wallace 1996: 55) Karen Smith is concerned that the pillar system raises issues o f 
consistency: ensuring that decisions made in one pillar do not conflict with those o f 
another. This has improved as the pillars increasingly overlap and demarcation between 
the pillars became less distinct. (K. Smith 2003: 65-66)
Pillar I incorporated the former European Communities (EC), retaining most o f the 
policy responsibilities it previously had under the 1957 Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC). The TEU allowed the EC to act only within specified parameters, 
granting the EC exclusive competence over the 'low politics' o f trade. Where the 
Community did not have exclusive competence, "the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle o f subsidiarity..." (Article 5, ex Article 3b o f the TEC) a 
rather vague indication that policy should be decided at national or local level.
The 'high politics' o f Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was reserved to the 
Council's Pillar II under a weaker institutional regime that demanded intergovernmental 
cooperation (as was Justice and Home Affairs, Pillar III). CFSP provided the Council 
with two important tools in the pursuit o f a common foreign and security policy, both o f 
which have been sparingly used. Significantly, both instruments were applied during the 
escalating crisis over Helms-Burton.
On the basis o f unanimity, the Council could define 'common positions' on any 
matter o f foreign or security policy that was of general interest to the member states. 
(Article J.2 o f the TEU)
Based on general guidelines from the European Council, the Council could 
decide to take a 'joint action,' determined by QMV. (Article J.3 o f the TEU)
Member states would be committed to ensuring that their national policies conformed to 
the common position/joint action.
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British and French insistence at Maastricht kept joint actions in foreign policy under 
national control, limiting the role of the European Parliament to an advisory one, and the 
role o f the Commission to an "advisory but not a policy-initiating role." (Hill and 
Wallace 1996: 12)92 The Commission is nevertheless 'fully associated' with the 
Council's CFSP work. This means that, while the Commission plays a secondary role, its 
contribution to CFSP can be significant, especially when EC instruments such as trade 
are involved. (Nugent 1999: 139-140)
7.3.2 Pillar I Ambiguity
Trade policy broadly falls under Pillar I. From its inception, the member states have 
delegated supranational competence on trade issues to the Community, allowing the 
Community to speak with one voice in international trade negotiations. But the 
Community has exclusive competence only in trade in goods; investment policy, 
intellectual property and trade in services are areas o f shared competence between the 
Community and the member states. (Woolcock 2000: 375; K. Smith interview) Meunier 
and Nicolaidis argue that the 1990s debate over trade was a reflection of the larger 
ideological controversy over deeper European integration. In 1994, the European Court 
o f Justice decided competence for non-goods trade should be shared. At the Amsterdam 
IGC, important member states (France and UK among them) were reluctant to transfer 
more sovereignty to the Community; therefore, Article 133 allowed for the extension o f 
exclusive community competence to the new trade sectors on a case-by-case basis after a 
unanimous Council vote. (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999: 478-496)
The main difference between exclusive and shared competence is at the ratification 
stage. For exclusive competence, the Council ratifies by qualified majority voting 
(QMV), but shared competence requires unanimity in Council in addition to 
parliamentary ratification in each member state. Shared competence seems to grant 
member states veto rights, both in Council and in their national parliaments. In practice, 
powerful member states exercise an informal veto even under QMV. The real difference
92 The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty extended and streamlined CFSP by giving it three new instruments, 
among them the definition o f CFSP principles and the adoption o f common strategies, all o f which 
required majority voting. The previous CFSP tools o f joint action and common position were to be taken 
under QMV. See Nugent 1999: 85.
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lies in the fact that "the expression o f dissent is dampened, the incentives for seeking 
compromise increased and the role o f the Commission enhanced in areas o f exclusive 
competence." (Ibid: 482) Indeed, Meunier argues that most policies are decided by 
consensus rather than by formal vote, with only 14 percent o f issues in Council decided 
by vote in 1994. (Meunier 2000: 108)
A complicating factor has been the increasing overlap between the political and the 
economic resulting in a blurring o f boundaries between pillars and competencies. These 
ambiguities have presented difficulties not only for the member states, as competence 
determines decision-making processes, but also for non-member countries with whom 
they interact. (Van den Bossche 1997: 29) Helms-Burton presented one o f a growing 
number o f 'mixed agreements' that straddled the interface between trade and foreign 
policy, raising troublesome questions over competence.
Ambiguity over competence is reflected in the fact that both the EU and the member 
states retain WTO membership. (Ibid: 26) When signing the Marrakesh Final Act at the 
conclusion o f the Uruguay Round in April 1994, the member states rejected the 
Commission's suggestion that the European Community and its member states sign 
collectively, similar to the manner in which they were already listed at GATT. The 
member states signed in alphabetical order, with the United Kingdom following the 
United Arab Emirates. Moreover, the French industry minister held a meeting with the 
USTR Mickey Kantor before Sir Leon did, defending his entitlement to act in areas that 
were not exclusive Community competence. (Ibid: 75-77)
LSE trade expert Stephen Woolcock argues that the continuing ambiguity spills over to 
who represents the EU at a WTO dispute settlement hearing when the dispute concerns 
the grey area o f mixed competence. (Woolcock 2000: 388) The EU has adopted a 
pragmatic approach insofar as the Commission speaks for the EU before the WTO, "even 
when disputes touch on issues o f mixed competence...and o f operating by a kind o f 
common-sense consensus-building." (Ibid: 395) Illustrating this pragmatism, the 
European Council empowered the Commission to speak on behalf o f the Community and 
the member states in March 1985, before the Uruguay Round talks began at Punta del
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Este that September. However, despite the sensible nature o f the accommodation that 
has evolved within the EU, the arrangement remains fraught with confusion and 
controversy. (Van den Bossche 1997: 53-54; 102)
As the most supranational o f the EU's institutions, the Commission often holds policy 
preferences divergent from those o f the member states. Helen Wallace argues that, 
because the Commission is insulated from national politics, it frequently develops 
innovative, idealistic proposals, which the Council finds impossible to translate into 
practical policy due to member states' reservations. (H. Wallace 1996: 58-59)
Tensions are exacerbated by delicate balance o f power considerations between the 
Council and the Commission in trade talks, as the Council seeks to maintain control, and 
the more liberal Commission seeks greater manoeuvrability in order to obtain an 
agreement. A flexible Council mandate, reflecting the lowest common denominator o f 
consensus in the Council, allows the Commission freedom to interpret the mandate 
according to its preferences and negotiate a fairly liberalising trade agreement. Some 
argue that this inevitably leads to friction at the ratification stage (Meunier and 
Nicolaidis 1999: 482), a common constraint at Level II. However, the Commission may 
deliberately exploit the fact that the Council may be reluctant to censure it, thereby 
committing the EC to an agreement whilst uncertain of internal support, but confident 
that the international costs o f reneging are high enough to ensure that reluctant member 
states approve. (Deutsch 1999: 103)
Competence delegated to the Commission is therefore often tightly drawn, and the 
Commission frequently consults with the Council with regard to new compromises that 
may have been tabled during talks. Woolcock observes that critics o f the EU accuse the 
Commission o f being unwilling to negotiate without a mandate, but unable to negotiate 
with one, as mandates may be so tightly constructed. (Woolcock 2000: 381) While a 
rigid mandate may create problems for Level I negotiators, the Commission may use this
9j On the heels o f the Blair House Agreement breaking the six-year US-EC deadlock over agriculture in 
the Uruguay Round, tensions flared as French Prime Minister Juppe famously told Commissioner Brittan 
that he did not trust him. (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999: 483)
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constraint to its advantage (as Putnam predicts) by responding to an unacceptable 
proposal that the Council will never agree to that, much as the US has been wont to do.
Competence remains zealously guarded. For example, when the Council decided in 
October 1995 to open a dialogue with Cuba to determine the level o f EU commercial 
relations appropriate to promoting reform in Cuba, it warned "that step may be taken 
only on the basis o f prior directives from the Council." (Commission 1995c: 1.4.108)
7.3.3 Resolution of Tensions
How does the EU resolve tensions between its supranational and intergovernmental 
institutions? Woolcock argues that continuous consultation between the Commission 
and the Council is essential to the decision-making process and the successful conclusion 
of international trade negotiations. The Council and the Commission share many points 
o f contact, with dossiers moving vertically up and down working groups and committees 
but also horizontally across to each other. (Woolcock 2000: 382-384) Indeed, a dry, 
legalistic view of EU institutions conceals a "dynamic, multi-layered and politicized 
system of decision-making." (CoHinson 1999: 208) Failure to consult may scupper 
agreement, as nearly happened in this case study. Collinson and Woolcock cite the 
example o f the failure o f EC diplomacy in the 1990s GATT talks due to the inordinate 
degree of power exercised by the agriculture ministers that undermined the credibility o f 
the Commission to negotiate. (Woolcock 2000: 383) This leads to what has been 
labelled 'a perpetual boundary problem' in the EU's external policy, as distinctions 
between domestic and external, and political, economic and security issues become more 
difficult to ascertain. (Collinson 1999: 208-211)
Integral to the conduct of trade negotiations is the Article 133 Committee, which deals 
with common commercial policy and is composed o f trade experts from the member 
states and Commission representatives.94 Article 133 sets out the procedure for 
conducting trade negotiations, whereby the principal (Council) delegates authority to its
94 Article 113 o f  the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) dealt with commercial 
policy. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) amended and consolidated the TEC, resulting in the change to 
Article 133.
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agent (Commission). The policy process begins with the Commission submitting a 
proposal to the Council. Key policy discussions take place in the Article 133 
Committee, which amends the Commission proposals before sending them to the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and finally to the Council. The 
Council determines the negotiating mandate by qualified majority voting (QMV), then 
delegates power to the Commission, who conducts the trade negotiations within the 
parameters set by the Council's mandate. The Commission may initial an agreement but 
the Council remains the final arbiter in deciding ratification. (Article 133; Meunier 2000: 
107; Nugent 443-445) Throughout, the Commission plays an integral role in mediating 
compromises between reluctant states, as it attends COREPER meetings and recognises 
member states' constraints. (K. Smith interview)
Continuous dialogue enables the Commission to have its mandate adjusted by the Article 
133 Committee. If the negotiations were particularly sensitive, the Commission may 
consult COREPER ministers, or the General Affairs Council (GAC), as SLB 
increasingly did when the Uruguay Round negotiations neared their end. Tim Abraham, 
former 133 Committee official, allowed that the 133 Committee advises and monitors the 
Commission, amending or refining the mandate as needed, but that member states have 
little interest in re-negotiating the mandate completely. To facilitate agreement, the 
Commission may declare, "We are going to take our own responsibilities," which means 
that the member states are 'shut out' o f negotiations; a general understanding exists that 
the Commission must be allowed to proceed with its remit. If  member states are very 
displeased, or feel the Commission is acting beyond its brief, they complain to the 133 
Committee or the GAC, who tackle the Commission on their behalf. (Abraham 
interview) In this case study COREPER, keen to see a peaceful resolution with the US, 
granted the Commission this independence, (research interview) However, as the talks 
neared conclusion, SLB consulted COREPER ambassadors with possible texts for their 
consideration, and received support from EU foreign ministers to press for an agreement. 
(Croft 1998b)
7.3.4 Competence: Pillar I or Pillar II?
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Was the EU's defence over Libertad undertaken as a trade matter under Pillar I with 
Community competence, or as a foreign policy issue under Pillar II, with the 
intergovernmental Council responsible? As late as September 1996, the FT  reported that 
the Commission was experiencing difficulties in enacting its blocking statute, as legal 
opinion in Brussels was unsure whether to act under Community competence, Pillar I, or 
under intergovernmental competence, Pillar II. (de Jonquieres and Barber 1996) This 
thesis argues that both Pillars were involved; the EU's foreign policy vis-a-vis Cuba was 
essentially Pillar II, but the WTO challenge was mounted under Pillar I.
• The EU's Cuba policy is a foreign policy issue, dealt with by the member states in 
Council under Pillar II. As the Helms-Burton dispute escalated, the Council initiated 
two responses under CFSP:
□ a Joint Action to protect European businessmen with interests in Cuba from the 
effects o f Helms-Burton,93 and
□ a Common Position outlining EU-Cuba relations.
• The dispute over the extraterritorial aspects of Helms-Burton involved investment 
principles, a Pillar I area o f shared competence between the Community and the 
member states, who co-ordinated an effective defence.
□ The Council Regulation was a Pillar I instrument, drafted by the Commission, 
blocking the effects of Libertad.
□ The Commission, acting under a Council mandate, mounted the WTO litigation, 
and conducted the bilateral negotiations with the US. The agreement required 
unanimous support of the member states in the Council in addition to ratification in each 
capital, as mandated by Article 133 for cases o f mixed competence.
The narrative, fieldwork, and a close reading o f EU documents will support this thesis' 
contention that the separation o f Cuba (foreign) policy from trade policy is legitimate 
and sound. The EU clearly regarded the Helms-Burton's extraterritorial attempt to 
dictate its commercial relations with Cuba as a (Pillar I) trade matter; indeed, this
93 The Joint Action cited TEU Articles referring to both Pillar II and III.
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interpretation was bitterly contested by the US, who insisted that Helms-Burton was a 
foreign policy matter that did not belong before the WTO.
LSE lecturer Karen Smith argues that EU foreign policy has increasingly been fashioned 
across pillars, especially as there has been a blurring o f distinctions between pillars. 
With regard to transatlantic disputes in particular, the EU has been markedly reluctant to 
use the 'high politics' o f CFSP for it is too provocative, signalling too much displeasure. 
Brussels prefers to use the more technical aspects of trade under Pillar I, particularly in 
view o f the fact that the volume o f transatlantic trade is so large. (K. Smith interview) 
Tim Abraham concurs that the EU often employs cross-pillar strategies, surmising that 
Pillar I would have been employed first, but, due to an element of political foreign policy 
as well, Pillar II was utilised as well. (Abraham interview)
In this case study, Brussels consistently based its arguments on the fine technical point of 
extraterritoriality under Pillar I. Both the Commission and the Council presidency 
signed the letter requesting a WTO panel, reflecting their shared competence under Pillar 
I. Furthermore, there was close cross-pillar cooperation, as the Council Regulation 
(Pillar I) and the Joint Action (Pillar II) were approved the same day.
Sir Leon Brittan served as one o f two vice-presidents o f the Santer Commission, and 
DGI Commissioner in charge o f External Relations (with North America), and relations 
with the WTO in the late 1990s. SLB had also been the chief EU negotiator during the 
protracted Uruguay Round talks. He claimed that his Commission brief included 
external political and economic relations with the US, and that he clearly had 
competence to represent the EU in a trade dispute with the US before the WTO. (Brittan 
interview) Per Haugaard, who worked at the US Desk in DGI, concurred that SLB was 
the natural choice as the lead negotiator given his position as head o f DGI. (Haugaard 
interview)
7.3.5 Seeking Consensus
Interviews with EU officials consistently painted a picture o f the deep irritation Brussels 
felt at Washington's extraterritorial legislation. The usual 'North-South divide', pitting
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northern liberal states (UK, Germany) against the 'Club Med' states (Spain, Italy) did not 
exist. In this case study, the French were quite determined, while the British, Dutch, 
Germans and Italians were more wary "not to provoke a full scale transatlantic row," 
cognisant o f Clinton's domestic constraints, (research interview) Lord Brittan 
emphasised the harmony in Brussels, characterising the WTO action, once initiated, as a 
"seamless process." (Brittan interview) Speaking just after the July Council decision to 
prepare a concrete response to Libertad, SLB said he was aware o f how strongly 
ministers felt, but "I was frankly surprised at the unanimity o f their conclusions, the 
rapidity o f their deliberations, the strength o f their condemnation and the determination 
o f their action." (Brittan 1996a)
A fundamental characteristic of the EU decision-making process has been the continuing 
ambiguity surrounding voting rules in the Council, both for deciding the mandate to be 
given to the Commission, and for the ratification o f agreements. The Council often 
adopts a mandate through unanimity, despite the clause in the 1957 Treaty o f Rome 
ending unanimity voting in trade negotiations by 1966. (Meunier 2000: 107)
These deliberations are essentially academic, as the Council has developed a de facto 
'culture o f consensus,' ensuring that it hardly ever acts under QMV, even when 
permissible under the Treaty. (Hix 1999: 73) The Council goes to great lengths to 
resolve the misgivings o f member states so as to achieve a consensus. Indeed, much o f 
EU decision-making, particularly in the Council, is based on a search for agreement 
between competing interests that is somewhat more than the 'lowest common 
denominator.' (Nugent 1999: 140) Resolution between competing national interests 
takes place primarily in COREPER, with a former ambassador observing that COREPER 
was "the last point o f negotiation before [policy proceeds] to politicians for decision." (S. 
Wall 1999) In this case study, the Council devoted substantial resources to building 
consensus at Level II, overcoming national objections both in deciding negotiating 
strategy and in adopting the agreement; this thesis argues that the UK Presidency was 
particularly crucial in securing ratification o f the final agreement.
Woolcock argues that the lack o f formal voting by the Council at the adoption stage of 
negotiations reverberates back on the trade negotiations themselves. I f  QMV were the
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norm, the Commission would only have to ensure that it had the requisite backing for its 
agreement. As consensus is the norm, the Commission operates under considerable 
constraints, for a member state may effectively veto a proposed accord in the Council. 
However, it is generally only in areas that affect "vital national interests" that a member 
state will "dig in its heels"; otherwise, members o f the minority will usually be persuaded 
to join the majority. (Woolcock 2000: 385)
Sir Leon confided that a formal vote was never taken over the Helms-Burton WTO 
action. SLB reported to COREPER, and when there was disagreement, reservations 
were accommodated, and the issue resolved by consensus. The question o f a formal vote 
was not discussed; indeed, the Council never votes unless someone specifically requests 
a vote. SLB also highlighted the absurdity o f holding a vote under rules o f unanimity 
after a member had voiced disagreement. (Brittan interview) A former COREPER 
official concurred that it was not unusual for a vote not to be sought when a "politically 
neuralgic" issue was being discussed and two large member states - France and Spain - 
were very unhappy, (research interview)
7.4 Three-Level Game
Negotiating with the European Union in reality opens a third level in the game: Level I is 
the international negotiation, Level II is the negotiation at the Union level and Level III 
is the compromise at the domestic level in each member state. Level II is the new level, 
forming the interface between governments in the Council o f Ministers and other EU 
committees and institutions, where member nations pursue domestic goals and co­
operative integration at the same time. Level III can be quite a complex grouping, 
including the domestic constituencies o f the member states, but also transnational 
interest groups who operate community-wide. The EU's win-set is actually a double one, 
for it is determined by preferences, institutions and the COGs (or chief o f government, 
Moravcsik 1993a: 23) at national and Community level. Furthermore, there is a two-step 
process of ratification as both Council and member states must approve agreements, 
although national approval may sometimes be informal. Such a game is far more 
complex, as bargaining (and the possibility o f side payments) at the domestic, 
Community, and international levels reverberate on each other.
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Two-level and three-level games can differ widely. In the two-level game, the COG is 
active in the international negotiations, and thereafter in the domestic ratification 
process. In a three-level game, however, the actors are different; it is the Commission 
that negotiates at Level I and reports to Level II but national ministers in the Council 
take charge in Level II and in Level III. Moreover, in analysing the relative agency o f 
actors, Level II in the EU's structure is far more active and more directly involved in the 
negotiating process than Level II in Putnam's model, for the Council determines the 
Commission's negotiating mandate, in addition to ratifying the agreement. (Collinson 
1999: 217-219; Patterson 1997: 141)
The Council splits loyalties as ministers juggle domestic interests against integrationist 
tendencies and policies promoting the welfare o f the Union, accommodating member 
states' domestic constraints through consensual agreement. In this case study, the Council 
struggled mightily to resolve Level II tensions and reach consensus, particularly at the 
eleventh hour, when the Council Presidency over-ruled minor objections of a recalcitrant 
member state as the final agreement was announced.
7.5 Early Defence
Brussels adopted a cross-pillar strategy vis-a-vis Cuba in 1995, pursuing constructive 
engagement with Castro, with the tacit support of the White House, under CFSP Pillar II, 
and objecting strenuously to the extraterritorial provisions o f Libertad as it was debated 
in Congress under Pillar I. The implicit threat o f a WTO lawsuit was mentioned quite 
early in the communiques.
• On 5th April 1995, the Council presidency expressed its "serious concern regarding the 
possible adoption by Congress" o f the Helms-Burton Act, pointing out "that it is opposed 
to the adoption of any measure having extraterritorial application and in breach o f WTO 
rules." (Commission 1995a)
• The passage o f Helms-Burton by the House of Representatives in September prompted
f h  • *a response from the Council president on 11 October 1995, re-iterating Brussels'
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opposition to this extraterritorial legislation "which is in conflict with the rules o f 
international organisations, including those o f the WTO." (Commission 1995c: 1.4.5).
• More explicitly, in a communique printed in the Congressional Record, the 
Commission expressed concern over whether Libertad was compatible with WTO rules, 
warning that it intended to defend its "legitimate interests in the appropriate international 
fora." (Commission 1996b)
The Council meeting o f 26 February 1996 heartily condemned the shootdown o f the 
two American civilian aircraft by Cuba, but concluded with a veiled warning, 
"Irrespective o f the circumstances o f the incident, there can be no excuse for not 
respecting international law and human rights norms." (Commission 1996a: 1.4.7).
The next chapter takes up the narrative o f the WTO action; this chapter continues with an 
analysis o f three remarkable cross-pillar documents that were adopted in rapid 
succession by the Council:
• the Council Regulation, (or blocking action) taken under Pillar I, and
• the Joint Action, and the Common Position, both enacted under CFSP, Pillar II.
7.5.1 Blocking Action
The Council meeting on 22nd April 1996 expressed grave concern over the 
extraterritorial aspects o f Flelms-Burton and pondered how to protect EU companies and 
their American investments. The Council asked "the relevant experts to draw up all 
WTO and other options" along with "the possibility o f countermeasures" in its defence. 
(Commission 1996c)
• On 15th July 1996, the Council, noting "widespread international objections to this 
legislation," requested that President Clinton waive Title III (due to take place the next 
day), and expressed disquiet about the implementation o f  Title IV. The Council 
proposed several countermeasures, including requesting a WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panel, legislation neutralising the effects of Helms-Burton, a watch list o f American 
companies filing Title III suits, and changes in the law governing admission o f American 
businessmen to the EU. Finally, the Council, hinting at cooperation between pillars,
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issued instructions to COREPER to lay the necessary groundwork for "urgent 
Community and coordinated national action." (Commission 1996d: 1.4.116).
Following the Council's request, the Commission approved the following two proposals
thon 24 July, (Commission 1996d: 1.4.117), formally adopting them a week later:
• On 30th July, the Commission invited European companies to compile a 'watch list' o f 
US firms and citizens that file suits against them.96 (Commission 1996d: 1.4.119)
• On 31st July, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Regulation aimed at 
neutralising the extraterritorial effects o f Libertad, to be binding on all member states 
(Pillar I). Hinting at the Iran Libya Sanctions Act being debated on Capitol Hill, the 
Commission proposed that the Council be able "to extend these measures to any other 
extraterritorial laws adopted in the future." (Commission 1996d: 1.4.118)
Level II Tensions
The Council negotiations over the blocking action provided evidence o f how this 
intergovernmental institution patiently sought consensus and resolved Level II tensions.
Commissioner Brittan drafted the Council Regulation modelled on Britain's 1980 
Protection o f Trading Interests Act, which forbade British firms from co-operating with 
American extraterritorial actions (during the pipeline sanctions), and authorised them to 
file counter claims in Britain to 'claw back' any penalties levied by American courts. Sir 
Malcolm Rifkind, who was Minister o f State at the Foreign Office in 1980, and British 
Foreign Secretary in 1996, recalled that both the dispute over the pipeline and Helms- 
Burton were centred on the principle o f extraterritoriality. The 1980 Act provided 
protection to British companies threatened by the pipeline sanctions, such as the UK 
engineering firm John Brown, by allowing them to respond to Washington that British 
law prohibited them from co-operating. (Rifkind interview)
96 The Commission later called on any EU entity that had been adversely affected by Helms-Burton to 
inform it so that it could measure the effects o f  the legislation. See Bulletin EU 10-1996: 1.4.85
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Britain's Rifkind objected to the proposed 1996 Council Regulation, on the general 
grounds that member states would be ceding too much sovereignty to Brussels. Rifkind 
preferred that each member state enact its own version o f the legislation, similar to the 
UK's existing legislation, rather than a Community-wide proposal. Rifkind's objections 
surprised the member states, as the UK had appeared to support the broad agreement 
reached by EU member states on a package o f retaliatory measures ten days earlier. 
Moreover, although frequently in the minority in the EU, Britain's leadership in 
campaigning for a tough united European response to Helms-Burton sent a particularly 
sharp signal to Washington. The Commission postponed its decision on a draft statute for 
another week, to allow time to ease British concerns. (Bates and Palmer 1996; Bremner 
1996; Helm 1996) Sir Malcolm recalled that his government sought to avoid a domestic 
row over deeper European integration (Rifkind interview), indicative o f the paralysis 
suffered by the Major Government as 'wets' and Euro-sceptics collided.
The Council also had to overcome Danish hesitancy. Denmark faced a court challenge 
by a group claiming that Danish signature o f the Maastricht Treaty was unconstitutional 
in abrogating too much sovereignty to the EU. (Southey and Barnes 1996) Lawyers 
laboured for a week to find a compromise that resolved these Danish fears. (Bates and 
Palmer 1996)
British and Danish doubts over how to proceed at Union level were prompted by 
domestic constraints, illustrating the Level II dynamic in EU decision-making. Both 
episodes portray the extent to which the Council was prepared to accommodate member 
states' legitimate concerns in its search for consensus. On the other hand, Spain 
threatened to take unilateral action if a European-wide commitment to substantively 
challenge Helms-Burton were not reached. (Martinez 1997: 290)
7.5.2 Council Regulation: Pillar I
On 22nd November 1996, the Council o f the European Union unanimously adopted a 
blocking action, Council Regulation EC No 2271/96, based on Articles 73c, 113 and 235
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of the (1957) TEC,97 clearly Pillar I. Referring to the Community's objectives, the 
preamble noted that extraterritorial laws are likely to "have adverse effects on the 
interests o f the Community," necessitating Community action to protect the "established 
legal order." The Regulation contained protective measures that explicitly forbade 
adherence to Libertad:
• "This Regulation provides protection against and counteracts the effects o f the
• • 98extra-territorial application o f the laws specified in the Annex o f this Regulation," 
(Article 1) and binds any interests so affected to inform the Commission within 30 days. 
(Article 2)
• "No judgement o f a court or a tribunal" outside the EU giving effect to these 
laws will be recognised as valid or enforceable. (Article 4)
• "No person...shall comply, whether directly or through a subsidiary...with any 
requirement or prohibition, including requests o f foreign courts, based on or resulting, 
directly or indirectly, from the laws specified in the Annex..."99 (Article 5)
• Any person so affected has the right to recover (claw back) all damages, 
including legal fees, caused by these laws. (Article 6) (Union 1996a)
It is significant that the Council chose to take action in the form o f a 'Regulation,' for this 
is the strongest type o f Community legislation, meaning it was immediately binding on 
all member states, “without the need for national measures to implement them.” 
(Communities 1999: 11)
7.5.3 Joint Action: Pillar II and III
The Council o f the European Union adopted Joint Action 96/668/CFSP on the very same 
day as the Council Regulation. Whereas the Regulation referred to the 'Community,' the 
Joint Action addressed the 'Member States,' for it was based on Articles J.3 (CFSP - 
Pillar II) and K.2 (Justice and Home Affairs - Pillar III) o f the TEU. The Joint Action 
referred to the Council Regulation as protecting "the interests o f the Community" from
97 They became Articles 57, 133, and 308 in the consolidated version. Article 57 granted the Council, 
acting on a Commission proposal, the right to legislate on the movement o f  capital.
98 Cuban Democracy Act o f 1992, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton) o f  1996, 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act o f 1996. The Council reserved the right to add to these laws. (Article I)
99 Article 5 allows individuals to comply if  non-compliance would "seriously damage their interests or 
those o f the Community."
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extraterritorial legislation, and instructed the Member States to take all measures 
necessary to provide protection "insofar as such protection is not provided under 
Regulation (EC) No 2271/96." (Union 1996b)
The Joint Action concluded by declaring that it, together with Regulation (EC) No 
2271/96, "constitute together an integrated system involving the Community and the 
Member States each in accordance with its own powers." (Ibid) In adopting the Council 
Regulation and the Joint Action, the Council utilised foreign policy instruments across 
all three pillars to pursue a consistent strategy.
The same agents may act under different pillars. (K. Smith interview) The Council 
Regulation was affirmed by the GAC under Pillar I, while the Joint Action, taken later 
that same day, was approved by the Council o f Foreign Ministers under CFSP Pillar II. 
Both Councils were composed o f the foreign ministers o f the member states, working 
together under different competences.100
7.5.4 Common Position: Pillar II
To formally confirm its well-established policy towards Cuba, the Council approved the 
Common Position 96/697CFSP on 2nd December 1996, based on Article J.2 o f the TEU, 
strongly conditioning EU economic cooperation with Cuba on democratic reforms. Its 
purpose was "to encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms." The EU pledged that it would "intensify the 
present dialogue" with Cuba and Cuban civil society to encourage reforms whilst 
continuing to provide humanitarian aid. "As the Cuban authorities make progress 
towards democracy, the European Union will lend its support to that process" through 
more intensive dialogue and closer economic cooperation. The Council pledged to 
evaluate this position in six months time. (Union 1996c)
As one o f the first experiments in CFSP, (Roy 1997: 79) the Common Position was 
substantially based upon the Spanish initiative hardening the EU stance against Cuba the
100 These Councils are now collectively called the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC).
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previous May. The document resolved diverging Level II preferences. Spain's proposal 
that every member state appoint an official in its Havana embassy responsible for 
contacts with human rights protection agencies was rejected, but Madrid "congratulated 
itself' nonetheless on the adoption o f the document.101 Many ministers, France and Italy 
foremost among them, objected to the very extreme conditionality o f aid which they saw 
as representing a "180 [degree] turn from European policy to Cuba, bringing it close to 
the American line."102 But the Common Position stated very clearly that it was "not 
European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures with the effect 
o f increasing the economic hardship o f the Cuban people." (Union 1996c)
The Common Position was understandably not well received by Cuba (Roy 1999: 39- 
40), heartily welcomed by Washington, and the subject o f a mixed reception in Europe. 
A British journalist icily characterised the document as "interference, lecturing and 
conditionality." He urged the new governments in Britain, France and Italy to forsake 
the Common Position and develop relations with Cuba without conditions. (Steele 1998)
Spain, France and the UK were among the leading hawks in defending the EU against 
Libertad. Given Spain's historical and cultural ties with Cuba, and France's deep 
socio/psychological issues with the US (and Total was threatened under ILSA), their 
position was readily understandable. But it was unusual for the UK to be so actively 
involved, as Britain generally preferred a more Atlanticist role. Indeed, Joseph Nye has 
underlined the important role that Britain plays in the reinforcement of US-EU relations 
by looking simultaneously across the Atlantic and across the Channel. (Nye 2000: 55) 
Sir Malcolm Rifkind felt that Britain's input was important precisely because it 
represented a departure, for the US tended to take greater notice when the UK objected. 
(Rifkind interview)
7.6 Vertical Consistency
101 “EU/Cuba: EU States Show More Willingness to Step Up Dialogue,” European Report. 30th November 
1996; “Opinion, ” El Pais. 5th December 1996, p. 14.
102 “EU/Cuba -  Spanish Plan for Making Aid and Cooperation with Cuba Strictly T ied ...” Agence 
Europe. 20th November 1996
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Karen Smith argues for vertical consistency between national and EU policy to ensure 
that member states do not undermine EU policy. (K. Smith 2003: 65) The evidence 
suggests that the EU has not achieved consistency in its Cuba policy. With regard to the 
Common Position, CFSP Pillar II, Professor Joaquin Roy argues that the EU's 
institutional framework contrasts sharply with national conduct, rendering the Common 
Position "neither common, nor a policy" as member states trade with Cuba with 
impunity.103 (Roy 2005)
Regarding the implementation o f Council Regulation No 2271/96 under Pillar I, two 
curious anomalies arose. Firstly, the Council Regulation mandated that any European 
firm investigated by Washington under Helms-Burton Act was to report this to the 
Commission within thirty days (Article 2). Reuters reported in February 1997 that the 
Commission was "very, very disappointed" with the fact that no company had come 
forward; the Commission was therefore launching its own quiet investigation into the 
suspected dozens o f companies that had been targeted by Libertad. (Fox 1997b) 
Commission officials and Spanish government sources confirmed that the US had 
requested information from some twenty EU companies regarding their investments in 
Cuba. The Spanish list included the banking group Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, the oil group 
Repsol, the tobacco group Tabacalera and the hotel operator Sol Melia.104
Secondly, the Italian telecommunications company STET, cited under Libertad's Title IV 
in May 1996, paid compensation to ITT in July 1997. This is difficult to reconcile with 
Article 5 o f the Council Regulation that specifically prohibited compliance with the 
American authorities over Libertad. The Financial Times (FT) reported that the 
Commission would "scrutinise" whether STET had breached EU law (Buckley 1997), 
but this researcher found no record o f any further action being taken. Professor Roy felt 
that it was "very damaging" that the EU took no action against STET's flagrant 
transgression o f the blocking action, (Roy interview) making a mockery o f EU 
legislation.
l02Roy credits the research o f Suzanne Gratius, “Cuba and the European Union: A Fragile Relationship,”
Transitions-Crit£me, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, for quoting this widely used expression in Brussels.
104 “US Government Asks for Information over Cuban Investments,” Gaceta de los Negocios, 22nd 
February 1997.
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But an EU official felt that that the Commission made a conscious decision not to 
prosecute STET. He observed that the Council Regulation was misunderstood, for it was 
a political defence primarily designed to help companies caught between two 
jurisdictions, not a tool with which to beat European firms, (research interview) The 
DTI's John Foggo concurred with this assessment: the Council Regulation was meant to 
support EU companies, and the Commission took the view that it would interpret the 
legislation "as a rather grey area," not get too irate over the STET deal, and concentrate 
on solving the larger political problem with Washington. (Foggo interview) 
Furthermore, another DTI official argued that the Council Regulation was drafted so 
hastily that it was "full o f holes" particularly compared to Britain's Protection o f Trading 
Interests Act upon which it was modelled. Its many ambiguities included lack o f clarity 
over what point in the trade process one is in breach o f the EU law, whom to report to, 
and what the penalties entailed were.105 (Woodger interview)
7.7 Conclusion
The Europeans were pleased with the unusual degree o f unity fostered by Helms-Burton 
(Roy 1999: 33). But Washington felt frustrated by European sluggishness and red tape, 
for it was burdened with four Commissioners who oversaw foreign policy coupled with 
fifteen member states who must agree on policy decisions. The EU's dual-executive 
necessarily means there is comprehensive negotiation and compromise before decisions 
are taken, but it may result in sclerotic government with little discernible movement. 
(Hix 1999: 55) Henry Kissinger's famous question was addressed somewhat in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, where the post o f High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (Pillar II) was created. Furthermore, the Prodi Commission re-organised 
the geographically-based portfolios, separating External Relations from Trade.106
Brussels never supported the American embargo against Cuba, preferring engagement to 
asphyxiation. Although there was broad general agreement that the extraterritorial
105 Article 9 stipulated that each Member State determine its own sanctions.
106 EU Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy said, "I think we have fixed the famous Kissinger problem. 
The EU has essentially restored a single telephone number on trade issues." See Lamy speech at the 
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 18th December 2000, 
www.europa.int/comm/trade/speeches articles/spla43 en.htm
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aspects o f Libertad were unlawful, divergent national preferences o f the member states 
meant the EU struggled to find a consensus that was somewhat more than the 'lowest 
common denominator.' This chapter has documented how the EU overcame internal 
constraints, formulating a comprehensive cross-pillar strategy that protected its 
commercial interests through the simultaneous passage o f the Joint Action under Pillar II 
and the Council Regulation under Pillar I. This was followed by the formalisation o f its 
relations with Cuba in the Common Position under CFSP, Pillar II. The EU's most 
instrumental and forceful response to Libertad's extraterritoriality was the initiation o f a 
WTO dispute settlement hearing, the subject o f the next chapter.
Chapter 8
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Level I of the Two-Level Game 
US-EU Negotiations and Agreements
“Consult before you legislate; negotiate before you litigate; compensate before you 
retaliate; and comply -  at any rate. ” (Pascal Lamy)107
8.1 Introduction
This thesis argues that the EU's WTO challenge was essential in defusing the 
transatlantic dispute over Helms-Burton. The US was trapped in a Catch-22 situation. 
Washington threatened to ignore the WTO procedure as it did not have sufficient 
confidence in its case, but it was loath to impair the prestige of the fledgling WTO, 
whose trade-liberalising principles it supported. Bilateral negotiations offered the only 
elegant escape. Washington and Brussels negotiated intermittently in 1996 in an 
attempt to settle their dispute, but the appointment o f a Dispute Settlement Panel in early 
1997 ushered in earnest bilateral consultations. This chapter analyses the bargaining 
strategies employed in the Level I talks which resulted in an interim understanding o f 
April 1997 and the final understanding of May 1998. It probes the Level II constraints 
on both sides o f the Atlantic, seeking to understand how the EU overcame diverging 
national interests to ratify the accords whereas the US did not.
Analysing international level negotiations is problematic as talks are held behind closed 
doors, with transcripts rarely available publicly. Important sources of information exist 
in the public domain, such as official documents, media reports based on periodic 
statements released to the press by aides, and statements by major actors. Fieldwork in 
the form o f elite interviews was essential in discovering how negotiations evolved, but 
fraught with tight-lipped functionaries on both sides of the Atlantic who were reluctant to 
discuss a "live" issue containing "policy-sensitive" material that "continues to be the 
topic o f active diplomatic discussion." (State Department emails 2001) Therefore, many
107 Speech at US Chamber o f  Commerce at Brussels, 7 th March 2001.
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interviews were granted on the understanding that the information would be background 
only, and not for attribution.
8.2 The WTO Challenge
Brussels' penultimate defence was to 'seek consultations' with the US under the dispute 
settlement procedure o f the WTO on 30th April 1996108 (Paemen 1996). Significantly, 
the letter informing Washington o f Brussels' decision was signed jointly by the 
Commission and the Council, representing the European Community and the Member 
States acting together on a Pillar I issue in which they shared competence.109 This letter 
referred to extraterritorial aspects o f both the Cuban Democracy Act and Helms-Burton 
which were inconsistent with US obligations under WTO, citing the provisions110 these 
two laws violated. (Baldocci and Leng, 1996; WTO 1996a) Washington's May citation 
o f several European businessmen for violating Libertad's Title IV provoked calls for
f hstronger measures, leading Brussels to initiate the 60-day formal consultations on 4 
June 1996.'"
President Bill Clinton sought re-election in the summer o f 1996. Putnam argues that 
Level I negotiators may collude, for each has an interest in enhancing the authority o f his 
counterpart, as this widens both win-sets. (Putnam 451-452) Knopf notes the 
opportunity for transboundary links in the two-level game, such as cross-level alliances, 
whereby Level I leaders establish contacts with the Level II of the opposition. (Knopf 
1993: 606-608) The EU supported Clinton's re-election, for they appreciated his
ambivalent position vis-a-vis Libertad. Brussels also hoped to see the Democrats regain 
control o f Capitol Hill, replacing a divided government that imposed severe constraints 
on its executive, and toppling Helms from his perch as Chairman o f the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. A Democratic Congress would widen Clinton's win-set, thus 
promoting a peaceful conclusion to the Helms-Burton dispute. In view of these cross­
level considerations, the GAC took a strategic decision at Tralee in September 1996 to
108 The European Parliament supported this decision on 24th May. ( Bulletin EU 5-1996: 1.4.76)
109 All subsequent communications followed a similar format; for example, on 3rd October, "The 
European Communities, acting on its own behalf and on behalf o f its Member States..." (WTO 1996b)
110 Articles I, III, V, XI, and XIII o f  GATT 1994 and Articles I, III, VI, XVI, and XVII o f GATS.
111 “EU/US/Cuba: Helms-Burton Law Grows Its First Tooth,” European Report. 1st June 1996.
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delay its Council Regulation and WTO challenge until after the US elections in early 
November. (Barber and Blitz 1996)112
Brussels inexplicably reversed itself on the WTO action in early October. SLB argued
I I Tthat the presidential elections did not justify delaying the EU's case; after three failed 
bilateral consultations,114 Brussels requested the establishment o f a Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) Panel on 3rd October. (WTO 1996b) Nevertheless, Rifkind declared that the 
panel would not meet until after the American elections. (Casert 1996)
8.2.1 The Arguments
In his first meeting with Stuart Eizenstat in September 1996, Sir Leon Brittan presented 
what was to consistently remain the EU's main argument, "firm opposition to any law 
with extra-territorial effects." (Commission 1996e) In requesting a DSB Panel on 3rd 
October, Brussels protested against the extraterritorial applications of Libertad, which 
"restricts trade between the EC and Cuba or between the EC and the US", detailing the 
objectionable titles o f Helms-Burton and citing the WTO Articles they violated. 
Specifically, Brussels sought consultations under Article XXIII(l/b) which deals with 
"non-violation nullification or impairment," and states that although an action may not be 
a direct infringement of the WTO rules, it may nevertheless impair the 'reasonable 
expectations' o f another party. Under this argument, the EU would not have to prove that 
the extraterritorial application o f Libertad directly violated WTO regulations. It would 
suffice to argue that US actions impaired the 'reasonable expectations' o f the EU with 
regard to trade with the US and/or Cuba. (WTO 1996b; Reinisch 1996: 560-561)
At the DSB meeting on 16th October, the EC allowed that the three rounds o f 
consultations had "clarified the facts" but had failed to solve the problem. Brussels was 
concerned that Title III was only temporarily suspended, and that Title IV had been 
invoked against Community citizens (two Sherritt executives). Washington expressed 
surprise "to find its tactical and foreign policy differences over Cuba raised before a
112 See also “EU/US: EU Prepares to Delay Counter-Sanctions Until After US Elections,” European 
Report, 11th September 1996.
113 “EU to Take United States to WTO over Cuba,” Agence France Presse, 2nd October 1996.
114 4 th June, 2nd July and 23rd September.
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multilateral trade forum", arguing that the President had suspended Title III, reflecting 
American willingness to work with its European partners to promote democracy in Cuba. 
Moreover, Title IV had not been applied to any European firms. Washington concluded 
that the dispute over Libertad was not a trade matter, and asked Brussels to reconsider 
before pressing ahead with its case, reasoning that bringing a matter regarding foreign 
and security policy before the WTO pushed the institution "into unexplored territory. 
For that reason, the United States would not join a consensus to establish a panel at the 
present meeting." The EC nevertheless demanded that the Panel request be on the 
agenda o f the next DSB meeting on 20th November. (WTO 1996c) Under WTO rules, a 
country may block the creation o f a Panel only once; if a second request is made, a Panel 
must be established. (Lubetkin 1996)
The Americans sought to persuade Brussels that the WTO was not a suitable venue to 
discuss Libertad. Washington exerted tremendous pressure on Brussels to abandon its 
case, but with no clear quid pro quo, the EU perceived that the US sought merely to 
maintain the status quo. It was not until Brussels was granted the establishment o f a 
DSB Panel on 20th November113 that Washington began arguing the national security 
exemption, Article XXI, permissible under WTO rules. (Morley 1997) Booth Gardner, 
US Ambassador to the WTO, expressed regret at Brussels' persistence, warned o f the 
possible damage to the fledgling WTO and implied the US would use Article XXL 
(Shapiro 1997: 97-108; Gardner 1996)
Dave Marchick, Eizenstat's deputy, recalled that the US was very reluctant to use Article 
XXI, fearing that it would set an inappropriate and damaging trend. After fierce debate, 
and in the face of EU implacability, the National Security Council resolved to use the 
national security exemption threat if the EU persisted with its request for a Panel. 
Washington's second line o f defence evolved using further linkage, threatening that if it 
were forced to use Article XXI it would not recognise the legitimacy o f the WTO Panel, 
and would not appear before it. (Marchick interview)
1 l;T he deadline for their report was nine months, 20th August; as the panel has six months to reach a 
decision, it had to be appointed by 20th February. See “EU/United States/Cuba: Sir Leon Brittan Agrees 
to Prolong D eadline...” Agence Europe 13th February 1997.
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Washington was increasingly irritated with each phase in the WTO process and tried 
mightily to thwart it. Eizenstat characterised the WTO action as a "lose-lose 
proposition," arguing that pursuing the disagreement in the WTO would support anti- 
WTO forces in the United States, increasing protectionist pressures. (Eizenstat 1996b).116 
SLB countered that the WTO was a robust institution, and that the US should underline 
its commitment to it rather than predicting negative fallout if it lost. (Brittan 1997a) 
When Brittan pressed on with the appointment o f the DSB Panel in early 1997, 
American reaction was "furious", with Eizenstat and Gingrich speaking "scathingly o f 
the EU position and the succour it gave to Castro." Some diplomats intimated that the US 
fury was also personal, directed at Sir Leon who was an unpopular figure in Washington. 
(R. Evans 1997a)
With the disputants unable to agree on a panel, and repeated blocking attempts by 
Washington, Brussels asked WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero to appoint the 
three panellists himself on 13th February, in accordance with Article 8 o f the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. (Fox 1997a; WTO 1997a) Ruggiero duly appointed a 
prestigious Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP)117 on 20th February. Eizenstat invoked the 
second line o f defence, threatening Washington would not co-operate with a "misguided" 
complaint that the WTO had no competence to handle and that "we would not show up"
1 |  o  # '
if called upon to testify. Curiously, the FT  applauded Washington for allowing 
appointment o f the Panel, after months o f stalling tactics, (de Jonquieres and Dunne 
1997)
The full motion o f a DSP hearing injected a note o f urgency and led to the conclusion o f 
an 'Understanding' between Washington and Brussels on 11 April. COREPER accepted
i L  ^
the agreement on 14 April, hours before the EU was to present its first brief to the DSP,
116 Cuban-American Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen warned the EU on a visit to Brussels, 
"Congress voted for the Helms-Burton law to be passed by a majority o f  over 400. Congress voted to join 
the WTO by less than 150. Work it out". See “EU/US: EU Ministers Emphasise Friendly Solution to US- 
Cuba Row,” European Report. 26th February 1997.
117 Arthur Dunkel, the Swiss former head o f the GATT, Tommy Koh, Singapore's Ambassador-at-large, 
and Edward Woodfield, experienced trade negotiator from New Zealand. Canada, Japan, Malaysia, 
M exico and Thailand "reserved their third party rights in this dispute." See WTO 1997a; WTO 1997b.
118 “EU/US: US Says It Will Not Help WTO Inquiry on Anti-Cuba Law,” European Report. 22nd 
February 1997
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formally approving it two days later.119 The EU agreed to suspend the WTO hearing for 
six months in return for an American undertaking to continue to suspend Title III and to 
seek presidential waiver authority for Title IV. It was implicit that the United States 
would not apply Helms-Burton against any European entity during this six-month hiatus 
from the WTO. Brussels requested a suspension in the Panel proceedings on 21st April 
1997; the authority for establishment o f the Panel lapsed on 22nd April 1998. (WTO 
1997c; WTO 1998)
8.2.2 Article XXI: The National Security Exemption
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is a rules-based trading system which encourages 
its members to reciprocally open markets to trade and investment, providing a much 
more cohesive order than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that it 
replaced. The core principles o f GATT, first laid down in 1947, were incorporated into 
the WTO, while the deficiencies in the GATT dispute adjudicatory system were 
corrected with the establishment of a formal dispute settlement system. The national 
security exemption that Washington claimed relates to Article XXI, which states:
• (a) No party is required to provide information that it considers "contrary to its 
essential security interests"
• (b) No party is prevented from taking "any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection o f its essential security interests" whether (iii) "in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations." (GATT 1947)
Washington appears to have anticipated defending Libertad on the basis o f national 
security, for the legislation contains specific references to national security. Findings 
§2(28) states that the "Cuban Government...continues to pose a national security threat 
to the United States." Purpose §3(3) seeks to maintain the "national security o f the 
United States in the face o f continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism 
and theft..." (PL104-114; Reinisch 1996: 561)
119 “EU/US: European and American Officials Clinch Deal to End Cuba Row,” European Report. 16th 
April 1997.
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The historical context o f Article XXI - the anxious early days o f the Cold War - provided 
the rationale for the adoption o f  an exception to an otherwise liberalising trade 
agreement. During the entire 47 years o f GATT, Article XXI was invoked only seven 
times, but proved sufficient to obtain a favourable ruling. The US drew the implication 
that any nation might unilaterally invoke the national security exemption, regardless o f 
the quite stringent rules governing its use; many European diplomats such as 
Ambassador Hugo Paemen, Head o f the European Commission's Washington 
Delegation, supported Washington's interpretation. (Shapiro 1997: 101-112)
But many questioned whether the US retained the unilateral GATT right to stop 
examination o f its trade policies under the more rules-based WTO. One trade lawyer 
condemned the American position that Article XXI offers a blanket escape clause that 
does not require justification, arguing that the phrase "war or other emergency" was quite 
specific in disallowing simple strained political relations. (Kuilwijk 1997: 51-56) 
American trade expert Ernest Preeg dismissed the notion that Castro presented a national 
security threat to the US, unreservedly condemning this tactic, and arguing that 
Washington's threatened boycott o f the DSP "constitutes a mockery o f the rules and 
commitments-based trading system" the US had promoted for fifty years. (Preeg 1997) 
Sir Leon argued that no country had sole discretion, for the WTO was the ultimate 
arbiter in deciding if the protection afforded by the national security exemption was 
reasonable.120
8.3 Moderation
This thesis argues that the rhetoric over the escalating Helms-Burton dispute masked an 
underlying discourse of moderation and restraint, as both the United States and the 
European Union preferred a negotiated settlement. Though prolonged and often tedious, 
the negotiations were conducted courteously between friendly allies rather than 
adversaries. Although each sought to gain concessions, there was respect for the other's 
constraints. Never did negotiations break down, and even when little substantive 
progress had been achieved, the press releases were upbeat and positive. Ambassador
120 Op. cit. footnote 115.
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Hugo Paemen confided that there was a deliberate shared strategy to "go for time" in 
order to "depassionner" or take the heat out of the dispute to promote a peaceful
•  • 191resolution. (Paemen interview)
At the US-EU summit in June 1996, Commission President Jacques Santer remarked that 
"the highly visible disagreements we have had in recent months over Cuba, Iran, 
Libya... represent a fraction o f our overall relationship ... there is much more that binds 
us together than pulls us apart." (Santer 1996a) British Foreign Secretary Malcolm 
Rifkind labelled the dispute just a "rift." (McCabe 1996)
Stuart Eizenstat was appointed Clinton's special presidential envoy for Cuba in August 
1996, and immediately embarked on a world tour to mitigate the effects o f Helms- 
Burton. Attempting to downplay the profile o f the dispute, Eizenstat argued that Libertad 
was not a blanket extension o f the American embargo against Cuba, for it was "targeted 
and limited" only to companies that were 'trafficking' in American assets. (Eizenstat 
1996b). The EU's request for a one-week delay in appointing the Panel in early 1997 in
199order to pursue further negotiations received Eizenstat's appreciation.
Even as the Panel was appointed in early 1997, both the US and the EU affirmed that 
they preferred a bilateral agreement to a Panel solution. Eizenstat expressed American 
desire "to provide every opportunity" to settle the dispute. Sir Leon characterised the 
DSP as "purely procedural," re-iterating that the EU's aim was to achieve a "negotiated 
settlement, and ...the panel procedure can be halted or suspended at any time if the 
parties reach agreement." The Commission received important backing from the 
member states as the GAC urged a negotiated bilateral settlement over Libertad.124
121 Indeed, Professor Joaquin Roy claims that US Mission officers in Brussels welcomed help in opposing 
Helms-Burton.
122 “A Stay in EU-US Trade Spat: Brussels Seeks to Settle Crisis over 2 Sanctions Laws,” International 
H erald Tribune, 13th February 1997, p i2.
123 Op. cit. footnote 118.
l240 p . cit. footnote 116.
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8.3.1 Substantive Threat
Why was the rhetoric so mild in the midst o f a serious transatlantic trade dispute with 
potentially damaging repercussions? Washington's threat to boycott the DSP prompted 
transatlantic concerns for the WTO's prestige, which would leave the WTO, in SLB's 
words, "immeasurably damaged."123 Some scholars worried about the loss o f public 
support in the United States for the WTO as a result o f its continual maligning from 
supporters o f Libertad. (Preeg 1998) Finally, the FT  expressed concern that an EU 
triumph would be a Pyrrhic victory, as weak American support for the WTO would be 
further sapped. (C. Wall 1996)
American and European reluctance to confront each other at the WTO was due to their 
overlapping win-sets in two key areas: a high regard for the institution o f the WTO, and 
a belief that it was not worth falling out over Cuba. (Roy 1997: 91) These rational 
considerations resulted in a mutual preference for a negotiated settlement over a legal 
confrontation.
Furthermore, the prevailing consensus among many trade experts was that the EU would 
win its case before the DSP. (Lockwood 1998)126 Reuters reported that almost all WTO 
member states supported the EU contention that Helms-Burton violated WTO principles. 
(R. Evans 1997b) This presented Washington with Hobson's choice o f continuing on a 
course that would almost certainly damage the prestige o f the WTO, or seeking a 
negotiated compromise solution. In choosing the latter, the US acknowledged both the 
weakness o f its case and its high regard for the multilateral trade principles promoted by 
the WTO. This thesis argues that the impending Dispute Settlement Panel was essential 
in forcing Washington into serious bilateral negotiations with the EU. The US would not 
have negotiated with the same conviction were it not for this tactical and substantive 
threat hanging over it like the 'Sword o f Damocles'. "Amidst this tension between
123 Op. cit. footnote 115.
126 See also “US to Make New Offer to EU in Row Over Cuba, Iran Ties,” Agence France Presse. 14th 
October 1997.
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Brussels and Washington, a limit has been set: avoiding irreparable damage to the 
WTO.” (Roy 1999: 41)
8.4 Reaching Agreement
Washington and Brussels held bilateral negotiations from late 1996 until May 1998, 
concluding two accords:
• an '’Understanding" on 11th April 1997, a short, hastily written document spurred by 
the appointment o f a DSP in February and the impending presentation o f  the first EU 
brief on 14th April, and
t h• an "Understanding" on 18 May 1998, confirming the first Understanding and 
incorporating it into a more comprehensive agreement, announced at the US-EU Summit 
in London by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his role as EU 
President.
The first agreement suspended the DSB Panel in exchange for an American pledge to 
attempt to neutralise the damaging effects o f Helms-Burton and stipulated that the 
antagonists would develop principles to regularise international investments by 15th 
October 1997. It also covered ILSA, pertaining to oil and gas investments in Iran and
I 97Libya. Despite provocation from France's Total, and Paris' calls for an end to 
negotiations, (Buckley 1997) the October deadline passed with mild statements about the 
'common ground' shared by Washington and Brussels and the commitment to continue 
negotiations. (Swardson 1997) The April truce remained in force: the WTO action 
remained dormant and the US did not sanction any European countries.
The second agreement encompassed the former in a comprehensive arrangement 
encouraging cooperation and multilateral dialogue. Again, there was pressure to reach 
an accord as WTO rules mandate that a suspended panel lapses after a year and the April 
1998 deadline loomed. Although the EU allowed the panel to expire (WTO 1998), as 
reactivating it would have been seen as escalating the dispute, it characterised the lapse
127 Total announced investment plans in Iran that September, precipitating fears o f  a strong American 
reaction. Washington's response was muted, stressing the necessity o f  a lengthy prior investigation. See 
"A Look Behind the News - Truce Declared," Reuters. 3 Ist October 1997.
as a 'technicality* as the EU could request a new panel if  Washington took action against 
their interests. (Croft 1998a) The May Understanding was agreed under the time 
constraint o f presenting it at the US-EU Summit in London that month. This chapter will 
analyse each in turn.
8.4.1 Understanding of April 11,1997
The Understanding confirmed both parties' commitment to the promotion o f  democracy 
in Cuba, with the US undertaking to continue to suspend Title III as long as the EU 
continued to press for democratic reforms in Cuba, a well-established quid-pro-quo. 
Dave Marchick, Eizenstat's deputy, disclosed that the negotiating teams agonised over 
the specific language o f the agreement, balancing every nuance in the agreement.
The US and the EU agreed to develop "disciplines and principles for the strengthening 
o f investment protection" which "should inhibit and deter the future acquisition o f 
investments from any State which has expropriated or nationalised such investments in 
contravention o f international law" before 15 October 1997, and to introduce those 
proposals into the MAI negotiations.
At the same time as the bilateral investment consultations commence, the US 
Administration "will begin to consult with Congress with a view to obtaining an 
amendment" granting waiver power over Title IV. Marchick argued that this did not 
constitute a firm commitment, only that the Administration would begin the consultation 
process with Congress. A former US official corroborated this interpretation, claiming 
this language was so "loose" that the US agreed to nothing, (research interview)
The Title IV waiver authority would come into force "once the bilateral consultations 
are completed and the EU has adhered to the agreed disciplines..." to protect property 
from confiscation. Marchick felt these were two very high hurdles for the Europeans.
The wording was intended to create a parallel process, a mutual conditionality whereby 
both parties had specific obligations to fulfil simultaneously. (Marchick interview)
The agreement noted President Clinton's continuing obligation to enforce Title IV, but 
hinted strongly that this process could be intentionally slowed down through the 
application o f "rigorous standards...a thorough, deliberate process...and careful 
implementation."
The EU agreed to suspend the WTO panel, but insisted upon a protection clause 
overcoming WTO rules prohibiting a renewal o f proceedings by reserving "all rights to 
resume the panel procedure, or begin new proceedings, if  action is taken against EU
• 1951 •companies or individuals under Title III or Title IV." (Understanding 1997)
8.4.2 Level II Reactions
The EU negotiating team was exceedingly pleased at securing a reasonable compromise 
with the US. The EU had sought Libertad's repeal, but, failing that, Brussels 
successfully mitigated the American threat against EU businesses through two interim 
objectives o f  a continued suspension o f Title III and a commitment to seek amendment 
o f Title IV to allow presidential discretion in return for suspending the WTO panel. 
While reaction in many European capitals ranged from mild resignation to sharp 
disappointment that the EU had acceded to American pressure in suspending its WTO 
action, Sir Leon felt the Clinton Administration could not have conceded more due to 
Level II constraints. SLB struck a deliberately positive tone, arguing that Brussels was 
"fully protected by this arrangement," for it provided recourse to the WTO if Washington 
cited any European entities.129
France, Spain and Italy objected to the conditional nature o f the American commitments 
and to the lack of explicit European condemnation o f the principle o f 
extraterritoriality.130 But a majority o f COREPER supported the agreement and felt that 
the Commission did the best it could. Britain and Germany were among the leading 
supporters o f the agreement, with Germany granting the White House credit for having 
made "strong efforts."131 The Understanding was approved by the Council o f Ministers
128 "or if  waivers under ILSA...are not granted or are withdrawn."
129 “EU/United States -  Helms-Burton Act,” Agence Europe. 15th April 1997.
130 Ibid.
131 “Bitterness Over US-EU Trade Deal Proves It a Truce, Not a Settlement,” International Herald 
Tribune. 15th April 199, p6.
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thon 18 April, and the WTO procedure was suspended. But "if action is taken against EU 
companies or individuals under [Libertad or ILSA], or waivers as described in the 
Understanding are not granted or are withdrawn, the Commission will request the WTO 
to restart, or re-establish, the panel." The declaration ended with a re-iteration o f the 
Council's opposition to all extraterritorial legislation. (Union 1997) France, who agreed 
reluctantly, attached a statement asking the Commission to be vigilant in defending EU 
interests and ensuring the US fulfils its pledges. (Gaunt 1997)
Libertad supporters were predictable in their condemnations. Senator Helms quickly 
dashed hopes o f cooperation, declaring that "Congress is giving up absolutely nothing in
119exchange for these talks." The Cuban-American representatives from Florida 
denounced the agreement as a "surrender." (Roy 2000a: 128) Congressman Benjamin 
Gilman showed little inclination to trade the "concrete tool" o f Title IV "for vague 
assurances from the EU," warning that, Title IV would not be changed unless the EU 
stopped 'trafficking'. (Gilman 1997)
8.5 Continuing Bilateral Talks
Luxembourg held the Council Presidency in late 1997; with the immediate pressure 
relieved after the April agreement, the exhausted negotiating teams did not resume 
serious meetings until September 1997 recalled Simon Fraser, SLB's Deputy Head o f 
Cabinet. Media reports o f the talks were deliberately upbeat as the 15th October deadline 
passed, and both sides agreed to continue bilateral talks, but little progress ensued. 
Fraser felt that the forthcoming UK Presidency in January 1998 could spur the talks 
forward as London enjoyed a special affinity with Washington, leading to what Fraser 
termed US 'confidence' in Britain's Presidency. Indeed, many felt that if the UK 
Presidency could not produce an agreement, the chances for a resolution were very 
bleak. Both the Commission and the UK Permanent Representation (UK Rep) engaged 
in forward-planning, to ensure conclusion o f  an accord at the US-EU Summit in London 
in May 1998. (Fraser interview; research interview)
132 Op. cit. footnote 119.
207
A UK Rep official sought to move the process forward without the continual interference 
o f the fifteen member states that had stalled the Luxembourg Presidency. His solution 
was to invite the Commission to report to COREPER once a month, thus keeping 
Ambassadors informed o f the progress o f the talks, and enabling them to contribute 
constructively, without impeding progress in the negotiations, (research interview)
A Commission official disclosed that COREPER's French Ambassador, Pierre de 
Boissieu, abruptly suggested that the 15 member states withdraw from the negotiations, 
and allow the Commission to "take its responsibility," or proceed with the talks. The 
official was puzzled; Total's investment in Iran meant the French should be very 
interested in the progress of the talks. But it was a ploy "to ensure that the format of 
negotiations was changed... by giving a free hand to the Commission to negotiate, whilst 
simply informing the Presidency o f progress.. .The people o f Total came and thanked me 
profusely afterwards." (research interview)
This initiative granted the Commission independence to proceed unimpeded with the 
negotiations, without unduly worrying about the more sovereign-minded member states. 
In easing inter-institutional EU tensions, the strategy contributed to the successful 
conclusion o f the talks.
The Commission made further concrete plans to maximise the potential benefits o f  the 
opportune British Presidency. Simon Fraser wrote a confidential paper entitled 
“Anatomy o f a Deal on Helms-Burton and ILSA” in autumn 1997, which was the genesis 
o f the structure o f the agreement, although the real architect, concedes Fraser, was the 
“creative" Stuart Eizenstat. Part o f Fraser's paper was entitled the “Transatlantic 
Partnership on Political Cooperation” (Fraser interview), an integral part of the final 
agreement package.
This thesis argues that the confluence of two leading European roles being played by 
Britain was significant, given the trust that characterised the Anglo-American 
relationship. Sir Leon and much of his senior staff were British, and Britain assumed 
the Council Presidency in January 1998. The UK Rep helped ease the deadlock in the
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Level I dispute, and managed the intergovernmental bargaining to ensure Level II 
ratification.
8.5.1 Understanding of May 1998
The May 1998 Understanding was a much more substantive and comprehensive 
document than the April 1997 Understanding. It incorporated much o f the previous 
agreement's key propositions, such as: (Understanding 1998)
• The disciplines would "inhibit and deter the future acquisition o f  investments" in 
illegally expropriated assets. There was no outright ban, and §Ic/l specifically mandated 
that the disciplines would not apply to questionable investments acquired before 18th 
May 1998. However, §Ib/4 mandated that investments in assets illegally expropriated 
after May 1998 would be banned.
• The US agreed to “continue intensive consultations with Congress with a view to 
obtaining” a Title IV waiver authority. The investment disciplines and the exercise o f the 
waiver "will be simultaneous." (§11.4)
• Linking EU efforts to promote democracy in Cuba, the US agreed to “take soundings 
o f Congressional opinion and consult Congress with a view to obtaining” a Title III 
waiver provision without time limit. The language regarding both Title III and IV did not 
constitute a binding commitment.
The agreement documented in detail the disciplines governing the protection o f property 
under international law, the aim to establish a Registry o f claims o f illegally expropriated 
property, and the plan to inhibit investment in dubious ventures through diplomatic 
efforts and the denial o f government assistance. (§I/a-b) Furthermore, the parties 
reiterated their intention to jointly submit the investment protocols to the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI), thus making this political agreement binding under 
international law. (§11/2)
Comprehensive Agreement
In addition to the Understanding on Investments, the comprehensive agreement included:
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• the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation (TPPC)
• the confidential US Non-Paper
• a letter from SLB to Madeleine Albright and an Understanding on Conflicting 
Requirements. (Annex D o f the Understanding)
Fraser's TPPC referred to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, in which the US and the 
EU had pledged greater cooperation in a number o f areas; the TPPC particularly urged 
the US and the EU to consult and respond multilaterally on the issue o f economic 
sanctions. In the event o f disagreement, the TPPC pledged they "will not seek or 
propose, and will resist, the passage o f new economic sanctions legislation based on 
foreign policy grounds which is designed to make economic operators o f the other 
behave in a manner similar to that required o f its own economic operators." Per 
Haugaard characterised this passage, with its oblique reference to both Helms-Burton 
and ILSA, as the crux o f the TPPC.133 The “Understanding on Conflicting 
Requirements” (Annex D), contained similar language, pledging "cooperation as an 
alternative to unilateral action.”
Non-Paper
ILSA authorises conditional presidential waiver o f sanctions. In the Non-Paper, the US 
pledged that it would grant a waiver to Total, the French petroleum company exploring 
for oil and gas in Iran, as this was "important to the national interest."134 Washington 
insisted on keeping the Non-Paper secret, and refused to accept the document as a fully 
binding part of the agreement. But the Commission needed a written guarantee o f a 
waiver for Total. This was particularly important to France, who had taken Fraser to 
task over the 1997 Understanding, where ILSA was included in the final paragraph but 
the language was so weak that France was concerned that it would be prosecuted. The 
compromise was this "Non-Paper". (Fraser interview) El Mundo reported that Spain 
had similar concerns, for the Spanish oil company Repsol was extracting 5,000 barrels 
o f oil daily in Libya. (Segovia 1998a/b) Spanish concerns were alleviated by the Non-
133 Krenzler and Wiegand (1999: 167) make the same argument.
|j4 The US further pledged to grant waivers to other EU companies under ILSA if  "the US and the EU 
continue the enhanced level o f  cooperation on non-proliferation, counterterrorism ..." (Non-Paper)
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Paper, in which the US pledged to "engage with the EU in a sustained process on Libya 
for consideration of waivers...." (Non-Paper)
Madeleine Albright announced the ILSA waiver in London on the same day the 
Understanding, after the US received an EU commitment to monitor the export o f 
material that may aid Iran in the development o f weapons o f mass destruction or the 
support o f terrorist groups. (Balz 1998) Albright insisted that granting the waiver 
should not be construed as support for the investment. She argued that, as the sanctions 
would not have blocked the investment regardless, it was unproductive to unnecessarily 
sour relations with the EU. Eizenstat, losing no opportunity to promote his agenda for 
presidential flexibility in sanctions policy, argued that exercising the ILSA waiver 
accomplished the basic purposes o f the act. (Lippman 1998b)
The EU posted the entire text o f the agreement package on its website, including the 
TPPC and the confidential US Non-Paper, but was forced to withdraw them in the face 
o f American anger. (Haugaard interview)
Annex D
Sir Leon's letter (Annex D) to Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright highlighted Level I 
sensitivities. SLB wrote that the Commission had investigated a number o f the 5911 
certified claims and had established that "it appears that the expropriations were contrary 
to international law," and that therefore, in accordance with the agreed disciplines, §Ib/2 
(urging diplomatic representation to the expropriating state, and denying all forms o f 
government support in such investments) would apply. Furthermore, if these 
investigated cases were typical o f all the 5911 claims, it was "reasonable to assume" that 
the same restrictions would be enforced upon them. The letter was meant to meet US 
concerns that European investment support agencies exercise extreme caution before 
granting investment support in countries such as Cuba where there appears to be 
expropriated properties. (Richardson 1998: 12)
Roger Noriega, Helms' senior staffer, was livid; his interpretation o f the letter was that 
the EU questioned the legitimacy o f all the 5911 claims that had been certified by the US
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. (Noreiga interview) In fact, the EU accepted 
only 8 out o f 10 claims it reviewed; extrapolating from this, one congressional staffer 
concluded that the EU would likely reject 20 percent o f the certified claims from 
protection by the disciplines. (Rademaker 1998: 16) But Albright argued that it was 
only for lack o f time that the EU had not endorsed all 5911 certified claims, and that 
SLB's letter signalled EU acceptance o f the legitimacy o f those claims. (Albright 1998c)
Sir Leon's letter also provoked European Level II sensibilities. He began his letter 
saying "We have taken note..." But, at the insistence of the COREPER Ambassadors at 
a late night meeting before the Understanding was announced, "We" was changed to "I". 
Spain's Foreign Minister Abel Matutes was among those who refused to admit in writing 
that Castro had illegally expropriated American assets in Cuba. (Segovia 1998a) Brittan 
confided that he didn't think the member states objected substantively to "We", but 
changing it eased their domestic constraints. (Brittan interview) Given the time 
constraints, there was no time to consult with the Americans, and Stuart Eizenstat was 
extremely cross at the change. (Fraser interview)
Unilateral Statement
The EU issued a sharply worded “Unilateral Statement” in conjunction with the 
announcement o f the Understanding on 18th May. It welcomed the agreement, but 
confirmed the EU's continued strong opposition in law and in principle to secondary 
sanctions and extraterritorial legislation. It further proclaimed
that it considers all the day's decisions and statements, including the US Non- 
Paper, form a “single package” and
the Understanding and the TPPC are important political commitments and are 
o f equal weight and status.” (emphasis Haugaard interview)
The Unilateral Statement pledged to implement the disciplines and not seek a WTO 
panel if there continued to be a waiver of Title III, if waiver authority had been granted 
for Title IV, and if waivers were granted to EU companies under ILSA. The EU 
concluded that its commitment would not apply if one o f these conditions was not 
fulfilled, or if "by the time of the expiry o f the President's term o f office, no waiver
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without specific time limit in respect o f Title III has been granted, as envisaged in II.5 o f 
the same Understanding." (Commission 1998b)
This thesis interprets the Unilateral Statement as mandating that the EU's commitments 
would lapse if an open-ended Title III waiver had not been granted by the end o f the 
Clinton presidency. Lord Brittan corroborated that the agreement was meant to be 
implemented before the end o f the Clinton Administration. (Brittan interview)
8.5.2 EU Level II Constraints
The Commission had to balance the Level I negotiations with the Level II constraint o f 
the fifteen member states. Fraser recalled that the 1997 agreement was negotiated in
thsecret, and the text agreed on Friday, 11 April, by phone via Brussels-Washington. 
Fraser briefed the press, who were eagerly awaiting an announcement, before the 
member states had time to consider it, and before Eizenstat had consulted Congressional 
leaders. In retrospect, Fraser admitted that he should have advised member states earlier. 
They were understandably incensed when the FT  carried the story on its front page on 
Saturday, the 12th o f April.133 (Barber and de Jonquieres 1997) Fraser cited two reasons 
for this secrecy: Eizenstat's constraints with Capitol Hill, and seeking to avoid giving the 
member states time to “unpick” the agreement. (Fraser interview)
This secrecy had immediate repercussions. One diplomat warned that "the Commission 
presented the member states with a fait accompli," but endorsement in EU capitals would 
not be automatic. Furthermore, due to enormous dissatisfaction on the part o f many 
member states, among them France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, the agreement 
was accompanied by a sharp statement that extraterritorial legislation is "unacceptable 
both in law and in principle," and a warning that the EU would automatically re-instate 
its WTO challenge if Washington cited any EU entities under Helms-Burton. (Gaunt
1997)
|j;> Indeed, France urged the member states not to talk to the press until the conclusion o f  their 
deliberations on 16th April. See "EU Struggles over Helms-Burton Peace Plan." Reuters 16th April 1997.
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The secrecy also had more long-term consequences, as SLB lost the trust o f the member 
states, which made the continuing negotiations much more difficult. (Fraser interview) 
Woolcock predicts that "member governments will have confidence that the Commission 
is reflecting their interests only if it keeps them fully informed of developments." 
(Woolcock 2000: 382)
Moreover, some key states were adverse to an accord; there was some difficulty with 
Germany at the beginning, but the main opposition emanated from France and Spain,
t hboth of whom had substantive concerns regarding ILSA. Indeed, as late as 14 May, El 
Pals pessimistically reported that the member states considered the American offers 
insufficient to reach agreement. With Spain, France and Portugal leading the hard-line 
position, many Europeans feared that the American Congress would not grant Europe the 
unconditional protection they sought from Helms-Burton and ILSA. (Oppenheimer
1998)
There was a frenzy o f activity in May, with diplomatic teams working feverishly on the 
fringes of the G8 Summit in Birmingham through the weekend o f 15th-16th May to secure 
an agreement. The weekend talks produced a "balanced package," incorporating 
investment disciplines, waivers on Helms-Burton and ILSA, and the TPPC's proposal for 
multilateral cooperation, which was particularly crucial in securing COREPER's 
approval. The meetings continued on Sunday136 in London in anticipation o f the US-EU 
Summit the next morning. At nearly midnight on Sunday, the UK Presidency presented 
the final text o f the agreement to the exhausted COREPER meeting, and recommended 
passage. The UK had support for the accord from the Dutch, who maintained "it was the
I 17only way to go." Six points were raised, and, in an adroit manoeuvre, the member 
states were given Tony Blair's phone number if they had any further objections to raise. 
A consensus approved the agreement, and it was passed with minor changes that night. 
France still resisted, but, Tony Blair, when he had not heard from President Chirac by 
eight o'clock on Monday morning, decided to proceed regardless, (research interviews)
lj<5 It was unusual in the extreme to hold meetings over the weekend. See Adrian Croft, "US, EU Hold 
Last-Minute Helms-Burton Talks," Reuters. 17th May 1998.
137 Among them, the change in Sir Leon’s letter previously referred to.
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The Spanish press reported that, with the constraint o f the 24-hour deadline looming, 
practically all the improvements in the text that were sought by the Europeans were 
realised. For example, the Spanish obtained a less ambiguous text relating to (Repsol's) 
investments in Libya, and the French gained greater clarity in relation to unilateral 
sanctions with regard to third parties. (Gomez and Vidal-Folch 1998)
Although the French Ambassador had suggested that the Commission "take its 
responsibility," the French were recalcitrant throughout the negotiations; at the midnight 
hour, they were unhappy about the "poorly written text," and objected to several minor 
points. French objections contributed to delays at the Monday morning meeting, and bad 
temper from the frustrated American delegation. American National Security Advisor 
Sandy Berger was so irritated by the protracted negotiations necessitated by French 
resistance that he warned, "We will not be treated like that another time." The US-EU 
Summit scheduled for that day was delayed by 90 minutes, which was unusual in the 
extreme, (research interview)
The Council Presidency decides when an agreement has been reached in COREPER. 
The accord then proceeds to the GAC as one of three options: "A" Point, which means 
no discussion as everything has already been agreed; "B" Point, which means challenge
I TSis permitted ; False "B" Point, where no one seriously challenges the agreement. This 
Understanding passed to the Council as a "B" Point, as the UK Presidency understood 
outstanding objections remained that needed to be addressed, (research interview)
There was considerable apprehension that the French may cause the entire accord to 
unravel as the press reported on 18th May that French officials at a WTO meeting in 
Geneva opposed the accord because it did not specifically condemn extraterritoriality. 
But France's finance minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, distanced himself from those 
reports on 19th May; calling the accord a "step forward," he indicated that while France 
was not entirely happy with the deal, it would not oppose it in the Council o f Ministers 
later that week. (Buckley 1998)
138 Ten to fifteen percent o f agreements are "B" Point. See Hix 1999: 68.
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The UK Rep orchestrated this extraordinary coup on the advice o f his French 
counterpart, Pierre de Boissieu, who was worried that troublesome politicians at home 
might scupper the agreement. De Boissieu suggested that a British reporter specifically 
ask Strauss-Kahn about the Helms-Burton agreement so as to secure public French 
support for the pact. Once the French were publicly on record as supporting the 
agreement, they could hardly undermine it in Council. This tactic succeeded in 
guaranteeing French cooperation, (research interview)
This thesis argues that great credit is due to the UK Presidency for the way that it
managed the fifteen member nations and secured a consensus. The astonishing
cooperation offered by the pragmatic de Boissieu, when the French were publicly so
recalcitrant, was essential. France opposed the agreement partly due to the ideological
110issues France always encounters in dealing with the US, and partly because o f ILSA's 
threat to Total, (research interview) But France's fractious behaviour appeared quite 
irrational once Total was no longer threatened.
The EU negotiating team greeted the accords with something close to celebration. They 
felt tremendous satisfaction in having successfully challenged the US, and in having 
negotiated a political solution that achieved EU objectives on waivers and arrested the 
WTO action.
The jubilation was not shared throughout Europe. A Whitehall official felt there was a 
degree o f self-deception on the part o f the EU, voicing particular concern that Brussels 
had ceded the principle o f extraterritoriality. He also expressed doubt over the credibility 
o f the EU's WTO threat, questioning why the EU backed down, instead o f proceeding 
with what many analysts considered was a fairly airtight case against the US. (research 
interview) Although aware o f American constraints, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Erik 
Derycke, was disappointed, arguing that the EU had accepted precise investment codes 
in exchange for vague promises from Washington to grant waivers to EU companies. 
(Croft 1998e) Critics voiced legal concerns that the Understanding violated Article 73c 
o f the Maastricht Treaty that prohibits limitations on investments, and that SLB had
lj9"When President de Gaulle demanded that American troops be removed from French soil, Lyndon 
Johnson asked whether that included those who were buried beneath it." (Humphreys 2002)
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exceeded his competence in signing an agreement with foreign policy implications, a 
policy area reserved to the member states. (Roy 2000b: 93-94)
Despite continuing consternation amongst member states such as Spain, France and 
Belgium, the GAC accepted the text that COREPER had drafted on 25th May. 
(Commission 1998c) SLB wrote that in "welcoming" the accords, the Council broadcast 
"a clear political signal" o f the EU's "willingness to implement the terms of the 
Understanding, if the US does likewise." (Brittan 1999)
8.6 Investment Protocols
The 1998 Understanding had potentially far-reaching effects, in providing protection for 
US investments worldwide, in addition to resolving the immediate US-EU dispute over 
investments in Cuba. Indeed, President Clinton declared that the measures the EU had 
agreed to would protect American property more effectively than unilateral American 
legislation. (Mikkelsen 1998) Theory supports this fortuitous outcome o f additional, 
unanticipated gains resulting from international bargaining. Instead of conceptualising 
bargaining as dividing up a limited pie, so that one actor's gain is another actor's loss, the 
pie itself can be expanded, with potential greater benefits to both protagonists that 
neither would have enjoyed were it not for the negotiations. John Odell applies the 
economic concept o f a production possibility frontier to international bargaining; he 
argues that this Pareto efficient frontier can be reached by actors asking themselves 
during the talks whether more gains could be achieved, and if so, how much? (Odell 
2000: 29-31)
The inherent potential o f the investment disciplines that offered worldwide protection 
was widely recognised; Americans and Europeans broadly agreed with DGI's statement 
characterising the protocols as "a valuable step forward in investment protection policy, 
which goes far beyond addressing the issue o f possible illegal expropriations in Cuba." 
(Commission 1998d) John Richardson, Deputy Head of the Commission's Washington 
delegation, declared, "By effectively banning investment in future expropriations, the 
'Understanding' will have a significant future deterrent effect. This provision has been 
largely overlooked in the narrower debate over Cuba -  but represents a real breakthrough
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on a thorny issue which has long remained unresolved -  and should not be dismissed 
lightly." (Richardson 1998: 11) Attorney Brice Clagett concurred, saying the 
investment protocols presented a "sea-change" in focusing on the serious problem of 
'trafficking' in confiscated property. (Clagett 1996-7: 314) Peter Bass, who served as 
Chief o f Staff to Stuart Eizenstat at the State Department in 1997-1998, felt that 
Eizenstat achieved something o f lasting value in the agreement. Bass charged the EU 
with underestimating the significance of agreement, particularly accusing the French o f 
effectively killing the protocols at the MAI, and mused that the EU may regret this 
action. (Bass interview)
Stephen Rademaker, Chief Counsel to the House Committee on International Relations, 
was more cynical. Rademaker argued that Washington recognised that political 
considerations prevented the EU from further isolating Castro, so "we all agreed to 
pretend to change the subject. The negotiations ostensibly were about the broader issue 
o f how to discourage investment in expropriated property around the world. But there 
was never any doubt that Congress's test o f any agreement would be how it applied to 
Cuba... "(Rademaker 1998: 14)
8.6.1 Contentious Issue: Order of Implementation
Was the US obligated to amend Title IV of Helms-Burton first, whereupon the EU would 
institute its investment principles, or was it vice-versa? The 1998 Understanding clearly 
stated that "Application o f the disciplines and exercise o f such waiver authority [Title 
IV] will be simultaneous." (§11.4) But the EU was resolute that it was not obliged to 
implement investment disciplines until Congress modified Title IV. This was 
substantiated by Joaquin Roy, stating "the implementation o f the Understanding was 
void until evidence o f a waiver on Title IV was in hand." (Roy 2000b: 93)
• A DGI report in October 1998 noted that the Understanding "contains a clear 
commitment on the part o f the US Administration that it will seek from Congress the 
authority to grant a waiver from Title IV...without delay. It is important to note that the 
EU will not apply the agreed disciplines until this waiver authority is exercised."
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(emphasis mine) The document later reiterated "But the EU...can only fulfil the 
European side o f the deal once the presidential waiver authority under Title IV o f the 
Helms-Burton Act has been adopted and exercised." (Commission 1998d)
• In a New York speech, SLB proclaimed the EU's readiness to implement the 
investment disciplines "when Congress authorises the President to grant a waiver to the 
European Union under Title IV o f the Helms-Burton Act, and when that waiver is 
granted." (Brittan 1998b)
• External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten140 had a long and "courteous" meeting 
with Senator Jesse Helms and urged him to accept a waiver of Title IV so that the EU 
could proceed with a programme of disciplines on illegally expropriated property. "I 
don't think it is for us at the moment necessarily to do any more.... I think it is now for 
the Senate and the Congress to show some greater understanding o f our position." 
(Patten 1999)
• The Commission's John Richardson claimed that the Understanding clearly 
mandated that the EU must apply the disciplines only after Congress amended Title IV, 
and the waiver authority was exercised. Therefore, the EU's implementation o f their 
commitments hinged on the US fulfilling its obligations first. (Richardson 1998: 8)
European documents would be expected to support the position that the burden was on 
the US to grant the amendment of Title IV first. But there is considerable supporting 
evidence from Washington:
• Eizenstat conceded that, "Implementation o f this Understanding is contingent on 
our obtaining waiver authority from the Congress under Title Four of Helms-Burton." 
(Eizenstat 1999d)
• In advance o f the 1998 Understanding, the White House pledged to "move 
aggressively to implement the arrangement," by seeking presidential waiver authority, 
as the EU "has agreed to implement the agreement upon receipt o f a waiver from the 
provisions o f Title IV o f the Libertad Act.” (White House 1998)
• Assistant Secretary o f State Alan Larson conceded that the implementation of the
140 The Commission underwent fundamental restructuring in 1999; the External Relations (Chris Patten) 
and Trade (Pascal Lamy) portfolios were separated.
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investment protocols depended on Congress granting waiver authority for Title IV, and 
would be concurrent with the exercise of that waiver. (Larson 1998: 6)
Per Haugaard reconciled the conflicting views. The disciplines and the waiver were 
meant to be simultaneous. However, in view o f the fact that it would take some time for 
Congress to amend Title IV, the EU would not implement the investment disciplines 
until the waiver authority had been approved by Congress and implemented by the 
President. (Haugaard interview) In conclusion, both American and European 
documents support the contention that Congress was obligated to first amend Title IV of 
Helms-Burton, so that the implementation o f Title IV by Washington and the investment 
disciplines by Brussels would be simultaneous.
8.7 American Level II Constraints
In contrast to the European satisfaction in having negotiated an agreement, the Clinton 
Administration was ambivalent over the accord. The pervading sentiment was that this 
was regrettably the best they could do under the circumstances, with one journalist 
admitting he did not expect Eizenstat to "turn a sows' ear into a silk purse." (Armstrong 
phone interview)
The FT  predicted that the Clinton administration would find it difficult to convince 
Capitol Hill and the American public that the agreement was not a "climbdown by 
Washington." (Baker and Fidler 1998) Benjamin Gilman regretted that the 
Understanding has "a number o f serious deficiencies" and does not "represent a viable 
substitute" for US sanctions laws. (Dunphy 1998) Lincoln Diaz-Balart warned Clinton 
"should not assume this has the support of Congress." (Balz 1998)
Little wonder that the Clinton Administration strove mightily to downplay the 
concessions it had granted to Europe. Alan Larson declared that, "This is not the 
abolition o f Helms-Burton; it is the internationalization o f Helms-Burton." (Larson 1999) 
Eizenstat testified on Capitol Hill in early June, claiming that the agreement would 
"effectively chill investment in confiscated property" (Fletcher 1998)
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Secretary Albright's press release o f 18 May 1998 is a particularly enlightening exercise 
in damage limitation, stressing the positive, massaging sensitive egos, and saving the bad 
news for the very last sentence o f a 500-word statement. Albright expressed her pleasure 
that the agreement advanced the protection o f property rights, a goal that the Clinton 
Administration shared with many Congressmen, including Senator Helms. She said the 
Understanding "advances in a most significant way the goals o f the supporters o f the 
Helms-Burton Act," mentioning all the lawmakers by name. "The Understanding will 
also ensure that Castro is not able to put illegally expropriated U.S. property on a fire 
sale in a desperate effort to undo the results o f 38 years o f political repression and 
economic mismanagement." At the very end, Albright mentioned that the Clinton 
Administration would "seek legislation authorizing the President to waive Title IV o f the 
Helms Burton Act with respect to countries implementing the disciplines set out in this 
Understanding." (Albright 1998b)
8.7.1 Senator Helms' Reaction
Whether to apply the investment disciplines to existing investments or only to future 
ones was a particularly contentious issue in the negotiations. The 1997 Understanding 
called for disciplines that would "inhibit and deter the future (emphasis mine) acquisition 
o f investments." SLB agreed that the EU would seek to restrain investment in 
expropriated property in the fixture but rejected similar disciplines over existing EU 
investments in Cuba. The US sought to apply principles to existing investments as well; 
otherwise, it meant Washington was effectively ceding its rights over 'grandfathered' 141 
American assets. But the 1998 Understanding specifically excluded investments entered 
into before 18th May (§Ic/l).
In an exceedingly frank speech, Alan Larson admitted, "It was evident from the 
beginning o f our negotiations that the EU would not support disinvestment... they would 
not agree to any stringent disciplines if those disciplines extended without qualification 
to properties in which European firms had already invested." (Larson 1999) Albright
141 Investments that pre-dated the May 1998 accord.
221
acknowledged the same, while pointing out that there were safeguards against, for 
example, expanding existing investment schemes. (Albright 1998c)
Senator Jesse Helms was predictably critical, vowing to oppose an agreement that 
allowed European companies to continue operations in Cuba as long as "new 
investments do not receive government support. For me, to accept this agreement offered 
by the European Union, would be to condone thievery and dishonesty...It will be a cold 
day in you-know-where before the EU convinces me to trade the binding restrictions in 
Helms-Burton for an agreement that legitimizes their theft o f American property in 
Cuba." (Helms 1998a)
This reaction from Senator Helms, though not unexpected, was puzzling, as the media 
had reported that senior Administration officials had liaised closely with Congressional 
leaders, and found a degree o f sympathy and understanding for their position vis-a-vis 
the Europeans.142 Stephen Rademaker confirmed that the Clinton Administration had 
consulted closely with Congress throughout the talks, particularly after the April 1997 
understanding (Rademaker 1998: 14) and that Capitol Hill held "innumerable 
consultations with Alan Larson." (Rademaker interview) Stuart Eizenstat felt he had the 
full backing o f Helms and the Cuban-American community during the negotiations, as 
he was not seeking to undermine the impact o f Libertad. (Eizenstat interview) A Clinton 
official claimed that Senator Helms was briefed as the progress o f the talks, and, while 
not giving a "specific commitment o f support," had said, "Keep negotiating. I'm 
interested." Lastly, the American Ambassador to Brussels, Vernon Weaver, warned that 
a general agreement encompassing both Libertad and ILSA would not pass Congress, 
which was much more "fiercely pro-sanctions" than the Administration. However, 
Weaver said that the White House had proposed "a solution concerning Title IV" that 
had received "good vibrations" from Congress.143 Even Helms claimed he was "puzzled" 
by reports that he was prepared to accept an agreement that "lets the EU off the hook." 
(Helms 1998a)
142 “Clinton Faces Trouble Over His Pledge to EU on Helms-Burton Pact,” Lloyd’s List, 20th May 1998.
,4j “EU/United States: Extra-territorial Aspects o f Law,” Agence Europe, 3rd February 1998
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What was the source of this misunderstanding? Helms' spokesman Marc Thiessen 
declared Senator Helms had given his "blessing" to the EU negotiations only because "he 
hoped by some miracle the president would be able to convince the EU to support an 
enforceable ban on investments in stolen properties....W hat the EU has offered doesn't 
even pique interest here on Capitol Hill." (Ulbrich 1998)
J.L
Helms and Gilman wrote to Albright on 17 June 1998, complaining that the 
Understanding would allow a company "currently trafficking in stolen American 
property [to] continue to do so without liability," and that it mandated exceedingly weak 
sanctions on new investments. The letter ended that "we are disgusted" that the EU 
needs a permanent Title III waiver as an incentive to increase their promotion o f 
democracy in Cuba; "Title III is not on the table," and they cannot agree to "swap" Title 
IV for the Understanding. (Helms and Gilman 1998b) Albright valiantly defended the 
Understanding, pointing out that it was the first time the EU recognised that American 
property had been illegally expropriated in Cuba, which was an "extraordinary 
vindication" o f Libertad's underlying principles. She acknowledged Congress' "strong 
resistance" to modifying Title III, which she had reported to the EU, and assured 
Congress o f her determination to enforce Libertad if  the EU defaulted. (Albright 1998c)
Significantly, Senator Helms postured and issued damning statements, but did little else. 
Marchick argued convincingly that the mere fact that Helms did not undercut the 
Understanding was tantamount to his acquiescence! (Marchick interview) Eizenstat felt 
that Helms was prepared to accept the ban on investments, but Roger Noriega, his 
hawkish chief o f staff, was very distrustful o f the EU for political reasons. (Eizenstat 
interview)
8.7.2 Amendment of Title IV
Senator Helms' staffers Marc Thiessen and Roger Noriega and Congressman Gilman's 
staffer Caleb McCarry visited Cuba during the Papal trip in January 1998. They saw no 
evidence o f increased EU support for human rights in Cuba, on the basis o f which 
Clinton had repeatedly waived Title III, and considered that the president's suspensions
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"make a mockery o f US law." They accused the EU of a cynical "business as usual" 
attitude, claiming that there was "no good faith" on which to proceed in further 
negotiations on Cuba between the US and the EU. They queried why Title IV was being 
so "sluggishly" enforced by the Clinton Administration, leading them to conclude that 
the Executive was "pulling its punches...to placate European governments whose 
companies have engaged in joint ventures with the Castro regime." (Noriega et al 1998)
Noriega's report highlighted the Level II constraints under which the Clinton 
Administration was operating. Nevertheless, administration officials attempted to fulfil 
their obligations with the EU by broaching the subject o f a Title IV waiver with 
Congress; Larson declared the Administration was "working closely with Congress to 
seek legislation" that would amend Title IV. (Larson 1999) But Caleb McCarry 
adamantly declared there was "never a commitment to revise the statute." (McCarry 
interview)
Stuart Eizenstat tried valiantly to persuade Congress. He claimed that the EU had 
acknowledged in writing for the first time that Castro's expropriation o f property from 
American citizens "appears to be contrary to international law," arguing that this 
admission was made possible only by the US offer o f a Title IV waiver (Eizenstat 
Testimony 1998) In later testimony, Eizenstat argued that presidential flexibility over 
Title III resulted in the EU's Common Position, and that the proposed waiver authority 
for Title IV could guarantee Americans protection internationally for illegal investments 
in expropriated properties. "We have in mind an amendment that would authorize waiver 
of Title IV for countries that are implementing the Understanding but that would require 
revocation o f the waiver if implementation is inadequate." (Eizenstat Testimony 1999c) 
But a formal bill was never introduced and Washington has defaulted on the accords.
There were numerous communications between Capitol Hill, the State Department and 
the European Commission over the interpretation o f the Understanding. Benjamin 
Gilman wrote a very cordial letter to SLB on 8th January 1999, welcoming SLB's offer to 
clarify the proposed waiver authority. Gilman apologised for the detailed nature o f the 
questions, o f which there were 22, but explained that they were necessary because the
224
Congress was seriously studying the Understanding, and was "committed to carefully 
reviewing all issues" relating to the waiver authority o f Title IV. (Gilman 1999) SLB 
answered half a year later, after consulting the member states. He refused to provide 
information on existing European investments in Cuba, and reminded Gilman that the 
EU was not obligated to apply the investment protocols until a Title IV waiver was 
granted. (Brittan 1999)
8.8 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the Level I bargaining strategies and the two Understandings 
concluded between Washington and Brussels in April 1997 and May 1998, arguing that 
the strategic EU decision to seek a WTO Panel was critical in pressuring the US to 
negotiate bilaterally. It has credited the 1998 UK Presidency with the remarkable 
achievement o f shepherding the agreement through to Council ratification, successfully 
overcoming diverging Level II national preferences in the process.
Finally, it has documented the Clinton Administration's futile attempts to fulfil their 
undertaking to amend Title IV, resulting in American default. Helen Milner suggests 
that the Realist school, who is the most pessimistic about the degree of international 
cooperation, may actually have overestimated states' capacity to cooperate. "Domestic 
politics reduces the possibility o f cooperation, even below the level that Realists expect." 
(Milner 1997: 98)
Paradoxically, the WTO was the essential midwife in resolving the dispute over 
Libertad, despite never having convened its Dispute Settlement Panel. The impending 
threat that this international institution posed, particularly after the appointment o f the 
Panel, was sufficient to promote intense bilateral negotiations that produced the 
compromise.
The FT  predicted in 1997 that any agreement would be "largely cosmetic." (de 
Jonquieres and Tucker 1997) Despite the European contention that the Understanding 
gave the Americans language that was "loose enough" to be able to go to Congress 
(research interview), the Clinton Administration never formally introduced legislation to
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modify Title IV. The agreement therefore remains, in Eizenstat's words, "inchoate” 
(Eizenstat interview). European negotiators were nevertheless pleased that, although the 
agreement was a political one rather than a binding legal contract, the pact proved 
effective in protecting EU companies. (Haugaard interview; research interview)
Jesse Helms remained resolutely opposed to the accords; in correspondence with 
External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, Helms declared that the fact that the EU 
had not "clarified' the Understanding, and Washington had not enforced Libertad 
properly combined to "undermine any confidence that the requested 'waiver authority' 
would not be abused." He reiterated his continuing opposition to trading "concrete 
provisions" o f American law for "vague assurances." (Helms 2000a)
Notwithstanding the grumbling over the details, both sides expressed satisfaction at 
having reached a resolution, and looked forward to increased cooperation through the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) pledging further bilateral trade liberalisation, 
announced at that same US-EU Summit in London in May 1998. Peter Bass felt that 
"Stuart Eizenstat made a commitment in good faith," thinking he could persuade Helms 
to accept the conditions. In Bass' estimation, Eizenstat probably could not have gained 
more for the US; reaching an agreement was better than no agreement at all, even if there 
was only a 10 percent chance of it being endorsed at Level II. (Bass interview) 
Commission President Jacques Santer warmly welcomed the agreement, for the 
protection it afforded European businessmen, praising the EU's ability to "act together, 
united in important foreign policy issues." (Commission 1998c)
Two DGI insiders label the successful US-EU negotiations on Helms-Burton an example 
o f "creative conflict management." While they acknowledge that the accords did not 
satisfy everyone, they nevertheless reconciled very different positions in a constructive 
manner. Most impressive was the TPPC, in which the US and the EU pledged not to 
enact sanctions legislation with extraterritorial applications. "Though fragile, the package 
remains an important, pragmatic and far-reaching political compromise, which is legally 
non-binding but shields EC companies effectively from the impact o f the Helms-Burton 
legislation, and also contributes to the ongoing review in the USA on sanctions policy in 
general." (Krenzler and Wiegand 1999: 167-169)
Chapter 9
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Two-Level Game Analysis
"...to sense what others really need to stay at the table and enter the end gam e.” 
(Eizenstat 1999d)
9.1 Introduction
Robert Putnam divides the negotiation process into two stages: the Level I international 
bargaining round where diplomats bargain and initial a tentative international agreement, 
and the Level II ratification procedure, where the domestic polity decides whether or not 
to accept the agreement, in a straight up-or-down vote. This sequence is not rigid as 
there will certainly have been extensive consultations with the domestic constituency 
prior to Level I meetings to ascertain what is acceptable to them. Indeed, consultation 
with Level II often occurs during the Level I negotiations, as SLB consulted with the 
Council in the frantic last days before the May Understanding, and Eizenstat's deputy, 
Alan Larson, consulted with lawmakers on Capitol Hill.
The win-set o f the domestic polity is uppermost in the minds o f the chief negotiators 
during the international bargaining sessions, with diplomats constantly asking 
themselves what would be ratified back home. "What will not be accepted at the 
domestic level cannot be usefully accepted at the international level." (Collinson 1999: 
216) Central to Putnam's analytical framework is the size o f the win-set, which 
fundamentally determines the parameters o f the negotiating contract. Putnam 
hypothesises that the larger the win-sets, the more likely they will overlap and enable a 
successful agreement at Level I, but the relative size o f the respective win-sets will 
determine the distribution o f joint gains from the bargaining round. The size o f win-sets 
depends on Level II preferences, interests and coalitions, Level II political institutions, 
and the strategies of the COG at Level I. (Putnam 438-450)
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This chapter applies Putnam's two-level game to the international bargaining strategies. 
It probes the COG's constraints, and the negotiating tactics, and skills he brings to the 
bargaining table, including an assessment o f the proficiency o f SLB and Eizenstat as 
negotiators. It considers opportunities for transgovernmental and synergistic linkages at 
Level I, and the role o f side payments in facilitating agreement. Finally, it discusses 
domestic constraints, the effect o f uncertainty, and the cost o f no-agreement in 
attempting to understand the causes o f American defection.
9.2 The COGs
It is difficult to overestimate the importance o f a strategically adept and autonomous 
COG. Putnam states, "The political complexities for the players in this two-level game 
are staggering. Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the 
outcome may upset the game board; and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his 
fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat." (Putnam 437)
The COG may negotiate as an agent representing his polity, or he may have his own set 
of preferences that diverge somewhat from his domestic constituency. I f  he is a 'dove,' 
his preferences lie partially outside the polity's win-set and closer to that o f his opponent 
and he has greater manoeuvrability in negotiations; if he is a 'hawk,' his preferences are 
further removed from the opposing win-set than is the domestic win-set, and his 
flexibility is more limited. Two-level game theory allows the COG to hold his own set 
of preferences and to act autonomously, whilst still within the confines o f his negotiating 
mandate or win-set. The COG effectively has veto power over the Level I negotiations, 
and may reject proposals that conflict with his personal preferences, even if those 
proposals are within his constituency's win-set. The domestic constituency's power is 
constrained to a straight up-or-down ratification; the COG is rarely constrained to a 
single outcome, and he may successfully manipulate the terms o f the agreement towards 
his preferred outcome. A proficient COG may manage to re-shape the domestic win-set, 
or achieve passage o f another preferred measure by linking it to an international 
agreement, something Putnam labels "synergistic issue linkage." (Putnam; Mo)
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The credibility o f the COG is important in guaranteeing ratification. Putnam, Moravcsik 
and Evans recognise 'COG collusion,' whereby each chief negotiator seeks to bolster the 
prestige o f his opponent in his domestic constituency, since each has a vested interest in 
helping his counterpart to attain ratification at Level II. Such collusion happens more 
often with COGs who are 'dovish' rather than 'hawkish' relative to their polity. SLB and 
Stuart Eizenstat frequently commended each other after a round o f  meetings as an 
illustration o f this phenomenon.
This thesis argues that, not only were the bilateral talks held between friendly allies, the 
two chief negotiators were congenial, and this fortuitous combination contributed 
significantly to the positive outcome o f the negotiations. Upon concluding the April 
1997 understanding, each complimented the other; SLB stated, "I would also like to pay 
tribute to Stuart Eizenstat...whose skill and dedication has helped bring this agreement 
to fruition." (Brittan 1997b) Eizenstat's statement also recognised SLB and his 
negotiating team "for taking a constructive and creative approach...and preventing 
unnecessary tensions." (Eizenstat 1997b) The press reported that European and 
American officials enjoyed an easy relationship, with Sir Leon and Stuart Eizenstat 
particularly close.144 After a November 1997 meeting in Washington which realised 
little progress, Eizenstat nevertheless commented, "Anytime you meet with Sir Leon 
you're likely to have some positive steps."143
9.2.1 Stuart Eizenstat
Stuart Eizenstat served as US Ambassador to the EU from 1993 to 1996, where he 
gained invaluable understanding o f the EU and became a strong supporter of an 
integrated Europe. As an advocate of free trade and closer transatlantic relations, he 
worked assiduously to obtain concessions on both sides for the Uruguay Round and 
actively supported the New Transatlantic Agenda to promote closer ties between 
Washington and Brussels. Eizenstat was appointed Undersecretary o f Commerce for 
International Trade upon his return to Washington; one year later, he became 
Undersecretary o f State for Economic, Business and Agricultural affairs, advising
144 “A Global Odd Couple at the Table,” International Herald Tribune. 13th October 1997, p 1. 
l4i “US, EU Negotiators Meet in Washington on Cuba Law,” Reuters. 2 Ist November 1997.
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Madeleine Albright. He was promoted to Deputy Secretary o f the Treasury in May 
1999, where he served until the end of the Clinton presidency. His appointment as 
Clinton's special Cuba envoy in August 1996 was nothing short o f brilliant; he was 
described as "Undersecretary o f State for all things extraordinarily complicated." 
(Crowley 1998) He spent months in shuttle transatlantic diplomacy, trying to achieve "an 
elegant face-saving solution." (Roy 1999: 37) Having failed to dissuade the Europeans 
from seeking a WTO action in February 1997, he served as the chief American 
negotiator in the bilateral talks, where he earned the title "master o f diplomatic 
gymnastics." (Wolffe and Dunne 1999)
Eizenstat was extremely well respected by the bipartisan community on Capitol Hill. A 
Republican congressman stated, "I consider you one o f the finest public servants o f the 
century." (Ibid) Senator Helms saved particular praise for Stuart Eizenstat as "an able 
advocate for the freedom o f the Cuban people," upon conclusion o f the 1997 agreement, 
(Lippman and Blustein 1997) prompting the FT  to report that Eizenstat's success in 
getting Helms to "consider amending" Libertad was "particularly impressive." (de 
Jonquieres 1997) In rejecting the 1998 agreement, Helms nevertheless complimented 
Eizenstat, saying he "has done his very best to reason with the Europeans." (Helms 
1998a) The FT  wrote that Eizenstat knew how to talk to "old cold war warriors" like 
Jesse Helms by arguing that Castro would be "delighted" if the compromise brokered by 
Washington and Brussels failed. (Wolffe and Dunne 1999)
Foreign diplomats who have encountered Eizenstat on the other side o f the table, laud 
him for his "sensitivity to the political pressures which shape other governments' 
positions and the difficulties which limit their room for manoeuvre. However, he is also 
ruthless about not letting the quest for consensus thwart his determination to achieve 
results." A European ambassador described him as "a totally driven man" who "will do 
anything to remove obstacles." (de Jonquieres 1997) Hugo Paemen, EU Ambassador to 
Washington, characterised Eizenstat's formidable qualities as a negotiator with the 
analogy to a hedgehog: "relentlessly sniffing at the edges o f the cases he had to deal 
with, looking where the right entry can be found. At the slightest danger, however, he
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curls up and becomes intangible. Then he unrolls and starts again." (Wolffe and Dunne
1999)
SLB praised Eizenstat, saying: "His talent, dedication and tireless efforts in the different 
posts he has occupied have been indispensable in all that we have done." Brittan 1997c) 
Simon Fraser found Eizenstat "creative," and a former EU official characterised 
Eizenstat as a "class act." (research interview)
Eizenstat's negotiating strategy called for "letting all involved have their say and 
respecting genuine differences among them. Living within constraints is what 
government is all about. We don't live in a perfect world, where we can just do whatever 
we want." (de Jonquieres 1997) An experienced and polished diplomat, Eizenstat 
enumerated the essential qualities required o f a good negotiator: "patience, persistence, 
creativity, a command o f the facts, the ability to argue persuasively, to know when to 
speak and when to be silent, to respect the position o f the other side and while 
understanding your own country's bottom line needs, to sense what others really need to 
stay at the table and enter the end game." (Eizenstat 1999d)
9.2.2 Sir Leon Brittan
Sir Leon Brittan was first elected an MP for the Conservative Party in 1974, rising to 
serve in various ministerial positions in the Thatcher government. A committed 
Europhile and free trader, SLB was appointed Commissioner o f Competition and 
Financial Services in the EU in 1989, moving to Commissioner for External Economic 
Affairs in 1993, and representing the EU as chief negotiator in the Uruguay Round. SLB 
developed a reputation as a powerful and independent commissioner, involved in 
matching intergovernmental agreements with national policy reforms, and managing 
win-sets o f member states, transnational constituencies and third countries 
simultaneously during the Uruguay Round talks. (Deutsch 1999: 102-104) There was 
speculation that, had he not been British, he might have been chosen as President o f the 
Commission in February 1995. Instead, he was appointed one o f two vice-presidents,
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serving under President Jacques Santer as External Relations Commissioner until 1999. 
SLB was made a life peer in the New Year's Honours List in January 2000.
SLB was a strong advocate o f further liberalisation o f markets. Having succeeded in 
negotiating the New Transatlantic Agenda in late 1995, he worked tirelessly, despite the 
Helms-Burton row (and others), to deepen and widen US-EU economic cooperation and 
further open trade, especially in services. The Commission approved his boldest 
initiative, called the New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM) in March 1998. It called for 
wide-ranging liberalisation o f trade between the US and the EU, through the removal o f 
all industrial tariffs by 2010 , the creation o f a free trade area in services, and further 
liberalisation o f investment and intellectual property rights. (Commission 1998a)
France, concerned about trade in agricultural products and the protection o f its domestic 
film industry, rejected the NTM in Council. The US-EU Summit in May 1998 saw the 
launch o f the far less ambitious Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), to promote 
trade liberalisation bilaterally across the Atlantic, but with no mention o f services, in 
what the French Finance Minister labelled "a more pragmatic and gradual" approach than 
the vetoed NTM. (Commission 2000) 146 Jacques Chirac dismissed the NTM as Brittan's 
personal project that sought to enhance the Commission's powers over trade policy. The 
bitter legacy o f the NTM sowed such suspicion that it was only through the strenuous 
efforts o f the UK Presidency that the TEP was accepted.
As the EU is the world's largest trading bloc, SLB argued that it was in Brussels' interest 
to support trade liberalisation; the EU has consequently been a strong supporter o f the 
WTO since its inception in 1995. SLB led the Commission in persuading the Council to 
undertake needed reforms when the EU has lost a WTO case instead o f challenging the 
WTO's ruling, arguing "If the EU does not abide by the WTO rules, there will be little 
incentive for the United States to do the same." (Hix 1999: 338)
Whilst undoubtedly an experienced and valuable negotiator, SLB never enjoyed the 
widespread admiration accorded to Eizenstat. Indeed, SLB was an "unpopular figure" in
146 See also “France Accepts EU-US Trade Deal: Strauss-Kahn,” Reuters. 19th May 1998.
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Washington. (R. Evans 1997a) The FT's Guy de Jonquieres reported that SLB's 
’’confrontational style irked US officials," contrasting his abrasiveness with the more 
"emollient" new Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy. (de Jonquieres 1999) Eizenstat's 
Chief o f  Staff, Peter Bass, confided that "Any conversation with Sir Leon is tortured," 
and that he found him "pompous" and "insufferable." (Bass interview) Nevertheless, 
SLB and Eizenstat enjoyed cordial relations; this congeniality, in addition to their 
professional negotiating skills and their determination to see a bilateral solution helped 
promote the accords.
9.3 The Waiver and the Common Position: Transgovernmental Collusion?
President Clinton suspended Title III with predictable regularity every July and January, 
always crediting Helms-Burton with having raised international awareness o f human 
rights abuses in Cuba. Announcing the first waiver in July 1996, that pre-dated the 
Common Position o f December 1996, Clinton called upon allies to help "accelerate 
change" in Cuba, promising that he would decide whether to end the suspension "based 
upon whether others have joined us in promoting democracy in Cuba." (Clinton 1996c) 
At the next suspension in January 1997, Clinton referred explicitly to the EU Common 
Position enacted the previous month declaring, "I would expect to continue suspending 
the right to file suit so long as America's friends and allies continue their stepped-up 
efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba." (Clinton 1997)
Administration spokesmen continued this linkage. Eizenstat remarked that the US was 
"acting alone" to promote democracy in Cuba before the "multilateral pro-democracy 
initiative" o f 1996, but now the world is not quiet about Cuban abuses." (Eizenstat 
1999b) And, "The possibility o f a waiver under Title III o f Helms-Burton... helped get 
the European Union to link future improvements in its economic and political 
relationship with Cuba to changes in the Castro regime's human rights record." (Eizenstat 
1999a)
Brussels was greatly irritated by the American presumption that it alone, through Helms- 
Burton, was responsible for raising international awareness over human rights abuses in 
Cuba. SLB argued Europe cared greatly about promoting democracy in Cuba, and had
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frozen plans for mutual cooperation with Cuba because Castro had not instituted the 
mandated reforms. But he declared that Europe's Cuba policy had been "arrived at 
independently and [would be] pursue independently..." (Brittan 1996b) Europeans 
remained adamant that there was no linkage between waiver and Common Position. 
During the Dutch tenure o f the Council Presidency in early 1997, a member o f the Dutch 
foreign ministry declared at a conference in Washington, “Ambassador Eizenstat would 
have us believe the European common position was in response to Helms-Burton, but 
this was absolutely not the case.” (van Voorst 1997)
Stuart Eizenstat once conceded this point in a press briefing in January 1997, saying, "I 
want to say that the actions taken by Europe were taken independently...in furtherance 
of their ow n.. .attitude toward democracy. (Eizenstat 1997a)
When asked to clarify this apparent contradiction, Eizenstat explained that his brief vis- 
a-vis Europe was two-pronged: to publicly impress the EU that Libertad was highly 
targeted, affecting only limited European investment in Cuba, and to privately urge the 
Europeans to take a firmer position on human rights abuses in Cuba. Elevating the 
international "decibel level" on human rights violations in Cuba would enable Clinton to 
waive Title III. Thus there was an implicit understanding between Washington and 
Brussels that linked the continuing waiver o f  Title III with the continuing extension o f 
the EU's Common Position every six months.147 (Eizenstat interview)
Ambassador Paemen resolved the apparent inconsistency when he disclosed that, in 
trying to "de-politicise" the situation, the Common Position was prepared "in close 
contact with some members o f the US administration (State Department with EU 
Presidency and Commission)." (Paemen 2001) This was an astonishing and significant 
admission, corroborated by the Spanish, who were responsible for initiating the Common 
Position. Celestino del Arenal wrote that the Spanish proposal to the Council o f 
Ministers on 14 November 1996 "was largely in line with US policy on the island. It 
incorporated all the requests put forward in September by the special US envoy 
[Eizenstat] during a tour o f European capitals." (Arenal 2004, fn 13)
147 The EU considered developments in Cuba bi-annually, and reconfirmed the Common Position. See, 
for example. Bulletin EU 6-1998: 1.4.139 and Bulletin EU 12-1998:1.3.130.
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This thesis argues that this quid-pro-quo was essential in providing Clinton with a basis 
upon which to waive Title III. Libertad granted the president narrow authority to 
suspend Title III, but the Common Position made it possible by widening Clinton's
i  / j o
domestic win-set. In a near-perfect solution, the Europeans were temporarily 
protected from prosecution as Clinton consistently deferred Title III. This agreement 
represented an extraordinary transgovernmental link whereby EU and US Level I 
officials colluded to empower Clinton to prevail over his divided domestic constituency.
In promoting this linkage, the Clinton Administration ignored a problem inherent in the 
conceptual basis o f the waiver. Open commitments by governments to promote 
democracy in Cuba justify the Title III waiver, even as it undermines those same efforts 
to succeed in Cuba. Cuba had to be faced with a choice o f responses: the European 
'good cop' promoting engagement, or the American 'bad cop' promoting isolation. 
Institutionalising European efforts within Libertad were self-defeating, as it linked 
perceived friends with the Yankee enemy. (Nuccio 1999: 20)
9.4 Reaching Agreement
There are two troublesome but interrelated questions regarding American strategy in the 
Helms-Burton negotiations. First, why did the United States conclude an agreement with 
the European Union that enjoyed dubious Level II support? Second, was American 
defection voluntary or involuntary? The thesis will propose several possible explanations 
to the first before considering the latter.
The 'cost of no-agreement' analyses whether the status quo remains unchanged or 
deteriorates if no agreement is attained at Level I. Putnam predicts that when the cost of 
no-agreement is high, the win-sets will tend to be larger, and vice versa. Ceteris paribus, 
perceived high costs o f no-agreement should positively advance the conclusion o f a 
Level I agreement, whereas a 'take it or leave it' (TILI) attitude will likely result in failed 
negotiations. (Putnam 443; Collinson 1999: 216) This thesis argues that the cost o f no-
148 El Pals recognised the potential benefit o f the Common Position in providing “el principal exito ” to 
Clinton. Op Cit. footnote 101.
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agreement was very high indeed; Washington and Brussels shared overlapping win-sets 
to reach a peaceful conclusion and avoid a WTO confrontation.
Furthermore, the Helms-Burton negotiations were an example o f coercive bargaining, as 
they were undertaken under threat o f a WTO hearing. Moravcsik argues that, by raising 
the cost o f no-agreement, threats widen the win-set o f the target state, thus promoting 
agreement. (Moravcsik 1993a: 29) However, Odell (1993) argues that the target will 
not comply with the threat if the internal political cost o f compliance is greater than the 
cost o f no-agreement. Both scholars also emphasise the importance o f the credibility o f 
the sender.
Meunier argues that if the EU is closer to the status quo than its negotiating opponent, 
"bargaining theory predicts that the outcome o f the negotiations will be equated with the 
EU's position." (Meunier 2000: 115-6) Milner makes a similar argument; the player with 
the power to set the reversion level (what happens if the negotiations fail) exercises 
enormous control over the agreement. (Milner 1997: 73-76) If the Level I negotiations 
failed, the status quo, or the reversion level, was a resumption o f the WTO Panel, which 
was closer to the EU position than that o f the Americans, making the EU the stronger 
player in the talks.
The negotiation literature employs the term 'BATNA, best alternative to negotiated 
agreement', to analyse outcomes. BATNA "is the only standard which can protect you 
both from accepting terms that are too unfavourable and from rejecting terms it would be 
in your interest to accept." The relative negotiating power o f the participants depends on 
how each views the option o f not reaching an agreement. If  the proposed agreement is 
better than the BATNA, accept it; if the agreement is not better than the BATNA, re­
negotiate, or withdraw from the talks. BATNA is the measure o f the balance o f power in 
a negotiation; the better the BATNA, the stronger the negotiating position. (Fisher and 
Ury 1999: 104-111) The EU had the better BATNA, and was therefore negotiating from 
a position of strength.
Synthesising all the above arguments, this thesis argues that the high cost o f no­
agreement was intensified by the WTO threat, and that the EU was master of the
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reversion level and had a better BATNA. Putnam endorses the Schelling conjecture, 
which contends that the player with the greater constraints is in a position to win greater 
distributional gains. The US, with its divided government and hawkish legislature, had 
the greater constraints, but this thesis argues that Putnam's hypothesis was not validated 
in these negotiations. Any advantages in having the greater constraints were
• weakened generally by the perceived high cost o f no-agreement, underpinned by a 
credible threat that outweighed the domestic political cost;
• undermined by the strong bargaining position o f the EU who commanded the reversion 
level; and
• diluted by the EU's BATNA.
To conclude, Washington negotiated a settlement, uncertain as to the Level II support it 
could expect, because the US perceived the domestic costs o f an agreement to be less 
than the costs associated with no-agreement and a certain WTO confrontation. 
Washington and Brussels unquestionably preferred an accord that was embedded in law 
to a tenuous political agreement, but Brussels understood American constraints. Perhaps 
there was collusion between the two, each agreeing to negotiate an inchoate agreement 
incorporating a political compromise that settled the dispute, and pragmatically choosing 
to co-operate informally in not pressing for formal ratification. Indeed, Lord Brittan 
expressed great satisfaction that the agreement was standing, despite the US defection 
that he had not anticipated. (Brittan interview)
9.5 Level I Defection
Many scholars dispute the Schelling conjecture. Evans argues that the strategy o f 
deliberately "tying hands" in order to compel the opposing COG to accept terms closer to 
one's own win-set is not attempted often, nor does it produce the desired results. (P. 
Evans 1993: 399) Milner argues that the COGs problems mount with increasing division 
in government. "The more divided the government, the less likely cooperation is, the 
greater the likelihood of ratification failure is, and the more influence the legislature 
tends to exert over the terms o f  the agreement." (Milner 1997: 98) She argues that the 
degree of divided government is exacerbated by an institutional imbalance in the US that
invests more power in the legislature than in the executive. Cooperation is unlikely when 
the distribution o f power favours the more hawkish player, for policy will reflect that 
player's preferences. Milner predicts that if there is a hawkish executive, there will be 
failure to initiate (Ibid: 236). By extension, a hawkish legislature will result in failure to 
ratify.
Clinton laboured under a divided government from 1994 that strongly constrained his 
ability to determine policy. He was further constrained by the institutional rigidities that 
favoured the hawkish legislature and resulted in American defection. Indeed, the Clinton 
Administration never formally requested the requisite amendments o f Helms-Burton. 
This contrasted starkly with the EU, whose member states overcame their national 
preferences to ratify the Understanding within a week.
Failure to ratify at Level II may be either voluntary or involuntary. Involuntary defection 
occurs when the COG negotiates an agreement that he feels is consistent with his polity's 
win-set, but which nevertheless fails to win Level II ratification. Voluntary defection, 
however, "refers to reneging by a rational egoist in the absence o f enforceable contracts" 
- a deliberate defection from the agreement initialled at Level I. Both voluntary and 
involuntary defection are fatal to a contract, and it is often impossible to distinguish 
between the two due to uncertainty or misrepresentation. (Putnam 440-441)
Capitol Hill's failure to fulfil Eizenstat's pledge to amend Title IV could be due to three 
possibilities:
involuntary defection, with Eizenstat making a "commitment in good faith," (Bass 
interview) reassured by congressional contacts that Senator Helms would consider an 
amendment
a cynical settlement concluded by a strategic negotiator seeking to misrepresent 
voluntary defection as involuntary 
voluntary defection, with Eizenstat negotiating to the best o f his considerable ability, 
but nevertheless doubtful that Congress would ratify.
Why would Eizenstat deliberately negotiate an understanding that he suspected would 
fail ratification at Level II? The US did not have sufficient confidence in the merits o f
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its WTO case, and that was the reason behind the posturing, using the national security 
exemption and threatening not to appear before the Panel. Nevertheless, Washington 
was loath to undermine the fledgling WTO by not co-operating with the Panel or not 
adhering to its (adverse) ruling. This thesis argues Washington's BATNA was so weak, 
and the cost o f no-agreement was so much higher than the domestic costs o f compliance 
that Eizenstat could have negotiated an agreement he doubted Congress would accept.
Significantly, Sir Leon did not expect US to default. (Brittan interview) And Peter Bass 
felt Eizenstat negotiated with great integrity, aware o f his constraints, but hoping to 
secure ratification at Level II. Bass nevertheless justified initialling an agreement, even 
if there was only a ten-percent chance o f having it ratified, arguing that even such 
adverse odds was preferable to quarrelling. (Bass interview)
Simon Fraser confided that he personally felt the US never intended to implement the 
accords. (Fraser interview) John Foggo o f the DTI suggested the EU was willing to 
accommodate the American negotiators with a political solution over a piece o f 
legislation their Administration didn't support. (Foggo interview) There may have been 
collusion between the COGs to find a face-saving solution, emphasising the extent to 
which both protagonists recognised their mutual interest in co-operating to resolve 
political differences.
Two-level game theorists (Iida, Putnam) consider how uncertainty effects negotiations. 
They note that ratification at Level II may fail due to unrealistic assumptions o f domestic 
preferences by Level I negotiators; this danger applies both to assessing one's own 
constituency, and to information regarding the opposition domestic polity, and is 
particularly hazardous when faced with a divided domestic constituency. As this thesis 
has just noted, domestic American constraints contributed to uncertainty as to the degree 
of Level II support for the agreement within both the European and the American 
negotiating teams. Although the European negotiators were uncertain as to American 
support at Level II, they were nevertheless willing to enter into an agreement that they 
felt, at the very least, afforded them the protection they sought. The American 
negotiators were also uncertain as to the degree of domestic support, despite numerous
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consultations with Capitol Hill, but were pleased to accept an elegant escape from 
implementing legislation they did not support. Both sides clearly preferred a negotiated 
settlement to a continuing WTO panel, even if it meant accepting the uncertainty o f 
American domestic support. This thesis therefore argues that uncertainty positively 
enhanced the ability to conclude a Level I agreement, whereas certain knowledge of 
American defection would have torpedoed it.
Odell and Eichengreen compare US defection from the ITO agreement in 1947-1948 
(where the US was its main initiator) with the successful ratification o f the WTO in 
1994. This was an unusual outcome, as one would have been expected the US to ratify 
the ITO as part o f its Cold War strategy o f trade liberalisation, and show more reluctance 
to co-operate in the 1990s. They argue that these outcomes were due to three factors:
• there was far less institutional 'slack' between the COG and Congress in the 1990s; 
there was a divided government in 1947, with a Democratic President Truman, and a 
Republican Congress;
• the BATNA was better in the 1940s than in the 1990s; and
• Clinton invested far more political resources into the ratification o f the WTO than 
had Truman into the ITO. (Odell and Eichengreen 2000: 159-180).
There may be lessons to be drawn from these negotiations for the American defection in 
the Helms-Burton talks. Congressional and Administration preferences diverged; 
Clinton, who never mastered the art o f 'working the Congress,' did not invest much 
political capital into cajoling Congress to modify Helms-Burton; and the EU had the 
better BATNA. These conditions would constitute sufficient cause to explain American 
defection.
9.6 Side Payments: Amendment of Title IV
Many scholars (Putnam, Moravcsik, Knopf, Martin) recognise the potential for increased 
cooperation between individuals who have different preferences across issue areas 
through side payments, whether money, votes, future policy choices, political 
appointments, etc. Mayer argues that, in a divided constituency, winners can 
compensate losers and still obtain ratification. Side payments are a powerful tool in the
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hands o f the executive, who may make an unratifiable agreement palatable by offering 
inducements to legislators and/or interest groups. Milner cites Clinton's offer to exclude 
some producers from NAFTA as vital in securing the legislative votes o f those districts. 
Strategic use o f side payments can widen win-sets and successfully obtain agreement.
The consideration o f offering side payments to Jesse Helms to gain his cooperation on 
amending Libertad raised some fascinating possibilities. Roger Noriega suggested that 
Helms might have cooperated on a Title IV waiver if the Spanish hotel group, Grupo Sol 
Melia, had been cited under Title IV, as a quid pro quo. Nick Gutierrez thought that if 
Sol Melia were forced to settle under duress from the State Department, Helms may then 
have considered a Title IV waiver as a trade-off. (Noriega and Gutierrez interviews)
Ignacio Sanchez suggested that the US perhaps discriminate in its enforcement o f 
Libertad by applying the waiver selectively. For example, the US could grant a Title IV 
waiver to countries it believed were conforming to Libertad, but not to those who did not 
co-operate, such as Spain due to Sol Melia. (Sanchez interview) Eizenstat recommended 
this very plan in Senate testimony, declaring "We have in mind an amendment that 
would authorize waiver o f Title IV for countries that are implementing the 
Understanding but that would require revocation o f  the waiver if implementation is 
inadequate... We want to work with Congress to craft an amendment to Title IV o f the 
Libertad Act that will implement the United States commitment under the Understanding 
in a manner that instils confidence in Congress." (Eizenstat 1999c)
Another strategy, suggested by FT  journalists, was that the part o f Title IV extending the 
sanctions to families o f cited persons was "originally inserted as a bargaining chip" 
which implied Helms might be flexible on a presidential waiver. (Dunne and Jonquieres 
1997) Finally, the EU could have offered a cross-level side payment to Congress: both 
Eizenstat and Bass argued that the fact that the investment protocols were not retroactive 
to before 18th May 1998 was a major stumbling block. If they were, perhaps Helms 
would have considered granting presidential waiver authority o f Title IV. (Eizenstat and 
Bass interviews)
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Clinton sought to persuade Washington's trading partners to act as proxies in propelling 
Castro to move towards democracy, with the side-payment being that Title III was 
repeatedly waived and Title IV was invoked only against four countries (of whom only 
one was European, STET, the Italian telecommunications company) despite some 200 
companies being accountable under it.
Spain, the major European trading partner o f Cuba, was certainly threatened by Helms- 
Burton but it seems that the Spanish cut a deal. The Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria 
Aznar, publicly called for democratic reforms in Cuba, leading a major Spanish 
newspaper to proclaim that, in return, the US promised that no Spanish firms would be 
cited under Helms-Burton. The Clinton administration denied the report. (Kiger 1997: 
65-66) Spain applauded Clinton's first waiver o f Title III in July 1996, with the Aznar 
government announcing that it would cut $3 million in aid to Cuba unless Castro began 
to institute democratic reforms. (Lazaroff 1996) If  indeed such a side-payment were 
offered, it would explain why, with such a large number of Spanish companies operating 
in Cuba, none was cited under Libertad. Ever suspicious o f Clinton, Helms reminded the 
president that Title IV carried no waiver with it in July 1997, and that "through its failure 
to enforce this provision, the administration has issued what amounts to an effective, and 
in fact, an unlawful waiver." (Schweid 1997)
9.7 Distributional Gains
Many felt that Europe capitulated to American interests in agreeing to the truce. The FT  
expressed disappointment that the US conceded less than that sought by SLB, and that 
the understanding was vague, relying on promised efforts rather than firm action by 
Clinton. It suggested that Helms might have been flexible on a presidential waiver for 
Title IV, but, "The belief that the EU has blinked in the confrontation may also 
encourage him to drive a hard bargain." (Dunne and Jonquieres 1997) A Washington 
investigative journalist noted that had the EU exerted more pressure on the US, it would 
have handed Clinton the necessary clout to tackle Helms. The EU surrender was not 
only astonishing; it made it impossible to move Helms. (Armstrong 1997; Armstrong 
phone interview) A former US government official argued that the EU was "blowing 
smoke" and not serious in its WTO action, (research interview)
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This thesis disagrees strongly, arguing that the EU won greater distributional gains in the 
settlement o f the dispute. The US and the EU shared overlapping win-sets in seeking to 
avoid a WTO panel; therefore, the suspension o f that panel was a triumph shared equally 
by both Brussels and Washington. Focusing on the other aspects o f the agreement - the 
investment protocols, the presumption o f the continued suspension o f Title III, the 
American undertaking to amend Title IV, and the synergistic inclusion o f ILSA - leads 
this thesis to conclude that the EU won greater gains.
This thesis argues that the US made substantial concessions to the EU on two core 
investment issues. Firstly, the Americans wanted recourse to legal protection from 
existing European investments in Cuba, but the language clearly specifies that the 
agreement applies only to future  investments, not to any questionable investments made 
prior to May 1998. The only concession to existing investments in confiscated American 
assets was that investment disciplines would apply if property was re-acquired, 
renovated or upgraded after May 1998, i.e. the existing investment benefited from new 
capital injections (§Ic). Secondly, the Americans sought an outright ban on investment 
in expropriated assets, but settled for substantially less restrictive language. As SLB 
stated in announcing the Understanding, the agreement aims to "inhibit" future 
investment on American properties confiscated by Castro without compensation, "and 
not to prohibit them ."149 The only ban was on investment in properties illegally 
expropriated after May 1998.
Furthermore, this thesis argues that the EU brilliantly overcame exceptional American 
opposition to synergistically link ILSA with Libertad, on the justification that both 
conferred extraterritorial powers. The US knew it would be much easier to solve the 
Helms-Burton dispute if it were not linked to ILSA, which the Americans labelled "the 
trickier o f the two." (Croft 1998c) Despite "fiercely resisting linkage," the Americans 
had to concede in the face o f a determined EU. (Croft 1998d) It is difficult to overstate 
the significance o f this achievement, especially in light o f the fact that Brussels' WTO 
requests cited only Libertad, not ILSA at all. But SLB was adamant that ILSA be
149 Op. cit. footnotes 129 and 131.
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included, for two reasons: Libertad and ILSA were equally objectionable on the principle 
o f extraterritoriality, and some member states were affected more by ILSA than by 
Libertad. SLB saw no problem including ILSA even though it had not been cited in the 
WTO briefs; the bilateral settlement did not hinge on the legal case. (Brittan interview)
Dave Marchick allowed that the US erred in permitting the inclusion o f ILSA, as ILSA 
dealt with a far more sensitive issue o f national security than did Helms-Burton. 
Marchick felt that political constraints o f appearing weak on rogue states would have 
prevented the EU from suing over ILSA; synergistic issue linkage with Libertad made 
such action viable. Marchick recalled that the US resisted linking ILSA for as long as it 
could, but was apparently worn down by SLB's insistence. Nevertheless, Marchick 
maintained that the US conceded nothing o f substance on ILSA. Indeed, a carefiil 
reading o f the 1997 Understanding reveals the President's commitment to implement 
ILSA “in a deliberate and fair manner”, whilst taking into account measures taken by the 
EU that may enable EU companies to be granted a waiver. (Marchick interview) But the 
EU gained the protection it sought when Total was granted an ILSA waiver in the Non- 
Paper that accompanied the 1998 agreement.
Finally, Lord Brittan argued that the EU had achieved almost all it sought in gaining 
protection for European companies from the vagaries o f Libertad and ILSA, and 
pragmatically declared there was "no need to row simply to row." SLB had frequently 
expressed this sentiment during the negotiations; when the WTO Panel was appointed in 
February 1997, SLB stated that the EU sought to protect European interests from 
American extraterritoriality, and not to take "our case to the point o f a decision by a 
Panel for its own sake."150
Despite American defection, the agreement has provided protection to EU entities from 
both Title III and Title IV. The only regret Brittan voiced was over was the EU failure to 
gain removal o f the two Britons, Patrick Sheehy and Rupert Pennant-Rea from the 
exclusion list o f Title IV. "This issue was raised without success." (Brittan interview 
and email)
150 Op. cit. footnote 115.
9.8 Continuing American Level II Constraints
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With Title IV still in force, supporters of Helms-Burton have lobbied strongly for the 
State Department to sanction the Spanish hotel group Grupo Sol Melia (GSM), one o f 
the leading hotel chains in Cuba. GSM allegedly built hotels on beachfront property 
formerly owned by the Sanchez family, owners o f a 100,000-acre sugar plantation. The 
family formed an American company, Central Santa Lucia, LC (CSLLC) to represent 
their unified claims. Their attorney Nick Gutierrez claims GSM opened two hotels in 
January 1996, which pre-dated Helms-Burton, but there was new construction after 
March 1996. GSM therefore received a very mild State Department letter in June 1996,
J.L
followed by an official advisory letter on 30 July 1999. Finally, GSM received an 
expanded advisory letter in March 2001, advising them that the five-year management 
contract on the two hotels that were opened in January 1996 had expired, and warning 
that renewal would place GSM in breach of Libertad. (Gutierrez interview)
GSM claimed it was cleared by the State Department for infringement o f Libertad in 
1996, and did not understand why it was the subject o f a further inquiry three years on, 
especially as they managed, rather than owned, the hotels. Undeterred, GSM was 
operating fourteen hotels by 1999, with plans for expansion o f five more hotels in 2000. 
(Garcia-Zarza 1999)
Supporters o f Libertad felt there was sufficient evidence to sanction GSM under Title IV; 
but such action risked torpedoing the uneasy US-EU truce. Spain warned that both Spain 
and the EU would renew their WTO appeal against the US if GSM were sanctioned 
under Helms-Burton. (Ibid) Gutierrez confided that he had been urged by the State 
Department to settle the claims o f the Sanchez family against GSM, for this would "get 
them off the hook." (Gutierrez interview) Gutierrez offered GSM a choice o f three 
options: adequate compensation, abandoning the project, or losing the rights of 
executives to visit the US. (Marquis 1999) A Commission official confirmed that the 
Clinton Administration had a vested interest in GSM brokering a deal with the Sanchez 
family, as it offered an elegant escape, (research interview)
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GSM held the EU's Blocking Action as a shield against settling compensation with 
CSLLC. However, Gutierrez claimed that both the Spanish Embassy in Washington (in 
mid-2000) and the Commission (in late 2001) declared that a compensation agreement 
would be acceptable in principle. Gutierrez characterised a settlement as a "win-win" 
scenario for all. (Gutierrez interview) A GSM-CSLLC agreement would follow the 
precedent set by STET's compensation to ITT in 1997.
As bilateral negotiations commenced between the Sanchez family and GSM, CSLLC 
demanded $10 million compensation. GSM's attorney claimed that the disputed property 
was worth a mere $3,000 in 1962, and accused the State Department of mounting an 
extortion game on behalf o f the claimants. GSM hoped that mounting EU pressure 
would deter further US action as the Commission had warned the US that it would 
vigorously defend GSM. (Alden 2001)
Gutierrez confided that other European hotel chains had developed beachfront property 
belonging to CSLLC. LTI (Germany) had received an advisory letter in late 1999, but 
the two French firms, Club Med and Accor, had not received any State Department 
communication as of early 2002, as their hotels were still under construction. (Gutierrez 
interview) A Commission official confirmed having received complaints about 
intimidation from US authorities from several European hotel groups including LTI and 
Club Med. (research interview) 131
9.8.1 Capitol Hill Pressure
The Clinton Administration came under unremitting pressure from Capitol Hill to 
implement Title IV against Grupo Sol Melia. Senator Helms and Congressman Gilman 
wrote to Peter Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary o f  State for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs in September 1999, regretting the necessity o f having to remind him of his 
responsibility for implementing Title IV against GSM. The sharp letter claimed that it
thwas Romero's "duty" to sanction GSM after having sent them a letter on 30 July. 
(Helms and Gilman 1999)
131 One wonders whether some firms have “paid under the table” given the low number o f targeted firms.
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Helms and Gilman were answered in October,132 with the explanation that the July letter 
to GSM did not imply that the State Department had "reasonably concluded" that the 
firm had 'trafficked' in American assets. Sol Melia had "raised complex issues" that the 
State Department was reviewing; furthermore, it was the Department's practice to allow a 
suspected 'trafficker' time to respond to the allegations, or to alter their behaviour so as to 
be in compliance with Libertad. The letter closed with a reassurance that the State 
Department intended to enforce Title IV "vigorously". (Larkin 1999)
Helms, Gilman, Burton, Torricelli, and the Cuban-American Congressmen wrote to 
Secretary o f State Albright in June 2000, castigating the State Department (who had 
briefed Congress concerning 24 suspected 'traffickers' in July 1999) for not having cited 
any new firms under Title IV for two years. They considered that "this inaction suggests 
a conscious decision by the Clinton Administration not to apply the law ."133 CSLLC had 
worked for over three years with the State Department to "build an air-tight case" against 
GSM, proving ownership o f clearly bounded property since 1857, on which Sol Melia 
was managing hotels and constructing new ones. The letter accused GSM of entering 
disingenuous talks with CSLLC in order to avoid Title IV prosecution. Concluding that 
a letter o f determination was "long overdue," the lawmakers asked the State Department 
to provide a list o f the additional information necessary to support a Title IV 'trafficking' 
sanction against GSM, and a timetable for taking such steps. (Helms et al 2000b)
9.9 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the US-EU negotiations over Helms-Burton were held 
between friendly allies rather than adversaries, and were led by COGs who were 
congenial and respectful o f each other's constraints. Above all, the talks were conducted 
with a determination to reach an agreement, as Washington and Brussels shared over­
132 Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, wrote the State Department's answer, 
explaining that Romero had "recused him self' in July from any further involvement in Title IV 
determinations, pending confirmation o f  his State Department position. Romero's nomination was never 
confirmed by Helms' committee due to his failure to enforce Libertad "vigorously." See Marquis 1999.
|3J They were surprised at Romero’s informal recusal. They expressed disapproval o f  the resulting gap in 
the delegation authority, taking it as further indication o f the laxity o f  enforcement o f  Libertad.
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lapping win-sets to avoid a WTO Panel that would undermine support for the fledgling 
organisation.
The announcement of the accords was greeted with dismay by many Republican 
lawmakers on Capitol Hill. This thesis argues that the cost o f no-agreement was so high 
that the American negotiators accepted an accord that had dubious support at Level II. 
The Clinton Administration chose to bear the costs o f attempting to persuade a reluctant 
Congress to make the requisite amendments to Libertad to the perceived higher costs o f a 
confrontation at the WTO.
Many Europeans were disappointed that the EU agreed to suspend a WTO case that it 
was likely to win. But this thesis argues that the EU nevertheless won the greater gains 
in this dispute with the US, even though Putnam predicts that the more constrained side 
wins greater distributional gains. The EU won almost every concession they sought, so 
they pragmatically concluded there was nothing to be gained by pressing on with the 
WTO Panel. Furthermore, the EU's able negotiator, Sir Leon Brittan, synergistically 
linked ILSA to the accords, although ILSA was not even cited in the WTO Panel 
requests, thus succeeding in obtaining an important waiver for France's Total.
It is worthwhile considering the EU's BATNA: could the EU have gained more by 
pursuing its airtight case at the WTO? There is little indication that Helms, who had 
voted against implementing the Uruguay Round measures that established the WTO in 
1994, would have complied with a WTO ruling to modify Libertad; and the WTO's 
prestige would have been damaged by a bitter confrontation. Based on this analysis, this 
thesis argues that SLB's decision to compromise was sound.
This chapter has also considered the conundrum of whether Washington's defection was 
voluntary or involuntary. This thesis concludes that Washington's defection was 
involuntary, and that Eizenstat negotiated in good faith, based on frequent consultations 
with Capitol Hill leaders. Although the agreement remains inchoate, there is a fragile 
but de facto truce that is valued by both sides. This has been particularly impressive in 
view o f the unabated pressures from Capitol Hill to implement Title IV.
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Negotiations are rarely, if  ever, a zero-sum game; there is usually a possibility for mutual 
gains that adept negotiators can seek out. (Fisher and Ury 1999: 73) Although this thesis 
argues that the EU won greater gains in the resolution o f this dispute, it does not deny 
significant gains that accrued to the US. The Helms-Burton talks were, in Simon Fraser's 
words, "an extremely elegant piece o f diplomacy" that defused the political row with a 
viable compromise that represented a 'win-win' situation. Professor Joaquin Roy 
observed, "Curiously, all the parties involved with Helms-Burton can claim partial or 
total success." (Roy 1997: 95) After the negotiations, Sir Leon defended the agreement 
before the European Parliament where he declared, "It is not possible to obtain complete 
victory over the United States." (Brittan 1998a) Stuart Eizenstat stated, "In the end, both 
sides must be able to proclaim victory, and neither concedes defeat if negotiations are to 
succeed." (Eizenstat 1999d).
Chapter 10
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Conclusions
"Today, Europe and America threaten each other with economic warfare when 
negotiations stall. But threats are where the conflict usually stops because everyone is 
deadly afraid o f  destroying the global trading system." (Joffe 1997: 25)
10.1 Introduction
The motivation behind this research project was resolving the puzzle o f  American 
foreign economic policy that saw the US using unilateral economic sanctions almost as 
the foreign policy tool o f choice in the 1990s. This researcher elected to study the 
transatlantic dispute provoked by the Helms-Burton Act, a particularly difficult bill 
which hardened the American embargo against Cuba, and purported to control trade with 
Cuba extraterritorially. Specifically, this project sought to address two core questions:
• Why did Washington enact Helms-Burton when over forty years o f sanctions had not 
succeeded in removing Castro, thereby deliberately provoking disputes with close 
allies?
• Was the European Union's strategy o f challenging Helms-Burton in the World Trade 
Organisation successful in achieving its objectives?
This thesis argues that post-Cold War American foreign policy was frequently 
domestically driven. No longer constrained by national security issues, American 
foreign policy in the 1990s was often commandeered by powerful interest groups with 
specific parochial agendas and little regard for multilateral consultation. This thesis 
agrees with Helen Milner, who forcefully rejects the Realist model that counsels 
disregarding domestic politics that impede the attainment of goals that are in the nation's 
best interests. "No political leader can afford to ignore domestic politics -  whether at 
home or abroad -  when contemplating foreign policy choices." (Milner 1997: 259-261) 
Only consideration o f domestic politics can offer a motive behind the seemingly
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irrational enactment o f Helms-Burton. Indeed, this bias led to choosing the two-level 
game as an analytical framework for this study.
With regard to the second question, this thesis argues that the European Union's defence 
strategy was extraordinarily successful, awarding the EU more than it had originally 
sought. The US would have disregarded diplomatic entreaties and enforced sanctions 
extraterritorially were it not for the WTO threat. Washington agreed to bilateral talks to 
avoid the WTO litigation.
Robert Putnam's two-level game accounts for the simultaneous interaction o f both 
domestic interests and international factors. This thesis has used the two-level game 
framework to analyse the Level II domestic preferences that supported and led to the 
enactment of Libertad in the United States. It has demonstrated how the EU overcame 
diverging Level II national preferences to plan a credible strategy in requesting a WTO 
Panel. Finally, it has explored the Level I bilateral negotiations that defused the dispute, 
and returned to Level II to explain how the EU sought consensus in the face o f strong 
resistance from key member states and successfully ratified the agreement, whereas the 
US defaulted.
This chapter will summarise the arguments o f this thesis before making some concluding 
observations about the utility o f this study in light o f the still fragile truce over Libertad.
10.2 Main Arguments
In assessing the Level I negotiations over Helms-Burton, this thesis poses two main 
concluding arguments, one with regard to strategy, and the second with regard to 
bargaining outcomes. The first argument is that the EU's strategic decision to request a 
WTO Dispute Settlement Panel was both substantive and tactical for it was absolutely 
crucial in forcing the US to the negotiating table. That the US was uncertain o f the merits 
o f its case is an understatement; Lord Brittan felt that the US would not have 
compromised with the EU if Washington were more confident o f its WTO case. 
Equally, although Washington threatened not to co-operate with the Panel, the US was
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reluctant to undermine the authority o f the fledgling WTO. This sword o f Damocles 
over Washington's head brokered the truce, effectively widening Washington's win-set to 
the degree that enabled, indeed propelled, the US to seek a compromise. As the US and 
the EU shared a win-set o f seeking to avoid a WTO confrontation, there was enormous 
good-will and determination with both sides devoting substantial energy and resources to 
achieving a commonly acceptable accommodation. The mutual recognition o f underlying 
economic interdependence was a significant constraint for both sides in this dispute, 
driving the two protagonists to seek informal cooperation as a face-saving solution. 
Furthermore, Cuba was not important enough to justify a full-scale trade war.
The second concluding argument addresses the distribution o f gains resulting from the 
accords. Putnam's paradoxical observation that political constraints and institutions that 
weaken policy-makers domestically -  in this case, the US - may strengthen their position 
at the Level I bargaining table was not borne out in this case study. This thesis argues 
that the European Union won the greater gains in these talks for the following reasons:
• The investment disciplines apply only to new investments after 18th May 1998, not 
existing ones.
• The investment disciplines do not prohibit dubious investments outright; they only 
inhibit them by proscribing government aid.
• The US must amend Title IV before the EU must implement the investment principles.
• The EU synergistically linked ILSA into the accords, which was particularly 
impressive as its WTO action had cited only Libertad.
The EU received de facto protection for its businesses from Helms-Burton and ILSA and 
an undertaking from the US in the TPPC to be more deliberate in the future, and to seek 
multilateral cooperation over unilateral actions. This thesis argues that the EU 
negotiated a very advantageous agreement indeed; therefore, agreeing to suspend the 
WTO action was not an act o f weakness but o f wisdom. Lord Brittan confided that it was 
fruitless to continue the dispute when the EU achieved all that it sought in the 
negotiations (except for the two Britons that remain excluded from the US due to their 
association with the Canadian company Sherritt International).
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10.3 Secondary Arguments
This thesis has made many secondary arguments in the course o f the narrative and 
analysis. This section will summarise these arguments.
Chapter 1 examined the Helms-Burton Act closely, and Chapter 4 narrated the 
circumstances o f its passage into law. They argued that Helms-Burton has failed to 
achieve its dual aims o f promoting democracy in Cuba and internationalising the 
embargo against Castro, nor has it had an appreciable effect on the level o f foreign 
investment in Cuba. Libertad's main effect has been to undermine meaningful relations 
with friends and allies. Chapter 4 pointed out the numerous flaws in the bill, and the 
reasoned opposition from lawmakers and the White House that correctly predicted the 
international backlash to come. It maintained that Libertad would not have become law 
were it not for Castro's mobilising incident in shooting down two civilian aircraft. 
Finally, chapter 4 argued that the Clinton White House showed dreadful negotiating 
skills in agreeing to the codification o f the embargo, and in not seeking presidential 
waiver authority for Title IV as well as Title III. Despite signing Helms-Burton into law 
with great fanfare, Clinton implemented Libertad very sparingly, and consistently used 
the Title III waiver to postpone the entitlement to bring 'trafficking' cases to court.
Chapter 2 examined the economic sanctions literature, particularly as it is relevant to the 
American trade embargo against Cuba during the Cold War. This chapter argued that, 
whereas sanctions cannot realise ambitious goals, they can achieve more modest ones. 
Therefore, although the American sanctions did not topple Castro, the embargo served 
significant, albeit less ambitious, American national interests during the Cold War, by 
expressing American resolve to contain communism, by satisfying American public 
opinion that demanded action against Castro, and, more substantively, by imposing 
considerable costs on both Cuba and the Soviet Union, and preventing the spread o f 
revolutions elsewhere in Latin America. The Cuban embargo has also performed an 
important expressive role, in providing a moral barometer o f basic civil behaviour
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incumbent upon all nations. Arguments regarding the continuing embargo will be 
considered later in this chapter.
Chapters 5 and 6 explored the American Level II domestic constituency with interests in 
Helms-Burton. Chapter 5 argued that a confluence of interests between state and non­
state actors was responsible for the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Act, 
both o f which tightened the Cuban embargo. The non-state actors were primarily focused 
hard-line Cuban-American interest groups that brandished substantial campaign 
contributions and resided in strategically important states. The fact that both these bills 
were passed in presidential election years was no accident.
Chapter 6 explored the counterweight to the Cuban-Americans, essentially corporate 
America, who supported general sanctions reform legislation that would restrict 
Congress' ability to enact sanctions. Although enjoying bi-partisan backing, sanctions 
reform legislation was not enacted due to lack of vital support from the Clinton 
Administration. The chapter analysed Clinton's ambivalent implementation o f Helms- 
Burton, attributing his behaviour to his inability to reconcile simultaneous but conflicting 
domestic and international demands, although he personally supported moderating the 
embargo. In a astonishingly candid appraisal, Clinton remarked to a New York Times 
reporter that mandated sanctions put "enormous pressure on whoever is in the executive 
branch to fudge an evaluation o f the facts o f what is going on...What you want is to leave 
the President some flexibility, including the ability to impose sanctions, some flexibility 
with a range o f appropriate reactions." (Sciolino 1998)
Chapter 7 presented the European Level II responses to Helms-Burton. Although there 
was unanimity o f purpose in opposing Libertad, the EU overcame significant diverging 
national preferences to forge a strategic consensus. Assembling foreign policy tools 
across all three Pillars, the EU based its principle defence on challenging Libertad's 
extraterritoriality, a Pillar I trade issue o f shared competence between the Community 
and the Member States. The Council Regulation blocking Libertad's effects and drafted 
by the Commission was a Pillar I instrument; the WTO challenge was undertaken by the 
Commission under a Council mandate, also under Pillar I. Pillar II (CFSP) and Pillar III
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(Justice and Home Affairs) were utilised by the Council in enacting the Joint Action, 
which re-enforced the protection from Libertad afforded to EU enterprises by the 
Council Regulation. Finally, under Pillar II CFSP, the EU issued its Common Position 
conditioning economic cooperation with Cuba to increasing democratic reforms and 
respect for human rights. Considering the disparate national preferences, the unity 
Brussels demonstrated in defying American unilateralism was quite remarkable.
Chapter 8 scrutinised the Level I international negotiations that produced the interim 11th 
April 1997 Understanding and the comprehensive 18th May 1998 Understanding; it then 
examined the Level II reactions to ratification on both sides o f the Atlantic. It argued 
that Washington and Brussels shared overlapping win-sets in a mutual determination to 
settle their differences amicably, and, as the negotiations took place between allies, the 
talks never faltered, although they were long and often tedious. It credited the 1998 UK 
Presidency with facilitating the Commission's ability to negotiate at Level I, and with 
brilliantly marshalling a consensus in the Council to ratify the agreement at Level II. In 
both these endeavours, the UK Rep received unexpected help from the normally 
fractious French, not surprising considering French interests in Iran.
Chapter 9 analysed the Level I international bargaining in terms of the two-level game. It 
argued that the cost of no-agreement was higher than the domestic cost o f compliance for 
the US, due to the pending WTO action; this explains why the US negotiated an accord 
that it knew would be problematic at Level II, and from which it defected. Nevertheless, 
with numerous consultations with Capitol Hill leaders, Eizenstat hoped he could 
persuade Congress to make the requisite amendments to Libertad. This thesis notes that 
there were varying expectations as to American intentions with regard to ratification. 
But even those who did not expect American defection understood Washington's 
constraints and were content to collude with the Clinton White House in accepting a 
political settlement over legislation the Administration did not support.
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10.4 Application of Two-Level Games
Putnam argues that, as COGs play at two boards simultaneously, what is rational at one 
game board may be inappropriate at the other. The key players must resolve conflicting 
interests o f domestic preferences in line with international realities. The two-level game 
allows that collusion between the antagonists, whereby each helps the other to shift the 
domestic balance o f power and widen the domestic win-set, may facilitate Level I 
agreement.
This case study has provided several instances o f important, and often secretive, 
transgovernmental links between Washington and Brussels, which sought to reduce 
tensions between their respective positions.
• The US supported the early 1996 secret initiative by EU Commissioner Marin to 
condition EU economic aid to Cuba on concrete democratic reforms, despite not sharing 
the EU's philosophy o f constructive engagement vis-a-vis Cuba. The understanding was 
that, if Marin succeeded, the US would respond in a positive fashion. This was quite an 
extraordinary episode, given the established American hard-line policy against Cuba.
• The COGs colluded in sharing the over-arching win-set o f avoiding a WTO 
hearing. The COGs recognised the high cost o f no-agreement, and, although the EU had 
the better BATNA, both sincerely sought a compromise. The Level I talks were 
therefore conducted with a determination to succeed.
• The leading COGs, Stuart Eizenstat and Sir Leon Brittan sought to enhance each 
others standing in their respective domestic communities by mutual compliments and 
positive spins after each round of negotiations, even when the talks achieved little 
substantive results. This strategy sought to widen their respective win-sets, thus 
promoting a compromise solution.
• In sharing the EU's concerns over extraterritoriality, the Clinton Administration in 
essence shared the EU's win-set. This allowed Clinton to present himself as a reasonable 
partner to the EU during the negotiations, and to characterise Congress as the real hard­
line villain in the dispute. (Roy 2000b: 92) Two-level games recognise the benefits that 
accrue domestically from international negotiations when a domestic group supports a 
change in policy being demanded o f its country internationally, which the faction could
not have realised without international pressure. Clinton concluded an agreement with 
Brussels that emasculated Helms-Burton; international pressures helped him realise a 
policy preference he could not have achieved on his own.
In the early stages o f the Libertad dispute, remarkable secret transgovernmental 
cooperation between Washington and Brussels (promoted by Spain) linked the EU's 
Common Position and Clinton's continuing waiver o f Title III, effectively widening 
Clinton's win-set and easing his ability to waive Title III. This was perfect 'win-win' 
situation, as the EU gained protection and Clinton gained a firm basis upon which to 
challenge his Level II hard-liners.
To present the above arguments graphically, Figure 3 below summarises a simple zero- 
sum game between the US and the EU, with USm and EUm representing the maximum 
returns to each, and USi and EUi representing the minimum agreement that each would 
ratify. Clearly, the win-sets overlap and an agreement is possible anywhere in the area 
represented graphically by the distance USi - EUi; this indicates shared interest in 
seeking a compromise solution, and avoiding a WTO confrontation. COG strategies o f 
enhancing each other's reputations would, if mutually successful, widen USi - EUi to 
US2 -  EU2 and further facilitate agreement. A strategy that was not equably successful 
would still widen the shared win-set, but would reflect lop-sided gains. If  only American 
efforts were successful, the shared win-set would be USi -  EU2, reflecting a wider win- 
set in Washington's favour, and vice versa if only European efforts bore fruit.
Figure 3: Effects o f increasing win-set size
EUr USr
US3 US2 US! EU! EU2
Taking US2 -  EU2 as the new shared win-set, the American win-set could have been 
further widened, both because Clinton shared the EU's win-set to amend Libertad, and 
through linking the Common Position to the Title III waiver. Furthermore, the Helms-
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Burton negotiations were an example o f coercive bargaining; the threat o f returning to 
the WTO also widened the American win-set. Graphically, US2 moved to US3, 
effectively widening the overlapping area from US2 -  EU2 to US3 -  EU2 in the EU's 
favour.
In addition to transgovernmental links, this case study has demonstrated how 
intergovernmental collusion within the divided EU Level II polity promotes accord. The 
remarkable collaboration o f the French Ambassador to COREPER enabled the 
Commission to negotiate the agreement at Level I, and it ensured that difficult ministers 
in Paris would not undermine the agreement after it was announced, thus guaranteeing 
Level II ratification.
Putnam argues that side payments can broaden win-sets by eliciting cooperation from an 
otherwise reluctant supporter. By offering tougher sanctions against Cuba, Clinton 
secured short-term Cuban-American support for a 1994 immigration policy that sent 
Cubans rescued at sea to Guantanamo. By allowing the re-location o f Radio and TV 
Marti from Washington to Miami, and agreeing to continue funding in 1996, Clinton 
secured the muted support of the Cuban-American hard-liners for his second waiver o f 
Title III, and his ambivalent implementation o f Title IV. Side payments were used at 
Level I, as well; Spanish Prime Minister Aznar seems to have gained protection for 
Spanish companies suspected o f 'trafficking' in Cuba by sponsoring the EU initiative 
conditioning aid to democratic reforms, the Common Position. Spanish involvement 
continued into the Bush administration, as this chapter will show.
Finally, Putnam argues that two-level games promote issue linkage at Level I that create 
policy options that were previously beyond domestic control at Level II, known as 
'synergistic linkage.' This case study has demonstrated synergistic linkage, whereby the 
Level I talks created an extraordinary opportunity to challenge another irritating 
American law, ILSA. It would have been impolitic for Brussels to contest ILSA 
directly; synergistically linking it with Libertad, on the grounds that both imposed 
unacceptable extraterritorial demands on legitimate European commercial concerns, 
made challenging ILSA possible, and resulted in a significant coup for Sir Leon Brittan.
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In conclusion, Putnam's two-level game metaphor applies well to the transatlantic 
dispute triggered by the Helms-Burton Act. The seemingly irrational motives behind the 
enactment o f Helms-Burton can only be understood by looking at Level II American 
domestic politics. The knowledge that Washington and Brussels shared a win-set of 
avoiding a WTO confrontation augured well for a successful conclusion. Bargaining 
outcomes that may appear to be disappointing demand re-evaluation in light o f domestic 
constraints; SLB's appreciation o f Eizenstat's constraints helped him negotiate a realistic 
settlement. Finally, the two-level game offers a plausible motive for American agreement 
to a compromise from which it ultimately defaulted. This case study thus validates the 
Putnam model.
10.4.1 Personalities
This case study is populated by a number o f  skilled personalities that influenced 
decisions and outcomes. The two-level game notes the important contribution that a 
creative and proficient COG can make to the outcome o f negotiations. Stuart Eizenstat 
was credited with drafting the agreement, and universally admired for the 
professionalism he brought to the negotiating table. Sir Leon Brittan was a tenacious 
negotiator, who was both pragmatic and astute in accepting the compromise. Senator 
Jesse Helms was probably single-handedly (and delightedly) responsible for American 
defection. The extraordinary strategic abilities o f the British and the French COREPER 
representatives spurred the talks to a successful conclusion, and ensured that the member 
states ratified the accords at Level II. Conversely, the loss o f a dynamic leader can have 
negative consequences; the Cuban-American National Foundation has floundered after 
the death o f its charismatic chairman, Jorge Mas Canosa.
Furthermore, this thesis has argued that congenial relations between negotiators 
contribute to positive outcomes, as was the case with Stuart Eizenstat and Sir Leon 
Brittan. Warm relations between United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert 
Zoellick and EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy contributed to the settlement o f the 
bananas dispute in 2001. (Petersmann 2003: 26)
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Unfortunately, the reverse holds true as well. FT  journalist Guy de Jonquieres blames 
the increasingly frigid relationship between USTR Mickey Kantor and his successor 
Charlene Barshefsky and Sir Leon Brittan for the deteriorating US-EU relations during 
the Clinton era. "Because trade is the only substantive external portfolio over which the 
EU exercises extensive competence, the tone o f dealings between Brussels and 
Washington is critically influenced by personal relations between senior trade officials 
on either side." Relations between SLB and Barshefsky became so acrimonious that 
constructive dialogue became virtually impossible; these tensions contributed to the US- 
EU clashes over Libertad, bananas and beef at the WTO. Eizenstat's appointment marked 
a turning point, as did the appointment o f Lamy, both o f whom laboured to lower the 
fevered rhetoric, demonstrating that "individual personalities played an important role." 
(de Jonquieres 2001)
10.5 The European Union as an International Actor
LSE lecturer Karen Smith argues that the EU has considerable 'presence' on the world 
stage, a consequence of the internal development o f the EU as an international actor to be 
recognised. However, the EU's ability to translate its 'presence' into 'actorness' -  the 
actualisation o f articulated objectives - remains weak. Member states pursue ever greater 
integration o f common policies, but this conflicts with national preferences to retain 
control as sovereign states, especially in foreign and security policy. The tension 
between the national and the collective has shaped the EU's institutions and foreign 
policy instruments. (K. Smith 2003: 24-26)
Professor Christopher Hill coined the term 'capabilities-expectations gap' (CEG), to 
conceptualise the discrepancy between the goals the EU sought to achieve as an 
international actor, and its often limited ability to realise those targets. EU capabilities 
are based on foreign policy instruments, such as diplomacy, force, positive and negative 
economic instruments, and cultural influences, along with the EU's fundamental 
resources o f human capital and political stability. Expectations are the ambitions both 
Brussels and outsiders anticipate it will fulfil, whether in the political, economic, or 
intellectual field. Hill argues that the CEG narrowed by the late 1990s due to lowered
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expectations; the EU's reputation suffered as CFSP has not lived up to the expectations 
generated by Maastricht. (Hill 1998: 19-37)
The EU has nonetheless developed an international identity that is unique in that it 
combines "the necessity o f cooperation with others in the pursuit o f international 
objectives...and a concentration on non-military means to secure goals." (K. Smith 2003: 
14-15) There is broad agreement that Europeans seek peaceful solutions to problems 
through subtle negotiation and diplomacy rather than through coercion. Europeans 
emphasise the importance of long-term economic solutions to political problems and are 
patient when solutions are not apparent. Europeans prefer indirect influences through 
engagement in cultural, commercial and economic ties, and seek multilateral resolution 
through international institutions. This philosophy contrasts sharply with the US; 
Americans prefer coercion to gentle persuasion, using the stick instead o f the carrot; they 
are goal-oriented, interested in fmalising solutions; and they are less inclined to seek 
multilateral approbation in international institutions. (Hill and Wallace 1996: 9; K. Smith 
2003: 15; Kagan 2002)
Contrary to predictions that the consolidation o f the EU would lead to a multipolar world 
in the twenty-first century, the US has retained its hegemony in a unipolar world. Robert 
Kagan argues that EU support o f international institutions is a consequence o f their 
weakness whereas American support for international rules of behaviour would 
significantly constrain Washington's freedom to act. (Kagan 2002) Stephen Walt agrees 
that Clinton's behaviour is as expected, "relying on international institutions when they 
suit U.S. purposes but criticizing or ignoring them when they do not." (Walt 2000: 77)
Disparity in power is only part o f the story. European values o f commercial ties, 
diplomacy, and multilateralism have evolved as an outcome o f their World War II 
experiences, which left Europeans with a mission to convince the world to reject the 
balance-of-power principle in favour o f moral consciousness and inter-state relations 
based on the rule o f law. (Kagan 2002)
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The divergence between American and European philosophies is apparent in this case 
study. American policy has been confrontational, harassing Castro and adopting 
unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions to asphyxiate Castro and effect regime change, 
while the EU has preferred gentle persuasion and cultural and economic engagement to 
promote democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba. The EU has demonstrated its 
preference for a peaceful, multilateral solution by requesting a WTO Panel, while the US 
has demonstrated its disdain for multilateral cooperation by threatening to undermine 
that international institution. Nevertheless, Karen Smith's observation that the EU has 
not achieved vertical consistency, in which member states do not undermine EU policy, 
is particularly apt in this case study.
Washington engages in a measure o f self-deception in rationalising its unilateral 
behavior. "Benign hegemony, however, is in the eye o f the hegemon. 'One reads about 
the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States,' one British 
diplomat observed. 'Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and 
unilateralism.'" (Huntington 1999: 42) Gillian Gunn (Clissold), British-born academic, 
observes that a degree o f naivety and 'innocent arrogance' characterises American policy­
makers and liberal academics who cannot understand why the world questions their lead 
when they are convinced their policies serve the best interest of the democratic West. 
(Gunn interview)
10.6 The Cuban Embargo
American interests in Cuba are ongoing and strong, due to geographic proximity, the 
chequered history o f bilateral relations, and migration patterns. §403 o f the Restatement 
mandates that "a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly 
greater," reflecting Washington policy-makers' attitude that Cuba is clearly more 
important to Washington than it is to Brussels, and therefore Europeans, as friends, 
should respect Washington's position, (research interviews)
10.6.1 Maintaining the Embargo
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The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported in March 1998 that the Cuban military 
had "minimal conventional fighting ability", and concluded that Cuba "does not pose a 
significant military threat to the United States or to other countries in the region." (DIA 
Report) Faced with anger from Florida's representatives when the report was published 
by the Miami Herald, the document was recalled for review. Re-released in May, the 
report was essentially unchanged but for a cover letter from Secretary o f Defense 
William Cohen, detailing his ongoing concerns over Cuba's continuing potential threat to 
its neighbours, and its potential to develop biological agents. (Ratliff and Fontaine 2000: 
31-33) The incident illustrated the stranglehold the Cuban-American hard-liners 
continued to exert over Washington's Cuba policy in the late 1990s.
The continuing embargo is evidence that, on a policy o f marginal interest to most 
Americans, a highly focused group continues to wield political pressure that few 
politicians have the political courage to contend with in the electoral marketplace.
"In the end, the debate over the embargo and related sanctions may be less about what works 
but rather about the political clout o f those in the United States who care strongly about the 
issue. This is particularly true in the aftermath o f the Cold War, when a U.S. president has a 
much harder time going against domestic political interests in the name o f a larger U.S. 
security interest. As a result, as long as Cuban Americans remain politically powerful and 
united in their support o f  the embargo, it will remain in place." (Purcell 1998: 55)
Supporters claim that Libertad has succeeded to some degree in attaining its objectives, 
despite its cautious implementation by Clinton. It has isolated Castro, raised awareness 
o f the dictatorial nature o f the regime, and increased international pressure for reforms, 
as demonstrated by the EU's 1996 Common Position. It has also stalled foreign 
investment; the number o f new Cuban joint ventures rose from 11 in 1991, to 33 in 1992, 
to 60 in 1993, to 74 in 1994, but Libertad debates in Congress contributed to uncertainty 
and new joint ventures fell to 31 in 1995. (Fisk 2000a: .72-78)'54 A State Department 
official testified that at least nineteen firms from ten countries ended or curtailed their 
business activities in Cuba between the enactment o f Libertad and May 1998. 
(Ranneberger 1998) Among the companies that have either withdrawn or reduced their 
investment plans in Cuba are Red Path (Canadian sugar refiner), Tate & Lyle (British
134 Joaquin Roy’s statistics for joint ventures, based on Cuban government sources, are: 140 by end 1993, 
185 by end 1994, and 212 by end 1995, with Spain accounting for the largest share o f investment. See 
Roy 2000a: 12. Roy’s statistics broadly tally with Fisk’s; adding up the new ventures in each year (Fisk 
statistics) comes to a total o f 178 in 1994 and 209 in 1995.
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sugar trader), Amerop (French sugar trader), ING (Dutch bank) and Banque Nationale de 
France. (Gutierrez 2001) Spain nevertheless remained Cuba's leading trading partner at 
the millennium, with a total o f 180 Spanish enterprises in Cuba, 70 o f them joint 
ventures; Grupo Sol Melia was the leading hotelier in Cuba's burgeoning tourist sector, 
professing unconcern over the continuing Title IV threat.155 However, Gutierrez 
contends that GSM is painfully aware o f Libertad, and that GSM shares fell dramatically 
in late 1999 on rumours o f impending Title IV citations. (Gutierrez 2001)
In maintaining the embargo, Americans policy-makers take the moral high ground in 
questioning the ethics o f doing business with a brutal and repressive government, and 
disregarding the fact that these earnings consolidate the regime's power. The Cuban- 
American hard-liners are appalled at European insensitivity in entering into joint 
ventures with a country that employs 'slave labour.' Foreign investors pay the Cuban 
government $100 monthly for each Cuban employee; the state then pays the employees 
100 pesos, about 3.8 percent o f earnings, while the government pockets the rest. In 
effect, joint ventures have been bankrolling Castro. (Suchlicki 2002b; Gutierrez 
interview)
To conclude, hard-liners argue for continuing the embargo because lifting it without 
meaningful democratic reforms would "guarantee the perpetuation o f the institutions and 
groups that support the regime." (Suchlicki 2002a) The question o f assets is a 
consideration for some, either to punish Castro for not compensating Americans for their 
expropriated properties (Suchlicki interview), or because the unilateral lifting o f 
sanctions without fair resolution o f "stolen properties...is morally repugnant to basic 
American principles." (Gutierrez 2000) Finally, Cuba analysts Falcoff, Fisk and Purcell 
fear that efforts to strengthen civil society in Cuba may be undermined if  resources fall 
into government, rather than private, hands. They argue that "The balance o f power and 
resources between the state and the civil society that currently exists on the island must 
be reversed so as to favor the people." (Aronson and Rogers: 35)
133 “Spanish Hotel Group Says Not Concerned About US Sanctions Threat,” BBC Monitoring Service.
31st August 1999.
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Mark Falcoff concedes that, although it is highly unlikely that the US would impose an 
embargo on Cuba today, inertia demands an excuse to lift it, perhaps some tiny 
movement towards democratisation. Falcoff also urges a more pro-active American 
diplomacy in countering the "widespread notion that [the embargo] is based on a desire 
for vengeance and is intended to punish ordinary people there," and in re-capturing the 
moral high ground that Castro does not deserve. (Falcoff 1998a)
10.6.2 Moderating the Embargo
Cuba scholar Jorge Dominguez has consistently argued the futility o f American policy 
predicated on the imminent demise o f Castro. Writing over thirty years ago, he predicted 
little prospect for change "in a policy which is irrelevant to the end it seeks, is internally 
incompatible and futile, and continues to cause unnecessary and tragic injury to innocent 
people." (J. Dominguez 1973: 111-116) Dominguez has decried the recent American 
policy o f the 1990s in which Washington flouted its own aversion to secondary boycotts 
in pursuing an "illogical" and counter-productive foreign policy. (J. Dominguez 1999: 
47-48).
The Cuba Lobby's myriad reasons for supporting moderation o f the embargo range from 
humanitarian concerns to the purely commercial motives o f USA*Engage. William 
Ratliff and Roger Fontaine argue that, aside from the fact that the embargo allows Castro 
to blame his catastrophic economic position on the Americans, it enables him to play a 
role on the world stage. Lifting the embargo would humiliate Castro by announcing how 
irrelevant he is in the 21st century. (Ratliff and Fontaine 2000: 18-19) Gillian Gunn 
argues that Washington's national interest demands a moderate Cuba policy that 
promotes respect for civil rights and a peaceful transition to democracy, that stabilises 
immigration from the island, and that encourages a rapprochement between the Cuban- 
American exile community and their homeland. (Gunn 1997) Indeed, a 1999 Gallup 
Poll reported that 51 per cent o f Americans oppose the embargo, with 71 per cent 
favouring re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. (Ratliff and Fontaine 2000: 3)
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The prestigious Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) sponsored a four-month 
independent bi-partisan task force in 1998, to consider American Cuba policy. The 
report consciously avoided the debate over lifting the embargo, and concentrated on 
"crafting a range o f recommendations that can be implemented within the framework o f 
current legislation." Among its recommendations were raising the ceiling o f remittances 
from $1200 to $10,000 per household; allowing Cuban-Americans to retire to Cuba 
without losing their Social Security pensions; allowing Cuba-Americans to claim 
relatives in Cuba as dependents; and seeking greater cooperation in controlling narcotics 
trade in the Caribbean. (Aronson and Rogers 1998)
Kenneth Maxwell, director of the Latin American Program at CFR, castigated the report 
for accepting Helms-Burton as its baseline, thereby disregarding the central issue that 
sanctions impeded normalisation of relations while providing Castro with a potent 
propaganda tool. (Maxwell 2001)
Richard Haass argues that the US should pursue limited rather than ambitious goals o f 
engagement with Cuba; for example, lifting selected elements o f the embargo in 
exchange for the release o f political prisoners. Washington would benefit from this 
approach regardless o f Castro's response: if  Castro was positive, American policy would 
be promoting meaningful liberalisation in Cuba; if Castro rejected these overtures, 
Washington could still ease its hard-line policy, gradually and unconditionally, at its own 
pace. (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000: 184-185)
This thesis rejects the contention that moderating the embargo necessarily bestows 
legitimacy or shows solidarity with the Castro government. Moderation could simply be 
a courageous admission that current American policy has failed to achieve its goals o f 
promoting democracy and/or toppling Castro, is unlikely to do so in the future, and 
entails negative externalities that are difficult to disregard.
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10.7 Outlook
10.7.1 Implementing Helms-Burton
The Helms-Burton agreement remains inchoate, fragile and uncertain. When President 
George W. Bush acceded to the White House in 2001, there was a degree of 
apprehension in Washington over whether he would continue his predecessor's practice 
o f suspending Title III so as not to break the uneasy truce with the EU. The anxiety was 
heightened because as a Republican, Bush would come under greater pressure to enforce 
Libertad. Furthermore, Bush felt indebted to Florida for its remarkable role in the 
presidential elections, and to his brother Jeb, Florida's governor. This unease was shared 
in Europe. A Commission official expressed hope that the US would "maintain and hilly 
implement" the Understanding at the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001. (research 
interviews) The FT  urged Bush to bury "this pointless and troublesome law."156
President Bush pragmatically chose to maintain the ceasefire. On 16th July 2001, he 
announced the suspension o f Title III, following Clinton's well-established precedent of 
arguing that it "is necessary for the national interest o f the United States and will 
expedite the transition to democracy in Cuba," and specifically linking the continuing 
American waiver to the continuing European renewal o f the Common Position with 
regard to Cuba. Bush conceded that "real differences remain" between the US and its 
allies, but argued that this action "will encourage support for the embargo." (Bush 2001)
In continuing Clinton's policy o f ten consecutive suspensions of Title III, George W. 
Bush tactically presented the Cuban-American hardliners with side payments: tightening 
the embargo by, for example, greater travel restrictions, and nominating right-wing 
Cuban-American Otto Reich to the position o f Assistant Secretary o f State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs.137 Bush succeeded in gaining hard-line support; Jesse Helms
136 "Bush and Cuba," Financial Times Editorial. 16th July 2 0 0 1, p. 16.
137 Reich's nomination was extremely controversial, given his paid lobbying on behalf o f  hard-line Cuban- 
Americans, and his questionable association with the 1980s Iran-Contra Affair, which illicitly sought to 
gain support for the anti-Sandinista Contras in Nicaragua. The Democratic Senate predictably delayed 
Reich's confirmation, leading Bush to make a 'recess appointment' during the second session o f the 107th 
Congress (2002). In early 2003, Reich was appointed 'Special Envoy' for Latin America, a post that
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declared that those who criticised the suspension should "consider the other salutary 
initiatives that the president is putting into force." (De Young 2001) President Bush has 
continued to exercise the global Title III waiver every six months. (Zuniga-Brown 
interview)
Overall, President Bush has presided over a tightened Cuba policy characterised as 
"rejection, isolation, and pressure" (Fisk 2004) and has made key appointments o f widely 
recognised hard-liners commensurate with this aim. Following his failure to secure 
Reich's Senate confirmation, Bush appointed another well-known ideologue, Roger 
Noriega, who was confirmed in July 2003 and is ably assisted by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Daniel Fisk. Caleb McCarry completes the triumvirate of hard-line former 
congressional staffers with his appointment on 28th July 2005 to the position o f Cuba 
Transition Coordinator; the creation o f this post was recommended in May 2004 by 
Bush's Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) that "proposed a 
comprehensive strategy to prepare for a peaceful transition to democracy in 
Cuba....empowering Cuban civil society ...to deny resources to the Castro regime to 
break its blockade on information..." (Rice 2005). CAFC endorsed $59m to promote 
democracy by, for example, beaming Radio and TV Marti to Cuba by military aircraft to 
prevent jamming by Cuban authorities. (Mount 2005)
CAFC recommended further tightening Cuba policy by restricting the definition o f 
immediate family members to exclude aunts, uncles and cousins. By June 2004, 
President Bush had announced that cash remittances could only be sent to immediate 
family members, and that annual visits to immediate family members would be restricted 
to once in three years. (Sullivan 2005) Speaking in Miami in October 2004, Fisk 
estimated that the flow o f remittances amounted to $1.5bn annually, and characterised 
family visits as having been abused due to lack o f effective controls. He claimed that the 
new restrictions could deny Castro up to $0.5bn annually, and urged Cuban-Americans 
to remember "that these are a means to an end: the end o f the Castro dictatorship." (Fisk
2004)
needs no confirmation; although the Senate was Republican again, there was strong bipartisan antipathy 
to Reich on Capitol Hill. See Larry Bims, “Reich Re-surfaces Again -  This Time at the NSC,” Press 
Memorandum, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 15th January 2003.
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With regard to Title IV determinations, the State Department cited a Jamaican hotel, 
SuperClubs, in April 2004; no sanctions were imposed as SuperClubs divested rapidly. 
Fisk proudly proclaimed "This was the first determination in five years. The law was 
implemented; the law worked." (Fisk 2004) In email correspondence in July 2005, Fisk 
disclosed that there are 26 cases "under active review." The State Department closely 
monitors the directors o f the sanctioned entities (Sherritt International and Grupo BM); 
sanctions were imposed against four new officers o f these two firms, and one officer 
was removed from the sanctions list. In response to this researcher's question as to 
which entity endured/merited sanctions, particularly important as two British members o f 
Sherritt's board are involved, Fisk declined to answer on the ground that the information 
is "confidential, unless the individuals involved want to make their situation public." 
(Fisk email) Impudently ignoring Helms-Burton, Sherritt International continues to 
expand its production on the island, oblivious to the continuing Title IV sanctions against 
its executives. In March 2005 Sherritt announced that its Cuban joint venture plans to 
spend $450m to increase production o f nickel and cobalt.138
Nick Gutierrez is guardedly optimistic that citations will be forthcoming against Grupo 
Sol Melia (GSM) with Noriega and Fisk ensconced in the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, complemented by McCarry in his new role as Cuba Transition 
Coordinator. Gutierrez claims GSM is operating three hotels on land belonging to his 
clients, the Sanchez family: the two neighbouring hotels, since merged into one, which 
GSM became liable for in January 2001 upon renewal o f their management contract; a 
hotel built in 1999; and a hotel opened in 2002, and billed as a Cuban hotel, rather than 
as Sol Melia. Gutierrez claims that the State Department recently sent GSM a letter o f 
determination, to which a reply should be imminent. Gutierrez feels that Sol Melia is 
somewhat vulnerable now that it is managing a hotel in Miami. Sol Melia is widely 
viewed as a test case whose Title IV citation could open the flood gates to many more 
determinations. (Gutierrez phone interview)
10.7.2 Continuing Repression
138 “Sherritt, Cuba to Spend $450 Min to Boost Mine Output,” Bloomberg 4 th March 2005.
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Castro continues to rule his beleaguered country with an iron fist. Amnesty International 
reported a severe deterioration in the human rights situation in Cuba, with a crackdown 
on dissidents in March 2003, in which 75 activists were arrested and sentenced to prison 
terms o f up to 28 years. Cuban authorities routinely harass, threaten, detain, and imprison 
human rights advocates, journalists, economists and lawyers. Brussels, who had opened 
its first diplomatic office days before the arrest o f the dissidents, protested vigorously, 
and announced diplomatic sanctions in June 2003, limiting high-level European visits to 
Havana, and inviting Cuban dissidents to the EU embassy in Havana. Castro refused 
further EU development aid, signalling his strong displeasure over the strengthening o f 
the EU's conditionality o f aid to improvements in civil rights. (State 2005; Amnesty 
International 2004)
In what was characterised as a 'conditional opening' by Joaquin Roy, the Council 
suspended diplomatic sanctions for six months on 31st January 2005; Spain led the EU 
in re-establishing ties, resulting in 14 o f  the dissidents being paroled, though not released 
unconditionally. The Council conclusion, referring to the Common Position o f 1996, 
declared its intention to "maintain a constructive dialogue with the Cuban authorities 
aiming at tangible results in the political, economic, human rights and cooperation 
sphere." (ICCAS 2005; San Martin 2005; Union 2005)
This thesis notes that, once again, the EU policy of conditionality vis-a-vis Cuba was 
initiated by Spain. Karen Smith observes that EU policy with regard to human rights has 
not been very consistent. Poor, marginal countries often endure suspension of aid, while 
abuses in countries with a higher profile for the EU (Russia in Chechnya) are virtually 
overlooked. This inconsistency undermines the EU's lofty principles o f promoting civil 
society, and can be explained by three possibilities: member states block sanctions 
because the country is commercially important, or strategically important, or there are 
doubts about the utility o f sanctions generally. For example, the EU has been reluctant 
to sanction Cotonou Convention African countries due to France's protection o f former 
colonies still in its sphere o f influence. (K. Smith 2003: 116-118)
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As Spain has maintained an intimate bond with Cuba throughout recent history,159 the 
Aznar government's break with Cuba (1996-2004) was truly historic, writes Joaquin Roy. 
This reinforces the contention that Aznar was acting altruistically in conditioning EU aid 
to reforms in human rights, and was not the recipient o f American side payments 
guaranteeing Spanish immunity from Helms-Burton. The Socialist victory restored 
traditional Spanish-Cuban closeness and diplomatic sanctions were removed. Prime 
Minister Zapatero is not as sensitive to the business community's interests as was his 
predecessor; does this herald the dismantling o f the EU's conditionality policy?
The grinding poverty Castro has imposed on his once-prosperous island continues 
unabated, due primarily to decades o f economic mismanagement, despite Castro blaming 
the American embargo. Bereft of investment, electricity supply is intermittent, and 
running water is not universally available. Cubans earn an average o f $15 monthly, and 
government rations provide about a third o f the Cuban diet. Castro has reversed much 
of the liberalisation of the Cuban economy necessitated by the 'Special Period,' limiting 
private enterprise, and increasingly centralising the tourist industry. In November 2004, 
Castro banned dollars, o f which there is an estimated $lbn annually in remittances, 
replacing dollars with 'convertible pesos', for which the government charges a conversion 
premium o f 10 percent. This has led to the paradox o f Cubans enduring convertible pesos 
with no value outside the country and standard pesos with little value inside the country. 
(McIntosh and Nulle 2005) Even the burgeoning tourist sector, which earned $1 billion 
in 1998, does not alleviate Cuban poverty, as most of the inputs o f food and fuel are 
imported, leaving Cuba with only 30 cents in the dollar. (Falcoff 1998b: 566-567)
With continuing uncanny dexterity, Castro welcomed joint ventures from Beijing, who 
has become his third largest trading partner. Castro also benefits from a close political 
association with Hugo Chavez o f Venezuela, with whom he runs a unique barter system 
-  subsidised oil in return for 15,000 Cuban teachers and medical personnel who work in 
the Venezuela's urban slums. Castro is currently prospecting for off-shore oil, a venture 
which has piqued Chinese interest. (McIntosh and Nulle 2005; Frank and Lapper 2005)
139 This enabled many to leave Cuba for Spain, before settling in the US.
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The prospect o f a Cuban-Chinese-Venezuelan entente cannot be attractive to 
Washington.
10.8 Conclusion
Putnam predicts that "America's negotiating partners have reason for concern whenever 
the American president is domestically weakened." (Putnam 452) Executive power has 
been checked during the 20th century by "an obstructionist Congress, relentless media 
criticism, and endless polls." Whereas the nation's big television channels used to carry 
presidential speeches, the advent of cable TV reduced the length o f a presidential 
candidate's quotations from 43 seconds in 1968 to just 7 seconds in 1996. Practically 
one in four presidential nominations were put on hold by a recalcitrant Senate, with 
Helms holding up 15 ambassadorial appointments in 1996 until he succeeded in 
restructuring the US Agency for International Development. A strong presidency 
ensures that the US pursues a foreign policy that encompasses a broad national interest, 
but a weak one finds that difficult to achieve. Clinton signed Libertad, knowing that it 
would "do disproportionate harm" to US relations with Europe. (Mallaby 2000: 2-8)
The limited opportunities for transatlantic cooperation resulting from a weak executive in 
the 1990s resulted in a propensity for high-profile trade disputes between increasingly 
integrated economies. European trade officials identify a 'paradox o f maturity' in the 
transatlantic relationship. The US has promoted a strong and vibrant EU to act as a 
partner in promoting mutually held international objectives for peace and stability, but, 
the number o f transatlantic conflicts tends to be greatest in trade policy, precisely the 
area where European integration has been most successful. (Krenzler and Wiegand 
1999: 178-179) The Helms-Burton negotiations underlined growing European
confidence in challenging its transatlantic partner in the area of trade, where the EU 
enjoys a high level o f integration.
Nevertheless, some halting progress has been made in identifying policies that facilitate 
transatlantic trade and investment ties. The Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) 
was launched in 1998, at the same summit that announced the Helms-Burton
compromise. The TEP built on the foundation o f the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) 
o f 1995, which had already established a Senior Level Group o f high-level officials to 
meet between bi-annual summits to resolve problems as they arise. It sought to increase 
cooperative endeavours by establishing an Action Plan to provide a "forum for bilateral 
consultation and early warning on any matter o f trade and investment relevance, with a 
view to preventing conflicts and resolving trade frictions," particularly in removing 
technical barriers to trade (TBTs), liberalising services, improving protection o f 
intellectual property, and increasing regulatory cooperation in areas such as food safety, 
the environment, and electronic commerce. (Commission 1998e) Harmonising different 
regulatory regimes that impact on environmental and health protection issues such as 
beef hormones and genetically modified foods is difficult, linked as they are to domestic 
politics. Working under the TEP Action Plan, the "Guidelines for Regulatory Co­
operation and Transparency" agreed at the Bonn Summit in June 1999 was a promising 
first step in co-ordinating regulatory regimes to protect consumers and the environment, 
reflecting mutual concerns to promote transparency and greater cooperation between 
regulators. (Aaron 2003)
O f particular note, the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation (TPPC), part o f 
the May 1998 Understanding over Helms-Burton, urged increased multilateral 
consultation and agreed to resist foreign policy inspired unilateral economic sanctions 
that impose secondary sanctions extraterritorially. It is noteworthy that, although 
sanctions reform legislation had not been passed by the millennium, Capitol Hill's 
propensity for enacting unilateral sanctions had waned significantly. Andrew Semmel 
claimed credit for this, saying, "We won the war, just not the battle." (Semmel 
interview) Perhaps the Helms-Burton dispute is partially responsible for this fortuitous 
turn of events.
What lessons can policy-makers glean from the Helms-Burton negotiations?
Domestic politics matters in many respects. First, policy-makers must understand 
their own domestic situation, and remember that consensus at home is important to 
ensure ratification o f international agreements. Second, policy-makers must also 
understand the domestic politics o f their adversary, in order to make rational decisions.
Appreciating the preferences o f major actors, the political institutions within which they 
function and constraints under which they labour will facilitate agreement. (Milner 1997: 
259-261)
The BATNA is important. The EU was arguably the weaker partner at the 
beginning o f the Helms-Burton controversy; Brussels' many representations to the 
powerful American Congress to amend its legislation fell on deaf ears. But the EU 
brilliantly changed the BATNA by resolutely mounting a WTO challenge in which 
Brussels convincingly argued that the US had breached WTO regulations, followed by 
deliberately broadening the bilateral talks to reach a comprehensive agreement that 
respected American constraints, while simultaneously planning mutually beneficial 
investment protection to be incorporated into the MAI. These stages changed the power 
relationship in the negotiations, invented options for mutual gain, and led to an 
agreement that was regarded as fair by both parties and allowed the suspension of the 
WTO panel. (Petersmann 2003: 39-40)
The international furore over Libertad was a most public display o f  Washington's 
continuing obsession with Cuba, and just how isolated that policy had become in the 
eyes o f the world. Paradoxically, the negotiations also revealed how expendable 
Washington's Cuba-policy had become.
The Helms-Burton negotiations remain a unique episode in 1990s transatlantic relations. 
The dispute was settled diplomatically after months o f delicate deliberations, in a 
political agreement that remains inchoate. But the agreement satisfied everyone: the 
Europeans gained the protection they sought, the Americans retained Libertad on the 
statute books, and a direct confrontation at the WTO was averted. And perhaps the US 
has learned to tread more sensitively and cautiously in an increasingly constrained and 
interdependent world.
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